Where does A is A come from?

The mind easily equates frequencies of 220Hz, 440Hz, 880Hz, etc., in fact we have a conceptual term that encompasses all of these exponentially related freqs: ‘A’

Where’s our disconnect?

Well, since you now seem to get the point I was making about exponential relations in the frequency domain, I think the disconnect (disagreement? I don’t know what “disconnect” means anyhow) would be over whether you can discover these kinds of facts about human perception just by reason and ordinary observation, with me saying you can’t.

If humanity was blind, and I was born with sight, my eyes would be “special instruments,” and thus any observations I made based on my visual perception of reality would be off limits from blind-mankind’s philosophy?

You know we hate unreasonable hypotheticals: being blind is not man’s nature.

The statement about “normal adult” has some serious implications for the primacy of the individual. It seems to put a scope on philosophy based on the arbitrary, average of humanity.

I don’t think it has anything to do with the “average” of humanity. What it means is that there are non-normal people who can’t see, or can’t hear; there are also mentally damaged adults who cannot reason. But philosophical questions can be resolved by reference to ordinary knowledge, meaning among other things stuff that you can see and hear, using reason. So if a person is abnormal because they can’t see or hear, or if a person can’t reason because they are brain-damaged, that does not then mean that all questions become scientific questions. It means: look at the range of knowledge gainable by man by simple observation of the world combined with reason, without special training or the derivatives of special training (instruments) – that is the domain of philosophy. It’s not a distinction defined by reference to the nature of each individual, it’s defined by reference to “man” and what “man” can know by a certain method, in general.

Perhaps it would help to rephrase “philosophical questions” as “questions that can be answered by philosophical methods”, idem “scientific questions” are “questions that can be answered by scientific methods”. Are you arguing that there is no difference at all between philosophy and science? Let me suppose you will say that is your claim – then how will you defend your claim? (I reject the claim, so I want to see how you think you can answer any questions in your way of approaching knowledge). If you do think that science and philosophy are different and you just disagree with Rand’s line, I want to see how you define the difference.

Also, if science answers (or studies) a question pondered by philosophy, does that question automatically become exempt from philosophical exploration?

Whether or not a question is properly a scientific vs. a philosophical question isn’t determined sociologically, by whether professed scientists vs. philosophers are addressing the question. The distinction lies in the nature of the question itself. Thus the claim that there are 15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,0

31,296 protons and as many electrons in the universe is a scientific question, not a philosophical one. The question whether “The simplest theory is the best” is not a scientific question, it is a philosophical one (a kind of dumb one at that).

Well, since you now seem to get the point I was making about exponential relations in the frequency domain, I think the disconnect (disagreement? I don’t know what “disconnect” means anyhow) would be over whether you can discover these kinds of facts about human perception just by reason and ordinary observation, with me saying you can’t.

By disconnect, I meant the difference between what you meant and what I interpreted, or between what you implied and what I inferred. (as opposed to a disagreement).

It sounds as if you’re saying we understand and agree on the exponential relations question, only now you’re saying that it’s not good enough to show the capability, but I must also show how man could come to recognize that capability with only his reason and “ordinary observation.”

Problem is, I don’t know what “ordinary observation” means. If you mean unaided human sensory perception, then I guess you have me. Still, I believe the distinction between unaided, and man-developed sensory adjuncts is arbitrary.

(Why the defensiveness? I’m not trying to dispute your point of view, only to understand it.)

“You know we hate unreasonable hypotheticals: being blind is not man’s nature.”

No, I didn’t know that. I don’t know what you mean by “unreasonable” in this context. Being blind is not man’s nature, because man has evolved a sense of sight. So at this particular juncture in man’s evolution, we have sight. Are we to contend that philosophy depends on man’s particular evolutionary sensory state? Or that man was pre-ordained to have the senses he has, for instance , to have the ability to sense octaval periodicity, but not to be able to count the frequency of sound to show that octaves represent powers of two? I’m not sure I’d put much stake into a philosophy that relies on a certain, arbitrary state of sensory capability for its basis. In other words, is philosophy by its very nature, man-centric? The continued mention of “man” as the absolute seems to put a sort of mystical value on man’s present physical state. Does philosophy take a stance on evolution? Does it believe that the current point in man’s sensory/mental capabilities is the ideal? I would prefer a philosophy with a more generalized view of sense and rationality. But maybe that’s just me?

