Ilya Startsev

My first language is Russian, but I understand English linguistics. Something, in itself, is unspecified, but it surely is specific, if you follow Peikoff. The idea of 'every' and 'some' follows the same logic as 'everything' and 'something.' 'Every thing' is like attaching 'every' to 'some' or 'a' thing. So, saying 'every thing' on a table is the same as saying 'something' (unspecified in terms of quantity). On the other hand, equating 'every thing' with 'some thing' follows a reduction (subaltern) from a quantity of objects to a more concrete quantity. It's the same as taking a greater quantity of objects to be a singular quantity in itself. For example, if I say 'every dog' in the house is Peter's, comparing Peter's dogs [to those] from another house, say Lucy's, if supposing they become mixed, you could say some dogs (or some dog, if a specific instance) are Peter's rather than Lucy's. Interestingly, we cannot say [*]'every things' but we can say 'some things' implying 'some thing' [or rather ?some 'something'], a category. Whether it is dogs or dog doesn't matter. Any quantity, say for demographic purposes, can be taken as a whole and compared to other wholes. 'Every thing' is as unspecified as something. By saying every Peter's dog, you are equivalently saying some (Peter's) dogs in contrast to some other. In the first instance, though, you are putting category 'dog' under [things owned by] Peter, while in the second under 'person'. Because Peter is a person, they are equivalently the same, just referring to less or more specific things or categories. And 'every dog' is a something, meaning concept 'dog.' So yes, every dog is all dogs taken as 'dog,' specific concept, a 'something.' A synonym of 'everything' is 'each thing' and 'each thing' is the same as 'every' thing[: all this is ambiguous]. You can find this on Google or Dictionary.com. 'Each' is also synonymous with 'any' (and even 'all' - [in some instances could also be considered an] ontological contradiction). 'Any' is logically equivalent to 'some.'

Greg, 'every thing' is synonymous with 'something.' For usage of 'every thing' in an argument concerning Rand's formulation of existence please refer to a statement by Harrison Danneskjold. For usage of 'something' in regard to everything, Peikoff in Understanding Objectivism can be handy, as in the following: Or the equivalent statement from his Objective Communication: Writing, Speaking and Arguing:

From the illustration above, you can see that Kant not only confuses experience with knowledge but also sensation with perception. The reason for these confusions is a much deeper confusion based on linguistic ambiguity. Rand is not different from Kant in this respect, as she also bases her philosophy on a linguistic ambiguity. Here are the ambiguities in Rand and Kant with explanations: Rand's 'everything' and 'every thing': everything is taken as every thing, or something, in Rand, yet the two are not the same because everything is not 'within' something. If you reduce everything to something, something contradicts everything, but this contradiction is implicit in Rand, thus making her dogmatic in terms of creating concepts out of nothing. Kant's 'mind' and 'reason': mind is taken as reason in Kant, yet the two are not the same because mind is not 'within' reason. If you reduce mind to reason, reason contradicts mind not only ontologically but also epistemologically, and this contradiction is explicit in Kant as he sends mind to noumenon (Nonexistence) through the necessary disintegration by fragmentary categories. edit: Kant's Vernunft (through Verstand) means 'mind' and 'reason'.

An illustration of Kantian anti-epistemology: "Imagine a group of scientists is on Mars. They experience some event that they don't understand. The leader of the group experiences yellow (quality), 2 (quantity), close (relation), and possible (modality). Other group members experience the same, except a lady scientist experiences necessity rather than possibility in terms of its modality. They have no idea of what they are experiencing and thus do not know. Their experience is not knowledge."

Thank you for sharing that page, Greg, which I meant to share but didn't. To anyone who is reading this thread, I suggest reading that Wikipedia article on the synthetic/analytic distinction and the arguments concerning this distinction. I also agree with Quine and Peikoff, as I haven't found a single example of when another philosopher explicitly uses synthetic a priori (as formalized by Kant), and the use of terms or their implication is very important in philosophy, which is essentially based around terms. Kant reduced Aristotle's predicates, which had relations to reality, to a list of mathematics-like terms/words. From the example of the Wikipedia page, Kant shows that the first sentences don't use his synthetic a priori categories, whereas the second does: "All bodies are extended." (implying space, a form of intuition in Kant, which in Crit#3 we learn also to be either schematic or symbolic) "All bodies are heavy." (implying mass) I still don't see what category the second uses from Kant's list. Or how do his categories structure the second proposition? From the same article, we find Kant's a priori definition going against Aristotle in thinking that logical necessity is true for a proposition that is not grounded in experience. Thus Kant builds the road to Frege and self-contradictory logical-mathematical, purely symbolic systems. Then the whole idea of "all bachelors are unmarried" being (analytic) a priori, even though we couldn't have grasped the concept bachelor without knowing of an actually existing unmarried man. Finding something a priori is like talking of a three-legged monster existing among humans. Kant escapes this criticism by inventing epistemology that is not based on origin of concepts but on their justification. This would mean that one can know everything from just reading books and passing their words through one's elusive synthetic a priori ('true' a priori knowledge). And yet this contradicts the nature of Kant's synthetic a priori. How can we justify analytic a priori? Kant says we cannot. But if we cannot justify the justification and cannot know that all bachelors are unmarried, how do we know that then? Either I don't understand something in Kant, or Kant leaves this question open. Now, if one can simply justify knowledge from words alone, as Kant seems to imply, then there can be no other way to justify his synthetic a priori. Otherwise, Kant's defining his analytic a priori not from experience but from word-based justification seems hooky like an internalized straw-man. If it was so simple to just peek into words and grasp concepts therefrom, we could do the same for Kant's synthetic a priori, can we not? But I don't see any concepts contained there and no experience either, which would explain how his synthetic a priori are not applicable to other philosophies. In contrast to Kant's categories, my metacategories provide genuine understanding of all philosophies, and because it's been three long years of intense research with not a single contradiction in sight, I am considering calling my hypothesis a theory, or at least thinking of it as one. So, I am going to repeat my argument for everyone to dare to contradict: I claim that I understand human nature by the help of metacategories, which I discovered and formalized from extensive empirical research of people (currently 388 individuals categorized). I can grasp their natures from contextual comparisons/contrasts among them. Thus, the nature or the essence of a person is found to be his or her consciousness and not their ideas (or the individual categories they may use). By understanding the person's essential character, I also agree, from the inherent delineation I've explained concerning metacategories and categories, that I do not mean to understand a person's non-essential characteristics, which may or may not involve (based on the individuals' set of mind) their personal ideas. Hence I delineate the human nature that can be known from various idiosyncrasies that may not be known or even understood.

Can anyone show evidence that any other philosopher used synthetic a priori (Kantian categories)?

Here is a way to make fun of Kant: Questions to all Kantians: Are Kantian categories applicable to philosophy in general? And if they are, what is a concrete example of such an application? If no such case can be made for Kant, then Rand was right in calling him a witch-doctor.

Greg, I missed you! I am glad you finally showed yourself to me in the open. It's fantastic how many words I've written! It must be even more fantastic how many words I've written in my 599 (this is my 600th!) posts, some of which are veeery long, on this wonderful forum that you've improved with some new features (like the useful 'quote words') since last I have been here a few years back. Lots of the content from the posts went into my blog, which could be made into a book! I can totally relate to Ayn Rand's words you quoted. Just like her, I also want to stress that Kant is simplicity clothed in complex, sometimes seemingly impenetrable, words, and at the same time, as she also did, I hated Kant quite strongly. Yet the major difference between Rand and I is that she hated Kant with her brain, and I with my heart, since it is the heart that Kant opposes, whereas the brain is his area, while Rand's brain is secondary to her metacosmic Existence. Oh, the Gish gallop is hilarious! I somewhat would compare Chomsky's monotonous style to this gallop. Then there is this idea that there are errors in such speeches - well, surely, when we speak we make errors because we must think quicker than in writing. But please don't compare my writing to his speeches! In writing, we can analyze what an opponent has written, and we have plenty of time to do that as long as we have patience and interest, and answer to his/her points. Now, the problem that I think you find with my posts is that you simply cannot understand them, and that's fine. I agree that this kind of content is hard to understand, as even some academicians don't! That's why I am here, Greg, to answer on your questions and simplify my thought as much as possible without reducing its essence. So, to simplify my previous post, I would say that the 8 metacategories apply to all consciousness, but specific consciousness must specify simple categories (such as a materialist who reduces, idealist who idealizes, and integrator who integrates), thus exiting the 'realm' of meta-. (Please don't confuse the meta- with noumenon, though; I simply showed that meta- and specifics are like two separate realms because of how different they are in terms of breadth and specifics.) The audience for my posts (as well as blog) is anyone who can reflect upon my ideas and understand in them what they can. Of course, I'd also prefer someone who understands Kant at least to some extent and who has read his works.

One interesting and important finding that I derived from my categorical research is that we need to differentiate not just people but their mental structures from their own categorical specifications of these structures. The Diagram shows that there are a priori structures into which we are all born, and yet you can see that each individual within these structures is unique and differentiated from others. This comes from the fact that each individual creates their own categories (ideas) that they develop on their own and due to influences or inspirations from others. However, we need to notice that these internal distinctions of categories are not, in fact, categorical and therefore not a priori as Kant argued. I am writing this in order to show that the distinction of structure versus category (a form of content) is more important because it is a priori in regard to distinctions of categories within each individual’s philosophical worldview. I think we need to start with consciousness. If consciousness is the structure that allows specifications of categories then we need to know whether consciousness itself could be considered a category and thus the first question should be whether categories can structure other categories. But in order to relate this study to philosophy, we may find this definition or analogy helpful: philosophy studies ideas, but metaphilosophy studies minds that study ideas. So the conflict is between minds as ideas (categories) and ideas (categories). It seems like categories, if we allow a categorical structure given a priori to consciousness, exist on two levels, one of which is meta- and hence structures the lower level. But the question then is whether (meta)categories can structure other categories. Based on the metaphilosophical research of the Diagram, I must understand consciousness not as an a priori category but as an a priori metacategory. This distinction may work, if we borrow the term 'metacategory,' which is only used in math, and apply it in philosophy. If we now look at Kant's a priori and differentiate categories as content from reason as structure, we may think that there is content in the structure, but not in terms of phenomena, which cannot be a priori according to Kant, but content can also be of or belonging to the structure itself as the specifications of the structure, i.e. the categories for which, as we read in the foreword to Crit#2, Kant very carefully selected the terms. Kantian categories are exactly that kind of content, which means that Kant argues for two kinds of a priori: a priori structure (reason) and a priori elements of structure, or content (categories). My argument against Kant is that elements of structure cannot be specified a priori because any act of specification would itself have to precede the results of it. In order for Kant to specify the elements he had to have a lot of experience (physical as well as mental, abstracting from the physical) before he 'discovered' these elements. However, one cannot discover something by specifying it, unless one is doing math, which itself, as a whole, is an invention, but that is a topic that reaches beyond the merits of Kant's synthetic vs. analytic distinctions. Kant had four basic categories differentiating into twelve transcendental groups of categories: Quantity: Totality, Plurality, Unity. Quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation. Relation: Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community. Modality: Possibility, Actuality, Necessity. These were based on judgmental differentiations of the basic four categories, into which I won't go further. Kant never called these basic categories anything besides 'categories.' But if Kantian problematic reaches beyond Kant in terms of his synthetic vs. analytic conflict, so then we need a new kind of category to not only transcend the conflicts first developed by Kant but also set Kant in context with other philosophies. If we assume, following the definition of philosophy given above, that philosophy is a metacategory, which subsumes ideas as categories, then metaphilosophy is a study of metacategories. That could be compared to our philosophy being the lens of our consciousness, from which we cannot escape. But it seems here that I equate philosophy with consciousness as a metacategorical lens, while metacategory itself seems to be a lens. What I mean is that every time you organize or conceive of other categories, it is your own metacategory, your idiosyncratic way of philosophizing, so a 'lens' metaphor is merely descriptively applied to consciousness as metacategory. But if consciousness (through the lens metaphor) is also our individual philosophy, then there may be no confusing equivocation. (The lens metaphor is borrowed from Kenneth Burke's rhetoric.) I don't think a person can talk about his/her consciousness without being philosophical about it in the first place, and we've already seen evidence of the kind of conflict of personal philosophies on this thread. So if we can understand our consciousness while living alone on an island, that means that our philosophy was a priori and it was a metacategory. It's interesting to note that metacategory must precede categories also because there are non-philosophers who follow philosophical traditions without realizing their specific categories of thought. Based on formalizations of my own philosophy, I derive the following 8 metacategories, divided by what they structure: The Model's metametaphysical categories: Existence, Nonexistence. The Model's metaepistemological categories: Sensation, Perception, Conception. The Diagram's metaphilosophical categories: Position, Direction, Scope. I'd appreciate your thoughts, comments, and concerns.

