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intrinsicist

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Everything posted by intrinsicist

  1. "A “universal” is any property, quality, relation, characteristic, attribute, or combination of these—generally, any “feature of reality”—which may be identically present in diverse contexts. The “problem” of universals is—to put it in any of several ways—whether there are, or can be, strict identities between disparate contexts; whether two objects can literally have common attributes; whether universals (i.e., repeatable predicables, or qualities that can be “predicated” of more than one object) are really and genuinely present in their apparent “instances” or whether the mind merely behaves as though they are." "There are precisely two basic solutions to the genuine problem of universals: realism and nominalism. The former holds that there are some real universals, the latter that there aren’t any. A general theory of universals may hold that some apparent universals exist only in the mind and that others are real in some other sense. But for any given universal, these two alternatives exhaust the possibilities, and an ontology that admits even a single real universal is a version of realism. Though there are subheadings under each type of solution, there is no genuine third alternative unless we are willing to dispense with the Law of the Excluded Middle. And - importantly - both views are irreducibly ontological. There is simply no way to reduce the problem of universals to a pure matter of epistemology; that is why it has traditionally been regarded as a problem of metaphysics in the first place" - Scott Ryan
  2. intrinsicist

    Just Shut Up and Think

    Dismissal is an act of force, not an act of reason.
  3. intrinsicist

    Universals

    The thing this boils down to in intrisicism is that things are what they are, they have a definite nature. In a purely reductive materialism, there are no actual things, not at the high-level "middle-size dry goods" ordinary objects of our day to day experience. If everything we see around us is a happenstance configuration of particles that could just as equally be any other way, if you can arbitrarily hack on various properties to these objects, arbitrarily assign various functions, and that ultimately the definition *doesn't matter*, then there are no "things". The only demarcation involved is your own naming schema, a nominalistic assignment. There is a really easy analogy here to software. In my coding philosophy, all of your objects are well-defined, your database tables are normalized. Attributes of the objects are columns on the table, and separate concepts go into separate tables, etc. etc. All of the functionality is broken up into delimited, well-defined functions. In every case, the objects and the functions are coded to the spec. The spec is a higher-level definition of what the thing is, what it ought to be. Any mistake can be easily judged - and intrinsically known to be wrong - without looking at any outside purpose, without performing any estimate of the consequences relative to an agent - because the judgment is relative to the spec, to the definition of the thing, which also lays out the standard of its ideal. When you see people abandoning this philosophy in code, when there are no well-defined functions, they don't have any specified purpose, all you have, rather, is a chunk of code which happens to do something - just as in a metarialistic metaphysics, you just have a configuration of particles - it could be any other way or do any other thing just as well, it just happens to be the way it is. And there's no way to know whether or not it's got a bug, except by some far-reaching consequence, that the user is unhappy, or that the system as a whole is slow, or what have you. When you look at the function itself, there's no way to know or define whether it's right or wrong, it's all relative to a utilitarian system whose outcome is completely out of the scope of the function. The code is in essence unintelligible, buggy, inefficient spaghetti code. Or when the database is not normalized, and you have multiple concepts crammed into a single table, or a table with a sprawling list of attributes that conglomerate a bunch of pragmatic considerations, with no overall definition, no spec which the idea of the table is supposed to adhere to, you end up with the same issue: an unintelligible, buggy, inefficient mess of spaghetti code. And likewise, as a developer, how can you own something, if there is no *abstractly-defined* "thing" to own? There's just a scrambled mess of a system that everyone is trying to hunt for little improvements or patch the problems where they spring up. Nothing has a spec that defines what it is or what it ought to be, and therefore there *is* nothing in particular which anyone can specifically own and ensure that it does the "right thing". There's is just the brute, collective reality of all the things that *are*. This is the way I see reality as an intrinsicist. There is a higher-level metaphysical spec which defines