GCS

I don't mean to be defending Diana's view here. I don't even know what it is. My point is only that we should wait for her to put forth her view before we begin to assess it. What we have from Joerj11 can mean anyone of a number of things depending on how DH understands the ideas of open and closed systems. We would need more context. Moreover, it was inappropriate for Joerj11 to publicly quote bits of a private correspondence, and it is inappropriate and counterproductive for the rest of us to conduct a conversation based on this information. I would suggest that the moderators delete the relevant messages altogether.

It is inappropriate to post details of a private email exchange to a public forum. Joerj11's peculiar attempt to reformulate what he takes to be Diana Hsieh's position into logical formalism ("A can be A and B"), his lack of a clear statement of Mrs. Hsieh's position, and his approach to this correspondence, gives us every reason to question the accuracy of his reports on their exchange. Given this, the proper course in evaluating Mrs. Hsieh is to ignore Joerj11's comments and to judge her on the basis of her public writings.

AR discusses courage as part of the discussion of integrity in Galt's Speech. She calls it "a practical necessity" and writes that "courage is the practical form of being true to existence".

If anyone is interested in learning about Kant, I strongly recommend beginning with a secondary source. (The same goes for Aristotle, BTW, who is also very hard to read.) A shorter discussion is better than a long one to start with, so I think the place to go is a good history of philosophy. The best and most accessible one I know of (on Kant at least) is W.T. Jones's _A History of Western Philosophy_. The chapters on Kant are in the 4th volume and are quite readable. (It might be helpful to read the chapters on Hume first.) -Greg

I don't really want to get involved in this debate again, and I certainly don't want to discuss anything further with Isaac, who is quite obnoxious. But in case any one else is following this it may be worth making a few observations. Isaac's C3 does not follow from his C1 and C2 (nor is his C3 true). It does not follow from the principle of non-contradiction that nothing can have two contradictory attributes *potentially*. The contradictory of "potentially a" is "not potentially a", not "potentially not a". For example, because it is pliable, a piece of clay is potentially a sphere and potentially a cube. So the same piece clay is a potential sphere and a potential non-sphere, for exactly the same reason, that it has the potential to take on a variety of shapes. There are a number of other problems with Isaac's argument and the whole style of arguing as CF has pointed out. The problem that's most likely to confuse an intelligent reader can be best raised with a question: Where does Isaac get the premise that the law of identity or of causality says that entities have act in *exactly* one way in one set of circumstances. All that the law of causality says is that it has to act in accordance with it's identity, and there's no reason why the identity of some things can't be such that they act in a non-predetermined way -- that they choose. In fact the nature of people is that we do act this way. Because we have the power of choice people have the potential to make any one of a number of contradictory choices. It is also a mistake to assume, as Isaac has been, that because an entity is the sum of its attributes and its actions express its identity that each action needs to be reducible to some set of attributes. An entity is more than a *collection* of attributes. It is a *unity* that can be analyzed into attributes. But it's actions are determined by the whole not by the parts taken in isolation. (It is also worth noting that in his previous post where he claims that on his view our actions are "up to us", they are only up to us in the sense that it is "up to a tree" whether or not to sprout leaves. But that amounts to saying that it isn't up to us at all.)

I keep on regretting putting my two cents into these threads. I keep thinking that I can make a brief helpful comment, but inevitably I end up getting drawn into a debate. So this will be my last post here for a while. All causality is an entity causing itself to do something, so it is not surprising that Isaac can reformulate causal statements to bring that point out. However, some of his specific reformulations rest on confusions. The concept "nature" conceptualizes an entity from a certain perspective (viz. as a metaphysically-given cause of actions). It is not valid to simply substitute "my nature" for "me" in sentences, just as it is not valid to substitute "my existence" or "my identity" for "me" into sentences. You can't say, for example, "My nature gave my existence's girlfriend's being the actuality of a card that said 'Be my unity's valentine'". The problem with that isn't just that this sentence is cumbersome. It is a misuse of all the metaphysical jargon I threw in there. It is true that existence is identity and identity is nature. But that does not make the concepts equivalent. Each concept gives a different perspective. And that perspective is necessary and valid only in certain contexts. (Incidentally, in 99 out of 100 cases, if you're tempted to write an equal sign between two concepts, there is something seriously wrong with your thinking.) Now human beings cause actions in a special way that is not predetermined by past events. Not all aspects of all of our actions are metaphysically given. So it is wrong to say that, in a case where we have a choice, our nature determines the action. That would obliterate the concept "choice" altogether. If you want to use the language of "nature", the proper formulation would be that our nature determines *that* we will choose but not *what* we will choose. What we choose is caused by *us* in a *different way*. It is precisely this different type of causation that gives rise to the need for the concept "choice". Now when I say what we choose is caused by *us* rather than our natures, what exactly does this mean? The nature of a thing is that thing *qua* necessitator of actions. But what we choose is caused by us *qua* *chooser* of actions. Now, if this all seems convoluted, it's because, it's because it is designed to make a very simple point accessible from within a warped rationalistic context. The direct way to come at the issue is just to notice that we can choose and that causing something by choice is different from causing it in some other way. For example, choosing to blink is different from blinking automatically (e.g., when dust enters your eye), though both are caused by you. That difference is self-evident and, in the end, that is all that the issue of freewill vs. determinism turns on. Isaac claims that the law of causality (or the concept of nature, or whatever) rules out the possibility of (non-predetermined) choice. But what's the basis for this claim? Where does he get his (overly narrow) conception of causality? Where does he get the concept "nature"? The argument is nothing but a string of words. If we detach our concepts from the facts that give rise to the need for them and write them neatly on pieces of paper in strings with equal signs and arrows, we can create all sorts of very rigorous feeling proofs, but it's all meaningless and it just leads to confusion. Parmenides, for example, "proved" in this way that motion and plurality were impossible, inaugurating two centuries of vexed absurdity. All of this was solved when Aristotle simply (but brilliantly) turned his attention to the facts that gave rise to the relevant concepts, at which point all the tangled webs of pseudo-logic dissolved making progress possible. Let's follow his example in philosophy rather than tying our minds in knots by emptying his concepts of meaning and playing word-games with their carcasses.

Your nature and you aren't different, they're the same, and your nature determines that in certain circumstances you *choose* -- i.e., cause action in a certain uniquely human way that is not predetermined.

I don't have the time or interest in continuing this thread. In response to Anatotle, I'll just make some closing points. (1) The LP Platform does say: "The violation of rights and liberty by other governments can never justify foreign intervention by the United States government." It says other things that seemingly contradict this, but none that actually do. (2) The Declaration of Independence makes it very clear under what situations succession is appropriate, and the Revolutionaries did not believe in succession of individuals or of sundry political entities. (3) A legitimate government is one that is essentially rights-protecting, rather than rights-attacking, which has freedom of speech, and a political process whereby one can work peacefully for improvement. Examples: America, England, France, Canada, Japan, and many many other nations. The contrast would be to, e.g. Iraq (pre-invasion), Iran, Cuba, etc. (3) I don't think a third party garnering 5% of the vote, would have any significant effect. Whereas 5% added or subtracted from either of the serious parties could sway an election. What effect exactly do the 3rd party supporters have in mind? By what steps do they see this 5% leading to significant political change in the nation? And over how long? Voting for Libertarians, despite their flaws, was argued for here as a "real-world" solution. Something that will have effects in the short-term (unlike working for long-term cultural change). My point here has been that it will not have such effects. That is part of the reason why there are no *reasonable* third parties. All the present third parties are magnets for flakes. The whole idea of having a Libertarian Party stems from the subjectivism of the libertarian movement. The idea is "we want to change American politics NOW" regardless of the FACTS about the state of the nation, the necessary preconditions for political change, etc. The whole movement is subjectivist to the core, and the very existence of the Party is a result of that. KGVL writes: "If the Libertarian Party of 2004 is malleable enough that the younger members along with the more rational ones are receptive to Objectivist philosophy, then I advocate taking a step to restore as many of those freedoms as possible, as rapidly as possible." How do you imagine this occurring? What would be the steps? You talk about trying to bring Objectivism into the real world, and yet you haven't said anything about how an association with the Libertarian party might actually affect this sort of change. It seems as though your claim that we need to bring Objectivism into the "real world" just amounts to the *feeling* that we need to *do* something (anything) *now*. Throughout you've been focused on the need to take some action, but not on *how* that action would result in some value. What freedoms exactly do you hope to restore and by what steps?

But it is precisely the essentials of the Libertarianism that are bad. The fact that Libertarians don't typically explicitly endorse anarchism does not mean that anarchism and nihilism are not at the root of their philosophy. Libertarians are not espousing the right principles for the wrong reasons. They're mouthing some Objectivist slogans (e.g. no initiation of force) in a context that undercuts their meaning and their ability to apply them. For Objectivism the primary is right -- the moral principles necessary for men to live and pursue happiness in a social context. You start from certain moral principles then you build a form of government around it. Libertarians do not do this. They start from the premise, "we want to be left alone so we can do what we want", and build from there. Accordingly they say "ban force", and "all interactions should be voluntary". But what constitutes force? What interactions are voluntary? They're unable to apply this principle. Take some examples. The most striking example of this is their foreign policy. Libertarians typically say that just as one individual should not initiate force against another, no government should initiate force on another. But many governments are criminal tyrannies that have no right to exist in the first place, and whose very existence poses a threat to neighboring nations. On what grounds do they say, then, that it is illegitimate for one government to work to overthrow another. In the LP Platform it says: "Today, no government is innocent of violating human rights and liberty, and none can approach the issue with clean hands". Anyone who does not see an incredible divide between the governments of the US and of Iran, such that our government is *legitimate* and theirs is not, has entirely abandoned all the essentials of a proper political philosophy. The LP supports the "right to political secession" by "political entities, private groups, or individuals". What exactly does succession mean? It means making yourself of your group into your own little country, no longer affiliated with the rest of the nation. The idea that any assortment of people have a "right" to do this is simply anarchism. A government is a monopoly on force in a reason. If it doesn't enforce that monopoly, if it allows individuals or groups or city blocks simply to succeed and become autonomous regions it is no longer a government and cannot fulfill its function of protecting rights. Now the LP Platform says that in exercising one's right to succeed one still has "legal and moral obligations not to violate the rights of others". But what does this mean? Once one has succeeded one has a separate country. So under the laws of which country is there an obligation to respect rights? If the parent country, then the succeeding "entity" is still under the jurisdiction of that country and there is no right to succeed. In fact this section doesn't make any sense, but the very inclusion of the idea of succession (even if inconsistent) is a bow to anarchism. And note their policy on Indians is a reflection of their policy of succession. Note that the LP Platform's discussion of property doesn't even mention intellectual property, reflecting the fact that so many libertarians don't recognize the legitimacy of such property. And I could go on and on. These problems aren't mere details, they are the manifestations of an essentially subjective political philosophy. I stand by my previous statement that a vote for a third party is *nothing but a political statement*. Voting for a party that has a chance of winning and encouraging others to do so, is taking part in a large scale decision making process. Voting for a fringe party is exempting oneself from that process in order to make a statement about it. Now I don't say that we *ought* to vote for the Republicans or Democrats in any particular election. It depends on the details of the particular election, and often not voting is the best option. But if one wants to make a political statement (rather than seriously participating in an election) one should be very mindful of *what statement one is making* and *how* one is making it. In voting for Libertarians one *is* sanctioning their immoral policies (in a way that doesn't apply with real political parties). Also there is a special danger in voting for Libertarians. Because they awful and superficially similar to Objectivism, it is essential that we *differentiate* ourselves from them at every opportunity.

kqvl: What makes you think that a "pure objectivist" would leave this society, or that *any* sanction whatsoever is involved in staying and voting for the best available candidate? Atlas Shrugged takes place in a nation on the verge of dictatorship. America today is not such a nation, there's no need to shrug, and it would be positively irrational to do so. If you decide to vote you have two options: Republican or Democrat. Those are the only two parties that have any chance of winning, so it you're trying to have some short-term effect on the course of national policy, those are the only two votes that have any effect. If you are not satisfied with either of those parties (and you shouldn't be) you can work towards longer-term change. But you accomplish absolutely nothing by voting for some joke of a fringe party. And, if you’re an Objectivist, you're certainly not upholding your principles by doing so. Because they divorce liberty from its philosophical foundations and advocate it as a floating abstraction, the Libertarians are far more inimical to freedom than any of the major parties.

Isaac's interesting post ignores Rand's position on free will entirely. Like all soft-determinists, he posits and then debunks a false alternative between determinism and indeterminism. But what about the alternative of agent-causation, which Objectivism endorses? It's a bit disingenuous to say that this is one of the only points where Rand gets something wrong, and then to make an argument on the subject that doesn't even address her own position. Presumably Isaac thinks that it is ultimately a form of indeterminism, but he needs to argue for that, because it's not obvious (and indeed it's not true).

For one thing a vote for the Libertarians is nothing but an ideological statement, since (fortunately) the Libertarians have no chance of winning, nor do they have any chance of becoming large enough to exert a real political influence for a long long time. A vote for a party that has a real chance at winning can be a vote for the lesser of two evils, and needn't imply any endorsement. There is no shortcut to political improvement. Some people said they were interested in the Libertarian Party because they wanted to effect political change now. But you can't effect the kinds of change you want *now*. Your option is to squander your time pretending to have a political party with a bunch of disaffected nuts, or to do something productive with your life, and work over time for the type of political and cultural change that is possible and would be beneficial. This type of change requires advocating reason and egoism. And it requires clearly differentiating a proper capitalist government based on the recognition of individual rights from libertarian anti-concepts like "anarcho-capitalism" and "minarchism".

I agree with Ash here, but I'd like to add something. The acceptance involved in proof can't be "the same as any other physical reaction" because neither proof nor the acceptance of a belief, are *physical* reactions. First they're not physical, they're *mental*, second precisely because volition is key here, none of this is properly described as a *reaction*, which at least implies passivity. What's wrong with the standard Objectivist definition of proof as the process of establishing the truth of a proposition by reducing it to perception?

According to Bradley Thompson's "John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty" and to the evidence presented there, Adams, though very influenced by Deism, was never a Deist. He was a sort of minimalist Christian who was very critical of Christianity as traditionally practiced. Nothing in the quotes linked to earlier is inconsistent with this.

These lists seem to be missing one of the most damning quotes on Christianity from a founder: "Of all the systems of religion that were ever invented, there is none more derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more repugnant to reason, and more contradictory in itself, than this thing called Christianity. Too absurd for belief, too impossible to convince, and too inconsistent for practice, it renders the heart torpid, or produces only atheists and fanatics. As an engine of power it serves the purpose of despotism; and as a means of wealth, the avarice of priests; but so far as it respects the good of man in general, it leads to nothing here or hereafter." This is from the conclusion to Paine's _The Age of Reason_, which is an all out polemic against Christianity. In private correspondence Jefferson was supportive of Paine's book. (Franklin was not, but largely for pragmatic reasons.) What is interesting about _The Age of Reason_ isn't just its Deist content, it is its style and tone. The book makes no apologies for tearing apart and ridiculing *every* aspect of the Bible, from the consistency inconsistency and implausibility of the stories, to their unoriginality, immorality, and poor narrative structure, to the intelligence of the authors who he describes as fools, incompetents, etc. This is not a polite Critique from someone inching away from Christianity. It is an all out assault by a life-long enemy who sees the doctrine as wicked and ridiculous. That such a book could have been published, and widely read (and that at least one president seems to have agreed with its content) says a great deal about whether America's intellectuals were Christian at the time.