Eiuol, if you strive to attain understanding of others' philosophies by any means possible, that is, if you see no limits in doing this, then you are bound to reduce someone's philosophy to fit into your square. However, if you reduce a circle to fit into a square, what you're doing is taking a part or a copy of someone's philosophy without consulting the whole or even while ignoring the whole or the actual. I wish you wouldn't do this, especially with Rand. Just keep her circle as it is without cutting its edges off or minimizing it to the point that it's not Rand anymore.

I've read it. Also Z and AC. I didn't notice particular differences from Schopenhauer, whose The World As Will and Idea I've also read. I mentioned before (on the 'transcending' thread) that, judging by their lives, Schopenhauer is a softer one than N, but philosophically speaking, a will is a will, is it not? And a bodily will at that. It's not like it was a Kantian will, no! That's strange, considering that you are being so aggressive putting Rand and N together on this thread. I highly doubt you'd be able to drop N from the picture, though.

The mind indeed has an identity, but in Nietzsche's case the position is not mind (as we cannot see or feel the internal 'I,' as he writes in BGE), but instead the body, which we immediately perceive. Therefore, I strongly urge not to mix Rand with Nietzsche, as the latter is a reduction of Rand's philosophy. I agree that Rand misunderstood Nietzsche, but then she misunderstood many others (e.g., Kant) because she couldn't follow their philosophy. The explanation for this I like to call circle-square analogy. Rand's circle doesn't fit into any square, whether Nietzsche's or Kant's, no matter how much you try. They are fundamentally different philosophies, and therefore they necessarily misunderstand each other, as they should, since they have very different worldviews. You must understand, Eiuol, that Rand dropped Nietzsche not just for any reason: she abandoned Nietzsche because she outgrew him and realized she was a circle rather than a square. I do not buy one bit that N opposed Schopenhauer and Hume. Please provide exact evidence of this. In my view, N is not categorically different from Schopenhauer (his primary inspiration; remember the 'Will') and Hume. Besides these two, if you look at the list of people who influenced him on Wikipedia, you'll find that these are virtually all the same (in terms of the overall structures of their philosophies): Voltaire, Heraclitus, Epicurus, Feuerbach, Poe, Rochefoucauld, Stirner, and de Sade. You can therefore surmise N's philosophy from these predecessors. If you claim that N opposed any (or even all) of them, then this kind of 'opposition' is internal from their convergence. Internal opposition is not as strong as external because it only involves opposition of mere ideas (categories in the general sense) rather than their overarching structures of reason. We all have our own ideas, but that doesn't mean that we all should conflict. Now, if N opposed so many people with even similar ideas to his own, then this shows him to be a person who was prone to conflict, like one existing in a Freudian reality of fighting as a natural way of existing. So even in this opposition he still shows himself to be similar to these philosophers, as they would have opposed him on the same grounds. Yet, I claim that this kind of opposition, although perhaps meaningful to N and his aforementioned kind, is utterly meaningless to those who don't share the same purely internal conflicts (like Rand and I, for example). Weak argument based not even on style (as you see N's and Rand's styles are starkly different) but on being or trying to be different. Guess what, everyone is different to some extent from another, whether they try to force their differences, but why focus on such trivialities? Now, if such trivialities are important to you as internal opposition to philosophers preceding him in his tradition for N, then you are showing yourself as not much different from N and thus not a Randian. You are trying to not simply 'correct' Rand et al.'s mistaken interpretations/understandings of N but also attract Objectivists to N's (and your own) side. I see this as a reduction to N's philosophy, and thus advice all Objectivists to see it as it is and not fall in this trap (supported by Reidy's second comment; I wish comments were numbered). Yeah, this is like comparing apples and oranges, circles and squares, artists and scientists. Now this supports his opposition on the trivial basis of differing ideas. However, I agree with some points from N, especially his understanding that fighters of monsters sooner or later become monsters themselves and his nihilistic wonder with the 'abyss' (these are aphorisms from BGE), and this rejection of rights, in whose existence, regardless of Rand's abstract claims, I do not believe. Human rights seem to be only internal constructs having nothing to do with reality, a la Kant. Thus we could have a person who believes in his rights and a person who doesn't coexist without any conflict. 'Human rights' as a concept is therefore trivial. New Buddha is right, however, to point out or at least imply that Nietzsche may have served a principal purpose as a bridge between Kant to Marx and Hitler. Sounds like a Humean/skeptical interpretation of N, with which I'd agree. Eioul, I notice that you keep mentioning 'creativity' to interpret N's philosophy. Although you may think of his creativity in an artistic sense, I don't think this directly relates to creativity in the sense of being a productive member of society, that is, in a more concrete sense following Rand. Rand was opposed to those artists like N who created their subjective works for nothing better than to show their own metaphysical views of reality not as it is but as they artistically perceive it. Thus I think Rand would have been opposed to your equivocation of creativity as being both art and a concrete productivity as it relates to reality or life. Besides, N's opposition, based on your own statements, may materialize in a conflict with such creativity as end-in-itself in a strictly Randian sense (that is, not subjectively aesthetic, Wildean sense of art for art's sake, as it may be related to N's). --- I agree with Eamon Arasbard's first comment. Interpretation of N's amorality is shared by some scholars (e.g., my professor Dr. John D. Schaeffer and his friends in philosophy department) who view N's call to go beyond good and evil as to side with evil, as one has to whenever trying to transcend (i.e., oppose) good or otherwise mix it with evil ("one bad apple spoils the whole bunch"). Eamon, please provide a reference from N that supports this because this is a very interesting claim, considering that, if it's true, it would relate N to Foucault, and thus would also show that N was directed toward the same kind of loss of identity that Foucault proclaimed by ignoring his own self. --- Jennifer Burns's thesis in Goddess of the Market seems to support Eiuol's comparisons of Rand's philosophy to N's, but Burns wasn't an Objectivist and could have inappropriately reduced Rand, which I also think what Eiuol is (sometimes implicitly) doing (like in this comment). I see that The Antichrist was originally published in 1895, and Nietzsche died in 1900. From the same Wiki page, an interesting bit of N's favorable stance in regard to Buddhism: Hereby, I believe, Eiuol, you've made two mistakes. One in misrepresenting The Antichrist as being published with Nazism in mind, and the second, from our private messages, that N opposed Buddhism as a nihilistic religion. Quite Freudian (influenced by N). A side note: this is not Darwinist, as Darwin had a kind of moral teleology. This is interesting and useful because I want to be like that. I am still struggling with an idea that I am not better or worse than others, especially Kant. I need to overcome my opposition against Kant, which is probably tied to my bond with Rand, and I cannot let go of Rand, as she is my only popular support. I don't want to be 'concerned with morality,' as it seems to be a subjective thing, and my Diagram doesn't allow any objective ethical evaluations of others' philosophies, yet I still cling to my so-called 'moral compass' based on the differences of my philosophy with that of Kant and even N. Cool passage, reflecting Lenin's thought (Toohey was supposed to, I believe, represent Lenin). Yet, as we know from the 60s, Rand also impressed her own personality upon people, those poor souls she used and then threw out of her camp, if they didn't follow her to a t. (I once saw a video interview with a woman who was so mentally abused and felt guilt from Rand even after she was kicked out, for she idealized her so much but struggled with the consequences of the 'teaching' all her following life.)