what the objects of this world are, and what they ought to be. There is a well-defined, intelligible order to the universe; reality has a flawless ideal which everything can be measured against. You can't say that is implies ought, if you don't have an abstract spec of what is, such that you can infer what ought to be *from the spec*. Otherwise the distinction between "is" and "ought" would be meaningless - if everything, concretely, ought to be what it already is, and nothing beyond that, then you cannot infer any moral conclusion whatsoever. The philosophical basis of the idea that is implies ought, is one in which there is an abstract standard, a metaphysical spec which defines the nature of the object, the purpose for which its intended, and the standards which define the ideal. Then, anything concrete can be checked against its spec, against it's abstract standard, and can be judged accordingly. Everything about how it ought to be, what it ought to be doing, and every standard of goodness and behavior, is implied by what it is. And if you abandon "is implies ought", then you are left with no rationally justifiable moral standard whatsoever. This is the way the intrinsicist sees the world, everything has some well-defined abstract nature. Every concrete is an instance of some defined abstraction, a kind. And there are many kinds in the world. This system of kinds you can call the logos - it is the metaphysical nature of reality. This logos is an important part of what people often mean by "God" - theological non-cognitivists take note. And while "God" often means many other things to many different people as well, it usually means this, too. And skeptics, atheists, and materialists of every stripe not only deny "God" - which includes all sorts of things to all sorts of people, often incorrectly - they also deny the logos. In this they are wrong, because the logos can be shown to be rationally irrefutable by the impossibility of the contrary, in that it makes absurdity out of any system of thought which denies it. This logos and the system of rationality, morality, and individual rights it makes coherent, is at the root of the religious worldview, as opposed to say a skeptic/pragmatic or absurd/postmodern worldview. So when you hear a believer talking about God, there is something basically true, basically right about their point of view, about what they are saying. At the very least, insofar as "God" means this logos, this intrinsicist worldview, they are *right*. This is just something to think about. All of philosophy - the rest of epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics - is going to start from, and depend on, this foundation. Everything in Objectivism needs to be analyzed and evaluated in this light, and the parts of Objectivism that are based on a consequentialist ethics and materialistic metaphysics, need to be *corrected*. Whether you want to *call it* Objectivism or something else, these issues need to be corrected, and we need to move forward with this project of philosophy. Make no mistake, we are losing, and we are losing to the absurd, postmodern worldview. And Rand was right, the moral and practical are one - this postmodern break from reality, break from morality, break from individual rights, is going to disintegrate into absolute hell, in your private life, and in our political world, if we don't start winning again. Just being louder, printing more copies of the books, is not going to change the game board. Atlas Shrugged has been published for more than 60 years. The Objectivist movement is broken. The liberty movement is broken. These ideas have not swept the political landscape, they have not unified the culture (or even the liberty movement, or even the Objectivist movement). Objectivism itself is broken. The philosophy is incomplete, and in places, inconsistent. We must start from the foundational roots of metaphysics in order to fix the philosophical problems, fix the arguments and inconsistencies, and thus change people's minds, unify the movement, and sweep the cultural and political landscape. That foundation is intrinsicism.
  4. Great question. Have you read The Romantic Manifesto? Rand talks about the origins of emotion in one's thinking and philosophical premises, and especially in one's metaphysics and metaphysical value judgements. You can become psychologically and emotionally twisted out of sync with reality through contempt for your own nature, the nature of man, or the nature of reality. This sort of malevolence is the place to start. The proper attitude in Objectivism is called the Benevolent Universe premise. So try to start looking at the world as a place that is intrinsically good, and at human nature as intrinsically good. Human nature naturally pairs us into male / female couples, and there is deep complementarity in that pairing, rationally, functionally, aesthetically, psychologically, socially, and so on. The level of meaning and value in that complementarity is surprisingly deep, I dont know if anyone has fully developed that idea yet. It's a moral ideal that you should strive for.
  5. intrinsicist

