punk

Let's see, so everyone should move away from disaster-prone areas... So we should abandon the gulf coast because of hurricanes. I guess they could move to california...oh wait there are earthquakes there. I guess we should insist people abandon california as well. I guess they could move to the pacific northwest...oh wait there are volcanos and a nast fault line off the coast. I guess we should insist people abandon the pacific northwest as well. I guess they could move to the southern atlantic coast...oh wait there are hurricanes there too. Too bad. I guess we should insist people abandon the southern atlantic coast as well. I guess they could move to the north east. I don't know enough about there. Maybe there aren't disasters there.

Number 1: Insurance has *nothing* to do with search and rescue and providing for displaced people in the time it takes for the insurance industry to formulate an adequate response. What good is insurance going to do someone starving to death on an overpass? Number 2: A sufficiently large disaster will bankrupt the insurance industry. A insurer has only so much liquid assets to respond with. The *only* way insurance can deal with this is to cap responses and say outright that if the disaster is too large it falls outside the scope of the insurance. That is realistically the insurance industry *must* say that if the disaster is too bad...tough luck. The *only* reason this isn't the case now is that the insurance industry can expect government assistence in such a scenario.

For any community there are going to be disaster scenarios beyond its ability to prepare for, and since these disasters are highly unlikely, it would be a misuse of resources to prepare for them. Every community is vulnerable to some sort of super-disaster beyond its resources. It happened to New Orleans this time, but it could just as much have happened to any of our communities. This *is* precisely one of the reasons that communities gather together into larger units (nations). This allows all to pool resources to help out in the super-disasters, this is part of the implicit contract between communities participating in nations. Thus since all American communities participate in *America*, they have an obligation to provide assistance to a disaster-area of this scale occurring in any other member community. Think of it as a contractual obligation rather than a moral obligation.

Wittgenstein was invited to participate as a very honored guest (since the Vienna Circle especially admired the Tractatus). They later found he understood it rather differently from them and branded him a "mystic". They also didn't like it much when he read some of Tagore's poetry to them.

Oh please. Hitler was no intellectual and certainly not involved with the Vienna Circle. Especially since Hitler lived in Germany the entire time the Vienna Circle was active. Why do people try to make Hitler into an intellectual? This is a man who when asked said that his favorite writer was Karl May. Yes the Circle had problems with local Austrian Nazis, but I doubt Hitler had heard of them.

Ayer would just say that all you are really doing is modifying the definitions of the words "existence" and "identity".

Oh there is a large gulf between postivists and objectivists. Objectivists hold that by reflecting on one's self and the world around one, one can reach basic conclusions, or "axioms" which hold as objectively true of the world, and based on which one can reach rational and true conclusions about the world. These truths lead to definite conclusions about such things as ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law, philosophy of politics, etc.. So by reflection one can reason to far-ranging truths about us and the world. Postivists hold that the only meaningful propositions about the world are empirically verifiable. Anything not empirically verifiable is meaningless (or analytic if you will). So things like ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law, philosophy of politics have no real meaning to them. We can have preferences, but they have no basis other than our own whims. As an aside, this is why Wittgenstein is *not* a postivist even though he is often classed with them. When the Vienna Circle was going through the Tractatus they kept describing it as "mysticism" which is to say he was saying the most important questions were precisely those the postivists wanted to reject as meaningless (questions of ethics, aesthetics, and so on). Postivists would call objectivists "mystics" as well.

Well, to a positivist like Ayer, either those statements *themselves* are empirically testable, and thus meaningful, or they just get in the way. If a philosophy has "metaphysical" propositions that lead to empirically testable solutions, then they aren't really "metaphysical" in Ayer's sense. But I suppose the propositions you are considering aren't considered propositions in Ayer's sense, that is that one is open to them being refuted by empirical observation. That is that they are taken as unrefutable no matter what the empirical observations. I think that Ayer would say that any statement taken as unrefutable by empirical data automatically becomes meaningless.

It was Aristotle and not Socrates. Also that derivation for the word "metaphysics" is likely true. Aristotle never uses the word "metaphysics" to refer to the subject matter. He uses the phrase "first philosophy".

