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curi

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Everything posted by curi

  1. "Then let's hear what is contradicted." Induction, among other things. Haven't you been paying attention? Fred, if they contain a good argument why don't you tell us what it is?
  2. are you trolling me? i'm saying that evolution is a single principle that applies both to genes and ideas. evolution is about concepts like "replication", "variation" and "selection" which are independent of DNA. DNA is just one case. i am not saying ideas are made of DNA.
  3. there is an underlying principle behind both types of evolution. they are the same thing. the underlying principle is that replication with variation and selection creates knowledge. replication with variation and selection literally happens in both cases (ideas and genes). You're linking to basics. If that's where you are, then what you need to do is study the topic more, starting by reading David Deutsch's two books, and also, if you haven't, The Selfish Gene. After reading those three books you will be able to understand this far better than those wikipedia articles. For fun you could then go back and edit them with some corrections.
  4. Popper contradicts Rand on some points (and gives some arguments). Unless Popper is refuted then Rand can't be fully right. Two contradictory things can't both be true.
  5. I got asked for my philosophy on one foot. I personally never found Objectivism on one foot that useful. I thought it's too hard to understand if you don't already know what the stuff means. Philosophy is hard enough to communicate in whole books. Some people read Atlas Shrugged and think Rand is a communist or altruist. Some people read Popper and think he's a positivist or inductivist. Huge mistakes are easily possible even with long philosophical statements. I think the best solution involves back and forth communication so that miscommunication mistakes can be fixed along the way and understanding can be built up incrementally. But this requires the right attitudes and methods for talking to be very effective. And that's hard. And if people don't already have the right methods to learn and communicate well, how do you explain it to them? There's a chicken and egg problem that I don't have a great answer to. But anyway, philosophy, really short, I tried, here you go: There is only one known rational theory of how knowledge is created: evolution. It answers Paley's problem. No one has ever come up with any other answer. Yet most people do not recognize evolution as a key theory in epistemology, and do not recognize that learning is an evolutionary process. They have no refutation of evolution, nor any alternative, and persist with false epistemologies. This includes Objectivism – Ayn Rand choose not to learn much about evolution. Evolution is about how knowledge can be created from non-knowledge, and also how knowledge is improved. This works by a process of replication with variation and selection. In epistemology, ideas and variants are criticized and the survivors continue on in the process. This process incrementally makes progress, just like biological evolution. Step by step, flaws get eliminated and the knowledge gets better adapted and refined. This correction of errors is crucial to how knowledge is created and improved. Another advantage of evolutionary processes is that they are resilient to mistakes. Many individual steps can be done badly and a good result still achieved. Biological evolution works even though many animals with advantageous genes die before other animals with inferior genes; there's a large random luck factor which does not ruin the process. This is important because of human fallibility: mistakes are common. We cannot avoid making any mistakes and should instead emphasize using methods that can deal with mistakes well. (Methods which deal with mistakes well are rational; methods which do not are irrational because they entrench mistakes long term.) A key issue in epistemology is how conflicts of ideas are handled. Trying to resolve these conflicts by authority or by looking at the source of ideas is irrational. It can make mistakes persist long term. A rational approach which can quickly catch and eliminate mistakes is to judge conflicting ideas by their content. How do you judge the content of an idea? You try to find something wrong with it. You should not focus on saying why ideas are good because if they have mistakes you won't find the mistakes that way. However, finding something good about an idea is useful for criticizing other ideas which lack that good feature – it reveals a flaw in those rivals. However, in cases where a good feature of an idea does not lead to any criticism of a rival, it provides no advantage over that rival. This critical approach to evaluating ideas follows the evolutionary method. This has implications for morality and politics. How people handle conflicts and disagreements are defining issues for their morality and politics. Conflicts of ideas should not be approached by authority and disagreement should not be disregarded. This implies a voluntary system with consent as a major issue. Consent implies agreement; lack of consent implies disagreement. Voluntary action implies agreement; involuntary action implies disagreement. Political philosophy usually focuses too much on who should rule (or which laws should rule), instead of how to incrementally evolve our political knowledge. It tries to set up the right laws in the first place, instead of a system that is good at improving its laws. Mistakes should be expected. Disagreement should be expected. Everything should be set up to deal with this well. That implies making it easy to change rulers and laws (without violence). Also disagreement and diversity should be tolerated within the law. Moral philosophy usually makes the same mistake as political philosophy. It focuses too much on deciding-declaring what is moral and immoral. There should be more concern with fallibility, and setting things up for moral knowledge to incrementally evolve. We aren't going to get all the answers right today. We should judge moral ideas more by how much they allow evolution, progress and mistake-correction, rather than by trying ot know whether a particular idea would be ideal forever. Don't try to prophesy the future and do start setting things up so we can adjust well in the unknown future. Things will go wrong in epistemology, morality and politics. The focus should be on incrementally evolving things to be better over time and setting things up to be resilient to mistakes. It's better to have mistaken ideas today and good mistake-correction setup than to have superior ideas today which are hard to evolve and fragile to error.
