DonAthos

Are you saying that you believe that the government is exempt from the prohibition against the initiation of force?

It sounds like you're making many "assumptions." I don't know whether any of them are necessary to engage this question I'm asking you. Frankly, I don't believe that this is quite so complicated as maybe you're making it for yourself. When the government of the United States was established, it rested upon coercive taxation and it protected the institution of slavery, to cite two examples of how it violated rights. That means: this government we're discussing violated human rights from moment one, in an ongoing fashion, and as part of its very framework. Did the men who set up this government have the right to do that? Did they have the right to violate the rights of other men? I feel like I've asked this same question a number of times and in a number of ways, but I'm not sure that I've actually yet had an answer. Do you believe that they had the right to set up a government that violated other people's rights? Because if you examine the record, I think you'll find that this is exactly what they did. I've read the Preamble to the Constitution. It is very nice. The US Government is (just as it was when created) much more than the Preamble to the Constitution. We cannot examine the government of the United States by reading the Preamble alone. And yet it certainly was imposing its will on others. Though that's not strictly to our point; insofar as a person's actions are just (and politically we mean responding to force, with force), it is right to impose one's will on another. But in part the US Government imposed its will via coercive taxation, and treating human beings as property, regardless of how the Preamble might have read. Indeed. The perspective I'm interested in is the objective perspective, where we determine whether or not a government is legitimate (I would argue... and, in fact, am arguing) on this basis: only if it is committed in structure and philosophy to the elimination of the initiation of force, and itself responding with force only against its initiation; i.e. according to the principle of the non-initiation of force. For without this, there are no "individual rights" left (as the slaves in the early American Republic could possibly have told you).

Yay! It's great when people decide to "spell [their argument] out." (Literally in this case, given that this is all typed and what not.) It helps to simply say things in a straight-forward manner! It saves time! Emphasis added. And, once more, yay! It's now clear where we stand, so thank you for "spelling out " your case. Now, if you would allow me again to draw your attention to a quote or two from Rand that I'd raised earlier? (In this case, the emphasis is the author's original.) Here's another (from Textbook of Americanism): If these appear to directly contradict Hardin's conclusion -- that there is not any moral force to the argument that the government may not initiate force to do X, where X is what Hardin wants the government to do, or believes that it should -- that is because: they do. In fact, I would argue that it is precisely in anticipation of Hardin's type of claims that Rand was so clear and so adamant in her language. She doesn't leave it to implication that the government cannot initiate force, or protect some rights by abridging others (though we could easily draw out those implications from other passages and works, if it were necessary); she says flat out that the government must not initiate force. She has Galt ask "do you hear me?" And I cannot help but feel that some... do not. *** If it actually matters to anyone reading along, so far as I can tell, the Objectivist case for intellectual property and against fraud do not rest on the notion that the government has some special power in those cases to initiate the use of force. Rather, it contends that property held via fraud or in violation of intellectual property amounts to an initiation of the use of force. But these are matters best suited for examination in their own threads, if need be. What is salient here -- and what has been laid clear -- is that some here agree with Rand's position that the initiation of force must be removed entirely from society (and certainly including the government). And some believe that the initiation of force on the part of the government is at times necessary, for the greater good.

Do not concern yourself with eloquence, except to endeavor to speak clearly. I'll take you at your words to the best of my ability. As for "the use of 'monopoly' as a qualifier in the anarcho scheme of things," I'm not quite certain what that's supposed to mean, though I invite your clarification. Take it for granted that we agree that context is important; if you introduce relevant context, it shall be considered. If you mean/meant to try to explain how a government initially gains its "legitimacy," as I've invited you to do -- even with the example we've been using, which we're agreed is the best government so-far in the U.S. Government and Constitution -- perhaps I can help you to focus your response: With everything taken into account, those who established the U.S. Government (though any other real world government could be substituted, and this would still hold true) asserted that they had the "right" to infringe the rights of others... at least through coercive taxation, and, in our present example, also extending to the protection of outright slavery. Do you believe that they had the right to do that? The right to form a body which assaults the rights of others? If so, whence do they gain that right? (And in the name of "monopoly," how/why would you say that nobody else could do the same?) And if they did not have that right in the first place, then in what sense is the government "legitimate," and what does an individual/citizen owe to that government in terms of fealty, or obedience, or deference?