I've read Ayer's "Language, Truth, and Logic", and I'm also familiar with logical positivism (a school where calling something "metaphysics" is about the same as calling it "bullshit"). Ayer was rather enamored of the Vienna Circle when he wrote that work. My recollection of "Language, Truth, and Logic" is that it espouses some form of verificationism. In overly simple terms that principle is: The meaning of a proposition is its means of verification The gist of this will be that only propositions which can be empiricially investigated have meaning. Since it does not appear that a proposition like "Existence exists" lends itself to empiricial verification, in positivist terms it is meaningless. Similar reasoning will toss out most of what people call "metaphysics".

To answer that question we would need to get down to what the main point of logic is. From a mathematical standpoint the purpose of logic is to insure that the truth values we apply to our whole set of mathematical propositions is consistent. So fuzzy logic is a "logic" in the sense that it insures that all of our truth values (on a range 0 to 1) are applied consistently to our whole set of fuzzy propositions. From a philosophical standpoint logic is used to infer new statements from existing statements. In this contexts generating new vague propositions from an existing set of vague propositions doesn't seem terribly useful, so one might begrudge it the label "logic".

Ayer would hold that a statement like "existence exists" is fundamentally meaningless. But to answer the question, both are using the term "metaphysics" in pretty much the same way.

Brouwer would agree that a well-ordering can always be placed on a finite set. The criticism was never that it would take *too long*. Brouwer's criticism comes up when dealing with *infinite* sets. The point is that we cannot just assume a well-ordering exists for an infinite set, we have to come up with a procedure which generates the well-ordering. For finite sets and problems intuitionism and conventional logic agree 100%. The disagreements only come up when considering infinite sets and problems.

I'm starting to think you are being willfully obtuse. Okay, lets construct a *very* simple fuzzy control system: Lets have an engine and suppose we want to set the throttle based on the temperature and rpms. Let X by the temperature value, Y be the rpm value, and Z be the throttle value (which for ease will set between 0 and 10). Let us define a function f to map the temperature into a value between 0 and 1 (i.e. that gives the fuzzy truth value for the set "engine is too hot"): f(x) = x/200 for 0 <= x <= 200 f(x) = 1 for x > 200 Let us define a function g to map the rpm into a value between 0 and 1 g(x) = x/500 for 0<= x <= 500 g(x) = 1 for x > 500 Let us finally define a function h to map from values between 0 and 1 to throttle values (i.e. takes a fuzzy truth value, or fuzzy control bit, as in put and generates a throttle value): h(x) = 10*x We can construct a fuzzy control system in which the throttle value is given by the observed temperature and rpm values as follows: Z = h(AND(f(X),g(Y)) Recalling that AND is here defined as: AND(x,y) = x*y So as the engine's temperature and rpm measurements fuzzy inclusion in the sets/conditions "engine too hot", and "engine rpms too high" change the system adjusts by setting the throttle to different values. This is the sort of problem fuzzy logic was intended to solve. That's it, right there, everything fuzzy logic is about. In fact if I write the last equation above in more purely mathematical form it is innocuous: Z = h(f(X)*g(Y)) But the thinking behind the control system is much less obvious. I didn't contradict myself. I was trying to make a distinction between logic as rules of inference and deduction, and logic as the basic structure which makes computers work. Hopefully this has made it clear that fuzzy logic is meant to be a logic in the sense of a basic structure which makes a machine work, and is not intended to operate as a set of rules of inference and deduction. In fact all the mathematical definitions which underlie fuzzy logic make appeal to conventional logic in their definitions (the same way all mathematics does). Fuzzy logic is just a bunch of mathematical objects. Maybe it should really have been called "fuzzy control theory", and we wouldn't be having this discussion, but again the creators understood "logic" to refer to the NAND and NOR gates which underlie computer computation, so fuzzy logic is a logic in that sense.

