DonAthos

Oh, I quite understand. What I keep trying to say, in response to Boydstun's questions whether Peikoff's position measures up to the "Closed System" I've been referring to, and Dante's questions about whether Kelley's position equates to the "Open System," is that it doesn't really matter who believes (or argues, or has argued) what: it only matters what is true, re: Objectivism. And I present the "Closed System" and "Open System" that I do, because 1) I believe that they are popular understandings of those positions, as stated, and as referenced in the quotes that I've provided; and 2) those two positions help to (as you say) "frame," foil, relieve, and otherwise help my own views to stand out by way of contrast. They are provided to aid communication and understanding, not as my definitive pronouncements as to the psyches, stances (stated or otherwise), or moralities of Leonard Peikoff or David Kelley. As far as I'm concerned, we can easily remove the names Peikoff and Kelley from this discussion and still retain the debate in full, because this is a debate of ideas and not assessments of individuals. That said, I will continue to refer to them (as I expect others to do) as is conducive to the discussion; I only ask that people take these references in the context of this specific discussion. The question is not "what does Leonard Peikoff believe Objectivism to be"? But "what is Objectivism"? You keep doing this to me! I want you to know, Doc (can I call you Doc?), that I'm like a sponge at this point. Every time you link out, I look... and usually wind up following link after link (or Googling) to follow up. It's not that I don't appreciate your efforts in doing that -- I do. And all of this information is... stimulating. Where McCaskey is concerned, I had no idea about any of that, but WOW. Reading the material that (for instance) Diana Hsieh had compiled is kind of like watching an autopsy -- fascinating, but gross. But this isn't a referendum on all-things-Peikoff, as I hope is clear by now. That said, these links and my (highly preliminary) investigation into the McCaskey incident have produced at least one (potentially) illuminating datum. From Leonard Peikoff's website, on his lecture(s) on induction: "These historic lectures present, for the first time, the Objectivist solution to the problem of induction—and thereby complete, in every essential respect, the validation of reason." Well, all right. Apparently Objectivism has a "solution" on induction, the author of which is not Ayn Rand, but Leonard Peikoff. Or do I have this wrong, somehow? Per my Essential System, of course Leonard Peikoff would be free to claim that his solution is "the Objectivist solution," and then we'd be free (as individuals) to judge whether he was right or not in his claim, by reference to the essentials of Objectivism and whether or not Peikoff's writings were consistent with them. It seems only sensible, and I guess it would have been the process that Ayn Rand would have performed had she been alive and able to either "approve" of his work or otherwise. But the Closed System...? I've heard it said that one of the reasons why it is important that Objectivism be closed is to differentiate between the work of Rand and those who come afterwards. It's got me thinking. Certainly, from a historian's point of view, this is an important distinction that needs to be preserved. But as philosophy? What is philosophy? Here's Ayn Rand (from "The Chickens' Homecoming"): Let me repeat from that quote, and with special emphasis: "The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life." I would take it, then, that a "full philosophical system" such as Objectivism does this. Whether the written body of work which we believe encompasses Objectivism is "comprehensive" or not is of much less import than whether Objectivism is comprehensive, functionally, in the mind of the Objectivist. When we say that Objectivism is "the philosophy of Ayn Rand," the first and most important meaning of such a statement is that it is the philosophy which Ayn Rand held internally and personally; her eventual publishing of select material is secondary and consequent to this first, primary meaning. Had she never published anything, she still would have been an Objectivist. If we say that Leonard Peikoff is an Objectivist, whatever else we might mean by that label, I think we'd agree that this means that he holds Ayn Rand's essential concepts at the base of his convictions. As Leonard Peikoff must perform actions, he must do so in accordance with his philosophy; with whatever philosophy he personally holds, which in other respects we could (rightly) describe as being "the philosophy of Leonard Peikoff." Should Leonard Peikoff perform new integrations, leading to a theory of induction or anything else, he will presumably do so as consistently as possible with respect to his fundamental convictions. Let us suppose that he does this correctly: he develops a theory of induction fully consistent with the essential concepts of Objectivism. Is his theory not Objectivist? The Closed System says "no, it is not." But now look at what the Closed System view requires! It insists that Leonard Peikoff keep separate -- in his mind -- his particular philosophical views according to their "source". What purpose does that serve Leonard Peikoff? A proper philosophy should be an integrated whole. But this Closed System view does not allow this integration, insisting that some of Peikoff's philosophical views are "Objectivist," while other philosophical views are... something else. Besides sundering this full integration, and calling into question whether Objectivism (or any other philosophy) could therefore be "comprehensive" and "[serve] as a base, a frame of reference, for all [of man's] actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential," it's interesting to consider the question of a "source" of a man's philosophical views. What, ultimately, is the source of the Objectivist's views re: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or etc.? Is it reading the words of Ayn Rand? Or is it relating what they read to the experiences in their own life, and their own logical faculty, i.e. by reference to reason and reality? And should Leonard Peikoff or any other Objectivist develop a proper theory of induction, consistent with the essential Objectivist concepts, wouldn't we expect that this theory of induction would proceed from the very same place -- reason and reality? Ultimately then, and in reality, does the Objectivist's views on those matters upon which Ayn Rand wrote, and other "non-Objectivist-but-Objectivism-consistent" philosophical topics really issue from different sources? And does it really serve the Objectivist to try to keep separate the multitude of his particular philosophical views according to these supposed differing sources? If Leonard Peikoff wanted to use a term for his philosophy, the philosophy of Leonard Peikoff, which represents an integration of his views on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics -- that is to say, his "comprehensive view of life" -- and certainly including his views on induction... what term should he use other than "Objectivism"?

I liked both of these! Looking forward to more.