It is somewhat hard to tell whether this post is directed at me at all or not. On the one hand, it contains no response to any of the arguments or the questions I've raised across several posts... so it's tempting to think that it has no connection to the ongoing discussion whatsoever. On the other hand, coming in the context of the preceding conversation, one expects that Hardin's post would contain a such a response. Especially since it seems that no other response is forthcoming. If I took this as a response to the things I've actually said, and not the anarchist boogeymen it otherwise appears to address, it would be severely disappointing, and for a number of reasons... but it seems that it is maybe the likeliest scenario, and so I'll address it accordingly, even if ultimately unnecessary. In the first place, I don't consider myself to be a "defender of anarcho-capitalism," though I'm not familiar enough with that term to honestly say one way or the other. As I've said before, however, I don't really believe that "anarchy" has anything to do with the subject I've been discussing. The question isn't whether there should be any kind of "governance," or to suggest that there shouldn't be any such thing, but to sort out whether a monopoly on such activities is consonant with the principle of the non-initiation of force. And also, as a related question, I've been exploring the legitimacy of an initial claim to government, and its origin. But it appears that nobody else wants to deal with such questions substantively -- after all, what is "discussion" for? -- so I guess I'll not try to revisit that topic, until or unless somebody shows interest. This is vague and passive-aggressive, and it's not at all clear what the point is (except possibly to build straw men for the purpose of burning them down). Nobody has called for outlawing dishonesty or "sexual promiscuity." Nobody has said that government exists "for the purpose of upholding morality." Hardin says that "we must hold the context of everything that precedes politics" -- and yes, we must bear relevant "context" in mind in discussing this, or anything else. But there is a profound difference between a general (and empty) call for "context," and directing our attention to something that actually pertains. So government doesn't exist for the purpose of upholding morality? That's good to know. It was also, perhaps incidentally, never in question. What remains is that people acting in the capacity of "the government" must act morally (for just like Soylent Green, "government" is people). Where politics is concerned this means that the government may not initiate the use of force. In Galt's speech, Ayn Rand said: Though perhaps she was confused when she said "no man"? Perhaps she meant to add "except of course Dennis Hardin and anyone he appoints may, should he deem it necessary for some greater good"? Though even if she had done, I believe we ought to call it into question. Ahh... so that's the relationship of ethics to politics, per Objectivism? "What is moral in ethics must be possible in politics." And... "ociety must institutionalize the conditions which enable man to live morally." I fear to know -- though the possibility suggests itself to me -- whether this formulation opens the door for certain initiations of force (which I would deem "immoral" otherwise), if done in order to "institutionalize the conditions..." Furthermore, it seems to me that these are (again) rather vague, and unlike what I've come to expect from both Rand and Objectivism. If only there were something more... simple. More clear-cut. Oh. Wait. From "The Objectivist Ethics": Whether one accepts Rand's phrasing, or prefers Hardin's... "interpretation," we should further recognize that none of this actually addresses any of the matter under consideration. Though perhaps that's the point? We could do this... or we could stick to the actual topic at hand. Though if you would like to discuss intellectual property, I assure you that there are a multitude of other threads in which you can speak your piece. Once again, nobody has claimed that the "evil of the initiation of force" is an axiom. Perhaps if we could find someone to make all of the claims against which you're arguing, you would do quite well, and solve many controversies. Unfortunately, in the context of the replies which have come before yours, these straw men and obfuscations will not serve. Fortunately, no one (here) is doing this. Though there are actual posts in this thread with actual arguments that perhaps, when you have time and interest, you could attempt to address... ...or not. In any event, I agree that the "implications" of your regrettable post are obvious. You either do not know how to defend your position against the questions that have been put to it, or there is no way to do so, because you are wrong.

They had "differing views"? All right. They had differing views -- what of that? I'm interested in finding the objective criteria as to what makes a government legitimate, and I do not believe it depends on the subjective views that a group might have, per their time, their culture, etc. Folks in the Soviet Union, and etc., may have had "differing views on peoplehood." I do not take it that, as a result, we must uphold that government as being "legitimate." (Unless all government is somehow "legitimate.") Do you take seriously the idea that man has rights of his nature? And that government's purpose is to uphold and defend those rights? If that is true now, then it was equally true then... unless man's fundamental nature has changed over the years. So you say it was "legitimate," and now I want you to describe what makes it so, in your view. Obviously it's not respecting rights, or setting "might" on the side of "right," because that didn't happen then and has not happened subsequently. Unless I'm mistaken, coercive taxation was there from the beginning, and slavery as we've discussed, and if I were to investigate early American government, I suspect I could find all manner of other things that we would account rights violations. Do you disagree? Now, what I mean by "rights violations" is 1) turning the very purpose of objective governance on its head, by setting the government against the citizens it is supposed to protect, and 2) an abridgement of an individual's life, liberty, property, etc. So... should the individual whose rights are abridged -- whose life, liberty, property is attacked by the government -- regard that government as being "legitimate"? Should a man pronounced a slave by governance in the 18th century have respected that judgment, because after all, the legitimate monopoly government said that it was so, and people just didn't know enough back then to be expected to do anything different? What fealty does an individual owe to a government that does not respect rights -- as no government on earth ever has -- and what is the precise source of that obligation? And further, how does an individual -- or a group of individuals -- become a legitimate government in the first place? Is it just a matter of getting a gun, pointing it at a group of heads and then proclaiming "I am the government now"? Does that carry moral force in impelling those targeted to bend their knee and obey my commands, because they must obey someone? Where does that moral force -- the "legitimacy" of a government -- come from? (And btw, tadmjones, I'm not asking you these questions either because I think you must have the answers, or to pick on you, but because these are the questions I'm currently asking myself.) Yes. I think so. I think that no individual should accept anything less. Where a government is not guided by the non-initiation of force in its actions, it is initiating force. It is curtailing rights. Hurting the people it is meant to protect. To accept that morally (to grant it "legitimacy"), I think, is to concede that "some sacrifices must be made" where the "sacrifice" might be you, me, your father, my son, etc.