    Universals

    @Eiuol I'm not sure you've addressed my argument. Your position is that even without metaphysical universals you can define a category in your mind, and accumulate instances which fit that category, but my argument is that without a metaphysical universal, there's no way to infer anything about future instances of that category, besides merely the criteria on which you've grouped them (which is simply tautologically true). You know in analytic synthetic dichotomy, Peikoff talks about how a nominalist forms categories that are merely tautologically true, as in you can't get anything out of them that you haven't already defined? It seems like you're backed into a corner: either there is something both metaphysical and universal and thus it's justifiable to infer more than a tautology about instances that you haven't already seen, or else if there is nothing both metaphysical and universal, and then you cannot possibly be justified in inferring anything but tautology about things which you haven't already seen. The thing is, I'm unclear which side of the dichotomy I'm presenting that you are trying to take. You do believe that you can infer non-tautological things about future instances from your epistemic categories, correct? Do you agree that there are things that hold universally in reality (by "universally" I mean in all cases / at all times, i.e. it's possible to identify some things that are always true in reality outside of tautologies)? If so, then these things, whatever they are, are both metaphysically real and universal. It's not a mere epistemic category or a tautology, but rather it's true in reality. Doesn't this amount to a realist/intrinsicist answer to the problem of universals? Because I mean, if you believe things can be metaphysical and universal, and you believe that you can justifiably infer things about instances you haven't yet observed, then that sounds consistent between metaphysics and epistemology - and contrary to the strong statements Rand made in ITOE against universals, like, "...“manness” in man and “roseness” in roses. I was arguing with him that there is no such thing". Or is the amount of metaphysical universality that you believe in not sufficient to cover cases like "manness" or "roseness"?Because it's like, if you say you believe in things that are metaphysical and universal, and you are thus justified in making inferences, but then you deny such things as "man" or "rose", etc., have any metaphysical universal grounding, then you aren't justified in making inferences on those things or things like them. Which would really impoverish your position back down again. So it's really a question of, well what's left that is universal? Because that's the limit of what you're going to be justified in making inferences about. And if you are taking out "man" or "rose", that really doesn't bode well for you philosophically, I mean the entire realm of ethics and politics deals with the nature of man and what you can infer about man universally. So you basically eliminate any justifiable theory of ethics or politics applicable to all men. I'm not hung up on calling it "a universal" or "manness", what I'm stuck on is the issue of, "is there actually anything that's universally true in reality?". That's the important sense of "manness" that's at issue here.
  6. intrinsicist

    When to take time off

    I do it every few years. Take a year or two sabbatical now and then. Saving enough money for permanent retirement is a very long-term prospect.
  7. intrinsicist

    Intro to Objectivist Epistemology

    Rand only wrote an introduction to epistemology (and no more than a few statements on metaphysics).
  8. intrinsicist