It sounds as if you’re saying we understand and agree on the exponential relations question, only now you’re saying that it’s not good enough to show the capability, but I must also show how man could come to recognize that capability with only his reason and “ordinary observation.”

I may have been thinking that we agree but now I’m not sure we do. So let me return to the example. As you mentioned, human perception can perceive the “doubling” relationship; but we don’t extract a true exponential relationship in the frequency domain. The fact of this difference in human perception isn’t something that you can arrive at philosophically by just observing the world about you, you have to engage in a specialised scientific investigation to make that determination: you need special equipment to create the experimental stimuli and knowledge of the physics of vibrations, you need training in the conduct of psychological experiments, and specialised numerical methods to interpret the data. That’s what puts it in the realm of science.

Problem is, I don’t know what “ordinary observation” means. If you mean unaided human sensory perception, then I guess you have me.

Yeah, that’s what it means.

Why the defensiveness? I’m not trying to dispute your point of view, only to understand it.

Why the accusation of defensiveness and the unwarranted psychologization? There is actually nothing wrong with trying to dispute my point of view: I’m trying to encourage you to do so, especially because I think it will help you to see an important distinction, namely the difference between science and philosophy.

I don’t know what you mean by “unreasonable” in this context.

Let’s contrast that with a reasonable hypothetical, which starts with “Assume that a man is standing at the corner of Main and State, waiting for the light to change”. At this moment, this isn’t the case, but it is a scenario that could easily arise without changing the essentials of the players in the hypothetical. On the other hand, it is not a trivial fact that man is a volitional, conceptual being, that he gains knowledge through his sense organs, and that those organs include ones hearing, sight, touch, and smell. In fact, sight is remarkably important for man’s knowledge, and the ability (indeed, necessity) to gain knowledge through sense organs is fundamental for man – sight is one of the two most important sense organs.

I’m not suggesting that one can’t engage in a mental exercise of conjecturing about alien creatures with a radically different kind of cognition, I’m saying that you can’t redefine man in a fundamental way and still be talking about the same thing. It can be fun to conjecture about space beings that only have ferro-magnetic detectors as sense organs, but those beings aren’t men.

Are we to contend that philosophy depends on man’s particular evolutionary sensory state?

More accurately, philosophy is homo-centric and the nature of philosophy depends on the nature of man, in particular the concept “knowledge”. Men have hair and don’t have scales, and the nature of philosophy isn’t determined by that fact, because the hair / scales difference doesn’t change the nature of knowledge.

In other words, is philosophy by its very nature, man-centric?

Yes. Now we’re in the same book, if not the same page. You could change that by changing facts of knowledge, by introducing a new kind of creature with a volitional, conceptual consciousness, assuming you can get them a visa. When that happens, there would have to be a radical realignment of our concepts, and at the very least the creation of new concepts to deal with these new facts.

Does philosophy take a stance on evolution?

For example is there a philosophical answer to whether genetic mutations can accumulate to the point of speciation? No, that’s a scientific question.

Does it believe that the current point in man’s sensory/mental capabilities is the ideal?

That on the other hand is a philosophical question, which hinges largely on the concept “ideal”. A philosophical analysis of the question would require you to define this concept with respect to man, and to have some kind of standard for relating unreality to reality. Round these parts, we deal with that issue mercilessly.

For example is there a philosophical answer to whether genetic mutations can accumulate to the point of speciation? No, that’s a scientific question.That on the other hand is a philosophical question, which hinges largely on the concept “ideal”. A philosophical analysis of the question would require you to define this concept with respect to man, and to have some kind of standard for relating unreality to reality. Round these parts, we deal with that issue mercilessly.

The relationship of science to philosophy is a question through the ages. Certainly philosophers and scientists often explore each other’s territory. Furthermore, being a scientist doesn’t mean one blinds oneself to philosophical questions, and the reverse. Often ideas in science and philosophy are thought simultaneously. Deleuze and Guattari’s volume “What is Philosophy?” explicitly examines philosophy’s relationship to science and art.

