But before we get into what may be a semantic stand off, can you give me a short statement of the scope of philosophy?
Let me quote from OPAR p. 289:
Philosophy by its nature has to be based only on that which is available to the knowledge of any man with a normal mental equipment. Philosophy is not dependent on the discoveries of science; the reverse is true. So whenever you are in doubt about what is or is not a philosophical subject, ask yourself whether you need a specialized knowledge, beyond the knowledge available to you as a normal adult, unaided by any special knowledge or special instruments. And if the answer is possible to you on that basis alone, you are dealing with a philosophical question. If to answer it you would need training in physics, or psychology, or special equipment, etc., then you are dealing with a derivative or scientific field of knowledge, not philosophy.
However, your example of acoustical frequency groupings vs. amplitude groupings is faulty. The argument that Nj doesn’t hold true for frequencies ignores a basic truism about frequencies: that powers of two are recognizable, and therefore classifiable as related frequencies.
If you have some experimental evidence to show that the Nj relation is perceptible in the frequency domain, go for the gusto and trot it out. (Of course there is no question that if you can abstract a numeric frequency and have either highly restricted data or a computational aid that you can analyze the Nj relation, but that is not the same as auditorily perceiving an exponential frequency relation). Another example would be perceptual relations of visible light which for humans is based on continuous ranges of the EM spectrum. There’s no rationalist explanation for why color percepts can’t involve discontinuous percepts, and in fact you can’t even know that it’s a fact about humans without undertaking special scientific investigations.
Surely I don’t need to identify instances where you perceive attributes of an entity without knowing the exact nature of the entity.
What relevance would that have to the question? You started by arguing that a child (infant) initially only perceives attributes and does not perceive entities. Interjecting the spurious amplification “knowing the exact nature of the entity” is unrelated to the point under discussion – entities precede attributes; man first perceives that there is an entity, then grasps its nature (attributes). In that order. Man does not grasp floating attributes and then surmise that there is an entity having those attributes. It is not necessary to know the exact nature of an entity before you can perceive the entity (please tell me that you at least recognise that fact)!.
I would, in fact, argue that entities cannot be perceived directly, but must be inferred from the sum of their attributes.
BTW in using the expression “perceive directly”, are you suggesting that there is such a thing as indirect perception, i.e. are you toeing the Cartesian / representationalist line? Anyway, I argue that attributes cannot be perceived without first perceiving the entity having the attribute, and that attributes are understood and perceived after the entity. Philosophically speaking, I’m right, and scientifically speaking, I invite you to show me the factual counter-evidence that supports your position and refutes mine.
I guess we have an semantic dispute here. I believe you sense an attribute, and that the sum of your sensations is integrated into the perception of an ent
It does seem to me that you’re approaching the question from a representationalist perspective. This actually isn’t as semantic issue, it’s a substantive one. You’re positing an additional, intermediate step in the causal chain from external object to mental grasp, namely “sensations”, or as Cartesians often call it “sense data”. There is no reason to believe in such a thing; but maybe it would be more productive for me to refer you to Huemer’s dissertation. Although I can’t possibly endorse his total misunderstanding of Objectivism, the diss is an excellent disposal of representationalism and skepticism