    Objective Black and White Ideals

    First and foremost Ayn Rand lists life as an end in itself. Her argument in The Objectivist Ethics is that: That is, moral principles derive from the nature of Man, because is implies ought. It's not just limited to life, she goes on: So you can derive a list of specific, objective values and ideals by reference to the nature of Man, and what it means to live like a man - and that means all the characteristics of man's nature - not just his survival as a living organism or his rational faculty. Ayn Rand lists seven major virtues in Atlas Shrugged: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride. Another more specific example like "life", would be one's sex, which means a couple of key things, like living as man or a woman accordingly, and learning to follow the principles of masculinity and femininity. It also means pursuing the ideal of heterosexual marriage and procreation. These are objective moral principles and ideals, guidelines for how to live, and how to give emphasis, optimization, beauty, etc, that follow from important aspects of human nature and identity. These would be like any other aspects of morality, they are not optional, or dependent upon someone's subjective whim, and going against them would be immoral and self-sacrificial.
  9. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Of course I agree that would would be a contradictory position to hold, if you are also assuming that the only thing that exists are concrete, physical objects extended in space. My claim here goes against that assumption. I am arguing for the metaphysical existence of universals, i.e. existents which are not concrete, physical objects extended in space. You are asserting the opposite position that I am taking. I've made a number of arguments for my position throughout this thread, so please take a look and let me know what you think of them. SpookyKitty seems to be the only one who has clearly understood what I'm saying so far.
  10. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Louie, I understand that. You can define a category of "winged things" which is open-ended, and therefore includes all winged things you've yet to observe. What I don't understand is why you aren't proceeding to my next question from there, as it is still unanswered. The question is regarding your belief that "any new particulars added to the set will behave as the rest of the set". Obviously any new instance added to the set will have wings, but what else can you say of it besides that? I'm suggesting that without such a thing as a natural class, that you are merely forming a nominal category, in other words the category is merely analytical, and the only thing you can infer from classifying something as a "winged thing" is that it has wings. Which is of course useless. If there is no natural kind backing the concept, then there's no justification for inferring anything beyond what you've already defined. If on the other hand your concepts are identifying a natural kind, then there's a necessary connection between all particulars in the set, from which you can justifiably infer things like "any new particulars added to the set will behave as the rest of the set". Do you understand this distinction here at least? I've been trying to describe these two fundamentally different ideas of concepts/universals, and how very different they are philosophically.
  11. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Again, I already understand what you're saying. You've defined some set of particulars - not a universal set, but a finite set - and you've identified some invariant facts about that set - which are not universals, but rather they are just abstract properties of that particular set. And again, the question I'm asking is, how can you extend that to particulars outside of your cherry-picked set? You're telling me it "stands for" an unlimited range of things abstractly, but concretely it only refers to some particular set of items you've already identified. How do you know that the abstraction you've come up with actually does apply to the full range of things that it stands for? You believe that, so apparently you do believe that you're identifying a universal in reality. Call it what you want - it functions as a universal. It abstractly identifies something in reality that is timeless, something where instances at all times and in all cases will behave in this same way. If you're trying to extend your abstraction across all instances at all times, and out into reality (in the sense that you actually believe that it will predict the future behavior of things in reality), then you are talking about something that is metaphysical and universal. A nominalist is someone who rejects that any such thing is metaphysically possible or epistemologically justifiable. If you deny the existence of universals metaphysically, then there's no reason to believe that your abstraction will extend beyond the range of the small set of particulars it currently refers to (and certainly not to believe that you have knowledge or certainty about it). In that case these "universal" epistemological abstractions don't provide knowledge, you can't have certainty about them - and indeed the opinion of a nominalist is that the use of or belief in such "epistemological universals" is foolish and counter-productive, after all, what's the point in having or believing in some "timeless essential" if it's not referring to something that is actually timeless in reality? These universal abstractions actually distort your view of reality since there are no such things. All you have are retrospective categories of reference guided by pragmatism. Again, as I've been saying, nominalists of all kinds own up to this and wear it proudly, declaring that all that is possible to man are pragmatically guided categories and statistical correlations, and that belief in concepts, in universals that actually hold in reality, is akin to a religious fantasy which we must break ourselves from and "be real". So you really have to pick a side here. Either you believe that there are these knowable universals which actually hold in reality, or else that there is no such thing. You can't keep telling me that there is nothing in reality which holds universally, but that you can still have knowledge of things which hold universally. You can't. You either need to own up to your metaphysical stance epistemologically, or own up to your epistemological stance metaphysically. You can't have it both ways. You can't steal the concept of metaphysical universality in your epistemology while denying it in your metaphysics - not if you're being honest with yourself. Either you have a merely pragmatic stance (i.e. "I'll hold this as if it's a universal, even though I don't believe in such things, since that seems to work well") in which case you ought to own up to that epistemologically as a nominalist, or else you do believe that universal knowledge is possible but you're operating on a stolen metaphysical premise, in which case you ought to own up to that metaphysically as an intrinsicist. Given the absurdity and incoherence of the former, I'd suggest going with intrinsicism.
  12. intrinsicist

    Universals

    I understand that's what you're going for, but my question here has been: how is that possible? How can a symbol meaningfully stand for an unlimited range of yet-to-be-observed particulars without relying on a real universal, some real property that makes them what they are, with which we can make universal claims about all such instances? It seems like you run into the same problems whether you're talking about things you're "referring to" or things that the symbol "stands for", I'm not seeing what that distinction buys you here. Based on what in reality? You're telling me there's this "something" in reality which makes all instances which have this "something" identical by nature. That's an exact description of a real universal! I would agree that this is clearly what she is implicitly relying on in numerous places in the book (and in many derivative ways throughout Objectivist philosophy), and yet she specifically rejects the reality of these metaphysical universals, these "timeless essentials" which man "recognizes", the "treeness" in tree or "manness" in man, etc. The issue here, both with you and with Rand, is the reliance on the real universals while denying them.
  13. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Sure, the concept tree refers to all particular trees that have ever existed or ever will exist. That's not "just a similarity", what you are describing is exactly what is meant by a "metaphysical universal", when all trees share this identical property of "treeness", this common denominator that makes a tree a tree. If such a common denominator exists, if there is such an abstract property of "treeness" that all trees share, then what we are dealing with is a real universal. What you are expressing is exactly the confusion and contradiction present in ITOE. Rand rejects the existence of real universals, of "treeness" in trees, and yet what she tries to capture in her concepts are real abstract properties shared by all particulars, so that the concept may refer to all the particulars of the kind that have ever existed or will ever exist. She rejects real universals, but relies on them implicitly.
  14. intrinsicist

