Values as primaries

Metaphysics and Epistemology
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In preparing to read The Objectivist Ethics, I have also pulled up this critique of the essay. Their first point is about regarding values as primaries - as properties of objects - rather than “agent-dependent”. Basically, the critique asserts that Rand assumes that values cannot be properties external to and independent of any single individual. She has no response or argument against proponents of absolute value:

The absolutist view is that it is possible for some things to be good, simply, or in an absolute sense; whereas agent-relativists think that things can only be good for or relative to certain individuals, and that what is good relative to one individual need not be good relative to another… For instance, if I say, “It is good that intelligent life exists on the Earth,” I am saying that the state of intelligent life existing on the Earth has a certain property: goodness. Agent-relativists think, instead, that value exists only as a relationship between a thing and a person. For instance, an agent-relativist might say, “It is good for me that intelligent life exists on the Earth,” and this would mean: the state of intelligent life existing on the Earth bears a certain relationship to me: it is good for me. But an agent relativist would not say it is good simply. Rand bases her ethics on the agent-relative position, but she offers no argument for it, only a bald assertion.

The closest I can find to a response by Rand is the following:

To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.”

This once again is not an argument but an assertion. Is there any good argument against the absolutist view that doesn’t simply assume the agent-relativist view? For example, replying that “you are context-dropping” seems to also implicitly assume the limits of “value”, without providing any argument for those limits.

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For example, replying that “you are context-dropping” seems to also implicitly assume the limits of “value”, without providing any argument for those limits.

And yet, one must have some common understanding of the concept “value” for the discussion/objection to be meaningful. What is “a value”? For instance, when the author says “it is possible for some things to be good,”…what does this mean in concrete terms, this notion of “being good”?

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And yet, one must have some common understanding of the concept “value” for the discussion/objection to be meaningful. What is “a value”? For instance, when the author says “it is possible for some things to be good,”…what does this mean in concrete terms, this notion of “being good”?

My guess is that he would say that it is good independent of the opinions of anyone else. In that case, I would ask how one objectively determines such a thing. All other properties of objects can be measured. How do you measure this one? He could not simply say, “well, everyone believes it is good”, because then it is not independent of opinion. The best he could do, it would seem, is to make his own bald assertion: “I believe X is good independent of anyone’s opinion.”

He may have simply been complaining about the lack of scrupulousness on Rand’s part.

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Their first point is about regarding values as primaries - as properties of objects - rather than “agent-dependent”. Basically, the critique asserts that Rand assumes that values cannot be properties external to and independent of any single individual. She has no response or argument against proponents of absolute value:

Sure she does. Absolute value asumes the existence of a thing above the individual, to which good is good. (Or, in the case of most Gods, who declares good to be good for no particular reason.) Her argument is that the individual is the top of the food chain, specifically the individual who is choosing the values.

If someone wants to come up with higher values, that apply to all humans for instance, they should first name the beneficiary/source of these values, and then prove that it exists. If it is a made-up thing, then why should I care about it s made-up values? Or even worse, if someone doesn’t even name this entity , from which the values arise, then he made up the values for no reason whatsoever. Again, why should anyone care?

I believe the source of the misundrstanding (of some of these critics) is on an entirely different level, in epistemology. Ayn Rand didn’t create her "relativist values out of thin air. She wasn’t faced with a choice where she had to go: Ok, should values be absolute or relative?

Rather, the question she asked was: What do humans (or a human) need to live?

And the most important answer to that question is : humans need philosophy. Not just any philosophy, but a specific kind of philosophy, with all the components she described.

After realizing that existence exists, humans are rational, etc. etc., she realized for instance that in order to survive, humans need ethics, and values.

The critics on the other hand pose different questions, which they answer with philosophy or religion:What would make me look smart? How can I enslave others? How can I help my master or religious leaders to enslave others? etc.

Their answer is “a philosophy” as well, but a different kind: the most straight forward way for the “enslavement” questions is of course making the notion of “absolute values” part of the victim’s philosophy.