Evolution is certainly such a notion that has been explored by philosophers and of course scientists; and the question of species certainly is.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/

Furthermore, contemporary philosophers still publish books addressing the issue of species, here’s a review of one:

http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread…s/morphogenetic

But, I digress… good discussion to watch regardless.

Actually, I think the thread has digressed a little, but the points are important nonetheless. For example, according to Objectivism, philosophy is a science – the most fundamental of all the sciences. In other words, it is one’s philosophy that leads to coming to understand nature or becoming a mystic; of studying Darwin or studying Jesus. And it was these men’s philosophy that led them to becoming a scientist (in the special science sense) or becoming the founder of a religion.

Objectivism is man centered because the whole point of having a mind like a human being is so that one can live more fully than an animal – that we don’t just go around living moment to moment, but rather plan long-range and teach our children how to be rational so that civilization can continue. In a more rational culture, one would not come across Objectivism in one’s twenties or thirties, as is what happens to most people, but rather one would be raised in a culture that would take philosophy seriously the whole time one is being raised. Aristotle would not be just someone you heard about in high school, but rather would be the center piece and foundation for the culture.

The point about philosophy being dependent upon man’s natural endowments, such as his senses, is very important. Unlike a physicist who has to study nature using specialized tools of investigation and years of study past high school, philosophy can be learned and studied by anyone willing to take a first-hand look at reality as provided by his senses and as understood by his rational mind. Philosophy – a rational philosophy – is the science that makes all other sciences possible, and without which there would be no civilization.

So, one does not have to study evolution to become rational, but one does have to be rational in order to study evolution. A philosophy based upon reason – i.e. philosophy as a rational science – is the starting point that branches off in to the more specialized sciences.

Actually, I think the thread has digressed a little, but the points are important nonetheless. For example, according to Objectivism, philosophy is a science – the most fundamental of all the sciences. In other words, it is one’s philosophy that leads to coming to understand nature or becoming a mystic; of studying Darwin or studying Jesus. And it was these men’s philosophy that led them to becoming a scientist (in the special science sense) or becoming the founder of a religion.

Objectivism is man centered because the whole point of having a mind like a human being is so that one can live more fully than an animal

I know this is a digression, but I’m starting to get some focus on this issue. The argument is that science and philosophy are complementary. As one who believes in the theory of evolution, I find that using man’s current state of development is a bit arbitrary (although I understand the desire, from a philosophic homo-centric point of view).

Is it reasonable to assert that philosophy uses the inputs of our senses and extends that knowledge through reason? If we agree on a definition of science in, say, terms of observation, hypothesis and testing, and say that philosophy lies beyond these concrete, measurables of reality, is there something inherently different between the knowledge we gain from PET scans or particle accelerators and the knowledge that we gain from our direct perception of EM radiation or atmospheric kinetics? In simpler terms, asking whether the Christmas tree lights are on is not a philosophical question, even though we gain that knowledge from our ordinary human senses.

Should the question on whether something if philosophical or scientific depend on whether we need specific sensory inputs to explore it, regardless of whether those are direct inputs or extensions based on man-made sensory equipment?

Sorry to belabor the point, but this seems a very important one to me, and I appreciate the views given here.

Should the question on whether something if philosophical or scientific depend on whether we need specific sensory inputs to explore it, regardless of whether those are direct inputs or extensions based on man-made sensory equipment?

I think you missed the point that man by his nature needs to have a long-term philosophic understanding of existence in order to become human as opposed to an animal. In fact, man cannot even live like an animal since he has no automatic knowledge that he gets from his genes or the fact that he is what he is. Man has to learn everything; he has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge. The method of leaning how to think – of how to be rational – is philosophy, and man has to know that in order to do the special sciences.

It is fully possible – and had been true for many thousands of years, since the dawn of history – for a man to be rational and not have a clue about evolution. Aristotle, for instance, was a rational philosopher, but he had no idea about evolution – not the foggiest; likewise for Thomas Aquinas.

I find it very interesting today that people are expected to have a view of evolution, to have kept up with the latest findings, say, about T-Rex, but are not expected to know if reason or force is the way of resolving disputes, or if Individual Rights are true or not, or if reason is man’s only means of knowledge versus faith. And yet, it is the answer to these types of questions that will determine if he is going to be rational or not; of whether he is going to live as a man or live as a beast.