  6. Dykes is one of the people who tried to criticize Popper's epistemology. Objectivists commonly cite him when challenged. If you can offer any better piece arguing with Popper, let's hear it. If there's nothing better, then Objectivist epistemology is refuted by Popper's.
  7. http://conjecturesandrefutations.com/2013/07/27/a-refutation-of-nicholas-dykes-on-karl-popper/ Alan wrote an answer to Dykes. Enjoy
  8. I was planning to write an essay explaining the method of rationally resolving conflicts and always acting on a single idea with no outstanding criticisms. It would follow up on my essay Epistemology Without Weights and the Mistake Objectivism and Critical Rationalism Both Made where I mentioned the method but didn't explain it. I knew I'd already written a number of explanations on the topic, so I decided to reread them for preparation. While reading them I decided that the topic is hard and it'd be very hard to write a single essay which is good enough for someone to understand it. Maybe if they already had a lot of relevant background knowledge, like knowing Popper, Deutsch or TCS, one essay could work OK. But for an Objectivist audience, or most audiences, I think it'd be really hard. So I had a different idea I think will work better: gather together multiple essays. This lets people learn about the subject from a bunch of different angles. I think this way will be the most helpful to someone who is interested in understanding this philosophy. Each link below was chosen selectively. I reread all of them as well as other things that I decided not to include. It may look like a lot, but I don't think you should expect an important new idea in epistemology to be really easy and short to learn. I've put the links in the order I recommend reading them, and included some explanations below. Instead of one perfect essay – which is impossible – I present instead some variations on a theme. ------------------------------------------------------------ Popper's critical preferences idea is incorrect. It's similar to standard epistemology, but better, but still shares some incorrectness with rival epistemologies. My criticisms of it can be made of any other standard epistemology (including Objectivism) with minor modifications. I explained a related criticism of Objectivism in my prior essay. Critical Preferences Critical Preferences and Strong Arguments The next one helps clarify a relevant epistemology point: Corroboration Regress problems are a major issue in epistemology. Understanding the method of rationally resolving conflicts between ideas to get a single idea with no outstanding criticism helps deal with regresses. Regress Problems Confused about anything? Maybe these summary pieces will help: Conflict, Criticism, Learning, Reason All Problems are Soluble We Can Always Act on Non-Criticized Ideas This next piece clarifies an important point: Criticism is Contextual Coercion is an important idea to understand. It comes from Taking Children Seriously (TCS), the Popperian educational and parenting philosophy by David Deutsch. TCS's concept of "coercion" is somewhat different than the dictionary, keep in mind that it's our own terminology. TCS also has a concept of a "common preference" (CP). A CP is any way of resolving a problem between people which they all prefer. It is not a compromise; it's only a CP if everyone fully prefers it. The idea of a CP is that it's a preference which everyone shares in common, rather than disagreeing. CPs are the only way to solve problems. And any non-coercive solution is a CP. CPs turn out to be equivalent to non-coercion. One of my innovations is to understand that these concept can be extended. It's not just about conflicts between people. It's really about conflicts between ideas, including ideas within the same mind. Thus coercion and CPs are both major ideas in epistemology. TCS's "most distinctive feature is the idea that it is both possible and desirable to bring up children entirely without doing things to them against their will, or making them do things against their will, and that they are entitled to the same rights, respect and control over their lives as adults." In other words, achieving common preferences, rather than coercion, is possible and desirable. Don't understand what I'm talking about? Don't worry. Explanations follow: Taking Children Seriously Coercion The next essay explains the method of creating a single idea with no outstanding criticisms to solve problems and how that is always possible and avoids coercion. Avoiding Coercion Avoiding Coercion Clarification This email clarifies some important points about two different types of problems (I call them "human" and "abstract"). It also provides some historical context by commenting on a 2001 David Deutsch email. Human Problems and Abstract Problems The next two help clarify a couple things: Multiple Incompatible Unrefuted Conjectures Handling Information Overload Now that you know what coercion is, here's an early explanation of the topic: Coercion and Critical Preferences This is an earlier piece covering some of the same ideas in a different way: Resolving Conflicts of Interest These pieces have some general introductory overview about how I approach philosophy. They will help put things in context: Think Philosophy: What For? Want to understand more? Read these essays and dialogs. Read Fallible Ideas. Join my discussion group and actually ask questions.