The Model is based on Object--Context relationships varied by scale. This is all presented in the description and also can be scooped by perceptive thinkers from the Model itself. You seem to fail to understand both the quantifying description and the Model as it is. I haven't found another way to present or describe the Model, so I cannot help you there. But your remarks that the Model is merely 'random' or 'arbitrary' or 'poorly organized' are all sliding off the wall. You simply cannot understand it, and it's not my problem but the limitation of your mind. The Model is not there to expand your mind, and neither can anything else expand it. People do not change. It's a fact I leaned from the application of the Model in the Diagram. While the Model presents all of scientific knowledge, the Diagram presents all of philosophical, dealing with people only, and it shows vertically (as it ignores the horizontal distinctions of the Model) that all people are limited and should accept this fact. Therefore let's stop arguing over the merits of the Model and concentrate on the limitation of your understanding of it. Epicurus had lost his identity in the infinite worlds (like Kant’s “manifold of sensation” [ein Mannigfaltiges der Sinnlichkeit]) to which he gives such significance as to compare to the same loss over 2500 years later in Foucault. You see, Eiuol, there are different ways to conceive of the loss of identity: it can be through Nirvana, through decentralization, through infinity over single individuals, and these are all in the same direction, but their primarily means of losing identity is through their position: whenever you take a material object as its own context, identity is not only put onto a metaphysical pedestal (which cuts off everything above level 10 -- all idealisms -- and limits the Model to the level of a mat) but also sends it to Nonexistence. One cannot have a contextualized object, seen as matter floating out in vacuum still alive (like in the movie Life). This contradicts realism of integrators, who take context as the starting location. It contradicts everything. Hence loss of identity we also see in postmodernists. Trying to find distinctions in order to describe my categories is fine, Eioul, but the basic idea, shared by all categorees in the most popular category in existence, comes from the very structure of their minds, not the specifications of that structure, and that's why it is so hard for me to explain this to you without touching upon the Model. It's impossible to explain if you reject it, and you must reject it coming from the limitations of the structure of your mind. I wouldn't have categorized those individuals as mat8 if I knew they would have accepted the Model as it is. So here is another way to understand the purpose of the Diagram: it is how you read the Model. Since the Model only consists of facts and factual predictions, it does not provide the 'correct' way to read or understand it. Even I can only grasp particular parts of the Model if I ignore the helpful theory, which was inspired by Rand (remember how she compared epistemology to math in ITOE? That's because she had the a priori analytic in her mind when she did that and when she also talked about linearization of drawing in RM, like a machine would have drawn). Because you reject the theory, you would also have to reject the practice - categorizations through the Diagram. So it confuses you how I was able to grasp your category (an easy one, to be sure, as 50% of humanity shares it) because it seems to you to have no theoretical backup. Of course it doesn't, as you've rejected it - you cannot grasp it without limiting it, and by limiting it you are only revealing through practice that you are a mat8, whose understanding of the Model can only be relayed through this category as a whole. A way to relate this to Kant is if you take the Model - theoretical reason, and the Diagram - practical. So if you didn't understand pure reason, you go on to read practical, and it seems to make sense in a way or at least impresses you in terms of connections it makes, but since you've abandoned your study of pure reason - practical seems to hang in midair. And I've written in my methodology that the first method to understand and use my categorical, practical apparatus is to learn the Model and its law. You can find my methodology here. And it's not called a 'methodology' for no reason. The first method, if grasped and accepted (through the lens of the student, of course), isn't enough. I've spent 5 years teaching my philosophy to my best friend, and while he grasped the Model, he never grasped its law and never could understand how I was able to categorize him as idealP (Platonist) or anyone else as some category. That's because he also never learned to think contextually or nonlinearly. So he opposed me in my categorization of him, and I had to cut our friendship. If a person resists not only understanding himself (which is too hard, I agree) but also keeps others from accurately understanding him in context, I cannot help but abandon all tries to do so and cannot go on having peddling conversations with him. The verdict is simple: either you contradict me on the grounds of my philosophy and accept it otherwise, or your road is the high road, as I have billions of other people to reach and see if they would go along with my framework. You are encouraging me to narrow down? Narrow down to what? Your level? I can't, Eiuol, I am sorry. The high limits of my own category (int9) won't let me. All I can do is dig with my deficient mat6 under you. You find my explanations and defenses of the categorizations as 'insistence.' If so I allow you not to read them. I hate pushing people in directions they simply cannot go. It's like pushing against a wall. And talking about walls, your category is a tiny bit transcendent between Rand and Kant. Yet you must go more with Kant, since you are closer to him. While I must go more with Marxist distinctions of idealist/materialist, as I am closer to them (even while still contradicting them). Hey, do you want to know my explanation of your choice to abandon Marxism in favor of Objectivism? Marxists are centralized on government based on class; they love all kinds of centralization, even when it's done by capitalists (Marx sent a letter to Lincoln praising his efforts for unification of the US, and Lenin praised state capitalism and even used a version of it with his NEP). That's why they are mat9: their society is made metaphysical by being taken as nature (all materialists, by the way, share this understanding in their directions, but Marxists position themselves on this level). A mat8 must be more individualistic to narrow the position from social to bodily, and since Rand is this kind of an individualistic idealist, she seems more congruent with you, but in fact Marxists are more congruent with you, Eiuol, and your category abounds in so-called Marxists: Paul Lafargue (1842), Georges Sorel (1847), Leon Trotsky (1879), Mao Zedong (1893), and Herbert Marcuse (1898). But since there is also a Mikhail Bakunin (1814) in that category, it seems like Molyneux actually opposes Marxists, whereas in fact they all go along. Collectivist vs. individualist and Marxist vs. anti-Marxist distinctions, from the words of these people, thus fail. My maxim: never trust what a person says about himself, especially if the person never listened to what others said about him. For the vast majority of people, it's better for them to listen what others say about them, for otherwise they won't know for sure who they are themselves. Context, Eiuol, context is the grounding of all my judgments. Context so far and wide that you can call my very thought contextual, and I've had a conception of such thinking since I was 23 years old. I thought I should teach this thinking to the world, but now I realize that the problem is not in the teacher but in the student: not everyone can think this way, so students must be carefully selected by the teacher. Since I've had a failure with an idealP, I wonder whether the idealH/egelian Skye (splitmary on this forum) would be able to handle being my student and succeed grasping my philosophy. As I haven't found an integrator to succeed me, maybe rare idealists would thus work. Maybe not. I don't know because I don't have enough practice teaching all this. I was really hoping that I would also find a true Randian (idealR) on this forum, but that hope may never be realized. Are you referring to the boundary of the formula? Then the boundary on knowledge, of course. Rand or anyone in her tradition can never expand the boundary of knowledge because it is set solid and unchanging by Rand's idealism, reflecting that of Parmenides. Metametaphysics to the rescue! The beauty of my formula is that there is no boundary. The Model is not limited to even its 17 levels. My metaphysics (which I presume to be metametaphysics, but I haven't read enough on the topic, so I cannot be sure) allows mapping knowledge of levels beyond the 17 found without changing the overall structure. The Model and the theory that describes it are the most flexible scientific epistemologies to date. You won't find this kind anywhere because for that they need to have discovered my metaphysics! Maybe this open-endedness makes you think that the Model be sheer chaos. I invite you to study my metaphysics, which I discovered thanks to the Model, although you already know the gist of it: I structure everything (all knowledge, as well as all other metaphysical theories) by the continuum of Nonexistence--Existence. Since Nonexistence and Existence are metaphysical boundaries of the Model, they guide unbounded epistemological expansion. In Rand's case, her epistemology is also bounded by metaphysics, but her metaphysics is not absolute like mine (her metaphysics cuts into my [meta]metaphysics, thus reducing it to level 15, although metacosmos is not metaphysical but physical, just more theoretical because it deals with dark energy). So Rand's metaphysics is a hard-set boundary because it cuts down knowledge we may gain on the universe as a whole. What Rand calls metaphysical (or any other idealist, who takes Source as its own context, i.e., Plenum) - I call physical. Because of this I am not an idealist - this is an eliminative explanation concerning my category. Idealists cannot look at their own positions even analytically, since they take their own analytics a priori and the only one (it's their only lens). Hence they also have family feuds (Protestant vs. Catholic is the first that comes to mind), and so do many individuals within their categories. Now, the fact that these merely internal conflicts exist without any external conflicts is interesting, and I don't know how to explain this through the Diagram. However, based on the Diagram, these conflicts may be judged unnecessary. The Diagram promotes internal peace. Taking Dostoevsky as a pessimist is like taking Peikoff's DIM as pessimistic (what has already been done by Dennis Hardin on the DIM thread). Now, I presume Hardin projects his own pessimism at the core of Peikoff as you do at the core of Dostoevsky. This can be explained by the fact that materialists not only project their internal structures on others (by reducing them to match their positions, as we have seen in your 'evaluation' of Jefferson) but also they only focus on the surface, the appearances, never to penetrate to grasp the actual philosophy of an individual. Peikoff, as Dostoevsky, used the negative aspects of their philosophy in the manner of negative theologies who try to prove existence of God by means of denying things. Peikoff with Dostoevsky, as do all grumpy idealists, only complain because they think that their complaints would force others to focus on their ideals, which are, at the core, optimistic. However, such thinking of these individuals is deeply flawed and can only be opposed by exactly what they desire: whenever they complain, simply say what they want to hear. In Peikoff's case, whenever he complains about religious totalitarianism rising in America, tell him that Objectivism is stronger and better and that it shall, as it deserves, become the absolute philosophy of the age, or whatever else along this line, and you will satisfy him. To Dostoevsky you need to say that belief in God shall prevail and people will change and become more religious, and stuff to this extent, and he'd be satisfied (contrary to the evidence of the senses that these things shall never be). Because they will be satisfied by simply affirming their positive ideals shows that they are truly optimists, and their pessimism is a mere (implicit, unknown by idealists themselves) mask that they want to wear to think (and make others think) themselves deeper or smarter than they actually are (compare to Trump's outspokenness). Now, materialists reduce idealists by focusing on their masks as if they were truths. Thus it is not necessary for a materialist to penetrate deeper than the mask, so the idealists-in-themselves can be ignored (see the parallel with Kantian/Democritean and even Epicurean/Humean philosophies). The purpose of the Diagram, in contrast, is only to view people as they are in themselves, i.e. their natures, and nothing else that apparently differentiates them. Because you are seeing only apparent distinctions, you are failing to focus on the actual distinctions provided in the Diagram. Your insistence comes from the a priori structure of your mind (as you are in yourself). Yet the truth is that Hesse and Nietzsche 'drove' in opposite directions. Nietzsche's or any mat8's 'spirituality' is merely 'spirituality' of body, that is, since material body is contextualized, it is also thus spiritualized, and mat8 take matter to be actually spiritual, but only as matter. Hesse is indeed mystical, in contrast to Nietzsche and even Gautama Buddha, who never believed in soul or God, but reduced everything to body in search of metaphysical pleasure in Nirvana, thus making him a lazy bum (a characteristic of many mat8), not creative at all. As we have eliminative materialists coming fresh from the Kantian press, so we have mereological nihilists coming through Gautama. Eiuol, your disintegration happens to take an integrator (as you would take anyone else) to be a mat8 like Gautama, ignoring that Hesse's Siddhartha is an int8 version of the historical Gautama. The int8 improved the image of Gautama through his attempted integration of him, just as Blavatsky (another int8) attempted the same, but if you study Blavatsky closely - you will find that there is a more ancient and truly mystical tradition that preceded the modern mat8 Buddhism by nearly 16 thousand years! The tradition of mystical Buddhism -- opposed by Dalai Lama's Buddhists -- is of Tonpa Shenrab Miwoche (c. 16,000 BC) , the bon-Buddhist integrator who even developed logic some 16 thousand years before Aristotle! So cut the crap, Eiuol, and listen to the facts if you can handle them. To call Jefferson a DIS you should have first read his inaugural address rather than whatever crap is disseminated by materialists who know of nothing better to do than place everyone into their materialist shoos. Whose method is wrong now? You can only dis my method, as I've learned, nothing more. Eternal return is seemingly idealized by you as it is by many materialists, and especially postmodernists. Postmodernists praise fragmentation and thrive in such 'reality-as-it-is' which is actually Nonexistence (yes, a truly metaphysical reality, in contrast to what idealists believe to be their own -- making it seem like they are floating in vacuum, which they don't). Nietzsche's hardline materialism is his walking on people's heads, as we see Raskolnikov do, but Nietzsche would have never found himself guilty as Raskolnikov had done, which shows that Raskolnikov was an idealist (created by the idealP) and not a mat8. I'll give you a more contemporary example of Nietzschean philosophy in Donna Tartt's The Goldfinch. Here is a quote reflecting exactly the kind of reality-as-it-is and the resistance necessitated to individualize/egotize all mat8 (postmodern or whatnot): Now, what are we arguing about? You are praising and placing Nietzsche's ideas on the pedestal of mat8, as is properly done. I am merely showing that you are mat8 and must therefore do so by the structure of your own mind. That you cannot make me do the same as you do or see the world through your lens doesn't mean that your lens is false: it only means that my lens is different, and I would like you to respect our differences instead of your continuing dissing me to your heart's pleasure. I am showing facts about who you are and don't care about what you call eternal return or how great it is or whether everyone should find it the same wonderful thing that you do. I cut through all these apparent reasons and get to the core: eternal return is Nietzsche's direction (which includes method and end, if you look at Complete Reality Hypothesis's -- CRH from now on -- definitions of my terms). From the very fact of your support for Nietzsche's description of Nonexistence (I don't care about descriptions so much as differentiating factors; Kant describes it as Noumenon, so what?) the Diagram allows me to conclude that you are mat8. Shall we continue this, even if you don't see any logic in my categorization? The logic is there though: it's all in CRH's descriptions as definitions and parameters of the Diagram. I mean, it's not as mathematical as theory of nested concepts, so what's the problem now? Yeah, you love what mat8's love - Nonexistence. That's great, but in my metaphysics - Nonexistence is necessarily taking the logical value of FALSE, in order for there to be Existence in the first place. Materialists love lies and falsities by claiming them to be the truth - that's the basic bandwagon of your general category. As an INT this is the only way I can see what you see, as I cannot look through your lens no matter how much I try. Whether you disagree with me also doesn't matter, since disagreement based on differences is the most natural disagreement that was structured into human minds by reality. From the conflicts alone we can derive most of the categories on the Diagram. I love conflicts, since we may learn the truth about people from them after all! Now, this is interesting. Hamilton is not categorized, so I can only currently compare Jefferson to Washington, who was a Platonic idealist (idealP). Hence I derived the stable int-ideal bond among the US founding fathers. I know there had to be other idealists among them, as some were inspired by Berkeley, but Jefferson was inspired only by INT, on whose basis he developed his own philosophy, as we know of it from the Declaration of Independence. The three INTs, whose busts Jefferson ordered to be installed in his home, were Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Isaac Newton. To get all INT in one's tradition must be a sure sign of him being an int, don't you think? Otherwise, what's wrong? Now, I've heard of the book Hamilton: The Revolution, in which some probably mat8 tries to dis all US founding fathers, even portraying Hamilton as one dissing sob. To me Hamilton seems to look like Washington (he wrote most of his speeches, after all), but I am going from intuition here. Either Hamilton is a mat8 or the writer of the book is, whose views you seem to accept. The point of Jefferson's government was not to make it so strong (something that Lincoln, an int8 -- following in Jefferson's footsteps -- improved upon later). The point was to make economic relationships free, which generated the economy without restrictions that were imposed at the time in all monarchies. Now, you may argue against Aristotle along the same line -- his political citizens were basically living in communism and he described slavery, as Spinoza I think did similarly, as a natural phenomenon, which means it was bound to change as evolution allowed. Yet, the point is not whether levels in directions of these INTs were 100% accurate for our time -- they were only the best available at their time. The point is that INT are 100% accurate, and also only from their own developments within the category, about their positions. So Aristotle was more accurate about consciousness than relationships or governments, whereas Jefferson was as accurate about consciousness as Aristotle but also more accurate than him on governments and completely accurate on relationships (Jefferson's int8 position). Building upon Aristotle and Jefferson, I -- as an int9 -- must agree with their positions (in their individual details and in whole) but not necessarily the details of their directions. Hence my position's central work -- Theory of Emotional Economy -- allows building an integrative culture to support the capitalist social order we've found to work miracles through free relationships and minarchist central government. Hence, as Jefferson, I oppose stronger government, and think that we need a smaller (minimum) government that is still respected by all citizens as the social (and also cultural, in my economic theory) center. The government in my theory is a bank operated along the lines of corporations with a board of trustees, but who can be elected by the citizens. My government structure cuts away the legislative branch and thus transplants the economic branch for the executive while retaining the court system, which would be applied to the new economy. You, of course, must disagree with the mystical (i.e., emotional/heart) elements which grow as direction from my theory, but that's only because it's so far over your head and opposite to your direction that you can do nothing about it. The only DIS who have any strength against my economic theory are Marxists, and you are not one of them, as we've learned, so that's that, as they say. She couldn't, and she didn't have to. Nor can or do I or anyone else who is not a mat8 like you. Only a mat8 can understand another mat8 as accurately as possible. This discussion has exhausted itself, I think. I am not interested in your mat8 or Nietzsche. This thread is about Rand and Kant. I've only allowed this discussion to go as far because you are the only active one here and I wanted to show to other readers how I apply my metaphilosophical categorical apparatus directly and in real time on an actual member of the audience. You've been helpful in allowing me to take you as an example to further studies of those interested in the Diagram, so thanks for that. Yeah, and so does a mat8 Ken Wilber (1949). That doesn't make him even a little an integrator. Your disintegrating tendencies are more apparent, though. And they are not only apparent tendencies - they are necessitated by your very structure through which you operate in many ways, among those - live, learn, understand, perceive, and also conceive. FDE quote, which we've discussed in private messages a few years ago:

Yes, ex nihilo indeed, as everything starts with nothing, and so it does with INT philosophies like Laozi's Tao and Jung's, which have nothing to do with idealist analytics, although their philosophies also don't extend as far or as explicitly as mine does here. In its entirety this criticism is a materialist one, which is directed toward nothingness in rejection of everything (your reduction of the Model to not being accurate or 'describing anything'). Your criticism first tries to make it seem like my philosophy is an idealism, with numbers being its primary analytical position, but this is obviously not the case, even though a materialist could only think this way in order to disintegrate what I have achieved. The easiest way to disintegrate is to idealize and then simply reduce. The same thing is done by Kantians like Harris, who first set me up as a 'randoid' idealist, and then reduce in a similar fashion. You won't understand, as you can't even understand idealists without reducing them to your point of view, but all right. The simplest explanation is how we see Rand's theory starting with sensation and ending in conception, and conception taking the primary role in her philosophy and an actual starting position. It's always about conception, conception this, conception that. You see the same in Peikoff, e.g. in his Objective communication: Writing, speaking, arguing. Now, I get it. We see the same in Kant, even though he reduces everything to a conception bounded by brain, so really a sensation with conception being a reduction of idealist conceptions to a set of categories. With idealists like Rand and Peikoff, conception takes a universal scope, especially with metaphysics, when Rand says that existence is certainly close to universe in IOE (meaning existence is more like metacosmos). Rand or Peikoff do not reduce things to a conception, but instead direct this unitary conception that's sitting on their pedestal (preformed since 3 y.o., in Rand's case) toward perception and sensation without quite reaching them, as Objectivism-as-science simply doesn't cut it for the sole reason of its overconceptualization (should I mention Peikoff's abstract-as-hell model in Understanding Objectivism?): in other words too much conception and not enough of anything else (we see this lack of external experience and sources in Rand's writing, except for the one time she mentioned how crows count up to ... 5 was it?). Because of this Objectivist methodology starting with such metaphysics, we must cancel the conception from each of the epistemological elements before we get the actual thing, whether an actual sense datum, percept, or conception as it is in anyone's mind and not only in Rand et al.'s. So you then have a function within the definition of the theory. And all it does is show that the sum must be integrated? Isn't sum already implying integration? I mean, sums call for computations in computing. There is no other purpose for a sum other than to perform it as addition. Now you can make the formula as complicated as you want with as many nested functions as you need, but in my view simplicity is best. The simpler the resulting formula, the more optimized it is, the easier it is to grasp and perform when you do actually calculate it ('integrate,' in this case). I am not trying to program people with my formula, but with your method - it seems to require people to even solve for the unknown in equations. What for, if the existence of the quantified epistemological theory was only justified for the sole act of describing the Model, thus epistemologizing it, or mapping all the epistemic elements onto each element of the Model? There is nothing else to it, and I don't know why you are making such a fuss from only a descriptive theory as if it was a prescriptive one. Just as Rand used her theory to describe how we acquire knowledge, I used the quantified theory to describe how knowledge is acquired through the Model. Really simple, even though it might look intimidating at first. Yeah, as I said earlier your problem is with the Model. In the Model, integration happens naturally too, but you are forcing it in another direction. If you place atoms side-by-side, based on their field environment, some of them will bond sooner or later. It happens regardless of your descriptions of it. Why force it by a required integration in your formula? It's like you are trying to make a Kantian law out of it. There is no duty or automation in integration, contrary to many views; there is only nature in it because it is a natural process. And if you cannot do it based on your a priori structure of consciousness, you can never do it, and all your attempts merely reveal who you are (i.e., not an INT). An integrator would always integrate whatever data is given to him or her. It's like a law of nature in their case. As I also said earlier, there are quite a few of such people in the world. I haven't found a single one yet on this forum, nor on any other forum. So the point is not to idealize integration. The point is to understand who you are in the scheme of things and accept yourself. If you are not born an integrator, it's all right. 99 out of 100 are not born as integrators, so at least you are in the majority and should be happy with that. I never asked nature to be born an integrator, but here I am and not a single one of you probably understands most of what I write here. And I have to be all right with that too, otherwise I'd go insane from being so unique and lonely in the world. True, yet you are ignoring that (S+P+C) in each one of the 34 elements of the Model is unique. So, based on the theory of nested concepts, you get 102 epistemic elements. And that's only the extremes! On each level the continua are virtually infinite, as you can get any real number concentration between the pairs. Hence the actual amount of all epistemic elements of the Model is basically infinite. I wrote before that the Model describes everything. I wasn't lying, you know? And I am not lying when I claim that the everything that the Model describes starts from nothing (the base of the Model). If you follow the Model, you can only have everything if you start from nothing. Otherwise, you would be always reducing everything to a lower number of elements and thus not growing them but driving toward nothing the further you go. Growth starts at nothing. It's a law, it's theory, and you can never go around this without rejecting everything I've built. The funny thing is that every one of you does reject most of what I've built, but that's the law of nature too. Your nature. Not mine or the Model's. The truth cannot be shared even when you are facing it through someone else's words. That's fine, but Nietzsche's attitude toward Christianity and Plato was nothing like Emerson's, and this is a more significant fact in comparison, since it is directly relating him to other philosophical traditions. Have you read Emerson's Nature? Yeah, and I've read Nietzsche's Anti-Christ. Now, to you Nietzsche's mind must be greater, since it approximates yours to a greater extend, whereas you must also reduce Emerson's idealism, so it cannot be as great as it is because of your own a priori restrictions. While everyone is a priori limited (as metaphilosophy shows), you are always limited in a particular way. Hence, in your case, you can only truly understand Nietzsche (or any mat8). Dostoevsky nihilistic? That's a new one. So Dostoevsky was a materialist (since only mat8 can be nihilists)? Every idealist I've found (138 so far) was an optimist, and you can never get optimism into nihilism - it's impossible, as far as I know. Interesting. To me a famous aestheticist in your tradition was Oscar Wilde (1854). A naturalist and monist - Ernst Haeckel (1834). Pluralist - Gilles Deleuze (1925). I haven't found a pure realist yet. And every idealism comes with a realistic direction. Wait, did you just say Herman Hesse, the romantic German author? Hesse and Nietzsche contradict each other because Hesse was a realist and a mystic, whereas Nietzsche was as materialist as they come on the bodily level of existence. To equate an int8 (going toward A) with a mat8 (non-A) is to disintegrate an int8 following 'A is non-A' logic. Yes, you are an obvious DIS now. There is no escaping, you've just attempted a disintegration of a great int8 in the tradition of an int7 Novalis. It's a good thing I can point to others your disintegrative mindset. Otherwise you might actually convince someone that a man who loved existence so much could be viewed alongside the man of eternal return! You have no idea of what a contradiction is because your reasoning is that very contradiction! The problem is that you take direction for a position, as most do who don't know that this distinction exists. Explain how. I see a family feud. Probably because these people create the same old systems that they didn't know existed and dismantle everything in the same old way they didn't know was already attempted. The beauty of the Diagram is in finding unique and rare points of view. As for the majority - it's all in a heap as it is in real life. I like to pick gems, not plow through mediocrity, but plowing through mediocrity is the only way to find gems, so I get with it. The Diagram doesn't differentiate subjective from objective philosophies because most people are objective and subjective to some extent. Joyce could be seen more as a subjective guy, whereas Rowling an objective gal (although you may not believe so with her Harry Potter). But as you can see, even this subjective/objective distinction fails when I try to use it on people. However, one sure fact that both share is their vulgarity, hence mat8 status. Have your read Rowling's most honest work to date, The Casual Vacancy? You should. It's a masterpiece as far as materialist art goes. Virtually all of her characters are mat8, a sure sign of the author's philosophy. And what one is, through such a materialist lens, is a body as an environment, thus a metaphysical, contextualized body, a will in Nietzsche's and Schopenhauer's philosophies. I've seen in the movies today a great example of exactly this kind of materialist metaphysical subject in the film Life (2017). A realist would be surprised and opposed to what a creature of 'Life' could do in that film, but to a materialist - it's all good and imaginary, like another mat8 would say, David Hume. All of these individuals' traditions, however, start with crying misanthropism of Heraclitus (a hard version of mat8, followed by Judas Iscariot) and the peace-loving and metaphysical pleasure-seeking Gautama Buddha and Epicurus (the soft ones). Now, Nietzsche, along with Freud, would be the harder ones like Heraclitus, whereas Hume and Schopenhauer would be the softer ones. In any case, all of their internal distinctions are useless, as they are all based on the same level of the Model (level 8 - body), and by contextualizing body they are looking at the only end they can conceive - the metaphysical reality that is Nonexistence but also called by such individuals Nirvana or simply a meaningless end, the sacred nothing, cyclic decentralized run-of-the-mill 'existence', and whatever else you'd like to call it. Yes, that's another case of your attempt at a Nietzschean disintegration of a most cherished pioneering integrator of the past, the very man who created the first capitalist nation with the first properly integrated economic relationships among people, the first of his kind, who changed our reality by integrating it a level up, from the level of Kantian brain and Aristotelian consciousness. Additionally, to go against Jefferson (by projecting your own mat8 non-A chaos onto him or by accepting what other materialists say about him) is not only to go against integration, but to go against Rand herself, against idealists, which is exactly how your Nietzschean path makes you operate in a discussion like this and what it requires you to follow and to where - away from classical liberalism and toward anarchy, obviously. Or toward a Kantian disintegrating EU, if you become of such a low mind. This is confusion. Rand idealized Nietzsche by looking way over him (7 levels above, to be exact). When she finally realized who she was (a special idealist who promotes integrators like Aristotle and Jefferson), she abandoned Nietzsche. In my earlier comment's FDE quote you requested, you can see that she realized that Nietzsche was way down with Kant and looking in the same direction. Even while her position was so much above them, she later felt that when someone compared her to Kant or Nietzsche it was very bad indeed - a reduction/disintegration generally done by all materialists. For creativity you might find more comparable to your type among postmodernists, but then, if you are of such an 'objective' mind as you seem to have been inspired, your case reflects that of materialists who find a complementary relationship with idealists (still reducing them though). That would only support the shared direction of materialists and idealists, and in a way it's good they so connect. Idealists in general inspire a lot of people: that's their only function and purpose given to them by nature. Yet their inspiration seems to make you conflict with your own kind, which is bad.

The problem seems to be that I had indeed integrated Rand's theory of concepts (we can discuss/argue this point further), and yet I am trying to transcend her philosophy in contrast/conflict with Kant. So my conflict seems to be between integration of Rand's epistemology and transcendence of her philosophy. But if what I had discovered metaepistemology based on Rand's epistemology, then by the help of this discovery the conflict between Rand and Kant could be transcended if we take into account that metaepistemology is directly related (as the [structural and theoretical] basis) to my metaphilosophy inspired by Peikoff.