Even though I have studied physics – I have a BA in both physics and philosophy – I don’t consider it to be extremely important to civilization as to whether or not there are black holes in space. It’s an interesting scientific question, but it has no barring on the life of a rational being unless he is simply interested in that sort of thing, as I am, or if he is in the field of astronomical physics. To man qua man, it is much more important for them to realize that reason ought to be supreme and the only means of gaining truth about existence.

Regarding man as he is now compared to where he came from or where he is going to from an evolutionary position, since those types of changes take place over millions of years, they have no barring on man as he is now, and his need for reason. It is not a philosophic question, but a special science question, and it has no barring on how a man ought to live his life. Again, like the black holes, it’s an interesting question, and I love to watch science programs that focus on those issues; but the existence of black holes or that we may have come from ape-like creatures does not say one thing about the fact that we need reason in order to survive as man – because that is what we are.

The special sciences are the result of being rational; not the means of being rational.

I think you missed the point that man by his nature needs to have a long-term philosophic understanding of existence in order to become human as opposed to an animal. In fact, man cannot even live like an animal since he has no automatic knowledge that he gets from his genes or the fact that he is what he is. Man has to learn everything; he has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge. The method of leaning how to think – of how to be rational – is philosophy, and man has to know that in order to do the special sciences.

…

The special sciences are the result of being rational; not the means of being rational.

I get a little uncomfortable when people talk in terms of absolutes - not philosophical absolutes, but absolutes about very complex subjects, such as the human mind. If we don’t have “automatic knowledge” (I know you could parse that down to meet your needs, but you use it in contrast to animals, who, you imply, do), how do we know to suckle, to eat, to hunt, to have sex, etc. Man is a subset of animal, and has certain similarities with other animals. To believe otherwise is, in my opinion, to fall into a somewhat mystical view of man (that’s not the same as saying that man isn’t the “ideal”; from our point of view, the only one that matters, he is.)

The statement “man has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge” is interesting. (Sum ergo cogito?) How do you learn to do something whose faculties you need in order to learn? The ability to automatically integrate concretes into abstracts does not imply the pre-existence of those concretes and abstracts, i.e., knowledge; it merely implies the existence of an ability, i.e., to think. As a (very) crude analogy, you can’t build a steel mill without steel girders, but you can’t make steel girders without a steel mill. How to start? Trusting the analogy, there is implied a rudimentary ability to think that is inborn, else how to integrate the sensory knowledge you need to refine your thinking process?

I believe the science and philosophy form a cycle of discovery: observation of nature provides the means (knowledge) to be rational, that is, it provides the given premises upon which rational thought is built. In turn, rational thought, philosophy, provides the means to extend our observations beyond our natural abilities, that is, to encode natural observations into scientific language and manipulate them with math, and to construct ways in which to gather more detailed, accurate, focused information about our world.

But to claim that that is the end of the process, that only natural observations may form the premises for rational thought, and that they lead to science, and there you have it, is, in my opinion, incomplete. The special sciences provide us more detailed and specialized knowledge. This, in turn, becomes the the premises for even more finely tuned rationality.

To restate your final assertion as my own, “The special sciences are the result of being rational, and the means of being ever more rational.”

To give some examples of this, would we agree that the existence of a creator is a philosophic question? In the absence of fossil evidence and its interpretations, the case for a creator is very strong. The theory of evolution provides a set of natural observations that must be integrated logically into any philosophic argument for or against the existence of a creator. Cosmology, likewise, provides clues about the organization and origins of the universe. Wouldn’t you agree that knowledge of a beginning point (or not) of the universe would feed any logical reasoning about the nature of our existence? Scientific studies of economic prosperity in the past few years show a strong correlation between general prosperity in societies and the level of protection of individual rights. Would it be wise to discuss political philosophy without taking into account these studies? Could Ayn Rand have even conceived of the true moral nature of capitalism without having done in-depth studies of the economic sciences?

The statement “man has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge” is interesting. (Sum ergo cogito?) How do you learn to do something whose faculties you need in order to learn? The ability to automatically integrate concretes into abstracts does not imply the pre-existence of those concretes and abstracts, i.e., knowledge; it merely implies the existence of an ability, i.e., to think.