That is as may be. You'll note that the portion of my post that you've quoted is in direct response to Ninth Doctor's representation of the Open System. When Ninth Doctor wrote that initially, in this thread, no one at that time offered any correction as to his assessment. What's more, I have reason to believe that Ninth Doctor's take on the Open System is a widely accepted one, and it is in contrast to that viewpoint that I present my own. I tried to stress that in the very post you're responding to, when I said "Again -- this is the 'Open System' as I understand it, and as I believe it is popularly understood. Whether this actually conforms to the views of David Kelley, or any given Open System advocate, I cannot at present -- and without a much fuller research -- say." I put that in the second sentence as its very own paragraph in order to avoid precisely this confusion. With respect to the specific matter you raise, are you saying that Ninth Doctor's equation of Objectivism to Philosophy, per the "Open System," is unfair to David Kelley? That it is Kelley's argument as a straw man? It's not in my interest to take that particular argument up at this time; rather than try to suss out exactly who believes what, I'd rather concentrate my efforts on what it is right to believe. If it turns out that the Essential System I argue for is also what Leonard Peikoff argues for (though under a different name), per Boydstun's implicit suggestion here, then that's fine: Leonard Peikoff would thus be correct. If it turns out that David Kelley argues for the Essential System, then he is correct, too. What a fine mess it would be, if Kelley and Peikoff actually argued for the same Objectivism, eh? But as both sides seem to straw man the other (at least to my untrained eye), and as no one seems to have any agreement on what exactly constitutes the Closed System or the Open System viewpoint (which may go some way to explain my initial confusion in trying to sort all this out), I think I'll just concentrate on determining what Objectivism is. Right now, I think that Ayn Rand correctly explained "what Objectivism is" when she explained that by holding the essential concepts (referred to in her quote, provided earlier) at the base of one's convictions with total consistency, one would have a full philosophical system. That "full philosophical system" is what Objectivism is. Is there any good reason for me to hold Rand mistaken? Incidentally, since you and Ninth Doctor have both linked to that audio, I've gone ahead and listened through it. Hearing what I have about the Open System, I found it quite surprising. As counterpoint, allow me to quote from Betsy from a different thread: Is she referring to that audio presentation? Is she referring to something else? I have no idea. Since it's not my interest to "bamboozle" anyone, and since I don't know the totality of Kelley's views, or what he might have said elsewhere, or what else Betsy might be referring to when she treats on the Open System, I think it's best that I steer clear from trying to decide what Peikoff or Kelley actually believe apart from what the Open and Closed System have come to mean in terms of this ongoing debate, and as established by the various quotes I've provided in this thread. This is what I mean (whether Kelley, or anyone else, agrees or disagrees): Objectivism does not stand for "all correct philosophy." Nor is it what Betsy goes on to say, representing the Closed System: These two positions pretend to cover all possible ground. It isn't true. Instead of "all correct philosophy," Objectivism stands for "all philosophy fully consistent with the essential concepts detailed by Rand, as quoted earlier in this thread." And to that end, Ayn Rand's personal consent is not required. This intrigued me, and inspired me to do some Googling. I believe I found the quote to which you refer in a work by Barbara Branden found here. I have not read this work yet, and so I can say nothing about the context in which it appears there, nor about its original context. That said, here is Rand's quote: This seems to be perfectly in keeping with the quote about which I've made so much. What is left to say? If "the elaboration of a [complete philosophical system] is a job that no philosopher can finish in his lifetime," then certainly Rand did not expect to do it herself with respect to Objectivism. If we take this quote at face value -- what it clearly seems to mean -- then how can this be reconciled with Betsy's view that nothing can be added* to Objectivism without Rand's consent? Unless we start stretching, to try to define "elaboration of a philosophy" in such a way as to be distinct from the philosophy, itself... or take Rand to mean that Objectivism (and by extension every other philosophical system) can never be complete? But no, mental gymnastics such as these are not required. It's far easier to adopt Rand's clearly expressed view that the complete philosophical system is available to those who hold her essential concepts with total consistency. * To be strict about this, as I come to understand things better, the Essential System would not hold that anything can be "added" to Objectivism. We are instead talking about the discovery of that which is, which has been, and which always will be totally consistent with Rand's essential concepts. No addition required. Just to mention, but whether Rand would personally have endorsed some view is not the crucial criterion. Neither is this. The sole judge remains, as always, the individual's mind -- his best, fullest use of his reason and according to as full a context as he can manage. And where that's concerned, I'm not certain that we can count on truth or falsehood being "immediately apparent." Would that it were that easy!

Having spent some time elaborating on the differences (as I see it) between the Essential System and the Closed System, I'd like to briefly do the same for the Open System. Again -- this is the "Open System" as I understand it, and as I believe it is popularly understood. Whether this actually conforms to the views of David Kelley, or any given Open System advocate, I cannot at present -- and without a much fuller research -- say. Here's a quote I'd used in my previous post, to discuss the Closed System: Now let's look at the Open System portion, which purports to equate Objectivism with "Philosophy." Objectivism is not Philosophy; it is, instead, a very specific philosophy. "Philosophy" (capital 'P') incorporates all sorts of irreconcilable and inconsistent views on every possible subject, which Objectivism cannot do. Moreover and much more importantly, which Objectivism does not do. The Closed System advocates are right in this: that Objectivism -- what it is -- was set down, once and for all, by Ayn Rand. And that identity -- the identity that she gave to it -- cannot ever change. In specific, Objectivism's identity is its essential concepts, as defined by Rand, held with total consistency. That is what Objectivism is, and it constitutes a philosophy, but that philosophy cannot be changed one iota and still held to be "Objectivism." To consider an analogy, imagine that Ayn Rand had developed a mathematical formula to determine... uh... prime numbers. And in her writings, she used this formula to identify 30 prime numbers. As regards the Closed System, it could not be said that Rand's system was only the 30 prime numbers she personally specified. But contra the Open System, it could not be said that Rand's system was anything other than those specific numbers which would issue from her exact formula. Rand's numbers, at any given time and from any given perspective, might be either unknown or miscalculated, but they would always be Rand's numbers, in reality, stretching into the distance. Those numbers would be defined by nothing more and nothing less than the formula Rand had invented to calculate them. To bring this back to an earlier example, where sex (as a philosophical topic) is concerned, Objectivism can only have one position; there is only one such position that will be fully consistent with (or, possibly, "implied by" ) the essential concepts of Objectivism. But because Objectivism is a full philosophical system, it will have some position on every conceivable philosophical topic, whether or not those positions were identified by Rand in her lifetime, or by Peikoff in his, or by me in mine, or by you in yours. The numbers -- defined by the formula -- are etched in stone the moment that formula is constructed, whether we're aware of them or not. My reply to Ninth Doctor's quote was that Objectivism is neither Philosophy nor a museum exhibit (where all of the heavy lifting has been done) but it is like a wonderous dig. Rand buried the treasures. And they are what they are, and they cannot be changed. But they're not all yet discovered. There's work yet to do. Through Ninth Doctor's other contributions to this thread, I became aware of the website Objectivist Living. Here is from (what I take to be) the board's administrator on the board's purpose and essence: This is wrong, and to be clear, it is not the Essential System that I am arguing for. Objectivism is absolutely a static set of principles. Objectivism does not change, and while it is certainly "dynamic," it is not dynamic in sense that he means. What *is* dynamic in that sense, is: people. A given person's understanding of Objectivism may be right or wrong at any given time, and his understanding of Objectivism's principles may change. As he attempts to hold Objectivism's essential concepts with total consistency -- "to understand, to define, to prove and to apply them" -- he will almost certainly err any number of times and in a multitude of ways. In a way, it may at times seem to him as though Objectivism, itself, is changing, just as the world sometimes seems to shift when we get a new insight or are struck with epiphany. But Objectivism does not change. If ever we were to discover a Position C -- which is a philosophical position which is not consistent with (or implied by) Objectivism's essential concepts, but was promoted by Rand in her writings or in the writings that she endorsed -- then that Position C would not be Objectivist and would never have been Objectivist, even though every Objectivist in the world had previously considered it so. It is not our thoughts on the subject that determine what Objectivism is. It is, instead, a matter of what in fact is consistent with the essential concepts of Objectivism. Static. Immutable. Undynamic. And in many cases awaiting discovery.