  9. Correcting mistakes is the method of obtaining knowledge. Error correction creates knowledge. Human fallibility is and should be a main focus point. It's important and has to be dealt with. Mistakes are common, we have to deal with them all the time, we need systems for that, it's a crucial issue. That's my point. You're asserting to the contrary but not saying anything that would change my mind.
  10. Where are the comments on content and substance instead of about format and trivial irrelevant stuff?
  11. Objectivist epistemology says induction is right. All my stuff about induction is commenting on Objectivist epistemology. I also criticized the weighing evidence idea. I've also talked about some stuff like certainty and fallibility. This is all Objectivism related. I consider forums to have asynchronous communication. That means I post on my schedule, and you post on your schedule. I don't expect anything else. Popper is not only criticism of rival views; he presents a view of how epistemology works. He has many books about this. Why does it seem that no Objectivist has ever read and understood them? I don't have a problem with you or any other one person not studying it. But someone should have. And I think if no Objectivist has answered it well, then Objectivists shouldn't be so harsh on Popper.
  12. Oh you want to read long dense text? OK read through: http://curi.us/archives/50 And this: http://fallibleideas.com/ When you don't finish reading all this and don't reply, maybe you'll understand why I linked something shorter to begin with, instead of insulting simplicity and brevity as childish.
  13. Did you actually read what I linked? It explains some philosophical ideas.
  14. Here is an introductory explanation of my philosophy: http://curi.us/think/ What do you think about it from an Objectivist perspective? I've read a lot of Rand and I still think this way. She didn't change my mind about these things. Did I miss something? Did Rand miss something? Are our ideas compatible?
  15. Why would you not post in the prior thread just because this thread exists too? I don't get it. Why are you accusing me of lack of patience? I didn't demand faster replies.
  16. Popper came up with many refutations of induction. That made it hard to come up with a new one. But I managed it: Deutsch, Popper, and Feynman aren't inductivists. I could add more people to this list, like me. So here we see a clear pattern of people not being inductivists. There's a bunch of data points with a certain thing in common (a person not being inductivist). Let's apply induction to this pattern. So we extrapolate the general trend: induction leads us to conclude against induction. Oh no, a contradiction! I guess we'll have to throw out induction. Q&A: Q: Your data set is incomplete. A: All data sets are incomplete. Q: Your data set isn't random. A: No data sets are entirely random. Q: I have an explanation of why your method of selecting data points leads to a misleading result. A: That's nice. I like explanations. Q: Don't you care that I have a criticism of your argument? A: I said we should throw out induction. As you may know, I think we should use an explanation-focussed approach. I took your claim to have an explanation, and lack of claim to have induced anything, as agreement. Q: But how am I supposed to object to your argument using only induction? Induction isn't a tool for criticizing invalid uses of induction. A: So you're saying induction cannot tell us which inductions are true or false. We need explanation to do that. So induction is useless without explanation, but explanation is not useless without induction. Q: That doesn't prove induction is useless. A: Have you ever thought about how much of the work, in a supposed induction, is done by induction, and how much by explanation? Q: No. A: Try it sometime.
  17. thanks for being honest this time, as opposed to the previous dishonesty. now i know where you stand clearly. let's not talk with each other anymore.
  18. Harrison Danneskjold, "Then explain your alternative." "How do you know that the dog says "woof"?" There is literature which explains it. It is your choice not to read it. (The books of Karl Popper and David Deutsch.) I have extensive essays, blog posts, emails, which also explain it. Again it's your choice not to read them. (http://www.curi.us http://fallibleideas.com http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fallible-ideas/ like in my signature. if you finish that material i'll be happy to show you a lot more). If you want further explanation then I suggest either: 1) read what i or others already wrote that isn't on this website or 2) ask some specific question i might be interested in answering. stuff along the lines of "explain epistemology to me." is not very motivating for me, especially without any reason given for choosing not to study the literature (mine or others) or 3) wait. i'm writing more essays. i can't say everything at once.