Yes, so this would be analogous to a cake recipe or Kantian categories. The idea of applying them is implied in the formula when you use it. When you don't use it but merely read it (as many who had only read the Model without understanding how the elements connect) - then it would be merely an act of reading and NOT application. Also, in contrast to Rand and Peikoff, an act of integration in my philosophy differs quite a bit from their acts of 'integration'. An integration is properly done only by integrators, and, as I've found through my research, they constitute about 1% of human population, so quite a rare breed indeed. Thus, in order to successfully grasp the Model starting from the bottom and directed to the top: one needs to be an integrator. Theory of nested concepts merely describes the Model quasi-mathematically. I do not claim math in any way to substitute for the Model (or for reality, for that matter). I completely disagree with those scientists (to whose worldview you seem to reduce my entire philosophy) who take mathematics as primary or as primary means of understanding reality. Mathematics in my philosophy, if you actually grasp it, is obviously secondary, secondary to every of its branches. Mathematics is an act of description, not an act of application. A theory, not practice. Rand equates theory and practice, while Kant strictly delineates them, and so do I, although not as strictly. Practice for me would be an application of theory, exactly the 'act of integration' whereof you speak. So I guess I am not using Rand's epistemology as a method here but as a theory, arguing here that her 'theory' should be taken for what it is. As concerns the 'arbitrariness' of my theory -- that's an oxymoron. By calling my theory arbitrary, you are rejecting it. Now, you may very well reject it without rejecting Rand's theory of concepts. However, this is because you do not accept my Model, hence you will never accept any description thereof. Yet, I do not call my Theory of nested concepts a theory for no reason. It is NOT a hypothesis. Every level of the Model is supported by the strictest scientific evidence anyone can ever find. If there is a level, there is that knowledge available in the human base of knowledge. Now, the Diagram, which is based on the Model, is hypothetical because of the results it derives, and yet in three years I haven't found a single contradiction in it. Everyone categorized remains where they have been first put by me; I have never yet changed anybody's category due to contradictory evidence because I simply haven't found any, and I already have 384 individuals in the Diagram's list. Hence calculating differences between levels in worldviews as shown on the Diagram is combining science with philosophy and applying them on people. I haven't used the %'s before, but you've seemingly inspired me to do so here, and I like the kind of quantified analogies they provide. Absolutely, they are different. In fact, some of them are contradictory. The reason I am allowed to use percentile differences is that I thoroughly and better than anyone understand the very differences of all philosophical worldviews as shown on my Diagram. Someone else who doesn't understand how levels or positions are structured might make a mistake, so I am not recommending using or extending my analogies. I've simply used them first to try to understand myself these philosophical differences better. If you were offended by my analogies, then keep in mind that math is only used to describe, never to replace the referents. I am not a materialist or an idealist who does that. I don't want to 'mix' Kant and Rand because it is impossible. If I ever do, then please correct me. I am not getting new ideas strictly from them but by reflecting upon them through my own lens. Transcendence is opposition, like pushing away from a wall, except there are two walls, so you are pushing against both at the same time, thus staying between them. My purpose is to get so far and exactly between them that I get to find out who I am and my own ideas in relation to theirs. I can then use these major figures' insights to evaluate and understand my own ideas in how these ideas compare/contrast (i.e., also my internal conflicts) and how they may, albeit differently, reflect the ideas of both Kant and Rand. The main ideas I am struggling with are all with meta- in them. I was hoping you know something, anything, about them in order to understand how these ideas relate to either Rand or Kant. That's interesting, but I can't understand it as you seem to do. C stands for 'concept of', so how can you have a concept of theory of concepts being an integration of concepts of sensation, perception, and conception? That would equate the act of integration (your 'I') to a concept (of concepts...)! The (+) sign was describing integration as in 2 data of sensation (senses) = 1 datum of perception (percepts), with 2 percepts = 1 concept. The mathematics applied to epistemology is evidently not strictly scientific math, yet the description makes sense, as you indeed get all three (S + P + C) integrated in theory of concepts. The issue then becomes, as I've found earlier in discussions with you and dream_weaver (where are you buddy? please come over!) on Rand's epistemology, on what boundary is set on the integration of those three in the theory. Rand sets a strict, unchanging limit because she favors conception. But, as I've shown with my modification to her theory described quasi-mathematically on my blog post, if you set a variable limit, you can get all three in equal proportions. That's the true meaning of my Theory of nested concepts, which not only describes the Model but also provides peculiar insights about metaepistemology (the area of philosophy that studies, not favors, all kinds of 'integrations', whether they are MIS as in Rand, DIS through senses as in Kant, or INT like me going from senses through percepts to concepts as they are, not as they are thought by Rand or Kant). Thus, you could think of my Theory of nested concepts as transcending Rand's theory of concepts, although before I thought of it as an integration of her theory (maybe I still do?). So, to reiterate, 'I' in your formula is unnecessary, since (+) implies integration (or disintegration, or misintegration, depending on how a worldview combines those elements). By putting 'I' in the formula not only do you keep the 'concepts of' skewing the formula to Rand's direction, but also unjustifiably mixing Peikoff's metaphilosophy into Rand's epistemology, which I delineate, as I delineate science (the Model) as the base of metaphilosophy (the Diagram). It also seems from this discussion that I've found an explanation for why Rand didn't understand a possible way her theory may be viewed as metaepistemological. The only way I know is the way shown in my theory, as in cancelling 'concepts of' and setting a variable limit, so all three epistemological elements gain a meta- status, as they are taken regardless of what any philosopher thinks of them or how he or she views them. I believe we should continue searching for available means of persuasion even when we know that we cannot pass the barrier of incommensurability in order to affect our opponent's views. This is so for two reasons: first, rhetoric is the best alternative to violence, which proceeds from isolation and non-communication (as we've seen with Hitler and Stalin), and second, we can thus continue honing our rhetorical skills to later more efficiently persuade those who at least partially share our views. Thus, I do not abandon my debates with Bill Harris, even though three years have shown no progress. In any case, I do not want to kill the old man; I pity him (maybe because we continue our 'useless' debates?). Concerning the video: I wasn't referring to anything specific, other than Chomsky repeatedly saying 'creativity' to attempt to counter Foucault's attacks. I was providing it for context and hoping you'd see their debate reflecting debates between materialists throughout history, like Democritus and Epicurus, Kant and Nietzsche. Those are the parallels that I see. You need to use 'synthetic' and not 'analytical' thinking, that is, use what I'd call contextual thinking, to try to grasp the intricate conflict perpetuated by the two philosophical traditions. I am also guessing that you would go with the latter: Epicurus, Nietzsche, and Foucault, than the former. Besides, if I may derive an insight from understanding such debates, it seems that, even though I still show it sometimes, analytical thinking isn't the way to comprehend metaphilosophy like that of DIM or my own. It requires thinking that grasps ideas regardless of space or time (contradicting Kant here, as his spacetime is a form of 'synthetic' intuition) but centered in the very characters of philosophers, like key or essential elements of their mental structure, or better, the very structures themselves (comparable to Kant's a priori reasons). I see you have your own metaphilosophical categorizations. Would you provide your formalizations of them, or at least name them, if you have given them formal names? I disagree with you on putting Emerson with Nietzsche only based on how Nietzsche was influenced by him. If you do that, then you would also need to put Dostoevsky with Nietzsche, and as we all know the two philosophies are so different that we cannot justify putting them in the same tradition. I agree that Rand is certainly not far from Emerson, however, even though she disliked his dialectical reasoning on (in)consistencies. I've proven to a Cambridge-graduate specializing in Emerson (my professor in American literature, Dr. Einboden) that Emerson was not a Kantian but more of a Hegelian. Interestingly, especially if you've read Sciabarra's book on Rand (which I still haven't, but it seems to support this conclusion), Rand through Emerson's individualistic philosophy is right next to Hegel. I completely agree with and even praise and promote your understanding of Marx as being set in a category all of his own, yet closer to idealists like Hegel. Marx is certainly closer to them than, say, Nietzsche, who, along with Stirner and Feuerbach, had some influence on Marx as well. In any case, kudos to you for even your short Marxist analysis! I know you wrote that you were a Marxist before you became an Objectivist. The one piece of (meta)philosophy that I borrow from the Marxist tradition is their distinction of idealism and materialism. These terms I set under Peikoff's DIM, thus materialism became DIS and idealism - MIS. INT is must more complex, as it is realism/mysticism. I define realism in opposition to materialism and mysticism in opposition to idealism, so INT becomes a way to transcend (not integrate, but oppose!) materialism with idealism, or, as we find in our discussion on this thread, also Kantianism with Randianism. (Side note: While Peikoff has 5 categories, I have 15, 5 in each of his main three. Hence Kant and Rand would be special, rare categories under DIS and MIS, respectively, which are categories more broadly conceived in my hypothesis). This is exactly my point. The quantification is a form of analogy, a description, which you have become so focused on that it is pulling you away from what I am actually trying to tell you. Just ignore the %'s, as they were hypothetical anyway - and I used them basically only for myself as an experiment whether any new insights could be pulled (I think that my internal conflict with Kant being smaller than between Kant and Rand was an interesting part that reflects my current stance in this discussion). It's a pity, though, that you don't see any merit in my quantified analogies, or we could've figured them out together. That's an interesting case of a complex system analysis. However, the basis of relationships being mere influences is misleading. For example, just the fact of me being influenced by Michael Kosok, Ayn Rand, and Leonard Peikoff is not logically followed by a claim that my philosophy is in the traditions of any of these philosophers (I do not follow any of them to an essential t, although I am certainly closer to Kosok, as we are both INT). Hence the system analysis of influences is useless to me, as it only maps discussions between traditions and not the traditions themselves. I have found a visual way showing how 'close' someone to someone else is (whether philosopher, artist, poet, scientist, scholar, movie director, or religious leader, among others) in my Diagram. You seem to have focused on my quantifications without realizing what those quantifications were describing: they are describing a visualization of all philosophies. Please refer to the link (which I also submitted in OP) before criticizing my level analyses. splitmary is also in the process of studying the Diagram, so I am hoping she would provide some of her own understanding that she has attained of the Diagram so far on this thread to help you all out. First, I must say I love your showing-tongue smilies - they are very cute and add a nice, exciting touch to our dry and wordy discussion. Then, please refer to the Diagram. mat8 is an abbreviation I use for a specific DIS category known as vulgar, Nietzschean materialism of level 8 (Body). I would appreciate if you share what you like about Rand as this is very interesting to me. Two other categorized mat8 individuals who were influenced by Rand are Penn Jillette (b. 1955) and Stefan Molyneux (b. 1966). See how you compare to them, for in the Diagram you would be following in their footsteps and thus would be maximally close to them, albeit they are both libertarians.