Hello Stephen, In the first place, my thanks for your replies. They are thoughtful and engaging. On the matter of "is implied by" versus "is fully consistent with," I don't know that I understand sufficiently the difference between the two to yet have a position. I hope that if I'm using the poorer formulation, my meaning is still clear. As to why I chose the language that I did, it was in an attempt to echo Rand's language in the quote I'd provided. Note (emphasis added): "If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the base of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life. But to hold them with total consistency—to understand, to define, to prove and to apply them—requires volumes of thought." If Rand's essential concepts were held with total consistency, then I don't know that any other philosophical position could possibly be "fully consistent with" those concepts and not "implied by" them. Could there be? I just don't know. I'm honestly talking a bit above my own understanding now, and so I'm going to demur, except to say... I worry a bit that "implied by" sounds like it's subsumed by logical deductions from formal axioms. And I'm not 100% sure that this would cover all of the ground that might be required for all those philosophical positions fully consistent with Rand's essential concepts -- I guess I worry that "implied by" might cut off some valid applications of inductive logic. What's more, I'm not certain that "total consistency" is "weaker" a criterion than "implication." Total consistency, as I regard it, is a highly demanding requirement (requiring "volumes of thought"). Blah, I really don't know! If you believe that this amounts to a substantive difference, then we could of course pursue it. I'm just unsure as to what that substance might be, at the moment. Let me be clear about what I've argued, or at least what I mean to argue. There exists a view of Rand's philosophy which, yes, would hold that Position C is a part of that philosophy. And yes, for my purposes here, I'm calling that the "Closed System." (Much more on this weak sauce parsing to come.) But yes, I reject Position C, and I argue that Position B is concordant with Rand's picture, as you say. As to your reformulations of my hypothetical Positions, so long as my earlier reservations (/confusions/ignorance) are noted, we'll adopt them for the time being. I believe I'd anticipated a bit of this in my earlier post: But that said, let me address this question of whether I've described the "Closed System" accurately head on. My primary aim is not to disagree with Leonard Peikoff (or David Kelley, for that matter). I do not know for a fact that Leonard Peikoff (either in his writing, or in his person) supports what I have described to be the "Closed System," or that David Kelley really argues for what's sometimes thought of as the "Open System." I'm open to the possibility that they both actually agree -- that they both would endorse what I've termed the Essential System (though in their own language) -- and that this apparent debate is either a big misunderstanding, or a personal feud, or that these terms have become so entangled into other differences of opinion that it's been nigh-impossible to prise apart the various threads for individual examination. Like so many other things, I don't know. However. My primary aim (where the "Closed System" is concerned) *is* to disagree with those who argue that Position C is properly a part of Objectivism, while Position B is not. If Peikoff is not among that number, so much the better. Does anyone, then, hold this view? I believe so. I'll now submit some quotes for your examination... The following from the first two pages of this thread (the initial quote being from the OP): More recently, and since the introduction of my "sub-thread": Let me now reach beyond this thread for a few others. From Diana Hsieh's blog: From Roderick Fitts's essay (linked to in this thread by softwareNerd): In what is perhaps the clearest statement, from the policies of the Harry Binswanger List (which I became aware of through this thread): In my opinion, these are all clear in that they would consider Position C to be part of Objectivism (though the authors of these quotes probably believe that there is no such extant position), and not Position B, and I believe that this approach constitutes what is typically meant by "Closed System." Now consider this: You are absolutely right. Had Rand died in '62, that "identity entails measurability" would be a conceivable Position B. And per the Essential System, someone else could have come along in '63 and written it out, and yes -- that could be understood as part of Objectivism. This is not allowable per the Closed System, however, as I believe the quoted sources demonstrate. And as for where Leonard Peikoff stands, your quote certainly suggests that he does not agree with the Closed System, as I've laid it out, and would instead argue for the Essential System as I've defined it. I might have to do a full analysis of Fact and Value and whatever other sources are available to me to say for certain, but for now allow me to provide the Wikipedia entry on him: How accurate an assessment this is of Peikoff's position, I cannot better say at present. But whether it is or is not Peikoff's actual position... whether, in fact, I've completely misunderstood the debate en toto, and none of the above quotes -- or their authors -- mean what I take them to mean, I will continue to argue here for the Essential System, as I've defined it, against what I take to be the Closed and Open Systems, until such time as I am shown to be mistaken.