I think this may be where you are making the mistake: There is no automatic integration of concretes into abstractions – this is what must be learned and it must be learned volitionally, via free will. The faculty of reason is there by birth – i.e. man gains the capacity to become rational by being born a human, but the workings of his mind are neither automatic nor does the content of his consciousness automatically comply with existence.

Keeping one’s mind in compliance with existence requires a method, and that method is logic; something philosophers (primarily Aristotle) have figured out. And that method must be used to discover things like evolution, black holes, and the double helix of DNA.

What you seem to have in mind (or think that I have in mind) is the idea that philosophers just sit around thinking in a basement somewhere without ever looking out at reality. A rational philosopher does not act that way – he observes existence and the workings of his mind to comprehend existence, and then comes up with the general principles by which he can be assured that the content of his consciousness matches what existence factually is. This method can then be used to further investigate reality.

Part of what you are referring to, however, is what Miss Rand called the spiral theory of knowledge; that so long as one integrates every bit of knowledge with the rest of his knowledge, everything learned compliments everything else that has already been learned. So, sure, the knowledge of DNA, T-Rex, and black holes can augment what he knows and even provide inspiration to continue to learn. For the laymen who is not a scientist and watches TV science programs, these can act as an indication of look what we can accomplish via reason!

When one is an infant, nature provides a kind of head start via the pleasure pain-mechanism, which is automatic – suckling milk is good because it feels good; but as an adult, a man cannot simply suckle on the teats of reality and get knowledge they way he got milk from his mother. He has to decide to conform to reality in the workings of his mind, or he will suffer the consequences, and sometimes this takes many years of intensive study in order to learn how to do it – i.e. to solve the equations of Relativity and understand what a black hole is and how to detect them is not something that can be learned by suckling. Digestion is automatic; learning how to think is not.

I think this may be where you are making the mistake: There is no automatic integration of concretes into abstractions – this is what must be learned and it must be learned volitionally, via free will. The faculty of reason is there by birth – i.e. man gains the capacity to become rational by being born a human, but the workings of his mind are neither automatic nor does the content of his consciousness automatically comply with existence.

Digestion is automatic; learning how to think is not.

I think we’re close here, and it sounds like maybe you agree that the source of knowledge (normal man’s sensory faculties, or his scientifically extended faculties) is immaterial - so long as the ultimate source of rational thought is reality.

I think where we still disagree (or have a question) is whether the initial integration of sensory signals into a perception of reality and entities is an act of conceptual integration. And possibly, whether the first attempts at rational integration, that is, classifying objects into conceptual categories (kitties, duckies, blocks, people) is really something that needs to be “learned,” or if it’s a natural ability for differentiation and comparison. After all, my dog knows that a “bed” is a soft thing that lies on the floor and is big enough for him, and he will find the nearest one to lie down on when I give him the command, even if he’s never seen that particular one before.

My opinion is that these very primitive forms of integration are the innate building blocks that make up our later, learned attempts at abstract reason.

I think we’re close here, and it sounds like maybe you agree that the source of knowledge (normal man’s sensory faculties, or his scientifically extended faculties) is immaterial - so long as the ultimate source of rational thought is reality.

It’s not immaterial as to whether it is the province of philosophy or the province of a special science. The examples I gave regarding DNA, T-Rex, and black holes are the province of the special sciences and not of philosophy. Philosophy can have veto power over a scientific conclusion – i.e. even sub-atomic particles are something specific, leading to a veto power over the idea that the Uncertainty Principle is saying something about the indeterminism of those particles – but it is not the province of philosophy to say whether or not T-Rex existed. One can be fully rational and not have a clues as to what DNA is or whether or not T-Rex existed 70 million years ago.

I think where we still disagree (or have a question) is whether the initial integration of sensory signals into a perception of reality and entities is an act of conceptual integration. And possibly, whether the first attempts at rational integration, that is, classifying objects into conceptual categories (kitties, duckies, blocks, people) is really something that needs to be “learned,” or if it’s a natural ability for differentiation and comparison.

There is no inborn concept of kitties, duckies, blocks, or people. For a young human, it is not difficult for them to form these concepts because the entities perceived are at the perceptually self-evident level. Nonetheless, it requires effort on the part of the child. He doesn’t just see a puppy and out comes puppy from his mouth without his parents teaching him that word; and then when they see a kitty, point to it and say puppy, because they don’t know the difference until they are taught it.