This may be so. Where it falls short of "perfection," it allows for (or even demands) the initiation of force against the people for whom government is supposed to be a protection against such force. I have demonstrated the "essential flaw" of a "monopoly" on justified force in the arguments I have laid out, and which you have not addressed. That the preservation of a monopoly would require the initiation of force against those who would assert their own governance, even if they were not themselves initiating force, and even if they were acting in full concord with objective justice. You are furthermore not even addressing that portion of my post(s) which you have quoted. Can you describe the process by which a "monopoly government" initially gains its legitimacy? Since you have upheld the U.S. Constitution (and one assumes, by extension, the U.S. Government) as being "the closest mankind has gotten," would you say that its inception was legitimate, despite, upon inception, upholding various features such as, to name one, slavery? Does that count as a legitimate government with respect to a philosophy which holds the non-initiation of force as its guiding political principle?

This question runs deep, in my opinion, so get comfortable. We might be here for a while. Let me first try to describe a "private court" in the context of this conversation. The idea of the modern state is a government with a monopoly on the use of legitimate force (primarily, though with more or less allowance for personal self-defense) in a given territory. One of the services such a government is expected to provide is a justice system, typically incorporating courts. A "private court" would be an entity within that state which also provides justice, though not-affiliated with the government which claims "monopoly." Now, I believe that the question before us is this. Imagine for a moment that we took seriously the idea that it is wrong to initiate force, and that we wished to govern ourselves by that idea. That "government" means that we commit our force, individually and collectively, only in response to its initiation -- via self-defense and retributive justice. If we did such a thing, and enshrined our idea in a Constitution so that our land were governed by the principle of the non-initiation of force, and some entity within our land set up a "private court" as described above, would we take action against that court for the purpose of preserving our monopoly? And to that question, my answer (thus far) is: we should only take action against that court if that court, itself, were initiating the use of force by acting contrary to the principles of justice. If, however, that "private court" were equally committed to the principle of the non-initiation of force, and acting only to provide objective justice, then we would have no call to take action against it. Indeed, to act against such a court would be an initiation of the use of force on our part. But then, if we allow the establishment of such a court... what has become of our "monopoly"? For after all, the idea of a "private court" is ultimately a self-contradiction, is it not? Insofar as the word "private" is meant to mean apart from governance, and that role which government is meant to play in effecting justice within a society, there can be no "private court"; every court is government of its nature. Equally suspect is the term "anarchy," thrown around in this thread and elsewhere. To suggest that the creation of an additional court which provides objective justice means to have no government whatever is flawed on its face, when we're actually talking about a net increase in... uh... archy. So if we take "anarchy" to mean "without government," then the idea of a "private court" is not a blow for anarchy at all, and rather its opposite. It does, however, take aim at one feature of the modern state that is typically assumed to be part and parcel with governance itself (in, perhaps, a bit of a "package deal"): that a particular government (meaning here: certain specific individuals and established institutions) must have a monopoly on the functions of governance. But as we've seen, insofar as other individuals within a state or a society administer objective justice apart from the previously recognized "monopoly government," then to take action against those individuals for the purpose of maintaining one's monopoly would be an initiation of the use of force. Thus, I find that the establishment of a "monopoly government" is incompatible with the principle of the non-initiation of force. And after all, we may imagine whether a John Galt, say, would feel a call to take action against some portion of Galt's Gulch who decided to administer government themselves, so long as they continued to do so according to the principles of objective justice. I'd imagine that his response would be something like, "so long as they don't initiate force against another man, they can do what they'd like." If I'm right about all of this (and, full disclosure: most of these ideas are very very new to me; and I've certainly not tried to articulate them before)... ...then I believe that what I'm discussing is actually the full flower of "a government of laws and not men." Or not even "laws," per se, but enshrining the principle of the non-initiation of force at the very peak of governance. After all, what gives a "monopoly government" its legitimacy? How does one man, or group of men, decide that they are capable and authorized to enact justice, and no other? Is it the first to claim that "he is the government"? Is it that act which grants him moral leave to initiate force against any other man who would make a similar claim? I suspect that historically this is so, in combination with the size of his rock or club -- the very "might makes right" which perhaps (hopefully) you would decry. But if might does not make right -- if only right makes right -- and if we take "right," politically, to mean the observance of man's rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force, then I think that we also must not initiate force against another man or group of men who are equally committed to protecting man's rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force... even if that means that there is no such thing as a legitimate "monopoly" on these activities. In one sense -- viewing "government" as a particular set of defined institutions and individuals which have a monopoly on the administration of justice -- this will seem like "anarchy," despite what we've discussed above. In another sense, however, it can be understood that these "private courts" would actually be operating within one government -- but it would be a government aligned around the principle of the non-initiation of force (which would have the only monopoly remaining: a philosophical monopoly), as opposed to being aligned around specific men and specific institutions. It would be a full recognition of the objectivity of justice, which does not derive its legitimacy from the "official" nature of those who enact it, but from the nature of the act itself -- what is just is just, and what is not is not.

Insofar as a person declares himself a "libertarian" by which he means that he believes in minimal government, but does not care to understand the moral basis of his political beliefs, or, more widely, ground them in metaphysics and epistemology, he is mistaken. He is equally mistaken if he asserts that he needs no philosophy apart from politics, even to do political good alone. While laissez-faire capitalism is correct, it cannot be properly defended or implemented when divorced from those wider philosophical principles from which it is derived. Viewing Objectivism through a strictly political lens, this is what it contributes to the discussion. However, insofar as "libertarianism" is the advocacy of minimal government, of individual rights, of "liberty," then Objectivism is rightly thought of as a "libertarian philosophy." An Objectivist is a libertarian, while not all libertarians are Objectivists. Similarly, there are atheists for all sorts of reasons, good and bad. While atheism could not be said to have one "philosophy" -- like libertarianism, "atheism" merely reports one's position with respect to a delimited topic -- it is certainly true that Objectivism is atheist. This does not mean that an Objectivist will find common cause with any or all other atheists; Marxism is atheist as well. And other libertarian philosophers or adherents generally are as apt to diverge with Objectivism as anyone else. But it is also not the case that Objectivism is somehow antagonistic to libertarianism or atheism, as such. Rather the opposite: it provides the best case for both libertarianism and atheism.

Are you quite certain this distinguishes our viewpoints? I'll come back to this in a moment, but for now let me observe that this is something I've often heard in opposition to any number of Objectivist principles, arguments or conclusions. That it's all too "fantastical" or "idealistic." That, after all, in the "real world," men make compromises to their principles in order to "get things done." And in such a case, it would not be just for the government to initiate force against that private court. Both because of how lovely it would be, and also because it is wrong to initiate the use of force -- it is a violation of rights -- even when the government does it. And so long as gun owners use their guns with justice (i.e. in self-defense, or for other things that do not violate others' rights), everything is lovely. The problem, of course, is that it is very likely that some gun owners will not use their guns justly. And in that event, someone's rights have been violated. Violations of rights are intolerable, of course. But as with gun owners, I think it's necessary to distinguish between those that actually do violate other peoples' rights, and those who do not. I think that such a distinction is, itself, an application of "justice." Those courts which pursue objective justice, which here means all of the procedural safeguards you mention along with whatever you think a government should properly do, do not violate rights, and thus a just government would not take action against them -- would not initiate force. But those courts which do not pursue objective justice, and violate rights, should have action taken against them, just as anyone who violates rights should. Before leaving off, I want to return to your observation that "it is very likely that the private court might [violate rights.]" I wonder how you come to this conclusion? Do you think that the government, generally, performs tasks more efficiently and with less corruption and immorality than similar tasks undertaken by the "private sector"? Since you've mentioned my "dream worlds" and "fantasy worlds," against which you're offering the sober perspective of "the real world," perhaps it is worth reintroducing the context of the actual world in which you and I currently live, in which there is not a single government which has ever, ever existed, except through a mass and continual violation of human rights. If your argument is that we must not have private courts, but only government courts, because -- heaven forfend -- a private entity could never be relied upon to act justly, as opposed to that stalwart bulwark of human rights known as the government, then I must say that you are very far from "the real world" yourself, in which perhaps the best government on record in the history of the planet, the United States, has laws which stand in perpetual violation against every conceivable human right, survives through a system of continual compulsory taxation, nationalizes the property of its citizenry, drafts its men to war, and so on. Given a private court today comprised of men of justice who subscribe to an objective code of justice, as against the government court of the United States, I should certainly prefer that private court as being the better protector of my actual rights. However we regard the idea of a private court -- hopelessly idealistic, a "dream world," or whatever other way you might think to slight it -- I think it stands at least as far from the reality of our situation as the remaking of the United States or any other actual government into a paragon of morality and protector of man's rights. If I am correct in my arguments that private courts would be allowed in a just government, then I'm no closer or further away from "reality" than you, but I would have the advantage of advocating a more consistent system of justice.

I'm not here to speak about "libertarianism," but what you've said here reminds me of my own introduction to Rand. She was being name dropped and dismissed among certain of my acquaintances as being brilliant-but-wrong with outrageous claims. I decided that I should investigate her claims, and her reasoning, for myself by going to the source. I didn't respect those people who, at the time, were content to dismiss her without first seriously considering her ideas (or honestly even understanding her ideas), nor did I take it seriously when they would claim to understand her ideas without needing to read her presentation of them. I still don't.

But I don't believe that anyone (yourself included) argues that government ought to control the use of force entirely -- imagine the application of such an argument to gun control, for instance. If a government's goal is to prevent the initiation of force -- this and nothing more -- then we can agree that such a government is just. But to argue that such a government must be the only agency that may respond to force, or act to protect individual rights, or enact justice, is something else altogether. More to the point, that's precisely the question under examination. In positing a private trial/court, we are examining an entity that does not initiate force, but responds to it in the same manner that we ordinarily ascribe to the government. If this private court observes justice in the same manner as a just government would, then our private court would not harm individual rights anymore than the just government -- would it? If you believe that this private court would damage individual rights (by, say, convicting a murderer in the same fashion that a government court would), then I'll ask you, again, to please demonstrate how. Would the private court be initiating the use of force against the murderer in proclaiming him a murderer or punishing him for it, in as objective a fashion as we may ask of any government? I do not believe that punishing a murderer for his crimes is an initiation of force. It seems to me that justice is a question of making sure that the murderer pays for his crimes -- and proper procedure is required to do this correctly. But apart from that, I don't see how it matters who dispenses the justice in question, so long as it is done correctly. If the government's "job" is to prevent the initiation of the use of force within its jurisdiction, then I do not believe it follows that the example of the private court is acting to prevent the government from doing its job; I do not prevent the street sweeper from cleaning the streets by finding a candy bar wrapper on the ground and throwing it in the trash. In what way? How would an independent agency that metes justice -- and does so according to whatever procedures you would demand of a just government -- act as a threat to the rights of any man? And thus far I believe I must disagree with this. The government (as with any group) does not have any additional or special rights; it only has the rights of the individuals which defer to that government. If government does not harm individual rights, as such, in administering justice -- if that is not an initiation of force -- then I would think that individuals could administer justice outside of a particular government (i.e in what we're calling a "private court") in the same fashion: with the character of retaliatory/just force and not as an initiation of force. What we haven't yet shown is that the government's "job of protecting rights" is necessarily frustrated or hampered or otherwise "obstructed" by another institution that also protects rights. But besides this, I'm afraid that I do believe that government must be restricted from initiating force (in even a "technical sense") for me to consider it just. Some may argue (as I've seen before elsewhere) that government must be able to tax people against their will, because such taxation is necessary for government to survive and do its good work of protecting rights, and so on. That the ends justify the means. And yet I do not believe in compulsory taxation either, because that is an initiation of force, both technically and truly. If we propose a government that survives on voluntary contribution, and never initiates force (even in a "technical sense") but only responds to the initiation of force, and only acts with justice, then I'm all for it. But I'm not willing to accept compromises in that regard.

To consider the question of "monopoly," I don't think we are best served by a hypothetical of a poorly administered "private trial." But imagine a private trial that does *everything* that government normally does in terms of due process, incorporating the same rules of evidence and jury selection and so on that you mention, and the same level of sensitivity to "any hint of impartiality." A private trial that provides as much "assurance" that justice will be served as any trial run by the state (unless you believe that no such private entity could ever "assure" justice in the same way... but then I would have to ask why not). Would the state -- in the name of preserving its monopoly of the administration of justice alone -- be justified in shutting down a trial that in all other respects was perfectly consonant with objective justice? When you say that "[t]he government would be justified in acting on principle to prevent the initiation of force by such agencies, even if, in a given instance, a particular agency acted properly," I must observe that this may be begging the question. For after all, I'm not talking about an agency initiating the use of force, but responding to force with force, as is just, in the same manner that a government might do. Justice in this case remains an aspect of self-defense. If, however, you're saying that the government is justified in acting on principle to prevent the use of force in response to force -- acting against those who have not initiated it (i.e. the agencies under discussion) -- then aren't we ultimately advocating the initiation of force on the part of the government?

Hey Dennis, I'm going to try not to be either "long-winded" or "ambiguous," though I've started to give some thought to the matters being discussed here, and I have questions... so I hope you don't mind? Suppose within a traditional ("monopoly") government, I decide to offer my own services of law and order, in order to effect justice in society where perhaps I believe there is ordinarily failure. I do so according to what you and I agree are objective principles, and let us stipulate that I observe whatever procedural features the traditional government likewise grants (i.e. trial by jury; habeas corpus; etc.). You would contend that the government should act to preserve its "monopoly" by shutting my efforts down, and that it would be right to do so -- is that correct? But if the government is to use force against me -- and to do so, itself, with justice -- then we are contending that I have somehow initiated the use of force. Yes? How so, and against whom? If I find a murderer and put him on trial and do everything that we would also have a proper government do, then am I not acting properly? -- which is to say, I am not initiating force, but acting in response to an initiation of the use of force, just as any other proper governmental action?

This forum is part of the "real world." And participating in this forum, conversing, clarifying one's understanding, learning to articulate one's views -- all of these are "actions which we take in the real world."

It has become apparent to me that I'll have to give all of these matters much more thought -- and do some reading besides. The Smith essay to which you'd linked, I've only just read. It is very interesting and does indeed seem to echo some of the thoughts and questions I've had in trying to engage this subject. So thank you for that, and if you have any other recommendations on further reading, I'd love to hear them. Since I'm here, however, on the subject of "procedural rights" and the inability of a man to "be a judge in his own case," I wonder: a man on a (nearly) deserted island, who has no recourse to a court or etc. Is it impossible for such a man to act justly? Can no man act on his own behalf with justice, because (accounting to "procedural rights"), to act on behalf of oneself is unjust of its very nature?

My take is basically the same, with two exceptions: 1) As has been referenced in this thread before, there are some who seem to hold Rand up as some sort of paragon of human virtue. It is Rand's ideas which are important, not the details of her personal life, as I believe that she herself would have maintained. But if some are going to use her personal life as some sort of evidence to make a point (as referenced in the quote immediately below), then, in order to engage such a claim seriously, we may have to make our own examination of the facts, such as we can. 2) In the process of doing what I've suggested in #1, it has been my experience that some people are willing to argue themselves into pretzels in order to provide a "defense" for Rand's actions, and thus preserve the conclusions of "moral perfection" or what-have-you. And these rationalizations can themselves be dangerous if taken seriously. For instance, my own participation in this thread was brought on, not to discuss Rand/Branden (for like you, I don't personally "give a rat's ass" what sex folks I've never met got up to decades ago), but because someone here made a claim that "[a]ll romantic relationships should be private," where "private," based upon the context, could very well mean "secret" (though we don't strictly know yet, because the person who posted that hasn't yet explained himself).

It seems to me that there is a large difference between keeping the details of a romantic relationship "private" versus keeping the relationship itself a secret. Before getting married, people were certainly aware that I was involved romantically with my now-wife, though they weren't necessarily privy to the details. And I suspect that this has been true of every substantial romantic relationship that I've had. I would really have needed to work to "hide" it from others -- and for what purpose? Because "all romantic relationships should be private"? What do you think you mean by this? How would hiding my relationship with my now-wife from my friends and family have made my life better?

You're restating your position on gun control, and again, I understand and respect the position you're taking. However, in order to resolve potentially thorny issues about where an individual can act on his own accord in self-defense -- versus what it is (and ought to be) illegal for an individual to do (because he has taken on the government's proper role) -- I believe we have to explore the nature of what Rand refers to here, which she describes as the "delegation" of a right of self-defense. We have to dig a little bit into the fundamentals. All right, so to put your position in concrete terms, what you mean is: there should be no restriction on private ownership of nuclear weapons. No "arms control" whatever. Is that correct? As to what I mean by an individual becoming "so powerful that their government would no longer be able to stop their actions," suppose I had a nuclear weapon or several at my disposal. And suppose I decided that I would no longer pay taxes to the federal government, on account of my belief that such taxation is theft. Any attempt on the federal government's part to enforce its tax policy on me will be considered an initiation of the use of force, and I am willing to commit any or all of the weaponry at my disposal to a response. Perhaps this is what you mean by "revolution"? I'm not certain. But in any event, at this point, what entity would thereafter "govern" me, and by what means? I think we're agreed that any situation must be practically analyzed to determine the correct response -- and that "collateral damage" is certainly a factor, just as you say. I must admit that I don't have nearly the breadth of knowledge you do when it comes to various philosophical positions on "anarchy," and etc. My only knowledge of Smith thus far comes from his book on Atheism, which I read long ago (before reading Rand, actually). But I will read through your linked example, soon. This seems to make sense. And again. Just to probe this position a little... (I hope you don't mind?) What, in your view, would distinguish a "vigilante" from someone who simply opted to withdraw his delegation of the right to self-defense (from whence must spring every aspect of governance, including the administration of justice)? What would separate a "vigilante" from a "government of one man"? And should this "vigilante" operate completely according to those principles and procedures by which we would otherwise recognize "objective justice," would we still consider him to have committed a crime? What would the nature of his crime be (i.e. against whom would he have initiated the use of force, and by what actual means)? Well, I guess the idea is that, if a person can legitimately surrender his right to self-defense (for at times I suspect that we're discussing more than a mere "delegation"; after all, if I delegate grocery shopping to you, I'm empowering you to buy groceries in my name... but I'm not restricting myself in any way from also buying groceries for myself)... then perhaps the means of self-defense may rightly be considered a part of that surrender. But yes, the "obstacle" you mention of people having other reasons (deemed "legitimate" by... some authority) for possessing these arms would still exist; and, in fact, I think that's the case that some are implicitly making. People filming war movies. Mining in outer space. Museum owners. These are "legitimate reasons" for possessing certain weapons which otherwise may be restricted or prohibited (or licensed and registered). Well, let's not tiptoe here. It isn't merely that "there aren't any governments that haven't initiated force at some point," is it? It's that there haven't been any governments that haven't initiated force routinely, continually, and seemingly woven into their very fabric. It is that no government exists on earth that does not continually initiate force against its citizens today, and that no such government will exist for the foreseeable future. Let's keep in mind, too, that the point to all of this (and by "all of this," you may take me at the broadest possible meaning, whether our discussion, this Board, "government," or philosophy entire) is for the individual to benefit his own life. Ultimately gun control must rest upon the idea that an indivdual surrenders his means of self-defense to the government because he judges that it is in his own best interest to do so. I think that taking into consideration the "nature" of government-as-actually-practiced, as evidenced by every single example, from man's inception to present day, is necessary for an individual to make the proper decision with respect to his own life. Say that tomorrow we hit upon the "perfect government" somehow, and now a call went out for everyone to turn in their weaponry (minus whatever would be necessary for personal self-defense, or licensed to film one's movies, etc.). Should one be in favor of such a thing? Would it be the smart thing to do to comply? Would achieving the ideal Constitution today ensure that one might not be faced with a tyrannical government X years down the line, and regret having given up his means of self-defense? Mistakes have been made, and perhaps things are improving -- but this is an argument for an individual to divest himself against the protection that he may need, should another "mistake" be made? After all, we do not live according to the "sweep of history." We live individual lives. What should it matter to me that "today's government" is generally quite good and respectful of rights, if I should be the man whose property is confiscated according to eminent domain, or whose children are drafted into the military, or etc? And besides, I think that such "improvement" happens in fits and starts, and a general trend is no guarantee that everything will move up in an uninterrupted fashion. Sometimes it is "two steps forward, one step back," as I'm sure Russia discovered after the Kerensky government, or Germany post-Weimar. Predicting the future isn't much my thing, but I've heard tell that some prominent Objectivists may believe that there's an impending religious/totalitarian uprising coming for the US or something like that. So you have answered my question of "why would anyone delegate" with the response of "because government works." To that I would say that sometimes government works, and sometimes it does not. And where it does, I suppose an individual isn't much worse off for having relieved himself of the burden of his own self-defense... and where it does not? I suppose he is no longer much disposed to argue the point.

Who is "we"? To what "argument" are you referring? Are you talking about "the right of hobbyists"? That's not what I'm talking about.

Understood. Let me ask you then, in the first place, whether you're comfortable with the language of Rand that I'd introduced in that post: that "[t]he individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government." If it is the case that an individual "delegates" his "right of self-defense" to the government (though I might suggest that this is only proper in relation to a government that is, itself, properly constituted), then what is the nature of this "delegation"? Does the individual thereby "lose" anything of his "right of self-defense"? Could this extend to arms? And, if the government is "the agency vested with the ability/responsibility of stopping the actions of individuals that seek to infringe on the rights of others," then isn't it necessary in practice that the government must be more powerful than the individuals by which it is vested? Is it the case that an individual (or group of individuals) could become so powerful that their government would no longer be able to stop their actions (whether rightly or wrongly)? And if so, then is there a case that arms control of some kind is necessary so that a government can effectively govern?

All right, I'd just like to be very clear about this. (I'd like to be very clear about everything, if possible, even beyond a general desire for clarity, but because there are so many "moving parts" to a discussion like this.) If I understand you right, you're saying that a private citizen cannot possibly employ a nuclear weapon in self-defense because there would be too much "collateral damage"; "because its use would be impossible to pinpoint the intended target without spillover effects onto innocent third parties." But isn't it also true that a government's use of a nuclear weapon "would be impossible to use to pinpoint the intended target without spillover effects" in that very same manner? So I read you as saying that nuclear weapons should be permitted to no individual or group (including governments/countries) on Earth whatsoever -- because their use is not "compatible with the non-initiation of force principle." Do I have this right? I'm probably "somewhere in the middle" with you. I'm certainly no pacifist... but if the alternative to pacifism is given as "all's fair in war," I don't know that I can concur with that, either. In "The Objectivist Ethics," Rand said: And, speaking as Galt in Atlas Shrugged: While I think that it's true that some amount of collateral damage may be unavoidable in the prosecution of one's right of self-defense, especially in times of war, Rand's quotes certainly seem to agree with your position that "discrimination in the use of retaliatory force must be essential." Does this take nuclear weapons off the table completely? I don't think that it can. Supposing a situation where some enemy nation itself has nuclear weapons, I think that there are cases where a retaliatory nuclear strike (or a preemptive one, depending on context) may be justified -- as being the only thing that can reasonably be expected to effect a defense of one's life. What do you make of that? I didn't/don't mean to speak to the "homogeneity of the military," or lack thereof, or the likelihood of the US military, as presently constituted, waging war against US citizens. A "classic argument" against gun control (as I'm quite certain you know) is that private arms are necessary to defend oneself against tyranny -- and possibly, at times, to wage revolution. So I raise this point, at least in part, so that this discussion can be situated in familiar contexts. But okay. If you're saying what I think you're saying, then you don't think that the "military" ought to have legal access to any weapon that a "citizen" cannot, and vice-versa. Which means that nuclear weapons are either permitted to "one and all," or somehow to be eliminated entirely, with respect to every institution on Earth. (Or at least that every actor would be beholden to the same restrictions.) Do I have this right? I'm beginning to feel like this discussion of gun/weapon control -- especially that part of the discussion that we conduct -- might spiral inescapably into the question of "government" and "anarchy." And frankly? That excites me, because I've long wanted to engage you on the topic. In "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business," Ayn Rand said: I wonder. Must an individual delegate his right of self-defense to some external agency? Is this delegation a choice that a man actually makes? Is it a choice that he makes once? Daily/moment-to-moment? Or is it something that is rightfully forced upon a person, whether he would choose it for himself or not? When Rand says that it is "for [a] purpose" -- it leads me to believe that this is an appeal to man's mind. And the content of that purpose is "an orderly, legally defined enforcement." But is that enough? Is the trade of one's "right of self-defense" in an indivdual's interest merely for "order" or "legal definition," which it seems to me is available equally to such "orderly" states as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. Or should one only be willing to delegate his right of self-defense to a government which is committed to the principles of objective justice; i.e. a "proper government"? And of a "proper government," Rand-as-Galt says: Given that no actual government on Earth has ever been "proper" by this standard -- but every instance of government has been an initiatior of force against its own people -- then would it make sense for any individual to be willing to delegate his right of self-defense to such an authority? And if we consider arms to be part-and-parcel of one's "right of self-defense" -- and in the context of "gun control" (as Eiuol has argued for, and I think quite well) part of that which one "delegates" -- then would it make sense for any individual to voluntarily cede his right to arms? Further, I wonder if one's delegation of the "right of self-defense" is meant to be absolute? Meaning: post-delegation, does one still have the "right of self-defense" that one had initially? Is it gone completely? Has any part been retained? I know that some have drawn distinctions between an immediate application of "self-defense" and the administration of what we'd normally call "justice," as even in a state with a proper government, there will be criminals against which an individual would have to defend himself before the government is able to respond. Is the resolution of gun control (in a proper state) to be found there? Can we draw a sensible distinction between those weapons "proper" to personal and immediate self-defense versus the weapons "proper" to those aspects of "self-defense" that we consider to be delegated absolutely to the government? In any event, even a proper government cannot predict the future to guarantee that its citizens will not suffer from future tyranny. So would a proper government seek to eliminate its citizens' ability to defend themselves against such a thing in the first place? Or is one of the hallmarks of a proper government that it will undertake the defense of its individual citzens' right to self-defense, now and in the future, by not reducing any individual's means to defend himself; i.e. that it will not seek any form of gun/arms control?

That is an excellent question -- one that I think probably requires its own discussion to explore. For our purposes here, I think it sufficient that we recognize that there exists some point or threshold where a government is tyrannical, and where self-defense by a citizen, or many, up to and including overthrow of that government, is justified. Are we agreed on this? Whether there is a law which states clearly that possession, sale, manufacture, etc., of nuclear weaponry is prohibited -- or whether it is de facto prevented by some range of laws and regulations tied to certain elements necessary for those things (e.g. radioactive materials) -- is immaterial. And further, even if one managed to "loophole" his way into the construction of such a device on the grounds that no law as written prevented him from doing so, I have to imagine that some arm of Homeland Security would not wait on formality to confiscate it at the very, very least.

Just to restate this for clarification -- I really don't know where I fall on this topic, personally. So I'm going to engage your argument in order to probe the issue, but in doing so, I may easily wind up playing "devil's advocate." Aren't you describing the use of a nuclear weapon as such? Meaning: if my scenario's use of nuclear weapons is not compatible with the non-initiation of force principle, then neither would a government's use of nuclear weapons against any enemy on earth, foreign or domestic. This may get us tangled in the (equally contentious) debate as to what responsibilities a person has when defending himself to confine his response to the guilty; what "collateral damage" is acceptable. I know that I've seen it argued that any "collateral damage" is acceptable -- and is morally assigned to the original initiator of force due to his having provoked a response in the first place. That the person who suffers the initiation of force only has the responsibility to defend himself by any or all means, and no other consideration must enter his mind. So in my example, such a person would argue that the tyrannical government is responsible for the "innocent third parties" that I wind up nuking, in the course of defending myself and my rights. Not me. Further, I have seen it suggested before that people somehow "get the government they deserve" or are somehow considered responsible for their government a priori, so, you know, it's fine to let the bombs fall on enemy civilian targets, because they're not "innocent"; they've allowed this government to exist in the first place. And... again, as you can probably tell, I'm not personally convinced by either of those arguments either. But it does sound to me like your arguments extend beyond the issue of gun control I'd hoped to explore... and maybe call into question nuclear weaponry entirely (as well as issues of proper self defense and military response). To maybe help get us back on track (or maybe take us afield entirely), I've been thinking about it... and it seems to me that there's an interesting question here that perhaps relates to positions I've seen you take in other threads, re: "anarchy" (though, as I've expressed to you before, I do not believe that what you typically suggest is actually anarchy). Anyways, for the moment, let's consider the abstract. Should a man be able to defend himself against his government, should the government turn tyrannical and be the initiator of force? If we answer yes, then doesn't a man legally need the capability to do so? And doesn't that imply access to the same sort of weaponry possessed by the government (or perhaps even greater weaponry), so that his self-defense can be effective? But if an individual is "allowed" to be powerful enough to mount a successful defense against his government, turned tyrannical, then how can that government be powerful enough to fulfill its initial function as a guarantor of rights? For if its powerful individuals themselves initiate force against one another, the state may not have the power necessary to enforce justice... and in all cases, criminals would feel emboldened, knowing that they at least have a "fighting chance." If a populace were sufficiently armed that they felt confident that they could wage war against its government and win... then would that government have the authority necessary such that we can finally call it a "government" at all? Or have we taken a step closer to a practical "anarchy"?

It amounts to the same thing. This "specialized concern" is ultimately another individual or collection of individuals. If we say that we're authorizing the government to control that individual's disposition of his property -- in ways that we would not do with Pez dispensers -- then, again, we're talking about gun control. Though trying to introduce hypothetical examples is always fraught with peril, allow me to posit one example, and maybe we can illuminate some aspects of this issue. Suppose that outer space nuclear mining is a thing, and that there is a private business which manufactures these explosive devices (which can also be used as weapons). Now say that I live on earth and I'm rich, and I'd like to buy one of these nuclear devices for my own personal use on earth -- and they'd like to sell it to me. If we'd like for me to have a defined motive, let's say that I've read these recent threads here on Objectivism Online (archived into the far future, because our writings are all so brilliant that scholars into the far future have looked back on our efforts in awe)... and I was moved by CrowEpistemologist's argument that "civilian weapons are completely irrelevant in the face of the US government." Suppose I want to be able to defend myself against the future possibility of a tyrannical government, and so I would like to possess a nuclear weapon so that, should the government turn tyrannical and initiate force against its citizenry, I would have the capability of mounting a meaningful response in the name of self-defense. I may even hold out some hope that my mere possession of such a thing will function as a deterrent against said tyranny. Is there any problem with my purchase and maintenance of this weapon? Ought there be?