Okay. Through the process of participating in this thread, I finally feel as though I'm ready to advance a specific argument. While the substance of my posts may already have made this argument clear (as Grames has graciously surmised), I'd like to put that argument together into one place, and into the strongest form that I can, so that anyone taking issue with my perspective can do so effectively. Part (or most) of what I'm about to say will be reiteration; I apologize if I bore anyone. However, I'm hopeful that anyone who believes that I'm wrong on this subject will seize this opportunity to explain how and why I err, so that I (and others) can be brought to a better understanding of the truth. Disclaimers being disclaimed, here we go... Imagine the following philosophical positions: A, B, C, D, and E. Position A is a position specifically addressed by Ayn Rand in her writing. It is fully consistent with the essential positions of Objectivism, as identified by Ayn Rand. Position B is a position not specifically addressed by Ayn Rand in her writing, but it is fully consistent with the aforementioned essential positions. Position C is a position specifically addressed by Ayn Rand in her writing. It is not consistent with the essential positions. Position D is a position not specifically addressed by Ayn Rand in her writing. It is not consistent with the essential positions. Position E *is* one of the essential positions of Objectivism, as identified by Ayn Rand. The "Closed System," as I understand it, would say as follows: that Positions A, C (should any exist), and E are properly considered to be a part of the philosophy which Ayn Rand formulated and advocated, which is to say that only Positions A, C, and E are "Objectivist." A person's opinion with respect to Positions B and D are incidental with respect to his identification as Objectivist. The "Open System," as I understand it, would say as follows: that Positions A, B, C, D, and E are all subject to inclusion or exclusion in Objectivism depending on whether or not they are, of themselves, "reasonable." Thus a person could hold Positions A, B, and C, but not D or E; or B and E, but not A, C, or D; or any permutation thereof -- and so long as they considered their positions "reasonable," and self-identified as "Objectivist," they could consider themselves to be Objectivist, in fact, because anything held to be "reasonable" falls within Objectivism. Here it is my intention to argue for neither of the above Systems, as stated. (And if either of my characterizations turn out to be straw men of the actual positions held, my apologies -- it is unintentional; the above representations will still serve to demonstrate the contours of my argument via contrast.) My system, which for the purposes of discussion I will term the "Essential System," would say as follows: that Positions A, B and E are Objectivist while Positions C and D are not. I believe that the Essential System best approximates how Ayn Rand, herself, viewed her philosophy, which I will now proceed to demonstrate via the same quote I've already copied here a bajillion times: To take this a bit at a time... Q: What philosophy is under discussion in the above quote? A: Ayn Rand says "my philosophy." We are therefore discussing "the philosophy of Ayn Rand," from a piece entitled "Introducing Objectivism" taken from "The Objectivist Newsletter." The philosophy under discussion is Objectivism. Q: Is Objectivism a "full philosophical system"? A: Yes, in essence it is. However, in practical application, whether it is a full system or not is contingent. Q: Contingent on what? A: Contingent on whether certain concepts -- here referred to as the "essence" of Objectivism -- are held with total consistency, as the base of one's convictions; whether these essential positions are "understood, defined, proved, and applied." Q: If this quote were taken seriously, what then would be the standard by which a given philosophical position would either be included or excluded from this "full philosophical system" which is Objectivism? A: Whether or not it proceeded from these essential concepts. Q: Given this, which of the earlier hypothetical positions would be Objectivist, and which not? A, B, and E would be Objectivist; C and D would not. Ayn Rand here argues for the Essential System, and no other. If Ayn Rand had meant to argue for the Closed System, how might she have described the "essence of her philosophy"? Perhaps she might have said something like this: "There is no 'essence' to my philosophy. My philosophy consists of precisely those positions which I set into writing, no more and no less. Objectivism is not a complete philosophical system -- it does not exhaust the field of rational philosophic identifications. It may or may not guide the course of your life, depending on how long I live, and which subjects I choose to write about in the interim." If she had instead meant to argue for the Open System, this may have been her answer: "The essence of my philosophy is reason, and reason alone. Whatever positions are reasonable, those are ultimately what I mean by 'Objectivist.' Where metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and politics are concerned -- whatever mistakes may be made along the way, and whether one attempts to integrate seemingly opposed views -- if one only holds himself to be reasonable, then he and I share the same philosophy." Rand said neither of these things, nor anything close to them. What I've quoted does not argue for the Open System or the Closed System, but it does argue directly for the Essential System. I am open to -- no, I invite -- further disagreement and discussion on these topics. However, I would like anyone now taking issue with what I'm stating to make reference to my specific arguments and demonstrate how I've erred in proceeding from the quote I've provided. Whereas initially I was mostly just confused, I now believe that I've really found an idea worth considering. And so if it is to be ultimately rejected, I should like it to be for the right reasons, which is to say: reason.