    Universals

    So you're telling me that by "universals" you are merely referring to sets of observed particulars. And you're saying that "the facts don't change" and therefore there's no issue - but what do the facts buy you? How do you interpret anything you observe, how do you predict the future, how do you classify anything new, when you can't infer anything in general about reality? The "man" you've classified today might have nothing to do with the next particular you observe. The ball you're observing in one moment tells you nothing about what you might observe in the next moment. Any particular, any moment that you've yet to observe, you can't say anything about it, because your classifications are all retrospective, they only refer to the particulars you've already observed ("we cannot refer to things we don't know of"). The length "epistemic universal" you invented today can't tell you anything about the length you'll observe tomorrow, because you're telling us that you're not inducing any necessary connection, anything general about reality itself, you're just cataloging regularities in your experiences. You are just making retrospective statistical observations - the moment you start talking about length - every property of length in all places and all times - then you're talking about a universal property out in reality, a metaphysical universal, which is exactly what you're rejecting. "I don't understand how we -could- refer to all particulars. That would be further from reality." -- and this is exactly the nominalist opinion on concepts. If all we can refer to are particulars, then concepts (e.g. Man, referring to all men who have ever lived and will ever live), actually distort our view of reality, since it's not really like that. I'm just telling you that calling your epistemic categories "concepts" or "universals" is mistaken. You shouldn't try to claim any of the positive results Ayn Rand tries to claim, like solving the problem of induction, the ability to have conceptual knowledge or certainty about reality, etc. None of this is really consistent with your real view; you are a skeptic about any general statement about reality, a nominalist who believes in categories of convenience, and your epistemic standard (and thus, necessarily, your moral and political standard) is subjective and pragmatic. There are plenty of people who own up to holding exactly this view, like Gordon Stein, or Sam Harris. I'm just asking you to be clear and honest with yourself on exactly where you stand. If on the other hand you are not truly a skeptic about reality, if deep down you really do believe we can know things that are necessary and certain and universal, then we need to start talking about the metaphysics of universals. Either way there's an inconsistency in Ayn Rand's thinking.
  15. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Honestly I don't think you've done either of these things. First you got distracted by me naming intrinsicism in particular, then you've pummeled me with questions about the details of intrinsicist metaphysics. But nothing I've actually argued depends on any of that. I've made a specific criticism of Objectivist metaphysics which nobody seems to have yet clearly understood, let alone attempted to counter. The closest thing I've seen is the Harry Binswanger thing you quoted, "To be nothing in particular is to be nothing at all--i.e., not to be." -- but that just seems like an assertion that universals aren't real, I don't see that that's an argument in favor of that assertion. As for "the concretes referred to by a concept have to be identical in some respect, as if all shades of blue were identical, all lengths were identical, etc." - obviously that's a silly straw man, the point is that the abstract attribute of blue or of length is held in common by the particulars, not the exact shade or measure of their lengths. Again, he doesn't seem to understand the Realist position that he's criticizing at all, he seems to be just assuming that only particular concrete objects are real, and therefore concludes that universals must be "nothing". The fact that we can perceive things as similar, that we can isolate the abstract property of length which things have in common, seems to demonstrate that. Obviously I can't go around and show you all men who have ever lived and who ever will live. I can't physically show you an infinite set to prove a universal inductively. That's like asking me to prove that a^2 + b^2 = c^2 by calculating the formula for all natural numbers. Either you presuppose universality in the first place, and thus are capable of arriving at a universal inductively without observing an infinite number of instances, or else you presuppose that universals aren't real in the first place, in which case absurdity follows (in the problem of induction, subjectivism, and all of the other problems I've been arguing). Likewise, Rand's stated position is that universals aren't real, and thus there's no way to arrive at a universal inductively. Rand's argument in ITOE in which she describes how to arrive at certainty about the boiling point of water by referencing knowledge about the behavior of H20 molecules is an infinite regress - because the natural next question is how does one arrive at universal knowledge of the behavior of H20 molecules? When Rand describes acquiring knowledge about the abstract property of length, or certainty about the boiling point of water, or maintaining a non-contradictory definition of man despite a changing context of knowledge, she is implicitly relying on the belief that there are universals (length, water, man), contra her own stated position on the subject.
  16. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Eioul, the issue is absolutely whether or not there is anything in reality that holds universally. I'm not following why you're suggesting that's not the issue here. I'm trying to interpret what you are saying in a way that isn't blatantly contradictory - after all, if there's a "universal aspect of things", how could you also say that "the aspect itself isn't the universal"? I'm guessing what you mean by a "universal aspect of things", is some aspect that holds for all particulars in a given set. But the "recognition of invariant facts about sets of particulars" is not a universal unless the "set of particulars" you're referring to, is the universal set of all particulars, as in, "for all X, such and such holds". Saying merely "for this specific set of particulars, such and such holds", is not a universal claim, it's just a claim about some particular group of things. So this is precisely the issue here. Rand denies real universals quite explicitly, as I quoted here. She believes everything in reality is particular, that there is in reality no "manness" in man which applies universally for all men at all times, but rather the concept "man" is merely our way of organizing the particulars we see around us into a mental grouping. So as the set of particulars we have observed changes and the context of our knowledge expands, so too must change our definition of "man". In ITOE, Rand writes that, contra Aristotle's intrinsicist philosophy, Rand specifically rejects the notion that there is a metaphysical essence, i.e. that particulars are instances of real universals, universals which hold at all times and for all of the particulars of that kind. On the contrary, our concepts are only "universal" over the total set of of our observations. But this is not the universal set! This isn't guaranteed by any metaphysical principle to hold at all times and for all instances in reality. Concepts in this view aren't describing something that holds abstractly in reality, they are just describing something that holds abstractly over the particular, delimited set of observations which we've accumulated thus far. So these Objectivist concepts aren't universals. Rand doesn't refer to them as such. She only uses the word "universal" in this sense in a couple of places in the book, and exclusively in the context of specifically pointing out how the Objectivist view differs from the Intrinsicist view in holding that there are no real universals.
  17. intrinsicist