I think you need to read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology where Miss Rand goes into a lot of details regarding concept formation.

And none of it is automatic.

What is automatic is the perception of the entity; but conceptualizing it requires mental effort.

It’s not immaterial as to whether it is the province of philosophy or the province of a special science. The examples I gave regarding DNA, T-Rex, and black holes are the province of the special sciences and not of philosophy. Philosophy can have veto power over a scientific conclusion – i.e. even sub-atomic particles are something specific, leading to a veto power over the idea that the Uncertainty Principle is saying something about the indeterminism of those particles – but it is not the province of philosophy to say whether or not T-Rex existed. One can be fully rational and not have a clues as to what DNA is or whether or not T-Rex existed 70 million years ago.

I think we’re talking past each other. I don’t contend that you need the entirety of science in order to be rational, only that knowledge of the nature of reality informs our ability to reason and avoid contradicting proven qualities of reality. Philosophy can have veto power over a conclusion, but only if it takes into account that conclusion and can reason a way around it. For instance, we could assert that “spooky action at a distance” does not occur, that there is in fact an internal (though possibly unobservable) structure to twin particles, but we can only do so if we can reason our way around the EPR paradox.

[…] and teach our children how to be rational so that civilization can continue. [emphasis added]

You might want to rephrase this just so that no one gets the wrong idea.

You might want to rephrase this just so that no one gets the wrong idea.

I take it you mean that children should not be raised for the sake of civilization, but rather for the sake of themselves and being able to understand existence and live their own individual lives rationally and happily. If so, I agree. The result will be a better civilization, but man’s life is the standard, not civilization.

Let me quote from OPAR p. 289: …

I argue that attributes cannot be perceived without first perceiving the entity having the attribute, and that attributes are understood and perceived after the entity. Philosophically speaking, I’m right, and scientifically speaking, I invite you to show me the factual counter-evidence that supports your position and refutes mine.It does seem to me that you’re approaching the question from a representationalist perspective. This actually isn’t as semantic issue, it’s a substantive one. You’re positing an additional, intermediate step in the causal chain from external object to mental grasp, namely “sensations”, or as Cartesians often call it “sense data”. There is no reason to believe in such a thing; but maybe it would be more productive for me to refer you to Huemer’s dissertation. Although I can’t possibly endorse his total misunderstanding of Objectivism, the diss is an excellent disposal of representationalism and skepticism

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind. The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away, and absorption and reemission or reflection of that energy by the surface of an entity into two transparent fluid-filled lenses which focus the energy on a matrices of specialized cells, each of which generates an electrical signal into the brain which results in the sensation of sight. Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities. I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity. It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination. Belief that entity precedes attribute requires an absolutist view of the answers to both these questions. I take a more generalized view, because, as some posters here have pointed out, in some cases I have to consciously transform visual senses into entities. Now I think I have shown that sensing of attributes (in this case the EM reflective and absorptive properties of an entity’s surface) precedes the perception of that entity in the brain. Can you provide factual evidence that I perceive the entity *in every case* before I sense the attributes?

Here’s a more concrete proof: take away the sense of vision (it’s night time, if you wish to object on homo-centric grounds), and tell me whether you perceive an entity when you hear a strange noise, or feel heat on your skin; or, if it takes a conscious, cognitive effort to translate the sensation of heat into the possibility of an emitting entity.

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind.

I assume you mean counterevidence to the indirect realist position, not the Objectivist epistemology. The indirect realist position is that there is an actual projection of the external thing, e.g. a little picture or sound wave, and such pictures and sound waves are entities (though they have no mass). But I’m not actually sure what they say these things enter – they enter your head, and the mind “sees” the internal projected picture. I dunno: I’ve never actually met a living representationalist.

The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away…

I guess: but we could push the causal chain back by referrng to the condensation of matter that gave rise to the sun. I find it best to simply assume that light hits the eys, somehow.

Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities.

One name for such things is “percept”. The notion of “automatic” can refer to two things, “no thinking required” and “no experience required”. The former is applicable of visual and auditory perception, the latter is not, though the experience is gained early enough in infancy that people don’t remember the good old days.