I don't have much to say in response to this, except that I want to agree and emphasize it. It's more than this, though. If you're an honest person, you'll come to conclusions as best you can whether those conclusions are consistent with Objectivism or not. I don't take this to be at issue, however; I don't think that those who argue that Objectivism is "closed" would insist that we maintain consistency with Objectivism at the cost of being wrong per philosophy. They would say, rather, that we abandon Objectivism if Objectivism is wrong. I guess the question, as I'm framing it, comes down to this: are the "conclusions" we're discussing Objectivist conclusions if (and only if) they stem from Ayn Rand's writings? Or are they Objectivist conclusions if they are consistent with fundamental Objectivist principles (as defined by Rand), apart from whether Ayn Rand had written about them specifically? Well, this doesn't really speak to what I'm trying to suss out. Whether the moral status of sex is interesting or not, I don't think it bears on whether or not a moral evaluation of sex is properly philosophy. But come to it, I think it's sometimes worth saying that clean air and healthy food are good. And where sex is concerned, I fear that it's more than St. Paul who's taken issue with the value of sex... Hmmm... I agree with you. My question(s), however, are aimed at teasing out what I regard as subtleties which have left me thus far unsatisfied that I have a full understanding of an "open system" or a "closed system." Believe me, as soon as I feel confident that I can say that I know "what Objectivism is," I will do it in a straight-forward manner. (More on that subject later in this post.) I understand this sentiment as the crux of your position. And... I really wish that I could simply agree or disagree with it, as stated, but I'm not quite there yet. This seems fair. But on the subject of Einstein and Newton, isn't it significant to your analogy that Einstein's theories undermined Newton's? There's no question (at least, not for me) that anything which would conflict with Objectivism's essential positions would not be Objectivist. But if a physicist came along, not to overthrow Newton's theories but to establish logical corollaries to F=MA or what-have-you, wouldn't that be considered part and parcel to Newtonian Mechanics? For instance, Wikipedia provides this timeline of "classical mechanics" under the heading "Newtonian mechanics": While the sources of these innovations are all preserved -- and importantly so -- isn't it also significant, and also with respect to your analogy, that they are all understood together as "Newtonian mechanics"? Here's something (else) that I don't understand about this entire affair. If I take Ninth Doctor at what I believe to be his implication, that this "open/closed" debate is not an "important philosophical disagreement".... And if I read you right here, where "elaborations" or "applications" are fine, they're simply not "the Philosophy of Ayn Rand"... Then why is there seemingly so much rancor on the subject? While I'd like to reach a final understanding on these issues, and feel a goodly amount of curiosity/drive that I always feel in these types of pursuits, I can't say that they get my blood boiling, and I can't imagine them impacting my life in so direct a fashion that they could. If I were to ultimately err in the conclusion that I reach (where you're concerned, let's say that I decide that, "yes -- Objectivism can be 'added' to, so long as the addition is consistent with Objectivism's fundamentals"), would that mean that I've committed a grave moral offense? Ought I feel as though my soul is somehow on the line in this controversy? Because, honestly, I'm not convinced that it is. I can't speak to this. I've seen some accusations leveled at ARI over the years, even though I've mostly kept apart from "the movement." About a decade ago, when I was very new to Objectivism, I had the good fortune to work at ARI. While not everything was perfect there, I highly esteemed many of my co-workers and I know for a fact that they do good work. As to the "sycophants, posers and detractors," I don't know that I've yet met any...? I probably wouldn't be very familiar with their work. At any rate, I certainly don't feel moved to despise anyone yet. Am I wrong there, too? I believe in manners. And I try to be a fair and rational person. But I think I'm going to stick to this board for now; I don't know how long it would take me to evaluate the morality of an entire board, and relate that evaluation back to specific premises, individually held, on a topic where I don't even understand all of the sides yet... But to bring a couple of these topics back to the main issue, I must say: whether OL is sewer-like or not, and whether or not closed system advocates produce better non-fiction than open system advocates, that wouldn't necessarily convince me of the truth of one side over the other. At the risk of tipping my hand, I'm not yet sure that there's not an "excluded middle." (Again: see below.) Here's another thing I will not debate: the genius of Ayn Rand. If there are four like her, I guess I'd spot you Aristotle and then ask you to name who you think the other two are. So I'm not posing my hypothetical as a "likely" scenario, all things considered, but it's fashioned as it is for a reason. I'll grant that our New Genius would later give credit to Rand for "discovering it first" (although he wouldn't cite Rand as an influence, as Rand did with Aristotle, because in my scenario our Genius has never heard of Rand)... but what is the 'it' he's meant to have belatedly discovered? If the 'it' is Objectivism, then doesn't that call into question the idea that "once Ayn Rand is done then Objectivism cannot be added to or subtracted from"? After all, couldn't our New Genius discover everything that Rand did and one thing more (given that this thing is fully consistent with every other aspect of Objectivism)? If our New Genius agreed with all that Rand wrote, wouldn't that make him an Objectivist? Or, on the basis of having discovered "one thing more," does that disqualify our New Genius from being an Objectivist, his philosophy from being Objectivism? Taking your core argument -- that Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand -- as seriously as I can, here's the conclusion I feel I'm forced to reach as regards my hypothetical. Our New Genius develops his philosophy and arrives at reason, reality, rational self-interest, the whole nine-yards, and he writes out the whole of what Rand would have considered "Objectivst Epistemology" had she written it. Later on, he discovers Ayn Rand's writings and is stunned to find agreement on every possible point. Of course, he immediately considers himself to be an Objectivist, gratified to find that someone else in the world had reached the same conclusions. But he is mistaken. Because he has incorporated a fuller treatment on epistemology into his philosophy, he cannot be an Objectivist -- because Objectivism cannot be added to, once Ayn Rand is done. He must have a wholly new name for his philosophy, and distinguish it from Objectivism, even though "his philosophy" and Objectivism will never disagree on any possible philosophical topic. It seems to me like we would thus demand two different names for the same philosophy. This does not appear sensible. But it seems like it is the proper conclusion to draw from your premise. Where have I gone wrong here? Not just "a philosophy that argues" for those things, but the specific philosophy articulated by Rand. I don't believe that any other philosophy could argue successfully for those things, because insofar as they disagreed with Objectivism, I would hold those others philosophies mistaken. I don't believe that I'm looking at two different concepts. I asked whether my hypothetical New Genius could be an Objectivist without having read Ayn Rand. I would answer "yes" in that they could follow the philosophy articulated by Rand without ever encountering Rand's specific formulations. They could even have done so prior to Rand's having written her works, or envisioned her philosophy, or been born. Allow me again to refer to Rand's quote from my earlier posts: I'm starting to feel as though no one here but myself feels that this quote is pertinent to our discussion... but what can I say? -- I think it pertains! When Rand says that "you would have a full philosophical system," I take her at her word. What would we call that particular "full philosophical system" other than Objectivism? She says this in the context of describing the essence of "her philosophy." And if Objectivism is "the philosophy of Ayn Rand," that must be what we're trying to get at. And if Rand says that this particular system is achieved by holding Objective Reality, Reason, Self-interest, and Capitalism as the base of your convictions with total consistency, what grounds do I have to disagree with her? Could my hypothetical New Genius cold those concepts with total consistency? There's no reason to say "not," is there? And if New Genius did so, wouldn't he be an Objectivist, per Rand's words quoted above? And if my New Genius wrote "Objectivist Epistemology" -- wrote it such that it is totally consistent with his philosophy, which is that very full philosophical system achieved by holding the aforementioned base convictions with total consistency (that is, Objectivism) -- then wouldn't it be Objectivist? And if all of that is so, then isn't it wrong to take Objectivism being "the philosophy of Ayn Rand" as meaning that "once Ayn Rand is done then Objectivism cannot be added to or subtracted from"? Or is there something wrong with what Rand said that I quoted? Or something wrong with how I've interpreted it, or proceeded from it? If so, what? Though, as stated, I don't think I'm dealing in two concepts, allow me to answer this question as though I were: yes. Yes, to me this is now more than a discussion on how we ought to define "Objectivism." It's become increasingly clear to me -- through the links provided by Ninth Doctor and even over course of this thread through his conversation with Marc K. -- that there's a lot at stake here, for reasons unclear, and that the true issues (for whatever reason, be they philosophical or psychological) remain muddled. And so I'd like to be able to bring those true issues to light and find a way to formulate them such that men of reason could finally come to some sort of agreement/understanding. Or at the least, I'd like to satisfy myself on that score, not because the labeling of who "is" and who "isn't" Objectivist is of intrinsic interest to me -- it's not -- but because I'd like to at least know why it is that there's such seemingly pointless strife and fracture in the Objectivist movement, and who (if anyone) is in the right. "Butter-side up" versus "butter-side down"? I don't care in the least. But if everyone is going to take up arms to shoot the other side, I guess I'd better decide how I prefer my toast.

