Where does A is A come from?

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker

Kant doesn’t write this, Rand does, in interpreting Kant.

But you knew that.

Interesting syllogism at work here:

A: (I feel) Your argument has a similarity to Kantian philosophy.

B: Kantian philosophy results in a contradictory conclusion. (an assertion which, in ignorance, I will accept as true)

Therefore,

C: Your argument is contradictory. (thus false)

I hope there’s something more convincing in ITOE. (hmm… is there a hidden message in that acronym?)

Kant doesn’t write this, Rand does, in interpreting Kant.

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Rand writes this? Thank you. Bob objects to Thomas’ fair summary of Kant by implying that Kant did not verbatim use those words; fair enough. But then you shouldn’t claim that Rand verbatim used those words in summarizing Kant, without an actual quote.

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Rand writes this? Thank you. Bob objects to Thomas’ fair summary of Kant by implying that Kant did not verbatim use those words; fair enough. But then you shouldn’t claim that Rand verbatim used those words in summarizing Kant, without an actual quote.

“Even apart from the fact that Kant’s theory of the “categories” as the source of man’s concepts was a preposterous invention, his argument amounted to a negation, not only of man’s consciousness, but of any consciousness, of consciousness as such. His argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and no others, therefore, his consciousness is not valid; man is blind, because he has eyes—deaf, because he has ears—deluded, because he has a mind—and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them.”

Ayn Rand, “For the New Intellectual,” For the New Intellectual, P.30.

Unfortunately, a critique of her logical progression (pairing the figurative ‘deaf’ and ‘blind’ with the physical ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ to manufacture a clear contradiction; twisting Kant’s argument against causality into an argument of reversed causality - perception causing or proving non-existence) leaves one in the position of seeming to defend Kant.

Which I can’t.

(you’re welcome!)

Okay, not too shabby :lol:

Here is the Kantian argument. I’m not making the claim that you are a Kantian, at least not without further evidence, I’m just saying this is the same argument made by Kant. And, no, I’m not going to dig up quotes from Kant; at least not tonight.

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind. The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away, and absorption and reemission or reflection of that energy by the surface of an entity into two transparent fluid-filled lenses which focus the energy on a matrices of specialized cells, each of which generates an electrical signal into the brain which results in the sensation of sight. Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities. I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity. It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination.

Kant argued that we have a sensory manifold, and that it was cognition within the sensory manifold that led to perception, just as you are doing in the bold above. In other words, if that is true, then we have no base point in which to start reasoning from. If the sense are not totally automatic, and requires volitional effort in order to perceive something, then how could we ever know that what we are seeing is what is actually out there or just a figment of our imagination? We couldn’t; which is why Miss Rand stated that he claims that we have eyes but are blind, etc.

Perception, as is clear by observing existence and being introspective about it, is not a volitional process. It does not require any volitional effort for you to perceive the Coke can as cylindrical, red and white, cold, shiny, heavy, etc. as one object. You do not have to consciously put all of those pieces together in order to perceive the Coke can.

Now, what you are confusing is perception (which is automatic) with cognition (which is volitional). When you try to identify if it is a Coke can or Joe’s Cola, you must use your volitional cognition and compare your memory of Coke cans to Joe’s Cola cans, and make a volitional determination as to which one it is. But this process is identification, not perception.

Furthermore, you picked something with your heat example that is not developed well enough for us to be aware of entities qua entities via our heat receptors. We do not perceive entities qua entities with our heat receptors, like some infrared camera that has a clearly defined image; they don’t work that way. But they are still accurate in telling us if there is something hot acting on our skin.

Like so many other skeptics, you focus in on something for which no one makes the claim, and then try to say that I said that we perceive entities qua entities via our heat receptors – which I never said. I said tactile, not heat. And I didn’t say we are only limited to sight and touch, I said sight and touch give us entities in an integrated manner. The other senses are not as well integrated physiologically for us to be able to be aware of an entity qua entity, but only some of their attributes (i.e. sweet or smelly or hot or noisy).

The not-so-well integrated senses (hearing, smell, taste, heat sensing) still tell us that there is something there in reality, it’s just not perceived as a “solid thing”, as compared to the eyes and the fingers. In other words, in order to be perceptually aware of the Coke can qua can, you need vision and / or touching it with your fingers (though certain areas of the skin of the body, such as the back or forearms can perceive an entity qua entity, just not as clearly as touching it with your hands).