I forgot the part that makes it analogous to logic.... For conventional logic take 0 to be false and 1 to be true. Let us define a function CAND (conventional AND) so that we get the right answers for AND" For function CAND(*,*) we take: CAND(x,y) = x*y (here * is multiplication, above it was a placeholder, sorry) We then can define a fuzzy AND (FAND) as: FAND(x,y) = x*y Except that where for CAND, the inputs could only be 0 or 1, for FAND the inputs are any number between 0 and 1 (including 0 and 1), so for x =0.5 and y =0.5 FAND(x,y) = 0.25 Similarly for other logical operators. (Note though, it has been a while so this might not be the conventional fuzzy definition of AND). We then can track these fuzzy truth values through our fuzzy control diagram to determine what the system does for various truth values. Again, the point of this is to make, say, a computer program operating a system more easy to program, understand, and debug, while controlling the system correctly. That is making the ENGINEERING more transparent.

You should actually read a book on "fuzzy logic" before deciding what it is. It is a rigorous engineering discipline. It is logic in the sense of a control system making decisions. Think of it as being "logic" in the way a computer operates is "logic", rather than "logic" in the sense of the way we decide what is true or false of the world around us. That is the logic of a flow-diagram. There may be models of probability theory able to handle the same problem, but there is also the issue of which system is more graceful and capable of handling complex situations in elegant ways. There are *always* going to be multiple ways to solve any engineering problem, the key is finding the one that handles it in a simple and robust way. At the base of "fuzzy set theory" there is the issue to assigning the membership number of an element in a set in a consistent and systematic fashion (i.e. given an element which we are saying has 0.5 membership in set A, and 0.25 membership in set . Any system which we give to assign these numbers will end up following the laws of conventional logic. So the very basis of "fuzzy set theory" requires conventional logic to be made systematic. "Fuzzy logic" makes then doesn't use "true" or "false" (0 or 1 set membership), rather it uses a continuous scale from 0.00 to 1.00 to assign shades of "truth-hood". The real issue is what a set/proposition is in "fuzzy logic" and conventional logic. In conventional logic a set/proposition will be something like "brown dog" and the elements a bunch of dogs. A brown dog will have membership 1 and a dog of a different color will have membership 0. In "fuzzy logic" a set/proposition will be something like "the engine is too hot", and the elements various states of the system. Now based on the degree of membership of the current state of the system in "the engine is too hot" and its membership in various states of a similar nature the system will make a decision to make certain will-defined changes to itself. This isn't anything philosophical, it is just the logic of a flow-diagram which dictates what the machine will do when in certain states. The sets are those aspects of the system chosen because they are deemed important to control of the system by engineers. The alternative using conventional logic for machine control would be to create a whole slew of sets/propositions like "the engine is between 100 and 150 degree", "the engine is between 150 and 200 degrees", etc. and have the state of the system be reflected in a strict true/false, 0/1 membership in these states. The machine then makes strict decisions based on these states. The point of "fuzzy logic" is that it is less cumbersome than conventional logic for these sorts of things.

"Fuzzy logic" is a rigorously defined mathematical structure. An important application of "fuzzy logic" is in control theory. That is the mathematics of creating a system able to respond to outside perturbation to maintain a stable system. So an application of "fuzzy logic" would be in creating the "brain" to run an automated aircraft in stable flight. "Fuzzy logic" is built on "fuzzy set theory" (much as logic can be modelled on set theory). In this conventional set theory an item is either in a set or not. In fuzzy set theory the membership of an item in a set is ranked on some scale (conventionally 0 to 1). So if the membership of an object in a set is "1" it can be thought of as 100% belonging to the set. A membership of "0" has the object not belonging to the set. A membership of "0.5" would have the object belonging 50% to the set. One constructs a rigorous system on this. Basically it is a logic of making decisions by weighing the information available and is not intended as an alternative to conventional logic. Put in other terms, fuzzy logic is about answering the question "What should I do given the information I have right now?" At a deeper level fuzzy logic is founded on conventional logic, so it doesn't contradict it.

I've looked into this.... I can find no evidence for my recollection of a boycott, nor for any instruction from KPD leadership for its base to vote NSDAP. What I did find was that the KPD and NSDAP deputies did vote together on several issues before the parliament (Reichstag) that can be construed as destructive to the Weimar Republic, and they may have coordinated in regards to a strike. It looks to me like Ms. Rand confused parliamentary votes by KPD deputies with electoral votes by the KPD base.