I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity.

I on the other hand would counter-counter-argue that in a physically developed post-infant, the process does generate a (mental) entity, that it does correspond to reality, and that the perception of an entity takes no cognitive effort (assuming ordinary lighting conditions). However, the correct identification of the nature of the entity (slotting under concept A vs :worry: takes some gognitive effort, for a while.

It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination.

No, that’s not the argument, as far as I know it. I don’t even need to assume a visual cortex, though I know there is such a thing. The question is, simply, whether an intermediate object in the mind has to be posited, i.e. sets of primitive raw “sensations” of floating “attributes”, which the mind stitches together into the perception “there is an entity”. I’m saying that there is no evidence for such a thing, and no evidence for the primacy of attributes in perception.

Can you provide factual evidence that I perceive the entity *in every case* before I sense the attributes?

As easily as you can provide factual evidence that anyone can perceive an attribute without perceiving the entity that it is an atrtribute of in any case.

Here’s a more concrete proof: take away the sense of vision (it’s night time, if you wish to object on homo-centric grounds)

Pfft. All I have to do is close my eyes.

and tell me whether you perceive an entity when you hear a strange noise, or feel heat on your skin;

Okay, yes, I did it. I did. I didn’t need to think about it very hard at all. I did indeed perceive a scuffling, breathing, heat-emitting entity. It didn’t take any conscious, cognitive effort to figure out which entity it was.

Here’s a suggestion. You want to show that man can perceive an attribute without perceiving an entity, so run the experiment. The stimulus would be some attribute, without a corresponding entity. You prediction is that you could perceive an attribute without perceiving an entity, so just use an un-caused attribute in your experiment. Lemme know how it goes.

Okay, yes, I did it. I did. I didn’t need to think about it very hard at all. I did indeed perceive a scuffling, breathing, heat-emitting entity. It didn’t take any conscious, cognitive effort to figure out which entity it was.

Ahh, you’ve changed the experiment. I said a strange sound or heat. You replaced it with a familiar sound AND heat! I assume it was either Rover or a slovenly office mate? “Figur[ing] out which entity” tips me that the entity in question already existed in your conceptual model, so that’s cheating. You’re supposed to form a new entity from the sensing of a single attribute. Try it again with just a heat source sensed by your skin.

Other than the heat attribute, what entity do you conceptualize from feeling heat on your skin (assuming you don’t just categorize it as a pre-known entity, such as the sun or your dog, or the light over your kitchen table.) What if you feel heat from all sides - are the walls hot? Is the air hot? or is “it” hot? Or are “you” hot? When your mind constructs the sentence “I’m hot” is it attributing heat as an attribute of self? Or is it using the closest conceptual terms to describe a disconnected sensation of heat?

Hmmmm…

Okay, so you’re saying that the human mind automatically and innately “knows” that every attribute is caused by an entity?

Doesn’t that require inborn knowledge of the nature of reality? (there are no disconnected attributes)

If you’re “right,” man is born with the concept of entity already firmly established.

If I’m “right,” he figures out that attributes always belong to entities, then begins thinking effortlessly in terms of entities.

Both beliefs converge once the concept of entity is established in “my way.” So how to resolve this? Faith?

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind.

You’ve got some pretty bizarre ideas regarding perception, as evident in this posting and the one following it; and I’m beginning to think they come from Kant.

Our sensory apparatus, including our visual cortex, does not create entities out of the sense data; the entities exist and we perceive them. The sensory processing is automatic and requires no conceptual figuring out in order to perceive an entity – you look and you see it. Conceptually identifying it, in terms of what you think it is, does require conceptual processing; such as the flag flapping in the distance I mentioned earlier. And we do not need to do any conceptual processing – i.e. thinking – in order to keep all of the attributes together into an entity. It does not require any thinking on my part to keep this —> A <— altogether as one letter “A.” Likewise, it doesn’t require any conceptual processing for me to keep the weight of an object together with the touch of the object together with the sight of the object, etc. Our nervous system automatically integrates all of those inputs into the perception of the entity.