I said: “…because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. …”

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

His whole philosophy states that, though if he said it so clearly he would be rejected in a heart beat.

Furthermore, you picked something with your heat example that is not developed well enough for us to be aware of entities qua entities via our heat receptors. We do not perceive entities qua entities with our heat receptors, like some infrared camera that has a clearly defined image; they don’t work that way. But they are still accurate in telling us if there is something hot acting on our skin.

Like so many other skeptics, you focus in on something for which no one makes the claim, and then try to say that I said that we perceive entities qua entities via our heat receptors – which I never said. I said tactile, not heat. And I didn’t say we are only limited to sight and touch, I said sight and touch give us entities in an integrated manner. The other senses are not as well integrated physiologically for us to be able to be aware of an entity qua entity, but only some of their attributes (i.e. sweet or smelly or hot or noisy).

Okay, fair enough (I’m trying to learn, not to hang on to stubborn convictions, so I appreciate the thought put into this).

The bold quote relates to the apparent automatic generation of gestalts (I’m going by decades-old memory here) by the visual cortex. If I remember correctly, these organize vision into perceived patterns which can correlate to entities in some cases, but can be confused by camouflage or optical illusions in others. (How do you feel about optical illusions that create the perception of an entity, which, on closer inspection does not actually exist? Does the entity exist when we think we see it, then poof! metaphysically disappear when we realize it’s not there after all? That is, are entities all in our head, as Kant would assert? Or is an illusion just an illusion, i.e., a faulty perception, with no bearing on the nature of reality?)

But your point about poorly integrated secondary senses leaves open the possibility that integration of sight and touch occurs as an initial stage of learning: I can imagine my mind becoming trained (through a small amount of experience) to integrate the secondary senses, so that if I feel heat on my hand regularly, I start automatically (effortlessly in my introspection of process) perceiving an entity that must be the source of the heat. I didn’t do this the first time I tried the experiment, the sense of heat startled my mind and I had to mentally conjure the heat source. The next time I do it, I imagine the source will come to mind more easily, and soon enough I will “see” a heat source when I feel the heat on my hand.

As an example of this, it’s been shown that electrode matrices mounted on the tongue of blind subjects, and activated with a camera (to create a 2-D matrix of taste sensation), soon become integrated into a sense of vision by the subjects. (these early experiments developed into matrices mounted directly onto the visual cortex to create true rudimentary vision in the blind). It is reasonable to hypothesize that the same would hold true for heat-generating matrices placed on the skin. How to explain this, except to posit that the human mind has the innate ability to integrate sensory signals and to learn to perceive entities from them? And if it can from the secondary senses, who’s to say that it didn’t do the same with the primary senses?

How do you feel about optical illusions that create the perception of an entity, which, on closer inspection does not actually exist? Does the entity exist when we think we see it, then poof! metaphysically disappear when we realize it’s not there after all? That is, are entities all in our head, as Kant would assert? Or is an illusion just an illusion, i.e., a faulty perception, with no bearing on the nature of reality?

Optical illusions are not a problem of perception, but rather a problem with identification.

For camouflage, for example, we perceive the pattern quite easily – you know, the splotches – but in a forest setting, it can be difficult to distinguish the pattern on the clothing from the natural pattern of colors, which is why they use camouflage in those settings. The purpose of camouflage is to disrupt the outline of the form of the item (i.e. the man or the equipment), and it works because we naturally physiologically integrate together patterns of similarity.

For other optical illusions, a similar thing occurs, like the one where you perceive either a vase or two faces facing each other. If you focus on one pattern, you see the faces; if you focus on the other pattern, you see the vase. Again, this is not a problem of perception, but rather an unusual situation that makes identification difficult, though the pattern is quite easily perceived.

In general, the optical illusions do not call into question the perception of reality, as many skeptics claim, but rather confirm it. We automatically perceive relationships, and it is possible to take advantage of this and create all sorts of illusions – like movies in 3D because each eye sees a slightly different image(which normally gives us depth).

I can imagine my mind becoming trained (through a small amount of experience) to integrate the secondary senses, so that if I feel heat on my hand regularly, I start automatically (effortlessly in my introspection of process) perceiving an entity that must be the source of the heat.

You can imagine it, but I doubt that if you went blind that you could perceive the world via infrared. At least no one has ever reported this happening.

Now, if one pinpoints the sense receptors, as your tongue experiment indicated, then yes, something like that might occur; otherwise, something like heat or taste becomes too diffused over the surface area containing the receptors that a clearly sharp differentiation between here and there is not available. In the case where the receptors are pinpointed, the brain automatically integrates together similarities and differences in relation to the surface area in question. In other words, the pattern is given in perception, but the subject must learn to identify the entity via this new perceptual source.

So, I would maintain that in vision, the perception of an entity is given automatically, but what must be learned is identification – the conceptual processing of information given by the senses. However, the physiological processing is automatic.

One of Kant’s other premises is that since the information is processed (via the visual cortex or whatever) then it is unreliable, in part because we don’t know what that processing is. So, he would contend that maybe what is really in reality is a purple elephant, but we perceive it as an apple due to the processing. However, Kant never made a single reference to reality, so pinning him down on that is quite difficult.

How to explain this, except to posit that the human mind has the innate ability to integrate sensory signals and to learn to perceive entities from them? And if it can from the secondary senses, who’s to say that it didn’t do the same with the primary senses?

Again, what is given in perception is the given, but must be identified – in explicit conceptual terms – requiring volitional cognition. And the senses do not create an entity, which you have alluded to several times. The entity is there, and we perceive it with the senses. In other words, we don’t perceive an output, say on a screen, and then have to interpret what it is that we are watching on our little internal movie screen. We perceive the entity, not a processed image of the entity.

Again, what is given in perception is the given, but must be identified – in explicit conceptual terms – requiring volitional cognition. And the senses do not create an entity, which you have alluded to several times. The entity is there, and we perceive it with the senses. In other words, we don’t perceive an output, say on a screen, and then have to interpret what it is that we are watching on our little internal movie screen. We perceive the entity, not a processed image of the entity.

Actually, I do have a little internal movie screen, called the retina. Only instead of “me” watching it, I have millions of individual visual receptors watching. Each of them reports the level and color of incident light from a particular vector direction to the visual cortex, which based on differences between adjacent levels, discovers discontinuities, then correlates the discontinuities to discover edges, then correlates connected edges to discover shapes, then correlates shape areas to discover entities… etc. But all of that is immaterial because I only know about the rods and cones through the medical sciences, and I can’t consider that information in my philosophy, so my perception of entities just happens.

Or something like that?

So I’m still trying to figure out if an illusion is an entity. For instance if twins turn to each other and bring their faces close, is the outline of a vase an entity? Are patterns formed by the random alignment of multiple entities, entities, or just patterns? Is the outline of Orion or Ursa Major an entity? (These are serious questions which seek to establish the precise definition of your terms.)

You can imagine it, but I doubt that if you went blind that you could perceive the world via infrared. At least no one has ever reported this happening.

David Odden did, on Dec 11, at 11:14 a.m. (Sorry, David)

In the case where the receptors are pinpointed, the brain automatically integrates together similarities and differences in relation to the surface area in question. In other words, the pattern is given in perception , but the subject must learn to identify the entity via this new perceptual source.

I think you’re wrong there. Imagine feeling a sour spot go from right to left across your tongue. At the same time you hear someone walk across the room, from right to left. Getting an unfamiliar sensory input, your conscious mind makes a connection between the two movements, but it doesn’t just automatically correlate and begin perceiving entities by taste, you have to play with it for a while to make sure you really are sensing what you think you are, that is, you’re comparing, differentiating, correlating with effort, the movement on your tongue. Once you’ve determined the sense data is consistent with reality, your mind starts to take over, learning to refine by continuing the correlation process. In other words, it learns to perceive entities through taste, a sense, which by a previous post, you conceded provided attributes only, and not “entities qua entities.” (which I take to mean “entities.”)

I see you’re holding on tenaciously to the entity as the irreducible primitive of perception, although I see some cracks.

By declaring the primacy of entity is self-evident, you are eschewing any need to prove your point of view. I accept that, logically, but I remain skeptical of the asserted principle.

My “problem” is probably that I don’t see the Kantian trap from presuming a learned, automated integration of attributes into an entity. The rational mind is obsessed with eliminating contradictions, so in the given example, if you tried to take a bite out of that apple and instead got a purple tusk in the eye, you’d be served with a contradiction between perception and reality. I take it as self-evident that my perception is completely consistent with reality, because I perceive no contradictions, and I can, for instance, correlate all of my senses, pick up a rock and toss it into a drainage pipe 50 feet away. Pink elephants don’t routinely appear and disappear in my living room. Every aspect of my perception is consistent with every other aspect, and this completeness, this perfection, proves to me that my perception is representative of reality. I can comprehend intellectually that my senses provide an artificial encoding of attributes, such as color, sound tones, brightness, etc., but regardless of anyone’s views on whether they are or are not equal to reality, I can see, hear, feel, etc. that they are representative and consistent, so I don’t have any doubts that my perception is “real.” To be a metaphysical (term?) skeptic is to abrogate any useful definition of reason, so I reject the irrational conclusions or suspicions of Kant and nihilists.

I believe Rand, in her hatred of Kant, may have overshot the mark when attacking his philosophy, and in doing so rejected his premises and any possibility of a causal (and thus vulnerable) processing chain between reality and perception, when in fact she only needed to recognize the weak links in his logic to reject his conclusions.

But just as a final point (and then I’m done - promise), would you say that your perception of reality is consistent with subatomic physics? If not, do you reject that branch of science as not representative of reality, or do you recognize a limitation of your perception’s representation of reality? I don’t think this is a minor point of missing senses, like UV, radio, etc., because there are behaviors apparent in QM that truly are counter-intuitive and incompatible with our (my) perception of reality.

Actually, I do have a little internal movie screen, called the retina. Only instead of “me” watching it, I have millions of individual visual receptors watching.

This is an abuse of the concept “watch”. A tree cannot “watch” the sun, even though it may absorb EM energy from the sun. You can’t even “watch” an object if you’re asleep but your eyes are open. Watching is an active mental state, and a visual receptor does not have a mind, so it cannot be aware or “watch” anything.

Each of them reports the level and color of incident light from a particular vector direction to the visual cortex

No, again, they cannot “report”, anymore than tree roots “report” the existence of water to a tree. Reporting is a conscious action of a mind. The pattern I’m seeing here is that you’re using inappropriate metaphorical extensions, anthropomorphisations of bodily functions.

So I’m still trying to figure out if an illusion is an entity.

I suggest trying to figure out what “entity” refers to. An illusion doesn’t have mass or definite physical extent. I don’t think the answer is trivial – we know that mental objects are existents, but they don’t have mass. First sort out your ontology – what are the classes of existents.

David Odden did, on Dec 11, at 11:14 a.m. (Sorry, David)

What you should be apologizing for is egregiously misunderstanding me. The visual perception of infrared is not the same as the perception of heat. A man with no eyes can still feel heat created by infrared radiation, but not be able to visually perceive IR radiation (as, I think, pit vipers can do).

This is an abuse of the concept “watch”. A tree cannot “watch” the sun, even though it may absorb EM energy from the sun. You can’t even “watch” an object if you’re asleep but your eyes are open. Watching is an active mental state, and a visual receptor does not have a mind, so it cannot be aware or “watch” anything.No, again, they cannot “report”, anymore than tree roots “report” the existence of water to a tree. Reporting is a conscious action of a mind. The pattern I’m seeing here is that you’re using inappropriate metaphorical extensions, anthropomorphisations of bodily functions.

That’s a fair objection (although we could have lively debate on whether a root “reports” water to a trunk!). I didn’t intend to imply a conscious effort on the part of the rods and cones. The visual cortex crosses into a gray area. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical, electro-chemical mechanisms - nerves and neurons. Where does Objectivism draw the lines between what are apparently automatic functions (translation of stimuli into electrical signals, transmission of signals into the visual cortex), what are apparently conscious efforts (identification, concept formation, higher functions), and what lies between (integration of sense organ signals into perception of entities)? And how does it justify those lines?

I suggest trying to figure out what “entity” refers to. An illusion doesn’t have mass or definite physical extent. I don’t think the answer is trivial – we know that mental objects are existents, but they don’t have mass. First sort out your ontology – what are the classes of existents.

Hmmm… (scratch, scratch) Aah… That’s exactly what I’m trying to do here. But it doesn’t matter to me what a term means to me, it only matters to me what it means to you. It’s only through precise understanding of each others’ terms that we can understand each others’ concepts. So my ontology is immaterial, only our shared ontology has philosophical relevance. Which leads me (finally) to realize that I need to read and understand your epistemology before I can efficiently engage in discussions here.

What you should be apologizing for is egregiously misunderstanding me. The visual perception of infrared is not the same as the perception of heat. A man with no eyes can still feel heat created by infrared radiation, but not be able to visually perceive IR radiation (as, I think, pit vipers can do).

I apologize for misrepresenting you. I still think I’m right, but I’ll give the benefit of my doubt and go try to learn how you think about these things.

Thanks, all, for the illuminating discussions. I intentionally left ITOE off my reading list (I’ve read just about everything else), because, frankly, Rand intimidates me with her incision and clarity. I wanted to wait until I thought through some of the issues on my own before delving into the scriptures. I think I’ve gained enough here to be intellectually honest in my reading.

I appreciate your patience,

~A

I didn’t intend to imply a conscious effort on the part of the rods and cones.

Since I just got done ranting about George Mitchell, I’m on a theme. Okay, so I accept that you weren’t trying to sneak something evil past us. One thing I’m certain of is that metaphorical language is like nitroglycerine. It can be useful, in the right context: I’m developing the conclusion that it is never useful in exploring philosophical or scientific ideas.

Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical, electro-chemical mechanisms - nerves and neurons.

Uh, what? You’re either being too reductive, or not reductive enough. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical entities: leptons, bayons and forces. Same with trees growing and rocks falling. I don’t see the value of inquiring into the physics of thought, at this point. I do see the value of inquiring into the physics of the sense organs up to the point that signals get into the head, after that there is virtually nothing useful that can be said about perception (much less thought) at the cellular level.

Where does Objectivism draw the lines between what are apparently automatic functions (translation of stimuli into electrical signals, transmission of signals into the visual cortex), what are apparently conscious efforts (identification, concept formation, higher functions), and what lies between (integration of sense organ signals into perception of entities)?

The line is drawn thusly: “That which is in fact automatic is automatic, that which requires a volitional consciousness is that which does in fact require a volitional consciousness”. Objectivism does not have any position on the visual cortex or the nature of transduction from optic nerve signals to mental representations. That’s 'cuz Objectivism is a philosophy, not a branch of brain science.

But it doesn’t matter to me what a term means to me, it only matters to me what it means to you.

In other words, you’re saying that meaning is completely arbitrary and dog plank eat both of traveler, at random. I suggest instead that we should simply look at the categories of existents: actions, attributes, entities. Am I missing anything? I’d suggest that an “illusion” is, indeed, an entity. Of course the genus “entity” admits of multiple species, so that “tree” and “illusion” can be eventually distinguished.

Thanks, all, for the illuminating discussions.

You’re welcome, but I’m not sure we are getting anywhere because you are starting in mind-stream instead of observing what you perceive.

When you look out at the world, you do not perceive your eye lens, your retina, your optic nerves or your visual cortex – you perceive what you are looking at. And that is where you have to start in philosophy; not at the level of high-level abstractions, such as optic nerves. What do you perceive when you are aware of existence? Similarly, you do not perceive your tongue when you taste something, you perceive the taste of the object inserted into your mouth. Likewise for feeling something with your fingers, it is not your fingers that you are perceiving, but rather the shape and texture of the item being held.

And while it is true that the brain is composed of neurons, we are not aware of those neurons when we think or imagine, we are aware of our consciousness and what it is doing.

In other words, as I related on my website, our sensory equipment in the processing of information about the world are completely transparent to the mind when we are perceiving. I do not see my retina, I do not taste my tongue, I do not smell my nose, I do not feel my skin, I do not hear my ears, etc. We perceive the entity and its attributes.

And, no, the constellations are not entities. The spacial relationship between the stars are observed, and the shapes we see up there is just a spacial relationship, not an entity. It is our imagination that draws those imaginary lines together to form things like Leo or Scorpius.

This all gets very frustrating when you try to start in mind-stream. No one is denying the optic nerves etc., what we are trying to tell you is to observe reality. And then you will see that we do not perceive our sensory organs when in the process of perceiving the world at large (unless we are looking in a mirror, then we can see our eyes and ears, and nose, etc.). But when you look at that Coke can, you are perceiving the Coke can and not your means of perception.

This all gets very frustrating when you try to start in mind-stream. No one is denying the optic nerves etc., what we are trying to tell you is to observe reality. And then you will see that we do not perceive our sensory organs when in the process of perceiving the world at large (unless we are looking in a mirror, then we can see our eyes and ears, and nose, etc.). But when you look at that Coke can, you are perceiving the Coke can and not your means of perception.

However someone else can perceive your sensory organ parts and you can perceive the parts of someone else’s sensory organs. My opthalmologist does this when I visit him for an eye examination. On the other hand you are the only person in the entire cosmos who is aware of your mind. No one has ever perceived a mind in a body that is not his. We may well suppose other people have minds, but we have no direct perceptual evidence to that effect.

I have three sets of images from an MRI scan of my skull (with resolution good to a millimeter) and an image from a PET scan of my own skull I had made several years ago. Nowhere in this image do I perceive even the faint outline of my mind. Objectively speaking my mind is nowhere to be seen. It apparently does not occupy space and time which is damned strange for something that is supposed to exist. Or maybe I don’t have a mind. I know for sure I have a brain though.

Perhaps you have had more luck than I have. Has anyone perceived your mind?

Bob Kolker

Nowhere in this image do I perceive even the faint outline of my mind. Objectively speaking my mind is nowhere to be seen. It apparently does not occupy space and time which is damned strange for something that is supposed to exist. Or maybe I don’t have a mind. I know for sure I have a brain though.

Perhaps you have had more luck than I have. Has anyone perceived your mind?

You completely missed the point. However, if you want to claim that your mind doesn’t exist, I might be willing to take you at your word at that :slight_smile:

When you look out at the world, … you perceive what you are looking at.

…

And, no, the constellations are not entities. The spacial relationship between the stars are observed, and the shapes we see up there is just a spacial relationship, not an entity. It is our imagination that draws those imaginary lines together to form things like Leo or Scorpius.

So let me get this straight…

I observe a constellation, but it is not an entity, just a spatial relationship.

I perceive a coke can, and it is an entity, not just a spatial relationship of light and dark, red and white shapes.

My mind knows how to differentiate an entity from something which is just a spatial relationship, or a product of my imagination, because it knows the difference between a percept and an observation.

But my mind can only differentiate entities, which are the primary objects of perception.

So, therefore, I must perceive the individual stars and my consciousness arranges them in a spatial pattern which emulates an archer, or a bear, or a lion.

So why don’t I perceive the corners of a box as entities, and my mind arrange them to form the spatial relationship that we call a cube?

Is there a missing principle at work here? If the lines connecting the spatially related points are not imagined, then it’s an entity, if they are, then it’s not? Is a corner an entity, or is a box, or both, or neither? It seems to depend on your definition of entity, which changes from poster to poster here, and, sometimes from post to post. That would be okay, I guess, since it’s difficult to get to a precise definition, very difficult, it seems; except that something extremely special and unique is being claimed for those things called entities, so you really have zero leeway in your definition, if you hold to that special distinction.

Here’s a problem: a constellation is not an entity, a solar system is not an entity, an asteroid belt is not an entity, the rings around Saturn are not entities, or maybe they are, depending on how close I am when I see them.

The milky way is not an entity, just a pattern of fine stars, unless I squint. If I shrunk myself to the size of a water molecule, this monitor would disappear into a pattern of spatially related molecules. I would perceive these particles (given that I could see), but my observation of “monitor” would be merely a spatial relationship of particles. (Of course that could never happen, I’m just trying to get the hang of it)

Yes, I’m being facetious. But the point is not ridicule, it’s that there is a principle missing in this philosophy, in my opinion. And no, that’s not an indictment of Objectivism (which I don’t actually know to this level), just an observation… err, logical conclusion? It’s not as simple as “we see what we see and that’s reality.” The line between the automatic and the conscious is not, in my opinion, a razor sharp one (he said, drawing a deep breath).

Cheers

That would be okay, I guess, since it’s difficult to get to a precise definition, very difficult, it seems; except that something extremely special and unique is being claimed for those things called entities, so you really have zero leeway in your definition, if you hold to that special distinction.

An entity in the primary sense means something that you can pick up and hold the whole thing in your hands, like a Coke can, a glass (of water), a cigarette, a lighter, a baseball – something that you can grasp quite easily via perception.

Once you grasp that these are entities, then you can move on up to bigger things that you cannot get the whole thing of, like the earth (unless you are in deep space), a house (which can be grasped perceptually as one thing if you are far away), an ocean liner or an aircraft carrier, etc. These are all one thing, one entity.