Here is a link to election results: http://facultystaff.vwc.edu/~dgraf/weim.htm Between the second to last and last election the net is: total deputies go up by 63 (to 647) KPD deputies go down by 19 (to 81) NSDAP deputies go up by 92 (to 288) DVP deputies go down by 9 (to 2) Everywhere else the changes are smaller. The number of deputies is based on a formula of a party getting one deputy for every 60 000 votes received. KPD still has heavy support, though it has lost a number of votes (consistent with my memory of parts of the KPD calling for a boycott). NSDAP has gained many votes but is still short of a majority. DVP was another right wing party so its loss of deputies is consistent with voters switching from them to NSDAP. NSDAP appears to have gained most of the votes of new voters who didn't vote in the previous election. I would say this is consistent with a partial boycott by KPD voters. I haven't seen any historical evidence for calls by KPD for its voters to vote NSDAP, so I still dont think that is true. There was too much bad blood and violence between KPD and NSDAP members. Also the KPD knew full well that one reason the establishment was making common cause with NSDAP was to counter the power of KPD. I still go with the scenario of one wing of KPD calling for a boycott, the rest continuing to vote KPD.

The problem with environmentalists is that they want to preserve nature for the sake of preserving nature. At the extreme end of this are those that view humanity as something that can be expended for the preservation of nature. Nature can get along just fine without us. A very real possibility is that we can damage the environment enough that the continued existence of us (humanity) becomes questionable. An "objectivist environmentalist" would, I suppose, advocate respecting the environment for the sake of preserving humanity. If the environment is damaged enough humanity is gone. There is a saying: In order command nature you have to obey it.

I didn't really follow any of that. What are you saying? My account is based on my memory of reading history books on the coming to power of the Nazis in the Weimar republic several years ago. If parts of the account are historically wrong, then I will admit so when confronted with historical data. I have never had a high opinion of Peikoff (a low opinion which I derived from reading "Ominous Parallels" actually), so I don't really consider that a source. From what little I think I understood of your post though, it seems like you are trying to get theory to trump actual data, and when data disagrees with theory, to throw data out.

As with all political parties, there are wings to the party representing diverse views. One wing believed they could work through parliament and take over, another wing believed they had to let the Marxist dialectic work to its conclusion. While the Nazis were an outsider party like the Communists without any support from the German political establishment, the first wing was generally in control of the Communists and they continued to run against the Nazis. At a certain point though the German political establishment decided they would take the Nazis under their wing and use them to consolidate parliamentary control (which of course ended up being a big mistake for the German political establishment, but that was later). The Communists perceived this alliance between the establishment (i.e. capital) and the Nazis as a sign that the establishment had made a fundamental change in its intentions and methods. It is at this point that the second wing becomes dominant, and they essentially boycott the parliament.

The issue isn't what you think the Nazis were, nor what the Nazis thought the Nazis were. The issue is what the *German Communists* thought the Nazis were. In Marxist-Leninist thought, the ultimate stage of capitalism is imperialism. Imperialism involves the oppression of the population at the behest of the ruling class (the owners of capital) so that the ruling class (capital) can plunder abroad to keep profits at acceptible levels. Under this system of thought the Nazis can be seen as the beginning of imperialism, and since in Marxist-Leninist thought things have to happen in a certain order, they would see it as a good thing to let the imperialists run their course fore-doomed to failure. Also, the Communists never voted for the Nazis. They simply refrained from voting at all. They were going to let the inevitable happen after which they were going to triumph.

The German Communists felt that National Socialism represented the culmination of a failing capitalist order. After this last hurrah's attempts to maintain capitalism inspite of its collapse, the oppressed proletariat would rise up and overthrow it and impose the dictatorship of the proletariat. Of course without allied occupation of Germany after the war, this is probably what would have happened.

Germany in the 19th and early 20th centuries had a much more intellectual culture than contemporary America. A working class German was much more likely to be reading and discussing literary works of merit than their contemporary American counterparts. So they might be reading Nietzsche, Goethe, Thomas Mann or the like whereas the American counterpart is more likely to be reading Stephen King, or some "Left Behind" novel. This seems to be an American problem rather than Germany being exceptional. I recall hearing that in the 70's and 80's you could go into bars in Latin America and easily strike up a conversation about the works of Gabriel Garcia Marquez with strangers. I don't see anything like that happening in most American bars.