Again, my thanks for providing these sources. In the interest of not side-tracking what I believe to be at issue here (I have no desire, for instance, to wrangle over the meaning of "pound sand"), I'm going to withhold comment on most of it. My evaluation of Leonard Peikoff's epistemology, for instance, doesn't seem to matter when it comes to discussing the nature of Objectivism as a philosophical system. But I'm sure that we will have cause to discuss these topics another time. You're introducing concepts here of "newness" and "Objectivism-specificity," when I'm not sure that they're relevant to what I'm trying to determine. Is "A is A" "new" to Rand? Is it "Objectivism-specific"? Is it more or less "shallow" than "sex is good"? (What does "shallowness" entail, anyways?) If you'd like to elaborate on your meaning of these terms, I'm game to listen... but on the face of it they seem to me to be off-target. After all, Ayn Rand didn't invent reason. This doesn't prevent reason from being a hallmark of Objectivism. Isn't that precisely what's at issue? What if I were to say to you: "no -- the way that you show that something is properly 'Objectivist' is by reference to reason and reality. A position on a philosophical topic which is consistent with all of the fundamentals of Objectivism, as set forth by Ayn Rand, is an Objectivist position, whether or not Rand wrote on it specifically"? Consider again what I've quoted from Rand earlier: Did she say "if you held these concepts with total consistency and your name happened to be Ayn Rand..."? Did she say "if you held these concepts with total consistency and I'm good enough to write it all out for you"? No. She said that if you held these concepts -- the essence of Objectivism -- with total consistency, you would have a full philosophical system. Well, what do we mean by "full philosophical system"? Boydstun introduced the concept of "philosophical topics" to this discussion, and noted that sex is a philosophical topic. He (appears to) maintain (though he may correct me, if need be) that a philosophical system is not "full" sans a position with respect to sex, and he presented a philosophical position on sex which would run contrary to the Objectivist position (in the form of the Pope). In contrast, he provided Rand's words on the subject via Leonard Peikoff wherein she declared that "sex is good." It does not seem that she shied away from providing an Objectivist position on philosophical topics when asked. But how did she determine what the Objectivist position would be? And what is it that she did that anyone else is unable to do? If a "full philosophical system" would ultimately require positions with respect to all philosophical topics (as it must, else how could it be assured to "guide the course of your life"), and if Objectivism is a full philosophical system, then Objectivism must ultimately have positions with respect to all philosophical topics whether or not Ayn Rand wrote on them. And how can such positions be arrived at without the great fortune to unearth some previously unknown Ayn Rand manuscript? Exactly the way she did it; by holding the base convictions of Objectivism with total consistency: "to understand, to define, to prove and to apply them." Difficult, for someone who is not Ayn Rand? Perhaps. Impossible? No. Finally, even if we do not insist that a "full system" must have a position on every philosophical topic -- if we delimit a philosophical system to the fundamentals of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and consider their further application on topics such as sex an ancillary issue (deeming such applications "in the Objectivist tradition," perhaps, but not Objectivist, per se) -- we must still confront the issue that ITOE suggests that a full OE has not yet been created. (Unless Rand chose her title in error? Or she changed her mind that Objectivism would constitute a full system? Or is there another possibility I'm not considering?) And I would still ask, in that case, whether a newly-written "Objectivist Epistemology" would properly be Objectivist? It must be, mustn't it?

I don't have zero experience with this stuff -- I've read Fact and Value and Truth and Toleration before, and a couple more articles besides -- but I'm still fairly close to zero (especially as regards understanding), and your link will help me dig deeper. So thanks! (That said, it'll take me a while to wade.... Lawd-a'mercy, but it's depressing to look at that timeline. Is it just me, or is there a whole lot of wasted effort, time, potential... everything!?) I hope this doesn't come across as flippant (because I really don't mean it that way), but wouldn't the "means" by which something new is uncovered be the same as those employed by Rand? I mean... it's not as though she threw darts at a board to decide on (to use the previously introduced example) her position on sex. If Rand had never said anything on the topic (let's say that Peikoff hadn't chosen to ask), and if there were a position on sex (as a philosophical topic) consonant with the Objectivist fundamentals of reason, reality, etc., would it really be improper to regard that view ("sex is good") as the Objectivist position? How did Rand determine which views were consistent with her own fundamentals, after all? And if she could do it, couldn't I? And in acting in that fashion, in employing a life philosophy in accordance with the fundamentals of Objectivism, wouldn't I be acting as an Objectivist? And if I were acting as an Objectivist, and basing my views on philosophical topics such as sex on the fundamentals of Objectivism as specified by the person who coined the term, then in what way would those views not be Objectivist in nature? Peikoff, in asking Rand "what philosophy specifically has to say" about sex may have uncovered another previously unknown aspect of Objectivism. But I do not think that his was the only way to go about it. Ayn Rand, for instance, must have employed another method altogether.

Hi Mark. Since I gather that you and I potentially disagree on this "open"/"closed" system debate, I'd sincerely like to understand your position better. Maybe you can help me to do it? I've written a few posts in this thread, and I'm not 100% certain, but it doesn't seem to me that the substance of my posts has been addressed head on. Could I give you a sample question that speaks to my lack of understanding? Imagine a person exists who's never heard of Ayn Rand, let alone read her. This person believes in an objective reality, that reason is the means to apprehend this reality, that ethically they should pursue rational self-interest, that the only proper political system is lassiez-faire capitalism. They've striven to integrate and apply their beliefs and, though they are again unaware of Rand, if they did read Rand, they would be surprised to see that they share complete philosophical agreement. Prior to encountering Rand, is this person an Objectivist?