    Universals

    No, not in the sense I've been exhaustively explaining here. And the distinction is important, because the only alternative to basing your philosophy on real universals is subjectivism, as I was arguing in the original thread: I'm hoping we come back to my arguments here, I don't have anything to contribute right now regarding your comments on "objective (metaphysical) idealism", as you call it.
  18. intrinsicist

    Universals

    I don't know what that is. I've been making a case for universals being metaphysically real, as against Rand's position that they are merely epistemological.
  19. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Well if some "other type of universal" existed, then it would be real, wouldn't it? If something exists that implies that it's real. What I'm trying to distinguish is between one conception of what "universals" are, and another very different conception of them. A realist says that universals are features of reality that exist and persist outside the mind, outside of any human mind. There is an intelligible structure to reality whether anyone understands it or not. Our concepts can be right or wrong according to whether they correspond to these universal types, these natural kinds. A nominalist holds that there is no intrinsic intelligibility to reality, intelligibility is something we do in our own minds as a way of organizing our sense data of reality. Reality is like this tabula rasa, materialist blank canvas. "Universals" are categories that we make up, like mental "buckets" to group together particular sensory-perceptual experiences. Whichever buckets you make up might be judged as practical or impractical, according to unit economy or whatever, but there is no "right" answer, there aren't "true" or "false" buckets. There are no true universal types, there aren't natural kinds, out there in nature. The "kinds" are things we make up, these mental buckets. These are not basically both the same type of thing, just one I believe in and one I don't. It's not like we are dealing with real and imaginary breeds of animals, like wolves are real, but werewolves aren't real. Of course I do believe we form concepts in our minds, like creating mental buckets like the nominalist believes, or like Ayn Rand describes the process of concept formation. The point is that I think there are real universals out there, and the ones we come up with in our head can be true universals or they can be false; they can be right or wrong not just in terms of pragmatic standards like unit economy or utility, but in terms of corresponding, or failing to correspond, to the true universals in reality.
  20. intrinsicist

    Universals

    I can only respond to this a bit at a time, let's start with this: There are other metaphysical positions which accept the reality of universals besides intrinsicism, but I'm speaking here to an Objectivist audience, and if you are an Objectivist who rejects the aspects of subjectivism and nominalism in Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology, and instead accepts the implicit realist aspects, then I argue what you end up at is intrinsicism. By "real universal", I mean something that exists metaphysically, outside of your head in reality, and not merely epistemologically, as something you've come up with in your own mind. This is not exclusive to intrinsicism, as I said, of course there are other metaphysical views which hold that universals are metaphysically real. But Rand does follow standard nominalism is denying the existence of such things, in favor a view in which "universals" are merely epistemological, made up by man for his use.
  21. intrinsicist

    Universals

    I wasn't asserting there that universals exist, I was just making a point about knowledge - "If universals exist then our awareness of them is accurate and knowledge of universals is possible, but if they do not, then our seeming "awareness" of them is really a phantom, and the universality that we imagine is not really "knowledge"."... that is, if there's nothing in reality that holds universally, then any universal proposition cannot actually be true, not in the normal sense of logical truth; such "universal knowledge" is not actually knowledge, it's just a hypothesis, or a useful convention, or something like that.
  22. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Knowledge about a fictional world implies the existence of the fictional world (qua fictional world, of course). You could make something up about the fictional story of Harry Potter, for example claiming that Harry is a mathematician, when actually he isn't one, and that wouldn't be knowledge. Whereas some truth about Harry Potter, for example that he is a boy, is knowledge. But I think this is all an aside from the main point, hopefully it's clear to everyone else by "knowledge" I'm talking about correspondence with reality.
  23. intrinsicist

    Universals

    Knowledge of universals implies the existence of universals. Even knowledge of similarity implies the existence of a universal (i.e. some feature of reality which is identical at different places or times). So the "problem of universals" does not arise from questions about our awareness or knowledge, it is really prior to that - if universals exist then our awareness of them is accurate and knowledge of universals is possible, but if they do not, then our seeming "awareness" of them is really a phantom, and the universality that we imagine is not really "knowledge". This issue that you're raising - that we seem to be aware of similarity and universality, but are we really, and how? - is related to the problem of universals, but the question of whether universals exist at all is a more basic one, and is the grounds for your answer to the question regarding whether we are actually aware of universality, and whether that awareness is truly knowledge which corresponds to reality. Sorry, but you can't bypass metaphysics and begin in epistemology. Everything in your epistemological philosophy is going to depend upon the metaphysics that you've presupposed.
  24. intrinsicist

    The Royal Family of Nominalism

    But that's not any different than what a nominalist would say. A nominalist might say, sure we have these abstract concepts in our minds. But the issue here is whether they correspond to a real universal which has a true definition, or rather on the contrary that there is nothing universal out in reality for it to correspond to; it's a made up definition which cannot in principle be true or false. If there is no universal in reality to check a concept or definition against, then they are just stipulating the definitions of words, and the only issue is whether they are using their words consistently or inconsistently, or whether their concepts are pragmatic or unpragmatic; nobody can possibly tell them that they are wrong. Nobody can tell them that their definition is false, that their conceptual classification is not corresponding to the real, natural kind. After all, their basic metaphysical position is that there are no natural kinds. "When he says he is this or that, then he is this or that" ...
  25. intrinsicist

    The Royal Family of Nominalism

    splitprimary quoted this from ITOE: - was this quote not clear? also from ITOE: and You said "You don't have to be an Objectivist to accept the fact that universals exist," which is true, but the point here is that if you do accept the fact that universals exist, then you aren't an Objectivist. You are an intrinsicist. Your thread is about nominalism, too... which is a basic metaphysical and epistemological issue. From the OP: The nominalist doesn't deny that there are concrete particulars out there in reality to which concepts refer. That is exactly their position, that "these names refer merely to an organization of concretes, that this is our way of organizing concretes". What they deny is that there are any real universals to which concepts refer - which is exactly what Rand denies. Hence the result: without a real universal as the standard, true or false are not applicable to definitions. At best what you get is that one way of organizing concretes is more useful than another, and hence one definition may be "better" than another in this sense of being "better" pragmatically. This is what Rand claimed essentially, that certain definitions are better than others according to context or unit economy. In these respects she was following the basic nominalist metaphysics which she endorsed. The issue is that every time she referenced natural kinds as the ground for identifying a concept or judging a definition as true or false, she was in fact stealing from a realist metaphysics which she denied. which is what splitprimary was saying earlier: If one is a nominalist, i.e. denies the existence of natural kinds, as Objectivism does, then definitions cannot be validated as "true" or rejected as "false", and from there open the floodgates to subjectivism and slavery and everything else you have diagnosed in this thread, I think correctly.
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