I think you were trying to point out that our sensory equipment is limited, that we don’t perceive an object, say, when we hear a sound. That’s true in the sense that we do not perceive objects with sound waves the way bats and maybe dolphins are thought to be able to do. So what? We do perceive objects with our eyes and our tactile equipment (primarily the sensitivity of the hands). It is the very fact that our senses are something that gives them their limitations – i.e. we cannot perceive radio waves or ultraviolet – but it is this very same indentity of the senses that makes it possible to trust them, because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. You might not be intending that, but that is the road you are going down.

We do not start off with a myriad of inputs that we have to consciously decide how to put together before we perceive the world; that happens automatically. And we don’t have volitional control over how things appear to us – i.e. we cannot make adjustments to our sensory inputs so that we perceive an apple as purple when it is red, say, like a computer enhanced image that can be adjusted. Our sense don’t work that way.

We perceive existence the way it really is; and we perceive entities, not disconnected blobs of attributes.

And don’t ask me to prove it, because it is self-evident. Look, and ye shall see that we see entities.

You’ve got some pretty bizarre ideas regarding perception, as evident in this posting and the one following it; and I’m beginning to think they come from Kant.

Our sensory apparatus, including our visual cortex, does not create entities out of the sense data; the entities exist and we perceive them. The sensory processing is automatic and requires no conceptual figuring out in order to perceive an entity – you look and you see it. Conceptually identifying it, in terms of what you think it is, does require conceptual processing; such as the flag flapping in the distance I mentioned earlier. And we do not need to do any conceptual processing – i.e. thinking – in order to keep all of the attributes together into an entity. It does not require any thinking on my part to keep this —> A <— altogether as one letter “A.” Likewise, it doesn’t require any conceptual processing for me to keep the weight of an object together with the touch of the object together with the sight of the object, etc. Our nervous system automatically integrates all of those inputs into the perception of the entity.

I think you were trying to point out that our sensory equipment is limited, that we don’t perceive an object, say, when we hear a sound. That’s true in the sense that we do not perceive objects with sound waves the way bats and maybe dolphins are thought to be able to do. So what? We do perceive objects with our eyes and our tactile equipment (primarily the sensitivity of the hands). It is the very fact that our senses are something that gives them their limitations – i.e. we cannot perceive radio waves or ultraviolet – but it is this very same indentity of the senses that makes it possible to trust them, because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. You might not be intending that, but that is the road you are going down.

We do not start off with a myriad of inputs that we have to consciously decide how to put together before we perceive the world; that happens automatically. And we don’t have volitional control over how things appear to us – i.e. we cannot make adjustments to our sensory inputs so that we perceive an apple as purple when it is red, say, like a computer enhanced image that can be adjusted. Our sense don’t work that way.

We perceive existence the way it really is; and we perceive entities, not disconnected blobs of attributes.

And don’t ask me to prove it, because it is self-evident. Look, and ye shall see that we see entities.

Okay, so “sensory input” in your philosophy is limited to the visual and the tactile. In that case, assuming I accept your new, radical definition of “senses,” I probably have to agree with you. I won’t comment on your Kantian arguments. They are irrational and disconnected from my line of argument. Don’t bother answering that, just know that I argued you are blind when the attribute in question is not visual, and that was the basis of my point. Your view of sensory perception is limited to the visual and the tactile, and so, is limited.

Arguing that my point of view comes from Kant and the “bizarre” smacks of the ad hominem (especially to those of us familiar with Rand’s opinion of Kant - which I share), and reminds me of Rand’s illumination of the false choice (an observation which has changed my perception of politics). I see you refuse to engage in my experiment of the sense of heat, so I will drop it. We don’t have to agree to disagree, since you will only agree that you’re “right” and I’m wrong. I will hang on to the rational mind’s inalienable right to be skeptical of others’ convictions.

I tried the experiment myself, holding my hand up to a heat source. My senses told me that my hand was warm and I volitionally (but not effortlessly) made a connection between my hand feeling warm and imagining a heat source causing that sensation. It was an honest analysis of the process. But maybe my mind works differently from every other human mind on the planet.

Perhaps after I’ve read Rand’s Epistemology I will understand better what you mean, and agree with her point of view. But it will only happen after she has torn down all my objections. If you can’t tear down all objections, you haven’t made your case.

Thanks for the debate. I think we’re at a standstill, so no further comment is needed (though would still be appreciated).

Cheers.

…because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. …

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker

…because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. …

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker