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  1. Today
  2. Proving that God does not exist. Can someone evaluate my reasoning here. Axiom: Law of Identity Observation: Self Evident Claim: There is a being that can do the miraculous. Definition of Mircale: an event that is not explicable according to natural laws, but super (above) nature. Violation: Law of Identity If someone claims that there is a being that can alter eixstence in a way that violates the law of identity then can’t it be said that it would be impossible for that being to exist? Why is this not a plain and simple proof that there is no God that meets this criterion and is therefore incoherent as an asserition that God (this kind of god) exist. A true miracle would be to turn water into wine. It would not be miraculous of water on its own to turn to wine if it could do this by the means of natural process. The notion of a miracle is “super” natural inexplicable according to natural laws. This assumes that the identity of win is different the natural identity of water. To make this happen there would have to be a violation of the Law of Identity. That is to say, that water would not really have identity in the first place. To have identity is to be something specific. Water cannot be water and also wine at the same time according to its identity. Hence, for someone to say that there is a being that could do such an act is to prove that such a being is incoherent and cannot said to exist in reality. Reality itself is the proof that God does not exist. Hence either God exists (which is incoherent) or reality exists. You cannot have your cake and eat it to.
  3. You might find this blog post useful for figuring out a purpose for your life: http://aristotleadventure.blogspot.com/2008/05/what-is-central-purpose-in-life.html
  4. The distinction I have in mind is different, but not incompatible with that. Physical necessity is about physical things. Logical necessity is broader, and includes the sort of necessity one can grasp in, say, higher mathematics. For example, this consequence is logically implied by this theorem. For example, this function is differentiable, therefore continuous. The reverse may be true, too, but not always.
  5. The weed-vine example strikes home to anyone who has tried it. In the example, a flowering vine, in the garden, pole beans, cucumber, to a lesser extent squash and pumpkin. Pulling the weed-vine meant being able to distinguish without being able to see, or where finding a viewing angle was just downright awkward. I took the physical-logical necessity as a neat example of ontologically based logic.
  6. My integrative and conceptual powers applied to a lifetime of experience still leave me scratching my head. Is this distinction an academic and historical characterization of what philosophers thought or think or is a first hand distinction of a proper philosophy? Is the distinction as follows: physical necessity IS metaphysical i.e. identity, and logical necessity IS epistemological i.e. non-contradiction?
  7. Four Things Next week, the Van Horns will be on a family vacation. I should be able to pop in from time to time to monitor comments and possibly post once or twice, but I won't guarantee it. In light of the circumstances, it seems fitting to leave you with a post about the kids. 1. When I told my daughter I liked her under-sea sketch so much I wrote about it, she asked why I didn't also post her flower sketch. I explained that I liked both, but preferred the one. In any event, here's the other, at right. 2. For me, the "killer app" of the Amazon Echo was, for the longest time, its weather report. Now it's the music player. Ever since we got bunk beds for the kids, I have had to replace my old morning wake-up tactic of last resort: I can't easily pick up either one from their beds now, so I play music. Fishbone, the B-52s, and (surprisingly) Gregorian chant are particularly effective. As an amusing bonus, I usually get an audible indication of success in the form of one of them shouting, "Alexa, stop!" 3. Question: What does a five-year-old boy do at home after he wins about a dozen rubber ducks from a claw game at the arcade? Answer: He takes off his shoes and socks, and jams about eight into one of the socks. Duh. 4. As the kids get older, the intensity of their different responses to me coming to pick them up from after-school care is beginning to wane, so I will note them now. My son, who will be six the next time I write about him, smiles and runs over for a hug. My daughter, soon to be eight, gets upset, especially if she is caught up in something that interests her. (She is like me in that she intensely hates to be disturbed while concentrating.) The memories of each that stand out the most are: (1) I was once slightly off-balance when I crouched to hug my son, and got knocked over. I had a mild ankle injury after that one. (2) My daughter once angrily asked why she never gets to be the last one to be picked up. This was on a day I was running late and had only about ten minutes to spare. -- CAV Link to Original
  8. Jordan Peterson interviewed Objectivist philosopher Stephen Hicks almost two years ago. In March he did so again. Links: video of first interview audio of second interview They are long, about 1.5 hours each.
  9. Thank you for that, Stephen, especially for the distinction between logical necessity and physical necessity. Also, I liked your comments about John Locke. I have began a series on my blog about inference and necessity. Here is the first: Blanshard on Implication and Necessity #1. More to come.
  10. Hi, I came across Ayn Rand in high school. It helped me organise my life back then and gave a lot of motivation to achieve my goal which was studying abroad. Now I’m at university but it didn’t really make me happy. Probably because my expectations were too big. I mean it’s alright but I started doubting in my future career related goals and got trapped in some sort of nihilistic mood. I can’t find anything that makes my truly happy or values that are worth living. Don’t get me wrong, there are many things that give me joy, probably too many but this is short term unsustained happiness which I consider very immature and irrational, nothing to do with true happiness. The only happiness that I could think of now is spending all time on art and Philosophy and sharing thoughts with like-minded people that I have big problems to find. How can man find his values? I admire people who know who they are. I feel like I can be anyone but I don’t know who I want to be therefore I’m no one. Whenever I think I overcame that nihilism of mine with some solution then there’s always another “why” that I can’t find answer. Does being an objectivist mean that you have everything figured out in your head?
  11. Yesterday
  12. PNC Ground Shifts to the Side of the Subject– Conventionalism III To set myself the task “weed this patch of periwinkles” I may need to use language. The two popular weeds there at this season are dog violets and a native vine I don’t know the name of. Getting to the nub of that weed-vine among the thicket of periwinkle vines and pulling out the former without pulling out the latter is a challenge. Names and language do not seem to be enlisted in executing the task; they enable only my report of this work. The weed-vine and the periwinkle are of different leaf shape and color. Tug gently on the end of the weed-vine reaching for the sun. You won’t be able to see the weed-vine you’re tugging but a few inches before it disappears (leafless in this portion of it) among the thicket of periwinkle vines hugging the earth and putting down their roots continually along their way. But as you tug on the weed-vine, you’ll be able to find with your other hand that single vine being tugged. It is tightly tensed and in synchrony with any rhythm of tugs you apply with the other hand. Repeat from there, and eventually you arrive at the nub of the weed-vine and pull out that vine by the root. Pause at a step in which you have the single obscured weed-vine in each hand. Pull with the one hand, feel the pull in the other. That is a perceived connection between two distinct events. At this point, philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Hume and Kant stick up their noses. Not Locke. That applied force can be conveyed along a vine is a physical necessity. That different things in general (as example, weed-vines and periwinkle vines) are not same things is another type of necessity, logical necessity, however neatly it coincides with physical necessity. Logical necessity holds unconditionally and in all contexts. What I’ve called physical necessity is traditionally taken to be necessity under some sort of limiting conditions, and this necessity has been called a contingent connection, reserving necessary connectionfor logical (and other formal) necessity. The real distinction, I think contrariwise, should be in what aspects of things we are accessing and the different ways these two aspects are accessed. Peikoff 1964 points out that Locke avoided the contingent/necessaryterminology. Locke instead applied probable/certainto the division. We have seen in my section Aristotle II that Locke maintained we have by sensory perception instances of the general fact that different things are not same things and that a thing is never both A and not A at the same time and in the same respect. Philosophers, including Peikoff in 1964, are correct to fault Locke’s blurring under probable/certaina clear understanding that ampliative inductive generalizations over perceived instances do not suffice to land the absolute necessity in general principles of logic or pure mathematics. Peikoff notes on page 218 the parallel criticism in Hume’s famous dictum that we do not find in sense perception any necessary connection between distinct events (distinct impressions,in Hume’s own parlance and perspective). Countering Hume’s quandary, Kant attempted a radical subject-sided formulation of necessities such as the necessity in a principle of causality, a reformulation in which Kant would have objective temporal order of distinct events get the necessity of that order from a necessity of causal structure demanded by human mind. (Cf. Peikoff 2012, 32–33.) Locke had fogged up by his softening of the distinction between (i) the physical necessities one can sense and manipulate with the weed-vine in one’s hands and (ii) formal and metaphysical necessities. Nevertheless, I maintain Locke right in taking (i) to be the driver of (ii) and not the other way around, as philosophers from Plato to Kant and beyond would have it. British empiricism has its good sense even if it was never good enough. Locke was not really of one mind in this. Peikoff lays out an opposite strand also inAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding: IV 3.31, 4.6, 4.8, 9.1, 11.13–14. “What is Locke doing in such passages as these? He is now contrastingeternal truths and existential truths. The former are to be discovered only by ‘the examining of our own ideas’, and ‘concern not existence’ . . .” (222). Peikoff points out that the likes of platonist Cudworth or Leibniz had also maintained such a division, but for them consideration of our own ideas accesses the eternal truths as immutable relations in the divine understanding. Eternal truths such as the laws of identity and noncontradiction, as well as the essences of existing things, are givens to the human mind, independently of our self-examinations accessing them. But for an empiricist such as Locke, rejecting that rationalism, and joining considerable nominalism (the conceptualist wing of nominalism) concerning universal ideas to the empiricism, the divide between matters of fact and the eternal, formal truths can make conventionalism concerning the ground of logic “almost inevitable” (223). The leading German spokesman for conventionalism in science, geometry, and logic in the early years of the twentieth century was Hugo Dingler: “The application of the law of contradiction rests on my free will. . . and this is just what is called a stipulation [Festsetzung]” (1919, 14-15; quoted in Carus 2007, 120n14). “There is no other way to guarantee the general validity of a law other than its stipulation by the will” (1919, 13; Carus 119). Peikoff would not likely have known much about this history in 1964, much beyond, that is, what Popper wrote against it in his 1934 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. I want to point it out because although Dingler rejected as unfounded Kant’s basis of the necessity in geometry as arising from synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s picture of how certain laws are a priori conditions of the possibility of any experience (Wolters 1988). Dingler is nonetheless a redo of Kant, of the first Critique,with conscious choice (of alleged conventions) replacing Kant’s mandatory structure in any sensory intuition and in any conceptualization of things external to mind. Though crucial, fundamental organization of mind on Dingler’s view is voluntary, and although Kant would shake his head over such free play as that, it remains that the organization is an a priori condition for the possibility of any experience or knowledge. Carnap will resist such radical conventionalism in the 20’s and 30’s. I’ll return in the next installment to the course of Logical Empiricism and the role of (still overextended) conventionalism in their characterization of logic and in the characterization by Dewey and by C. I. Lewis. I expect to yet dig into the fate of conventionalism concerning logic to the present day. Jumping out of chronological order, just now I want to be sure to mention—to show that conventionalism in logic remains a current and a concern in philosophy today—the section 6.5 “Logical Conventionalism” in Theodore Sider’s Writing the Book of the World (2011 Oxford). ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Carus, A. W. 2007. Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought – Explication as Enlightenment.Cambridge. Dingler, H. 1919. The Foundations of Physics: Synthetic Principles of Mathematical Natural Philosophy.Union for Scientific Publishing, Berlin and Leipzig. (In German.) Peikoff, L. 2012. The DIM Hypothesis.New American Library. Wolters, G. 1988. Hugo Dingler. Science in Context2(2):359–67.
  13. Writing at Study Hacks, Cal Newport draws an interesting distinction that can help clarify thinking about productivity. In "Habits vs. Workflows," he writes: Image by Drew Beamer, via Unsplash, license.When most people talk about personal productivity, they tend to focus on improving the habits they deploy to wrangle their work. For example, batching email, or deploying time blocking to control the flow of their day (which, as longtime readers know, I highly recommend). There is, however, another relevant layer: the underlying workflows that dictate what you work on and how this work is executed. For example, if you're a project manager at a consulting firm, and you spend much of your day emailing back and forth with your team members to get answers to questions from your clients, this behavior is an implicit workflow that dictates that asynchronous, unstructured messaging is your preferred method for extracting relevant information from your team. [italics in original, link omitted]Newport indicates that these workflows could be more important than your habits in aiding or hindering your ability do "deep work" (i.e., concentrate on a problem uninterrupted for significant lengths of time). In his manager example, he notes that a couple of short meetings each day could greatly reduce the switching costs inherent in his current method of communicating. This is a valuable point for two reasons. First, some workflows (like having to check email frequently) look like or can affect habits, and second, control or mitigation of problems caused by workflow might be very different from changing one's habits. Assuming your email habits are good, how you deal with an office workflow that entails lots of email will depend on your ability to change the workflow. If you're the manager, you can change to meetings, but if you're not, you'll have to resort to other strategies. (One of them might be to get someone in charge to try that strategy. Another might be to hide schedule meetings or appointments with oneself (Item 4) for deep work.) -- CAV Link to Original
  14. Last week
  15. Thank you for the helpful information and advice.
  16. Fannie and Freddie trying to make another housing bubble? Another bubble and collapse
  17. Pharma blogger Derek Lowe excerpts a paper from Nature, a preeminent science journal: Image by Lucas Vasquez, via Unsplash>, license.n two decades, we will look back on the past 60 years -- particularly in biomedical science -- and marvel at how much time and money has been wasted on flawed research... ...many researchers persist in working in a way almost guaranteed not to deliver meaningful results. They ride with what I refer to as the four horsemen of the reproducibility apocalypse: publication bias, low statistical power, P-value hacking and HARKing (hypothesizing after results are known). My generation and the one before us have done little to rein these in. The "publication bias ... against negative results," reminds me of a lost year of my life as a postdoc long ago. The PI ended up having his right hand man run the same experiments I was running as a pilot for obvious reasons. He also got negative results. This vindicated me, but netted me a grand total of ... zero publications ... for all that work. Lowe also mentions something that will seem comical at first: P-hacking is another scourge. And sadly, it's my impression that while some people realize that they're doing it, others just think that they're, y'know, doing science and that's how it's done. They think that they're looking for the valuable part of their results, when they're actually trying to turn an honest negative result into a deceptively positive one (at best) or just kicking through the trash looking for something shiny (at worst). I wasn't aware of the example that Bishop cites of a paper that helped blow the whistle on this in psychology. Its authors showed that what were considered perfectly ordinary approaches to one's data could be used to show that (among other things) listening to Beatles songs made the study participants younger. And I mean "statistically significantly younger". As they drily termed it, "undisclosed flexibility" in handing the data lets you prove pretty much anything you want. [links omitted] This is funny ... for the few seconds before you consider the cost in human lives in at least the following forms: the time spent earning the money, often taken as taxes to pay for it; the time of the scientists involved; the time wasted in the attempt to apply such "results;" and -- when the government sees a regulatory interest -- time wasted by anyone coerced into following a law or regulation excused by such "results." What Lowe reports is a travesty, but it isn't the half of it. -- CAVLink to Original
  18. A few days ago, I mentioned in passing comedienne Julia Sweeney's one-woman show, "Letting Go of God." I found this soulful, humorous, and thought-provoking monologue about her intellectual journey well worth the time. (It's a little over two hours long, though. I found it helpful to download it and listen to it in chunks during a day full of errands.) For the curious, there is a shorter talk which is also worthwhile, that might give you an idea of what to expect, "The Gifts of Not Believing in God." I particularly like a point Sweeney makes in the middle portion of the latter, where she states the profound truth that being free of religion helps one appreciate how precious life is. In keeping with Sweeney's thoughts about helping children understand the psychological and cultural force of religion, I plan to recommend the longer show to my children at some appropriate future time. My own journey towards a better life started around seventh or eighth grade when, as a student at a Catholic school in Mississippi, I privately questioned the existence of God. (I recall admitting as much during Confession.) But for several years, I gave religion the benefit of the doubt. In part, this was because, like Sweeney, I was happy with my upbringing. In addition, I figured, Faith is just a stop-gap for my current educational level: They'll explain everything in college. They didn't, so I quit religion and let go in my own way. Theology class and a fundamentalist roommate served me in the same way that reading the Bible helped Sweeney: The vast difference between the benevolent imaginary friend that my God was and the neurotic monster I was supposed to accept on faith helped me understand that I was making the right choice. -- CAVLink to Original
  19. The typical advice from financial advisers to clients is to put their money into an index fund, getting a combination of: low commissions and lowered temptation to try an beat the market. In general, this is still good advice. but... ... it is based on a key assumption that the future U.S. performance will be pretty much like the past. Stocks can be hurt by inflation, but their prices inflate too. And, couple that to an unwritten assumption that statist governments have an incentive to subsidize the most common vehicle of investment. A true hyper-inflation type scenario is different. But, since such situation has not really occurred in U.S. history, a financial adviser will never advise you to plan for it; not qua financial adviser. A few economists might be willing to predict hyper-inflation in the U.S., but they're basing their advice on a theory that has not been borne out for a century. One can compare the DOW vs. Gold, but looking at the DOW "priced in gold", how many ounces of gold would it take to buy the DOW. Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/1378/dow-to-gold-ratio-100-year-historical-chart A big problem with this raw chart is that the price of gold was fixed in the U.S. from the great depression all the way to Nixon. So, the relatively bad performance of the DOW during the 1970s was gold shooting up in price from many years of pent up legal binding. Given that legal context, one really ought to look at post-1980 data. Which gives us this portion: Since 1980, the only time when one could have bought gold and still be better off than the Dow today was the years between 2000 and 2008. Notice that this is pre-Great recession, pre-housing-crisis, not post. Why? because the factor at play was the DOW rather than gold. It was the DOW that was shooting up. Since 2009, the DOW has shot up again, far beyond its previous highs. Since about 2012, the price of gold has not followed. Consequently, the DOW has risen significantly in gold terms. if you think the DOW is in a new bubble, then that might be an even better (as in history-based) reason to buy gold than a hyper-inflation scenario. However, betting against the stock market averages is something that a typical financial adviser will not recommend because it is usually a way to under-perform. My personal view on gold is that if I own it, it will likely under-perform the stock-market over most multi-decade periods. Personally, I don't see a complete break down of the U.S. system during my lifetime. I'm also aware that in a complete breakdown, either the government or some thug is likely to take my gold from me, and to prevent that it may become necessary to hide it and not actually use it... making its value theoretical. But, as I said, I don't expect anything even close to this scenario in my lifetime. I think gold is a decent multi-generation asset, if you want to buy some to leave to your grand children. Even here, buying something like a rental property is likely to have better returns, because it is a true investment. Finally, if you do buy gold, beware of the scammers out there. Companies that hype the coming inflation etc. are dicey. Many of them try to convince their customers to buy coins that are not near 100% gold. So, if you do buy physical gold, stick with regular U.S. Gold eagles and the like.
  20. I sometimes get solicitations encouraging me to buy gold and/or silver as a hedge against economic uncertainty and volatility. What do you think?
  21. Image via Wikipedia, public domain.It was not much of a surprise to see Joe Biden assume front runner status as soon as he entered the Democratic presidential field. The fact that he is its 800 pound gorilla has been, though. Towards the end of understanding what to make of it, I think reading two pieces, Jonathan Chait's "What Joe Biden Is Teaching Democrats About Democrats," and Dick Morris's "What Does Biden's Surge Mean?" can be profitable. The former argues that social media and sympathetic news coverage caused by reporters relying too heavily on same have caused many to overestimate how far to the left the Democratic party presently is. (In terms of average voters, I think he is right. In terms of its intellectual leadership, I do not.) Morris might agree, but adds the following interesting point: Agoraphobia -- fear of new situations and places -- is a key tendency in today's politics. With the nerve-wracking extremes of the left and the right, which our political parties often embrace, a solid, well-known face is attractive to many. But Biden's surge is also a reminder of how weak the commitment to a leftist agenda is even among strong Democratic voters. These are not avowed, dyed-in-the-wool socialists who indicate support for the likes of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. They are strongly opposed to Donald Trump and eager to embrace any alternative. They are willing to stray from the leftist principals of the Democratic progressive movement for the warm familiarity and comfort of good old Joe. How long will the Biden surge last? Not very long. It will begin to dissipate after the first debate this summer and will be a distant memory by Super Tuesday in March of 2020.Regardless of how far left Biden actually is, I think his familiarity does make him more palatable to many Democratic voters, especially those who are (or regard themselves as) "conservative," as well as those who do not understand the full implications of so much of the Democrats' agenda for the past several decades. These voters may not want full socialism, but they fail to realize that the mixed economy they want -- that feels like "home" to them -- is inherently unstable and prone to result in less and less freedom. If Morris underestimates what he calls "agoraphobia," Biden's lead could prove stronger than he thinks, and there will be a choice that will look "sane" to average Americans come November '20. If not, Trump of all people may well win reelection handily. Otherwise, perhaps Howard Schultz will eventually throw his hat into the ring. In any event, a danger Biden presents is that the same comforting fuzziness that makes him a strong candidate now (and could persist) could land him in the White House, where he will be under the unrelenting pressure of the left wing of his party to enact much of its agenda. As we have seen with Nancy Pelosi's failure to stand up to the anti-semitism of Ilhan Omar (despite initially appearing to do the contrary), the old guard will not be much of a bulwark against the young radicals, even if they do disagree with them. And I am not so sure Joe Biden necessarily disagrees. With Biden then, comes the threat of Americans voting for normalcy and getting a figurehead who will end up rubber stamping significant parts of a very dangerous agenda. -- CAV Link to Original
  22. It won't answer the title question, but to somebody enough interested in modus ponens I recommend Bland Blanshard's The Nature of Thought, Vol 2, the chapter Formalism and Necessity. The Feb 1963 The Objectivist Newsletter included a favorable book review of Blanshard's Reason and Analysis by N. Branden. That book also addresses modus ponens ("p implies q"), but not as much.
  23. Physical ought to mean merely causal for the philosophically minded, or else one run's the risk of committing oneself to dictating what the ontology of the universe is from a bedroom or porcelain throne based on a non-physicist understanding of physics.
  24. I read all that, and that's fine, but now I'm left wondering what you would say is in between an electron and a neutron. If spacetime is only a relationship, rather than some directly (albeit with tools) observable phenomena of something, then it seems like we have gaps of existence, i.e. nonexistence, throughout the universe. It would be like a propagating wave. Or maybe stretching. But then at some point it probably gets absurd, the smaller scale you get. The article that Grames linked about zero point energy gives some idea of how a true vacuum is (plausibly and up for debate) literally impossible, without assuming some material medium.
  25. There is something here that does not match my view of time. Yes, things of the past and things of the future do not exist. There is only what is happening now. In a sense, past things caused things now, through a chain of actions. But we cannot likewise claim a causal relationship between things now and things in the future, because the future hasn't happened; there is no effect that has been caused. The future is only a present idea in someone's head. If anything, the effect is the present idea, which would make the cause past choices.
  26. If everything moved together, collisions could not occur and momentum could not transfer. Also, we would have to assume that everything has been moving together throughout all of history, otherwise how did everything initially start moving? Swapping places is interesting, but doesn't it imply permeability, which implies space? What would "physical" mean in this view? To me, physical refers to the body of matter, whereas material refers to the substance of matter. Physical focuses on the thing as a whole; material focuses on the thing as a composition.
  27. I'm still considering your substantial replies, but I'll try to address a few points. This seems right. I'm using "medium" analogously. Basically, I'm struck by how physical media can be measured from high density to low density (solids, liquids, and gases). Then there is a perfect vacuum of space, which has zero density. Of course it's not a perfect vacuum anymore once material enters the space, and it's not a medium if nothing is in it. So, yeah, I have to think about that some more. If space is an immaterial, boundless existent, maybe we can only be aware of it indirectly through its dimensional relationships with matter. Also, when I say that an object is in space, I don't mean to differentiate it with the impossibility of being outside space. I intend to contrast it with being in matter, such as a physical medium of solid, liquid, or gas. I'm describing an environmental condition, not a spatial relationship. It's confusing, though, since I'm envisioning concurrent environmental conditions, where physical media exist simultaneously with and in space. Does that make sense? I should've said cubic foot instead of square foot, since we don't live in only two dimensions. I don't think space is stuff. Certainly not material stuff. To me, "stuff" suggests individual things. I don't mean a quantity of space things. A cubic foot of space would be a particular region of space. The region would have a spatial relationship to other regions or objects. I see the problem of spatial regions being relative to the position of material objects. But is that because space is a relationship, or because we can only know space through its relationships? Does calling it an environment help? I imagine that your two particles would act differently in a physical medium versus a perfect vacuum. They would be affected by other particles in a physical medium, but not in the vacuum. Distance is not the only external factor involved in the particles' interaction. Whether there is environmental resistance or other forces acting on them matters.
  28. Earlier
  29. I was not going to do this but just one more. If there were only two entities, I would say the distances between them are a relationship.... it is a specific distance at any one time but we also know at various times they can be at other distances and in general they could be at any distance but there must exist some distance relationship between them. That relationship is absolute in its existence but can potentially be any number of possibilities. What we happen to define and conceive of as space includes the particular relationships as well as all the possible ones. In other words, the way we think about space includes both the absolute particular relationship of the now: the distance they have between them now, and the potential distance relationships they could have in future as well as the previous distance relationships they had in the past. It should be noted that the distance between these two entities is a single relational existent which changes, not an infinity of relationship existents which rapidly pop into and out of existence. Consider space to be just as much of a construct as our concept of time. [In fact space as a concept is all wrapped up with time because things move in space over time... spatial relationships change] Things change and move and we conceive of time to understand and predict how these changes and movements occur. Time is defined and conceived of as including the past, present, and future. The events of the past existed .... they do not exist... but things of the now have a causal relationship with the past, they are a direct result via causality or simply continuity ... of things in the past... likewise things of the now have a relationship to things of the future ... the events of which do not exist now, but for which potentialities do exist (because of the relationship of now to the future). The sliver of now exists, the past does not exist... it existed, the future does not exist now, it will exist... so does time exist? Yes. Does our concept of time include potentialities... and things that are no more? Yes.
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