Objectivism also recognizes entities in a secondary sense, which means considering something apart from the rest of it – i.e. a two foot square section of your yard, or your toe nail, or your thumb. But these are not true entities in the primary sense, it’s just that we can mentally isolate out those pieces of a whole, and they can only be called entities in that sense.

I think the Solar System is closer to an entity in the secondary sense, since the planets and the sun are not really physically attached to one another.

In the case of considering something like the constellations, they might, and I stress might, be considered entities in the secondary sense (in the sense of mentally focusing in on that batch of stars), but they are most certainly not physically attached to one another.

In the case of things like atoms, these are not considered entities in the primary sense unless they are separated out from other atoms they can interact with. For example, your glass in front of you is one entity. It is not six trillion atoms hovering in space. It is one thing.

Scale is a very important consideration for deciding is something is an entity or not. For example, I think our galaxy can only be considered to be an entity in the secondary sense, because there is so much space in between each of the stars that comprise it.

I sincerely doubt if that answers your question. Not that I didn’t answer it, but since you are being quite the skeptic about everything I write, then it will not answer you, even though I have answered the question.

But again, and I keep stressing this, if you want to know what an entity is, then look at reality – that Coke can right in front of your face and held in your hands is an entity, it is not a constellation of different colors that happen to follow each other around as you move it.

I sincerely doubt if that answers your question. Not that I didn’t answer it, but since you are being quite the skeptic about everything I write, then it will not answer you, even though I have answered the question.

By skeptic, I assume you mean one who requires proof of purported fact, and not one who denies the possibility of real knowledge.

We’re not supposed to get nasty here, after all.

Thanks for the answer. I’ll consider it.

Uh, what? You’re either being too reductive, or not reductive enough. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical entities: leptons, bayons and forces. Same with trees growing and rocks falling.

True enough, but trees growing and rocks falling do not entail electro-chemical neural transmitters, as far as I know. Sensing, perceiving and thinking all do. Remember Einstein: “Things should be kept as simple as possible, but not simpler.”

If I reduced beneath neurons, I’d be too general (what’s a bayon? I thought it was a place in France) If I didn’t reduce to that level, I wouldn’t have a common element to tie the three together.

In other words, you’re saying that meaning is completely arbitrary …

No, no no! The exact opposite! Words are the precise translation of concepts. Problem is that a word cannot be defined precisely except as a relationship between other words, or a directed reference to at least one physical entity. The more precise and abstract the meaning of the term, the more complex that relationship must be. To use a metaphor, in communicating, we are carving stone with stone tools; the finer our work, the more and delicate strikes we must make.

…we know that mental objects are existents, but they don’t have mass…

I’d suggest that an “illusion” is, indeed, an entity.

We’ve had a whole series of messages on this thread, and just when I think I know what is meant by “entity” you toss in the perception itself, the concept and the illusion as entities. And I ask myself, “if we perceive entities of reality, and the perception of an entity is itself an entity, and the perception of an illusion is an entity, that means that reality is in the same class of existence as a perception, whether it be of a “real” entity or of an illusion. So how do I distinguish an illusion from reality, when all I have is reality and illusions to compare and differentiate? Since the identification of an entity is a conscious act, and since conscious identification is subject to faulty logic (isn’t it?), is it now in the realm of possibility that I am misidentifying illusions as metaphysical entities (term?) and/or vice versa?” (And to whom am I writing this, anyway?)

I am led (erroneously, I know) to a contradiction, so obviously, my understanding of your definitions is lacking. Just as obviously, trying to glean the precise definitions from a series of loosely organized posts is not getting me to the right level of understanding, so I need to sit down with univocal, detailed description of the terminology (ITOE). I don’t think you can help with this; I have to hammer it out on my own.

The problem here is that the existence of entities is self-evident to perception, and the existence of consciousness is self-evident via introspection. Neither one requires proof in the sense of giving a logical train of thought to verify their existence.

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world; and Robert is trying to figure out what consciousness is by looking at a medical scan. Both of you are starting at the wrong place – in mid-stream.

Look at the world to verify that there are entities and be introspective to verify that you have a consciousness.

It’s really as simple as that, but you both want a logical argument.

Well, sorry, there isn’t one to be had for the self-evident.

One does not deduce that there are entities and one does not deduce that one has a consciousness.