Yes, Eioul, I am trying to do something similar to Hegel here, using dialectics. And I agree that Rand and Kant are not in a 100% straightforward conflict. Instead, their conflict is more like 47% internal and 53% external (greater external on Rand's side). That's what makes this conflict so interesting and a challenge to resolve! I have long abandoned any hope of integrating the two, but I think that an idea of transcending, which is very different from integration, seems fruitful. By 'transcending' their conflict, I do not mean putting their comparable pieces together (I don't think that's possible in order to make a wholesome philosophy from that). Transcending Kant and Rand necessitates opposing both even without putting them together. So this is also a different kind of dialectic than Hegel's because I do not try to connect pieces through opposition. I am trying to oppose the pieces to the point of launching as far away from them as possible. The end result, I think, should be somewhere between Objectivism and Kantianism. I abandoned my neo-Objectivism when I realized that Objectivism cannot be integrated with Marxism. But there may be a key insight found through my failure. Marxism also tries to find its own way, and they are right between Kantianism and Objectivism! Following the same mathematical comparison I used above (from the levels of my Model), Marxists are 60% internal to Objectivism. In other words, Marxists transcend Kantianism by 13% (or his conflict with idealists like Rand, also comparable to Plato, as Eioul correctly stated). I also want to transcend Kantianism by 13% like Marxists do, but in a way that is more congruent with Objectivism. In other words, while Marxists were directed more toward Kantianism (and yet, through Russia's historical conditions, became more congruent with Platonism), I want to (explicitly) be more congruent with idealism (like Objectivism) because I am directed toward it. The beauty here is that Objectivism provides exactly the kind of foundation that I seek (Peikoff's DIM). Yet, my transcending Objectivism would have to seem like Kant's transcending idealism, as I also believe in a priori categories, yet my categories are broader than Kant's by 20% (external conflict; Kant's categories as 86% of Kant's reason are only reflected within 66% of my philosophical position) because my categories are not of reason but transcend reason. My categories are of worldviews. My categories are people as they are in themselves. The very nature of a person, which constitutes his or her identity and thus causes him or her to live and view the world in a particular way, is the person's category. And because people's natures (categories) are set and unchanging, they are a priori. I really hope you'd help me with this transcendence, which I call transmaterialism. Yes, this is very interesting. Bill Harris wrote to me on Facebook yesterday, repeating his same old belief, that Objectivism 'isn't a philosophy, it cannot in any way be compared to Kant.' So Kantians like Harris (a true academician) think that this is not a philosophical forum and that most people on it aren't philosophers. The conflict also develops along the same lines you mentioned. It is incommensurable because questions of interest to Kantians are non-questions or not interesting to Randians and vice versa. Hume is certainly closer to Kant, so Kant found a way for his ethics to work within Humean philosophy: their conflict would be mostly internal, as in 87.5% internal and 12.5% external. (These calculations ignore shared directions above positions.) However, internal conflict only occurs from similarity of views and not their difference. It's a psychological conflict, like when you see something of yourself in another and you hate them for it. People who are not so psychologically insecure (and I think Rand totally showed herself as such in debates with Kantians) wouldn't feed the conflict so much, but simply accept it as a ground of convergence. No need to bash each other's skulls if we converge - simply learn that we have our own spaces, and there is enough space for everyone. In On Pedagogy, Kant mentions a story related to this mindset, and I've just found the original. It is the story of Uncle Toby and the fly in The life and opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman by Laurence Sterne. Here is the excerpt from it: So in the same way Kantians and Objectivists can coexist in the world that is 'wide enough to hold both,' DIS and MIS. It is also a world that can hold INT. Returning to your quote, it is a surprise to me that Kant was in analytic tradition because he surely wrote like a continentalist! Maybe because he analyzed so specifically he would be an analyticist, but then Rand did too, didn't she!? (As well as Wittgenstein [some Objectivists' darling] whom I consider a Kantian.) To think Rand in continental tradition seems very wrong to me, very wrong. Perhaps such is the state of the world after Kant, when people are so, so very confused about philosophy. Besides, I reject analytical vs. continental distinction in traditions of philosophy, since they mix philosophers who have nothing to do with each other! I reject it as bullshit, the same bullshit as calling Kant's philosophy an idealism. There is nothing idealismic about it! Kant is a DIS, if you only listen to Peikoff. I think my problem is that I also share much with Kant. My internal conflict with him is much more complex, however, because my deficient 40% under Kant's categorical 86% is non-convergence that is contradictory and not at the same time (and yet my internal conflict with Kantianism is 7% lower than one it has with Objectivism). It is making me unstable. Kant's philosophy is stronger where mine is weaker, and yet mine is more fundamental (even more specific). I cannot understand this while I am explaining it to you, hoping that someone can explain myself to me, as we cannot explain us to ourselves, just as Kantians like Harris cannot look at themselves in context or Rand couldn't analyze her metaphysics (which she had since she was 3 years old). I have the same problem as everyone. I cannot look at my nature, however much I try, but I think analyzing my own lens is important in order to transcend the factoring philosophies. Metaphilosophically (if I am using the term right, but nobody has contradicted me yet, so I continue using it), it's not important in what way someone means something. It's important in what way someone thinks in context to someone else. And especially with an abundance of conflicts between those who call themselves followers of any one philosophy we need to differentiate even more than a few traditions for contextual analyses. Ideas change and evolve historically, but people don't change. It's people's nature not to change essentially but to remain who they are, regardless of space or time in which they exist. I haven't found another framework that theoretically explains how people in different countries and historical periods create essentially the same philosophies. With the help of my hypothesis, I've found many such individuals. Here are just a few to give some perspective: Democritus and Kant, Emerson and Hegel, Jean Jaurès and Hegel, Mach and Avenarius, Michael Kosok and Karen Barad. These individuals, some less known than others, developed, what they thought, their own original philosophies, but actually, we find, they were following traditions that continued throughout history. Speculatively, maybe these categories is nature's mechanism to prevent human philosophical diversity and endeavors from succumbing into oblivion. So, it wasn't about feelings for him? Did you know that your evaluations of philosophies reflect your own category? I would say, Eiuol, that you are a mat8 (Nietzschean), but you may prove me wrong.

Boydstun, Plato started with mind/body dichotomy (I believe he mentioned it in Timaeus) and Descartes developed and extended it, while Kant took the mind part and cut off the rest. This is of course a simplification of Plato and Descartes, and the only thing Kant seems to have inherited from Plato is terminology. As you well understand, essential Plato has more to do with Berkeley than Kant, which is to say his philosophy has little to nothing to do with Kant. What Kant rejected in Descartes is exactly his Platonism, the idea of mind coming from an analytic a priori noumenal realm. The materialist side of Descartes, which is also reflected in Peter Ramus, Kant gladly accepted. Evidently, Descartean and Kantian metaphysics are not the same, since Descartes is coming from a kind of Augustinian-Platonic realm, a God-head rationalization for mind's existence. Yet surely you must understand that Descartes is more complex than that, as he was delving into mental and bodily mechanics - the ways our minds and bodies work. That's what I meant above when I said that Kant took the mental (not metaphysical per se) part of Descartes and cut everything above mind (body and Platonic et al. metaphysics), reducing it to mind alone (really, metaphysical brain, which is today reduced by neuroscientists and psychologists to brain alone - not a major difference, in my book). Oh yes, Hume was a huge influence on Kant in terms of skepticism, but Kant at least transcended Hume's agnosticism as well as Hume's criticisms of metaphysics and ethics. So, in a way, I agree with you that Hume is a first-tier influence on Kant, and Descartes is a second-tier, but you understand that Descartes came before both, and he had built the foundation that Kant, arguably more than Hume, required for his philosophy. Everything I write comes through the lens of metaphilosophy I borrowed from Peikoff's DIM and developed on my own. So your comment of "Leibniz had earlier shredded Descartes’ skeptical-doubting way to sure knowledge" does not come through my lens, since Leibniz was essentially a Descartean, that is they had the same philosophy, as the boundaries of philosophies are concerned in my metaphilosophical framework. Even if Leibniz criticized Descartes so unfairly (from his own necessitated by the same metaphysics view, and not your evaluation of Leibniz), the nature of his criticism could only be compared to that of Francis Bacon's criticism of Aristotle, which wasn't a criticism of essential parts of philosophy but merely some new ideas trying to replace the old, forgotten, misunderstood ones. As we know, ideas change historically, but people's minds don't change. With that, you may and should, of course, attempt at providing counter-evidence to my claims. To start, you would need to show with quotes how (better from both sides) Leibniz contradicted Descartes in essential parts of his philosophy. This way you may finally be the one to contradict my hypothesis and make it collapse like a house of cards. Yes, so continuing with following results of my hypothesis, since Descartes and Leibniz are essentially following Descartean idealism, influence on Kant from Leibniz is essentially the same as when I said that Descartean foundation had provided the grounds for Kant. The specification of these grounds had the face of monadology, which reflects Democritus and, therefore, Kant (a major result of my hypothesis is that Kant is essentially a DIS because he is following in the footsteps of Democritus, even though he formalized and specified the philosophy to such an extent as to cause us to call this philosophy not merely Democritean but Kantian). Now, if you are unable to contradict me in regard to essential differences between Descartes and Leibniz, your contradiction in regard to essential similarities between Democritus and Kant would not only shut down my blog but would also shut me up, possibly forever. For that, of course, we would need to contentially compare the surviving fragments of Democritus from secondary sources to the bulky corpus of Kant. There you go. But this way you are not contradicting the results of my hypothesis. Instead, you are only supporting them because Descartes, as Ramus before and Leibniz later, contradicted Aristotle and later Newton, and the essentially same kind of contradiction against Aristotle and Newton was at the core of Kant's philosophy. So you know, my INTs are, among many others, Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and Newton. MIS (idealD) are Descartes, Ramus, Leibniz; related to MIS (idealP) to Plato and Berkeley. DIS (mat7) are Democritus and Kant; related to DIS (mat8) Epicurus and Hume. Here you can find all their essential conflicts or similarities, based on who they are categorically. But the best way to see what I mean is through the visualization my Diagram provides, a major improvement, I think, upon Peikoff's hypothesis, even though it required some changes to Peikoff's five categories. I could see from my side why Aristotle's syllogistic would be credited to Plato (and no, not merely from the side of Socrates's appearance in it). Aristotle developed logic not to describe his own philosophy, but to understand the end of his philosophy, which he saw in Plato. Aristotle's whole philosophy can be described as potentials actualizing. That actualization part is logic and Plato - hence the non-essential similarity in terms of Aristotle's direction toward Plato's position (their directions are pointed toward each other - quite a stable bond, as we've seen through history). Yet, it would be wrong to take this similarity anywhere further because direction and position aren't the same, and many people reduce directions to positions - such is, perhaps, a conclusion of Alcinous. Notice what Alcinous starts with in your quote: God. And Kant ended with God in his Critique of Judgment. This similarity of 'negative' theology thus may be non-essential. The differences in Alcinous and Kant are becoming much stronger as we continue reading the quote. Kant would contradict Alcinous, in that we cannot intellectually grasp God. Hereby, Alcinous's theology seems as objective as any other, except Kant's. If Alcinous was a Platonist, as you say, then his intuitive intellect would be vastly different from Kant's. Platonic 'intuition', as is their intellect, is basically analytical and not synthetic. In fact, the result of my hypothesis can be said to be that all genuine idealists (like Plato and Descartes; i.e. MISes) use analytic a priori. We need to thank Kant for revealing this, as he himself was NOT an idealist if we follow his analytic vs. synthetic distinction. He would be as much an idealist as transhumanists be humanists today. The 'trans' part was Kant's essential invention, and many people who only look on the surface then write that (I paraphrase) idealism is a kind of philosophy that is based on mind (sorry I cannot find the source where I saw this definition). The reason such 'definitions' are ludicrous is that materialism is also a kind of philosophy that can be based on mind. See Democritus, for the sake of an example! Or any of our eliminative materialists, if a need arises. Mind is basically brain - the essence of brain. Hence true idealists must make claims that stretch metacosmically and thus BEYOND mind. If someone cannot understand this clear description of idealists, then they must be materialists because only materialists cannot grasp this! Seems to be a superstition - a darling to idealists, like "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain". All his other 'negative' descriptions of God are so specific as to be intended as descriptions of Him in general. Kant realized this, so he never uttered any claim or description of God until the end of his last Critique and even then he qualified it by calling it subjective (see Remark to § 86). Oh, Alcinous, you have a 'concept' of Him!? And you are trying to prove it to us through a seeming absence of words that can be applied to describe it? But even whenever we say there is NO God, psychologically we are thinking of God. And so when we say we cannot describe God, you are still thinking of God as so many objective theologists do, like Muhammad, for example. In Islam, Allah is also ineffable and hidden beneath a veil. Actually many veils, so many that I've lost count. Put in other words, all these qualifications and unqualifications when negated result in Hegel's absolute idea. Still sounds idealist, whichever way you turn it. And idealism whether it's negative or positive theologically is still idealism. Even theology, whether it's negative or positive in idealism, most probably is objective. Hence I like to use objective vs. subjective distinctions in theology rather than negative vs. positive. The latter is deceiving, whereas the former reflects exactly the kind of content these theologies possess. This, for example, sounds like a very objective statement about God. Latter statements about God's ontology from the quote merely show God's transcendental nature (which Kant knowingly flipped or inverted), as with all transcendental, metacosmic realms, be they Platonic or idealist in general (but obviously not Kantian!). This kind of pure transcendentalism (both not Kant's original terms) was later modified in a very distinctive and essential manner by pantheists like Spinoza, as in thinking of God not being essentially 'different from any thing'. Nevertheless, Spinoza, through such modifications, didn't become an atheist; instead, he became a different kind of objective theologist. Kant, however, called Spinoza an atheist (e.g., § 87 in Crit#3). Why? I think because Kant himself wasn't an objective theologist, so he had to oppose any theologies that claimed to be 'objective', and especially those that were in direct conflict with his own 'subjective' kind, as Spinoza was not an idealist but an INT - the direct enemy of DIS.

Below is the famous Chomsky vs. Foucault debate on human nature. Chomsky uses 'creativity' like Kant's synthetic acts to oppose Foucault, who opposes Chomsky by claiming that everything is conditioned by social norms. Some commentators said the two sometimes talked passed each other on completely different topics without themselves realizing this.