  19. ok Eiuol. Curi, I'd be interested in a reply to my second paragraph because it's really hard to tell what your point is. What does induction supposedly achieve? Knowledge. What do inductivists (as you call them) claim can be done but actually cannot? They have a large number of claims and I brought up a bunch in my essay. if you have a claim i didn't address, feel free to bring it up. It's fine to say how some people reason badly, but what about induction in principle is wrong? I gave a bunch of answers to that in my essay as well as some sources with more arguments. if you want an answer to a particular principle of induction or theory of induction, you tell me what your principle or theory of induction is that you want an answer to. then i'll answer that one in particular. I'm not even sure we're talking about the same thing. If you didn't use the word induction at all, how would you phrase the issue you have? For the most part, I consider any induction to be the process of developing a premise and acquiring new knowledge. Even what you call "creativity" for coming up with new ideas I call induction. It may be right or wrong. It sounds like you've never really read anything about induction by either supporters or opponents (note that neither ITOE or OPAR says much of anything about induction). I can understand being confused from that standpoint. But, well, so what? What do you care? if you're interested read what popper says about it and what some inductivist says about it and then see what you think. btw the dictionary gives, "inference of a generalized conclusion from particular instances" which is basically good enough, close enough. this idea is wrong. and this idea is not any "process of developing a premise and acquiring new knoweldge" nor is it "creativity". http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/induction What would help if you point out a specific epistemological mistake(s) the inductivists (as you call them) are making. That way, I don't need to concern myself about all the various theories of induction, and focus instead on a specific error. Sort of like how Rand pointed out specific errors she noticed about stances people take on the "problem" of universals. I pointed out a number of specific errors in the essay so I don't really get the question. But maybe I've now answered it above. I'm not really even sure what expectation people have of induction that you find either a) unnecessary or b ) impossible to achieve. Be specific, because I really don't know. All I can say is "yeah, a lot of people are wrong. So?" If induction is wrong because it's seeking a holy grail of knowledge that doesn't exist, then induction is doomed to fail in the long run. You have a decent list of issues (at first), but no clear explanation of who an inductivist except "one who claims they like induction". here is a partial list of indications you're an inductivist: - you think the future will resemble the past - you think correlation (or patterns) implies causation - you think correlation (or patterns) hints at causation - you think correlation points in the direction of good ideas - you think there's only one or a couple possible ideas compatible with any given data set - you think data leads us to good theories - you think we "learn from experience" in some kind of direct or concrete way, as an actual philosophical idea - you think observations come before ideas in an epistemological hierarchy - you think bayesian stuff is important to epistemology - you've read inductivist philosophers, know what they say, and think they're right - you've read inductivist philosophers and some criticism (like hume's or russell's) and think induction apparently not working is a huge problem for epistemology (David Deutsch calls this being a crypto-inductivist. it's a lot like being an inductivist. see his book The Fabric of Reality) - you think observing the same thing a large number of times is valuable - you think criticisms of your positions can be ignored if you have enough support for your position so the criticism could only weaken your support but not refute it (it'd take 5 criticisms to refute you, or something) - you think we "generalize" or data/observations to create or "induce" general theories - you hate Popper - you think that you should open/empty your mind as much as possible and observe without bias and that's key to learning - you say stuff like "the sun rose the last 10 days so it'll rise tomorrow" (and get mad if anyone doubts that) - you think a denial of induction implies skepticism - you think evidence supports ideas, and the more evidence the greater the degree of support (yes i'm aware everyone thinks this. yet it's wrong. in short: evidence contradicts and rules out ideas. it does not differentiate between the ideas that it doesn't contradict or rule out. it doesn't provide degrees of support.) Here's another version I wrote in 2010: In short, induction is about ideas like: correlations or patterns in data hint at causations, ideas can/should be based on evidence, the future resembles the past, we should begin science by gathering data, we learn (directly) from experience, and large data sets are reliable. Induction says we generalize a bunch of particulars into universal statements, but this generalization process is an impossibility and a myth, and it says we support or confirm theories with more evidence. There are more exact/specific versions, e.g. Bacon's, and a Bayesian variety, but inductivists vary quite a bit in their beliefs so it's best explained as a bunch of similar/related ideas.
  20. I only presupposed induction on the premise that induction is how we think, generalize, or anything else. But I rejected that premise. There are other ways to accomplish everything induction supposedly could achieve. Also you seem to have a premise (it's a bit unclear, you didn't try very hard to explain) that infants learn without thinking. (Or maybe you don't think infants learn? I don't know.) I don't agree and don't know why you think that.
  21. Sort of. Induction being a myth that no one has ever done is well known to be Popper's position. It is mine too. However, abstractly-logically, it's possible that people do induction but you still can't test it, because you don't know when you've done it or not.
  22. To test induction you'd first have to know what induction is. You'd have to have a specification of the steps to perform induction and then follow them and see what happens. One of the problems with induction is there is no such step by step method to do it. So you didn't test it.
  23. How is selective attention accomplished without presupposing thinking?
  24. Eioul, The title "epistemology is wrong. a lot" wouldn't make sense. Induction is a particular theory of epistemology (actually several) which is wrong (all of them are wrong).
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