So, to sum up, the question of “Are values absolute or relative?” can be answered very easily after you answer the question “Philosophy? For what purpose?”.

If the purpose is to help you live, then values are those things which do.

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To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.” – [Ayn Rand]

This once again is not an argument but an assertion.

Quite the contrary. Miss Rand spends the preceding paragraphs demonstrating that this is a metaphysical fact as undeniable as the fact that 1 + 1 = 2, that an apple falls to earth, or any other fact of reality.

And this is one of the things you should look for and understand when reading “The Objectivist Ethics”: the PROOF that life is the basis of all value.

Is there any good argument against the absolutist view that doesn’t simply assume the agent-relativist view? For example, replying that “you are context-dropping” seems to also implicitly assume the limits of “value”, without providing any argument for those limits.

You shouldn’t assume anything when conducting any intellectual undertaking. Don’t assume an agent-relativist view, don’t start there at all. Start where Ayn Rand does: not by asking what is the proper ethics. But by asking is there any objective need for such as concept as the good? Are there any facts which give rise to the idea? Look at reality and follow it where it takes you.

The absolutist view is easily dismissed just by showing counter-examples. There is no specific value they can name that I can’t show to be a non-value to some specific person. Remember we are specific individuals pursuing specific values.

You can name general categories of values such as food but we don’t eat general categories we eat specific things. So peanuts may be a value to some but they can be deadly to others. Truthfulness is a value unless you are talking to a robber. A brick of gold is valuable unless you are on a dessert island.

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My guess is that he would say that it is good independent of the opinions of anyone else.

Rand would grant that something can be good independent of a person’s acknowledgment. That is not the same as saying that the concept “good”, “bad” and “value” assumes volitional actors.

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Rand would grant that something can be good independent of a person’s acknowledgment.

Independent of anyone’s acknowledgment, ever? That is what I meant.

Edit: Alright, I understand the difference. My original proposed reply to him is still sufficient, I believe. He could never do anything more than assert that a given thing has this “property” of goodness/badness. Unlike all other properties, it could not be objectively measured.

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In preparing to read The Objectivist Ethics, I have also pulled up this critique of the essay. Their first point is about regarding values as primaries - as properties of objects - rather than “agent-dependent”. Basically, the critique asserts that Rand assumes that values cannot be properties external to and independent of any single individual. She has no response or argument against proponents of absolute value:

The argument exists, it just isn’t within the scope of that essay.

The idea that values can be primaries or absolute is the application of the epistemological theory of intrinsicism to a specific idea, the “good”. A full refutation of intrinsicism is an epistemological argument and doesn’t properly belong in an essay on ethics. A full refutation is given in OPAR Chapter 4: Objectivity in the section titled “Intrinsicism and Subjectivism as the Two Forms of Rejecting Objectivity”. What it boils down to is that intrinsicism is primacy of consciousness, which in turn was considered and rejected in the Objectivist metaphysics as contradicting the three true and axiomatic statements concerning existence, identity and consciousness.

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Brian0918, I suggest you forget about properties, objects, arguments, and blah blah blah. Instead, just answer this: what is the meaning of “good”? If an object is “good” - what does it mean?

Can a rock be “good”? What about intelligent life? Well, why can’t a rock be “good” and intelligent life can? There is some implicit standard involved - what do you think it is?

This guy would not say, for example, that piles of shit are “good” (regardless of its relation to any person). Well, why not? How does he decide that “intelligent life” is good regardless of an observer, but other things are not?

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Ah, and one more thing: values are not primary. Water are not good by themselves - they are only good for a plant when it needs them to survive.

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@brian0918,

If you have a couple bucks to drop on a supplemental text in your study of Rand’s ethics, I can’t recommend Tara Smith’s “Viable Values” enough as a guide to Rand’s metaethics. Not only does it have an entire chapter on intrinsic values, but many of the other common objections to Rand’s metaethics are disposed of. A cursory perusal of the critique you linked to suggests it’ll answer most of these objections, too.

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I have 15 pages left to read of Viable Values, and I concur with Nate.