Totally agree, and as Rand said - you need to know your enemy (e.g., in "Philosophy: Who Needs It?"). However, I don't consider Critique of Pure Reason Kant's best work anymore. Now I think his best work is Critique of Judgment. After familiarizing myself with Kant (and I am still in the process), I can verify Peikoff's categorization of him as DIS. I freaking love Peikoff's work - it totally opened my eyes on philosophy. This is actually true. However, if you take it to a logical extreme, then it can create a nutshell around you, which cannot be penetrated by others and has others simply slip away (Chekhov's "The Man in a Case" somewhat comes to mind). And then you are left alone. And since others aren't required, you remain self-sufficient. I am writing from personal experience, by the way. And this is not only my view on this ethics. Consider Stefan Molyneux, who was also inspired by Objectivism and who talks about building healthier relationships than those usually developed by hardcore Objectivists. Besides, there isn't really a need to go farther than Rand herself. Consider how she was with her best friends Isabel Paterson and Nathaniel Branden. I consider Branden INT, by the way. The guy was a genius psychologist. Actually both systems are methods. In Boydstun's essay we have this elaboration of Kant's system as an epistemological method: Academicians understand Kant's system in exactly the same way, in that epistemology as a method to verify or test knowledge, so it can be differentiated from belief. Kant is not a skeptic (even Peikoff says this in DIM), Kant is a reducer: he reduces everything to reason alone, ignoring what's 'above' and 'beyond' reason that cannot be represented as knowledge in Kant's system. Kant's system thus becomes extremely narrow, whereas Rand's is considered to be extremely open, in this respect, even to the point of some academicians calling Objectivism - 'playing tennis without a net.' 'A net,' in this case, could be considered a Kantian epistemologism of a priori categories of reason. I think Rand's philosophy's breadth of application boggles some philosophers' minds because they cannot wrap their narrow Kantian heads around it. In fact, I think the general vs. specific conflict is the main one between them that can be overcome through my own philosophy, as I consider it to be broad enough and specific that it doesn't lose on either front and therefore transcends both Rand and Kant. However, maybe it's the same reason my philosophy is not understood by many: they simply cannot accept its Randian side. My purpose is to help them understand, but the best way is to first improve Rand's reputation in academia (hence premise 3 is a close second in importance). One of my issues with Kant is an absence of his politology (scratch that - see a discussion on Kant's politics below, in a reply to splitmary), so we don't know what role he gave to those in power. He couldn't have simply ignored the structures of power in favor of merely reducing everyone to minds, right? So the idea of dignity can be interpreted differently based on Kant's interpretation of how power structure affects citizens. If we agree with Kant and merely reduce everyone to a mind, then each person would be dignified but in a vacuum and completely oblivious to what's going on around him in terms of politics. But if we take Kant's statements when he praises war in Critique of Judgment, §28, and also there, §83, when he speculates that war can be guided by concealed higher wisdom, we can interpret his statement of dignity to the same extent the Nazis interpreted dignity: that is, you are only dignified if you fight for your glorious and sacred Third Reich. In support for this kind of thought, consider Kant's On Pedagogy (I am using a Russian edition, so I have to paraphrase), when he wrote that the only source of evil is when human nature is not made to follow rules and that, since we can train dogs and horses, so we can also train people. At the end of his Pedagogy, surprisingly, Kant teaches how to inculcate respect for religion and faith in God in young adults. Maybe this goes along with the 'concealed higher wisdom' that guides people to kill each other for the glory of one's Fatherland? Kant's (in)famous categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." The infamous SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Eichmann declared "with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life ... according to a Kantian definition of duty". ... [After the trial] Eichmann acknowledged he did not "live entirely according to it, although [he] would like to do so" (wikipedia). Wow, so people must have been right when they claimed that Kant's philosophy covered everything there is to cover by philosophy. This might seem that his philosophy is as broad as Rand's, but I interpret this as that he reduced everything to his narrow and specific view, whereas Rand, as epistemologue wrote, 'leaves metaphysical questions open' instead of punching out everyone's reality in 12 categories (as Harriman mentioned something similar once about Kant, I think). Now, as to Kant's politics, from the Wikipedia link you shared, "the exercise of governmental power is constrained by the law." (Question 1:) Is this law different from Kant's practical laws, and if so - how and what if it conflicts with the laws he derived from reason? This political section is very interesting in respect to how it relates to his practical reason. Another related question for you (Question 2), Skye, is (as you mentioned in our Facebook discussion) how does Rawls's egalitarianism contradict Kantian politics? I should also tell you about Eduard Bernstein, a famous neo-Kantian Marxist - as he, starting the whole revisionist tradition in Marxism (followed by Leszek Kołakowski and Noam Chomsky to an extent), thought that Marx was missing ethics and that Kantian ethics was perfect to fill that void. I am not sure whether Rawls's views at all reflect Bernstein's (I haven't studied either in more detail), but maybe they are somehow related through Bernstein's evolutionary socialism with the final goal of socialism being nothing and progress toward that goal being everything. Reformism (contra revolutionism) can very much match that view, since they'd like to change laws to help citizens economically without necessarily taking political power. It's liberalism either way you look at it: Kant's, Rawls's, or Bernstein's. From Wikipedia on Kant's political philosophy: This is similar to what European union did with their Charter of fundamental human rights (to me it's propaganda of peace for economic security, while those same rights are waived instantly when EU starts wars). In contrast (maybe a hidden malice?), compare to § 28.: Of Nature regarded as Might (in Crit#3): Interestingly, low selfishness is seen here as a bad result of commerce. Here is the original German of the last sentence from Kant, I. (1912). Sämliche Werke in Sechs Bänden. Leipzig: Inselverlag. B. 6. s. 126: herrschend zu machen can be differently translated as 'prevailing, prevalent' (in terms of happening) or 'ruling', den niedrigen Eigennutz as 'base (low) self-interest', Weichlichkeit as 'softness' rather than 'effeminacy', and die Denkungsart des Volks zu erniedrigen pflegt as 'to humiliate the way of thinking of the people.' Whichever way you look at this, Kant conflicts with Rand, and their ethics covered in my premise 4 is perhaps their biggest conflict. Also an interesting piece from Wiki: I don't know what to say to that yet or how to apply Kantian politics to governments other than EU, in whose 'objective' charter of human rights I don't believe. Perhaps I was wrong in thinking about Kant's politics more along the lines of Plato (or Stalin, for that matter), but that's only because I didn't know he had politics in the first place (poor excuse, I know). Thank you for enlightening me with this new information, Skye! Maybe Kantian politics is not so bad after all because we haven't seen yet what it can do to a greater extent. Or maybe EU is exactly that perfection, but then what about Brexit and possible Frexit? Problems with it after all. If it's already falling apart - that means it's not working. EU, following Kant, has 'democratic deficit' so it is not democracy per se but a federated parliamentary democratic republican union of governments - or whatever kind of beast it is, please someone explain. A mixture of some good, if not currently best, government structures so far, and it doesn't seem to be working. Kant "distinguished three forms of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy with mixed government as the most ideal form of government." I like this part of Kant: "the goal of perpetual peace in society can be achieved only when the rulers consult with philosophers on a regular basis." But it can work to the opposite effect too, as we all know. Yes, and I understood that you understood that the external includes the internal, hence also supporting the breadth/generality of premise 1. Kantians, on the other hand, cannot understand this because the external is included under the internal - the opposite of Rand. To us (Objectivists and me), perception connects our consciousness to external, physical, contextual reality, right? To Kantians, perception as internal appearances connects them (as minds with a priori categories) to a metaphysical reality (noumenon) within themselves (within mind but beyond the boundaries of reason). That's why Kantians are confusing to us. Or maybe just explain that 'filter' better. Or maybe the 'filter' itself can be used to transcend the conflict of 2? That's what I am trying to figure out. Can someone connect the connections between external and internal for Rand and Kant maybe by following a better description of them? I know external and internal are connected, but I don't seem to understand how in context with Kant. We totally need a Kantian expert on this thread. I am only trying to understand him still. Correct me if I am wrong. The directionality seems to be different: in Objectivism perception is outward - toward (external) objects; in Kantianism perception is inward - toward (internal) appearances of objects. While Objectivists take objects as objects (3D?), Kantians take objects as only surfaces (2D?). Perhaps the dimensionality is a useless analogy here, but I am trying to make a point that Objectivists take things-in-themselves as parts of objects of perception, like Marxist materialists do (who, in my opinion, also try to transcend idealism and Kantian materialism, but in their own way, obviously), but Democritus and Kant only looked at the surface of things, at their appearances within reason and could only explain the external world by means of mind/reason, that is, internally. Democritus also used math to explain different characteristics of atoms and called them 'amers' (this is from a soviet 1979 text, so I am not sure how it would back-translate or whether it's even considered accurate by the West academia), but here is something from SEP as a temporary buffer before further transition: That is, atoms (or matter) couldn't be known in themselves for Democritus but only through appearances (phenomena in Kant), which Democritus gave as much and similar value as did Kant, while both weren't strictly empiricists. In the Russian book Democritus (B. B. Bits, Democrit, Moskva: "Misl'", 1979), there is written: Hereby, I see this as a kind of similar view taking various categories through which we describe reality. The difference is that Democritus used mathematics, which is analytical, and Kant used synthetic a priori, but with Rudolf Carnap, a logical positivist, we found that there are also analytic a priori (perhaps the Russellian bridge from logic to math helped). Quine showed (as did Peikoff later) that there are NO synthetic and analytic distinctions, and Chomsky used some of Quine's ideas to support his ever-in-progress-to-completion universal grammar theory (remember how Rand called Kantians the grammarians in "Fairness Doctrine for Education" [FDE], 1972?). Hence historically we got to grammar, or mere sentence structures without any meaning in themselves, from a priori categories, first philosophical and then mathematical. This is also going beyond Peikoff's DIM but following in his footsteps and using the main Objectivist premise of philosophy affecting culture and science. If it wasn't for Descartes and Leibniz, Kant might have never found his philosophy. Descartes was overly concerned with reason and mechanistic determinism (also found in Kant's Crit3 when he speaks of mechanical teleology), while Leibniz tried 'integrating' Plato with Democritus, and his philosophizing about phenomenological 'appearances' were praised by Kant (see Boydstun's essay, from which I quoted in an earlier comment). So surely, Descartes upped philosophy through Enlightenment, but Chomsky is no Descartean (even though he calls himself so). Instead, he is, as Rand noticed quite accurately, a Kantian. See this quote to remind you of this from FDE: I spoke to a Kantian (Bill Harris, also known on this blog), and he said there is no philosophy in her quote, but I disagree. Here you may find the same kind of metaphilosophical delineation developed in Peikoff's DIM. In this quote, Rand differentiates the determinists vs. indeterminists: the famous conflict between Democritean and Epicurean philosophy (notice that they are both materialists, thus DIS in my book). Today the conflict is between Chomskyans (the grammarians) and the decentralizers like Michel Foucault (the feeling type, like Nietzsche). Do you see the parallels?

Concerning premise 4b, which I thought was a bit unfair toward Kant, here is a paragraph involving the kind of 'social' will from Boydstun's excellent essay on Kant and Rand. The quote is taken from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Kant seems to know minds better than people, thus allowing people who, he thinks, don't know their minds as well or well enough be forced to follow minds in power who know what the minds subservient to duty need to practice.

So, the basic idea is the following. After completing and successfully defending my Master's thesis on Objectivist rhetoric in America, I am now planning on professionally studying the aforementioned issues for a Master's in philosophy in Russia. Hopefully there I'd be able to test whether we could build more awareness about Rand in philosophy departments, so keep in mind that your inputs are not only very welcomed but may also be influential in the development of my future thesis.

Thanks, Repairman. Honestly, I missed you and every one else on this forum, even Harrison Danneskjold, whose comments had been always cutting and hewing me, but I even miss his comments. It's been long three years, my dear Objectivists, and I am back!

As can be seen with an old popular thread I started on Objectivism online forum, I am very interested in putting side-to-side various philosophies, even before I learn that some of them cannot be thoroughly compared! So I would like to find out whether it is even possible to conceive of transcending Rand’s worldview with that of her well-known ‘archenemy’ – Immanuel Kant himself. I’ve spent the last two years trying to figure out this big conflict in contemporary philosophy by studying Kant’s philosophy and debating Kantians, especially on Philosophy forums, which are now, unfortunately, non-operational. So what are some ideas that I’d like to put forward to initiate this discussion? Part I: Describing conflicts First, I want to delineate the premises of my argument as conflicting characters of both philosophies. Let Objectivism take only (a) subdivisions, while Kantianism take only (b) subdivisions. General vs. specific Objectivism is general in respect to being broadly applied to most areas of life, including even sex (in Rand’s words!). Philosophy, according to Rand, is a way of living, rather than only a way of thinking (which is a part of living but not the whole). Hence Rand is more concerned with having an integrated picture of the whole rather than only its parts in isolation or abstraction. Rand’s epistemology starts with metaphysics (most broad or general field of philosophy). Kantianism is specific in respect to being narrowly applied only to thoughts concerning positive knowledge in theoretical science, moral/ethical practice, and judgments in art. Kantian way of thinking takes ideas in isolation and abstraction and only bounded by mind, representing all areas of knowledge within mental structures and through categories of thought. Kant’s epistemology cycles through itself, making metaphysics subservient to it without a possibility of deriving any knowledge about ends. External vs. internal Objectivism is concerned with external experience of reality, where it finds knowledge. Every judgment must correspond to or be ultimately derived from external reality. Kantianism is concerned with internal experience, wherein it claims to find all positive knowledge. Everything considered to be ‘external’ to mind is merely thought to be a representation or appearance structured by our mind as pure reason or inwardly directed by mind as practical reason with aesthetic judgments connecting the two reasons. Public vs. academic Objectivism is well known in general public by means of popular novels, podcasts, presentations, and audiobooks, but not among many academicians, who openly oppose it or try to avoid it. Formal discussions of Objectivism mostly occur in Objectivist journals, and Objectivist scholars do not take these discussions to established and trustworthy academic philosophical journals. Hence the nature of Objectivist discussions and research is mostly closed rather than open, in regard to academic work. Kantianism is popular among many academicians but not in general public. Kantianism is considered by many academicians to be a ‘suble’ and ‘true’ philosophy not comprehended quite enough by most others. Objective vs. subjective Objectivism follows the ethics of rational or objective egoism to the detriment of sometimes being able to develop healthy relationships with others. Objects in this philosophy precede private subjects. Kantianism follows the ethics of rational yet subjective altruism to the point of forcing others (even violently) to heed one’s ‘social’ will (especially of those in power) as if it were universal law. Peikoff describes Kantian influences on Nazism in The Ominous Parallels, and Kant himself praises the sublime in war over peace in Critique of Judgment, §28. Thus, subjects in this philosophy are not only central but the only ones, as physical objects in themselves are non-existent. Political vs. scientific Objectivism has greatly influenced the progress of politics and economics through conservatives, neoconservatives, libertarians, and even some liberals. However, Objectivism hasn’t had much effect on science. Kantianism has greatly influenced the progress of science through Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, Chomsky’s universal grammar theory, and various neuro and cognitive scientists, anthropologists, and psychologists. However, Kantianism hasn’t had as much direct effect in politics. Part II: Transcending conflicts Second, as a possible way to transcend these areas as it would mostly benefit Objectivism (like a stronger connection to academia in 3), I need to provide a potential idea to be built upon. My current and main source of inspiration is Leonard Peikoff’s DIM Hypothesis (2012), which is based on Rand’s epistemology, in particular her theory of concepts. What Peikoff develops in his book called after his hypothesis is a metaphilosophy (although he doesn’t call it that) specifying boundaries of all philosophies involving three categories: disintegrating, integrating, and misintegrating. As a point of contention, these are Peikoff’s words that I reinterpreted in favor of my own hypothesis: I’ve been building on some concepts from Peikoff’s hypothesis this past couple of years and have found another way (a visual method) to describe all philosophies, while also borrowing some of these terms from Peikoff. Based on my extensive research, I would like to show not only that I independently verified some insights from Peikoff’s hypothesis (as I also did a few years back for Rand’s theory) but also describe what he had achieved (and he considers this book his greatest achievement so far) as an understanding of Rand’s epistemology not as an epistemology in academic sense (which they don’t accept as such) but a meta-epistemology that transcends epistemology as conceived by Kant. If Rand’s epistemology be truly a meta-epistemology and Peikoff’s hypothesis be truly metaphilosophical, then we can use these areas to transcend Kant’s ‘transcendental’ philosophy without losing specificity required (as in 1). As far as I know, Kant never covered these areas in his philosophy. Considering that there also exists a term ‘metametaphysics’ (books on the topic: 2009, 2015, and 2016; cf. my metaphysics), maybe this so-called ‘transcendence’ can also achieve greater breadth than Rand was able to conceive, although, as speculative as all this may sound, there is currently not enough understanding of these new ‘meta’ (meaning not just ‘after’ but ‘beyond’) fields because they are on the frontier of contemporary philosophical research. Maybe we can share knowledge and understanding to see whether any of my suggestions have ground for further developments. At the end, if we reach any conclusion, we may find and improve upon the missing links required for Objectivism to hold the center stage it deserves in philosophical discussions.

I strongly disagree. Religion is as different from mysticism as passivity from activity. True mystics were active individuals even to the point of being radical. Here is a list of mystics whom you could contrast to any religious idealist to date: Machiventa Melchizedek (1980 BC), Elijah (c. 900 BC), Laozi (605 BC), John the Baptist (c. 5 BC), Jesus Christ (7 BC), John the Apostle (6 AD), Hildegard von Bingen (1098), Helena Blavatsky (1831), Drunvalo Melchizedek (1941), Karen “Mila” Danrich (1960). There are more, but this should be enough to give you a comprehensive picture of genuine historical mysticism. Now, if you agree with (a Kantian?) Bertrand Russell who confused idealism with mysticism by claiming that Plato was a 'mystic' - then this is a question of your DIS, which evidently opposes true mysticism by giving its face (thus defacing, or concealing, it) to those it can easily reduce and disassemble into fragmentary pieces. In my book, what DISes do best is deceive, and it is much worse for atheists in this tradition than non-atheists, like Kant. Yet they standardize Kant in academia to justify their deceptions. Satan rather loves those who don't believe in him because that means there could come a time they would believe in him as god. And many have been so deceived. And this is one of Rand's mistakes (misintegrations). True materialism opposes true mysticism (which opposes true idealism). Does my statement need defense or explanation? This is as false as the above. True mysticism doesn't oppose reason, as Aristotle and Newton opposed neither reason nor mysticism. In fact, mysticism is what integrates heart (soul) and brain (mind), but both Kant and Rand fail at grasping this, which means they have something they share. How ironic that you bring up Russell, who seems to be in the Kantian tradition as his bridging the gap between logic and mathematics provided the ground for understanding the analytic a priori like Rudolf Carnap after him. If you are confused about mysticism, it's better not to create and than attack a straw man, but ask an actual mystic, like me. I know mysticism because I belong to their tradition. Do you have questions? All bullshit, sorry for my French. Only idealists and materialists can say this. By the way, idealists and materialists can perfectly complement each other (contrary to what Marxists believe) because they ultimately have the same end (Nonexistence). In contrast to idealists and materialists, the end of mystics is Existence. If you learn to think directionally (rather than only positionally, which is a fault that promulgates such false ideas about other philosophies) you would understand this. Otherwise, I am sorry, but you cannot be helped. This is true in the strictest sense of idealism there can be, as I've proved again and again during the last three years with my Diagram, but you would rather disintegrate or ignore it, right? That's what most of the academic kind like to do. Because facts contradict their petty beliefs, and they would rather have their beliefs than facts. Actually, I agree that idealism is directed toward mysticism (or spiritualism, as you put it). However, here we are differentiating position and direction. There is also idealism that is directed toward materialism, like Stalin's (except to Marxism only) or even Rand's. So instead of putting the direction into position, like you seem to be doing, try thinking of direction as dependent on position but not internal to it. The latter method works much better for differentiating various philosophies more accurately. That's what Aquinas said! Bah, this mixing of MIS and INT is no better than what Russell did. Oh yeah, and you should thank him for inspiring Kant with this and with much more (the mechanics?). So Berkley viewed not matter but his ideas of matter, which is the kind of appearances that idealists promote. In contrast to Berkley, Kant views actual matter as appearances that we can only understand through reason, like in Democritus as well. That's the main difference between idealists and materialists: idealists only view appearances that they believe in, and materialists only view appearances that they know exist. The key here that connects the two is appearances; that both look only on the surface and never at the whole as it is. Neither is concerned with actual, honest truth. Kant's evaluation of Berkeley is the same as Russell's evaluation of Plato, and Rand's evaluation of Hegel is spot on. Even Marxists know Hegel as a mystical idealist, different from all preceding idealists. There you go. In one statement you've shown two things: that Kant was a materialist in the tradition of Democritus, and that Berkley was an idealist in the tradition of Plato. You only need to look deeper into your own statement and think it through. Except in Kant that outer sense is also inner, as all 'beyond' mind representations are included 'within' mind. I call this inversive reductionism. Outside is what appears inside for Democritean materialists, since brain is also matter, did you know? Yeah, some highfalutin terms here, eh? People like coming up with terms, so we let them. In truth, not all terms mean what they intend to mean. Sometimes they are used to change perspective, sometimes to hide a perspective. For example, you can try changing frames for rhetorical purposes by calling taxation a burden and saying tax relief in order to change a liberal's perspective on taxes and persuade them to follow your point of view. Or you could call materialism transcendental idealism in order to change perspective on it for idealists. This way, you know you can have idealists accept your point of view and think it to be quite unique and even revolutionary! Oh, this is interesting because that's how I think of metaphysical Time and Space. Although physical ones would be the same if not taken to absolutes. That's how Kant seems to make what's beyond or outer to mind as internal: by calling space an a priori form of intuition. He has a discussion of this in Crit#3 on making macro a micro and vice versa by giving scientific analogies of the functional faculties of microscopes and telescopes (I would make here an analogy to theoretical and practical reasons). If this is so, then Bacon also followed Aristotle, since Locke followed Bacon. Most Kantians would disagree, referring to Bacon's criticisms of Aristotle, but I agree wholeheartedly. Go Kant! Yeah, and they say that Leibniz attempted to 'integrate' Plato (MIS) with Democritus (DIS). Seeing how highly Kant (DIS) spoke of Leibniz, I now think it must have been true. Leibniz's DIS part, just as that of Descartes, must have been a very noticeable appendage for Kant. Yes, and this is also called the Kantian dare to know! This kind of knowledge is reflected in destroying one's objects of sensation in order to 'know' them. Unfortunately, don't you think? Especially considering that we learn about particles by destroying them. In Kant, there was also a passage about receiving a conception of an eye when cutting the eye open (Remark I to §57 in Crit#3). You may extend the analogy. Perhaps transhumanists (also mostly Kantians) need to cut open living people in order to understand them and use this understanding in making them into robots in order to make us happy! Dare to kill! would be a better maxim for those Kantians who feel like the boundaries of knowledge are not so prohibitive anymore. Wow. And this is told about the man who basically started philosophy as we know it by the man who followed in the footsteps of Democritus. And you still squinge at my comparison without thinking what Plato would have done if he knew that philosophy would come to this end? Oh yeah, intuition? Is that schematic or symbolic, a la Kant? So you know, intuition can never be intellectualized so, especially not through math and geometry like Plato did. Intuition is better known by mystics, who feel with their hearts before they think with their minds. And let me tell you: mystics use math like Newton did -- that's to describe reality -- and not like Plato did -- to try to force reality to follow mental laws. Don't bullshit me about intuition no more. One thing I want to stress: Plato's level of position was metacosmic, while Kant's was metaphysical brain (really, just brain with metaphysical categories in it, like principles and parameters in a Chomskyan universal grammar module). Not 'purely' in the Kantian sense, but otherwise false. See his descriptions of intuition in §59 of Crit#3. Kant's philosophy surely is. And in academia nowadays this is the only kind that is respected. This is what those who are in power want from us. But reason can fathom a priori 's, which were before childhood? No contradiction here? Kant's philosophy is a joke. Only his theology has any value. Oh boy, why should I listen to Kant here? Aren't both 'faculties' just different ways our mind is used? I would rather connect science with ethics in my mind than separate them like Kant did. Otherwise, we have scientists who cause much suffering in the world. Just consider Richard Feynman and the atomic bomb. He obviously couldn't combine his two 'faculties' because he was an atheist, so there was nothing from the 'practical' side to connect, other than to nothing. I guess this goes along with his keeping sense and intellect separate. Yes, thus they both opposed heart, wherefrom happiness springs forth. Yeah, they have to complicate happiness and distance themselves from it to the point of happiness becoming so heavy as to be undecipherable. In truth, one grasps happiness only when one feels it (through the heart) and not when one merely reasons through it (through the brain). Therefore, happiness is quite a simple matter and doesn't really have to be discussed by philosophers who maybe have something better to do (or maybe not, and thus they discuss it, wasting our time). Yeah, but such people love to use Kant to justify their actions against humanity to a great extent (end too). Without Kant, they wouldn't have had such a wonderful scapegoat! Kant seems to know minds better than people, thus allowing people who, he thinks, don't know their minds as well or well enough be forced to follow minds in power who know what the minds subservient to duty need to practice. I think supramental information, as the judgments of minds other than your own, is the death of philosophy. Thus, if taking Kant for who he was, we should leave his reasoning for his own mind and not attach anyone else's to it. At least then we could survive and not suffocate to death from such a philosophy. Yes, true, feeling and also sense. Thank you for the essay, Boydstun. It was very well written and researched. I particularly liked your conclusion and that Rand's ethics, as based on individual rather than mind alone, is a better choice.