Point taken. I think... If Objectivism is "closed" but not "complete," what does that mean, practically? It means that there can be additions to the body of work known as Objectivism, so long as those additions are consistent with what came previously, yes? It means that "Objectivist Epistemology" could properly be understood as Objectivism? Yes, we're agreed. Which specific segments came from Rand's writing (or, rather, are Rand's writing) will still be a distinction worth preserving... as historical information. In the final analysis, who first said "A is A" will be worth immeasurably less than the fact that "A is A." All right, that seems reasonable. I thought you were attempting to make some sort of rhetorical point through your questions, the sum of which I was unable to divine. Is the question whether a position on "sex" and other similar "philosophical topics" properly a part of a philosophy (in this case "Objectivism")? My initial instinct is to say yes (which I believe would place us in agreement), though it raises a few more issues in my mind that we might want to discuss. For instance, we'd need to take care to distinguish those elements of sex which belong to philosophy and which "to the science of psychology," as Peikoff indicates in that quote. Also, it seems to me that one's position on sex is derived from more fundamental matters, such as their general metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. And so... we were to determine that Rand's philosophical position re: sex was ultimately at odds with that which was more fundamental, i.e. reason and reality, would this inconsistency therefore be a permanent feature of Objectivism? Would the person who said, "Rand was right about reason and reality, and for that reason was incorrect about sex" not be an Objectivist? Would there need to arise a "new" philosophy, which endorsed reason, reality, and the newly understood "correct" position on sex? In order to determine "what Objectivism is," and who is consequently an Objectivist, is it necessary to enumerate all of the many philosophical topics which may exist, and then find specific Rand-endorsed position papers on those subjects...? (And where Rand was silent, we must conclude that there is no "Objectivist position" on that matter?) Or is it sufficient to agree with Rand on reason and reality, and her positions on the further fundamentals of ethics, politics, and aesthetics, and then to allow those fundamentals to guide one to his conclusions on these various philosophical topics? Following links on the philosophy link you'd provided (in the Lexicon), I found this (by Rand): If we're agreed that Objectivism is a full philosophical system, then mustn't it ultimately have a position with respect to every possible philosophical topic? And isn't it defined by consistency with those four "base convictions?" And if two positions were promoted with regard to sex (as a philosophical topic), wouldn't the Objectivist position necessarily be that which was consistent with Objective Reality, Reason, Self-Interest, and Capitalism, quite apart from who was advancing the view (be it Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff, David Kelley, the Pope, or etc.)? Apart from trying to understand the terms of the debate itself, I'm also struggling to see why the sides are (or appear to be) so passionate. (And... angry?) I would think that a common agreement on reality, reason, self-interest, and etc., would unite far beyond the dissent that a disagreement on the substance of the phrase "the philosophy of Ayn Rand" could engender. But obviously that's just because I don't understand fully what this surface disagreement portends with respect to fundamentals. My ignorance betrays me everywhere. Obviously, Objectivism is not "philosophy" in general. It is a specific philosophy. But if this specific philosophy under discussion is defined by its essentials, then couldn't it be regarded as "open" in the sense that all of its applications (that is: applications with regard to properly philosophical topics, as Boydstun has introduced) weren't necessarily laid out by Ayn Rand? And in that way, wouldn't its study be something different than a museum exhibit? Would it be more like, oh I dunno, an exciting dig (where things are as they are -- what's buried, awaiting discovery, is buried and cannot be changed -- but not everything is yet necessarily uncovered)? Is what I'm suggesting a third path between the "Open" and "Closed" approaches? Is it closer to what Grames suggested with his use of "complete"? Or have I smuggled the Open or Closed approach into what I'm saying, and am just unaware of it? Come to it, didn't Ayn Rand identify essentials of Kant's thought which contradicted what Kant seemed to state explicitly? (If anyone wants to challenge me on this point, I offer immediate concession; I'm clueless when it comes to Kantian philosophy.) If we were to define Kant's philosophy, wouldn't it be in terms of his essential positions on metaphysics, ethics, and etc.? And wouldn't it be on that basis that we'd judge whether this philosopher -- Fichte or whomever -- were really a Kantian, regardless of whether he thought of himself, or Kant recognized him, as such?

I've tried to find earlier threads on this topic -- and succeeded in finding a few, including this very one, begun in 2005 -- though I'm sure I've not found them all. Per your posting, I also read the linked thread and off-site posts by Acount Overdrawn. I could be mistaken on this point... but I think that my series of questions aims at different potential aspects of this question than is Overdrawn's focus. I understand that an "Open System," in the sense that certain aspects of Objectivism could be modified according to "new evidence," would promote a general skepticism, and is a misapplication of a scientific approach to philosophy. Also that Objectivism is a cohesive whole, and that to change the epistemology, or the metaphysics, or et cetera, is to completely remake the philosophy; that is, it is to create a new philosophy altogether. And finally, I agree that "Objectivism" needs to stand for something so that we can individually decide whether we agree with it or not. I guess what I'm asking is whether something "new" could be added to Objectivism if it did not modify previously established principles, and did not threaten Objectivism's cohesion, and was instead fully consonant with what Rand wrote and approved of personally. (This is all assuming that this "new" thing is proper to a philosophy, as such; though I don't know what it would contain specifically, the example I'd used in my earlier post was the monograph "Objectivist Epistemology" to which ITOE forms the Introduction.) My initial inclination is that OE, whether written or approved by Rand or not, would properly be a part of Objectivism, though I sense that this runs afoul of many others' perspectives, and contrary to what is meant in part by describing Objectivism as "the philosophy of Ayn Rand." But I'm willing to be talked out of this inclination, if reason and reality are elsewhere. But mostly I'm hoping to see these issues more clearly, and that further discussion will help me to do it. Hello Stephen. To be honest, I feel like your questions are... slightly vague, and so I'm not certain that I know how to reply. When you say "there are philosophical topics seen by Rand as important for human life and in certain ways essentially connected to her philosophy," which topics are we discussing? Are they merely "seen by Rand as important for human life," or are they important? (Or does the distinction not matter?) When you say that these topics are "essentially connected" but only "in certain ways," what does that mean? Perhaps it would help me to understand if you could supply some examples for reference? Also, if you're stating something in roundabout fashion through these questions, I'd ask that you additionally state it outright. While I occasionally enjoy a Socratic approach in my learning, and understand the power of rhetorical questions, I believe that I am prepared to consider your position straight on. To the meat, what specifically do you consider "Rand's philosophy" to be? How does this relate to the questions I've asked regarding Open vs. Closed systems in this thread?

I've got some questions on the "open vs. closed" thigamajigger. I'm sure that my questions have been anticipated and perhaps even answered or refuted elsewhere, but I feel the need to ask them personally and hopefully engage in a discussion. I'm equally sure some other thread is more apropos -- it seems like there's always a better/older/more suitable thread -- but at some point a person just has to choose. I hope everyone will forgive my impertinence. My approach will simply be to launch these questions (mostly hypothetical) as a list, any number of which could be addressed or ignored. I'm still trying to work out the issues here... not only where I stand on them, but to even define the issues so that I understand them. What I'm aware of is this: the question of an "open" or a "closed" system is very important to many people. It seems to me that I should try to assess the problem, then, and arrive at my own answer. Alright, to the questions... Objectivism is "the philosophy of Ayn Rand"? In what way? I know that it is what she's expressed in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics, and not necessarily her thoughts on (as the popular example runs) psychology... but is that it? Is Objectivism simply what Ayn Rand had to say about metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics? Or does the phrase "the philosophy of Ayn Rand" mean anything more than that? What, specifically? Obviously, Objectivism cannot be modified to embrace anything which it is not. If an "Objectivist" introduces the possibility for divine revelation into his epistemology, he can no longer correctly call himself an Objectivist or his philosophy Objectivism. A is, well, you know. But can Objectivism incorporate something which is not contradictory? Something that introduces, expands upon, or further develops philosophical ideas in a fully consistent way? For instance, Ayn Rand termed one of her works "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology." At first blush, this would seem to suggest that a fuller treatment -- "Objectivist Epistemology" -- should follow. Suppose someone were to unearth an unpublished manuscript by Ayn Rand which is her full-length OE? Would this work now be a part of Objectivism? Suppose someone else -- Joe Blow -- were to write "Objectivist Epistemology" such that it would be what Rand would have written, verbatim, save for the byline? Is Blow's work Objectivist? Is it merely in the "Objectivist tradition"? Does his work need Peikoff's imprimatur to be considered "official"? (Does Peikoff even have such a power?) Does Blow need to coin a new term for "his" philosophy? Could an Objectivist also adhere to/endorse Blow's work? If he did so, would he still be Objectivist? Suppose we found such a manuscript among Rand's effects, but the byline is missing? Would we trust ourselves to determine the status of this work with respect to "Objectivism"? Or would it be impossible to know whether OE were truly Objectivist if we couldn't prove its authorship? Or, suppose that Joe Blow was born and raised somewhere else, such that he's never heard of Rand or Objectivism. He could be on an island somewhere, perhaps. Suppose that he came to the same conclusions with respect to metaphysics, etc., as did Rand, and wrote his views independently? (I take this as possible, given that Objectivism is based on reason and reality, and is accordingly true.) Would Blow's work be Objectivism? Would we now have two different philosophies, Objectivism and Blowism ("the philosophy of Joe Blow"), though they would agree on every possible philosophical issue? Suppose Blow's works were discovered and it was determined that he'd lived before Rand, and written what he had before Rand. Would Objectivism cease to be "the philosophy of Ayn Rand"? Suppose the writings that form the Objectivist "canon" were not written by Ayn Rand, but were a collection of documents authored anonymously. Could we understand them together as being a coherent philosophy? Or would not being able to attribute authorship to any one person mean that it could never be culled together into a unity? Or would that unity have to wait upon the first person to collect them together, and would that philosophy forever thereafter "belong" to the first person to do it? Would further anonymous documents which agreed conceptually with the first set be a part of this philosophy? Or would they only qualify if explicitly endorsed by the collector of those documents? Well, there's that. I dunno how helpful any of these questions alone, or together, will be to me... but I'm trying to grope out the shape of these issues in the darkness. If anyone out there has some light to share, I'd be very appreciative.

Maybe others here would disagree with me -- I'm sure there are many people far more active "in the community," and therefore knowledgeable than I -- but no... I don't think there are many pure egoists. I certainly don't think that I've acted in a consistently egoistic manner, not even after adopting the "Objectivist" label for myself. Not to make excuses, but there's a whole lotta culture and upbringing to overcome. To see through it and work through it constantly requires fairly scrupulous effort. I expect I'll become stronger and better over time. We'll agree to disagree unless and until we meet in a thread regarding Christianity specifically. Till then, you must understand that it's not that I'm ignorant of how the vast majority of Christians live their lives in the modern US. We've both grown up in and among the religion, after all -- my mother was a church choir conductor for several years, and I've had a lot of personal friendships and romances with people of many different stripes of Christianity. It's not owing to having seen these people act in extreme fashion that I believe that Christianity tends towards extremity. On this topic, I'd like to leave you with this thought: socialism/communism/statism can sometimes seem... innocuous in modern society. While Objectivists and various economic theorists might decry governmental intervention as "the road to serfdom," it can be hard in a day-to-day discussion to demonstrate that Amtrak is bringing us closer to oblivion. Sometimes it just seems like a train service. It requires an understanding of the underlying principles to understand the problem there, which can be hard to discern since all political and economic systems have been mixed for a very long time. There's no laboratory where the social sciences are concerned, you know? One strategy to employ, to help see the differences between statism and liberty, is to find those examples where statism and liberty have been the most developed or predominant. While the USSR sometimes had "capitalist features" (like, for instance, the NEP), it was sufficiently statist to allow us to observe what the general effects of statism are. Where Christianity is concerned, we might wonder if there have been any times, places, or situations where Christianity has been less fettered than it perhaps is today; more free to... express itself, as it were. If we can decide where Christianity finds its fullest bloom -- across all geography and over all time -- we can see more clearly exactly what type of flower it is. Whatever "satisfactions" Hitler may have felt aren't the kind I want. And I know you're not suggesting otherwise -- and I think we agree here -- but I think it's important to hit this point hard, because I think it's pertinent to this thread's central questions. Your reticence to ascribe "happiness" to a monster like Hitler is well-considered. Not all roads lead to happiness, after all. In fact, most of them don't. To find happiness -- that is, true happiness which is in the context of a "well-lived life" -- a person must devote himself to its pursuit. That is, he must act selfishly.

As a minor note, I'm not here referring to the irreason of being a Full Altruist. After all, you're right; peoples be trippin'. But what I mean is that, if the motivation for your every action was to benefit others, without regard to whether those actions also benefited yourself, I think you'd find it difficult to stay alive very long. I don't believe that altruism is conducive to human survival (or happiness, which is how I'd answer the thread's central query), and so I don't expect that a Full Altruist would live long or be happy for the duration. Happiness and survival both have requirements, per their nature, and in reality. To achieve either for the self requires a particular plan of action; selfishness -- as opposed to altruism -- greenlights their direct pursuit. Any success outside of selfish activity, where life or happiness are concerned, are therefore incidental. And since I'd suspect that it's hard to luck into survival and happiness, I just can't rate the prospects of an Altruist very highly. Now when we're talking about specific people (or even systems, like Christianity), we're again talking about mixed bags. A person -- even one who thinks of himself as "altruistic" or "Christian" -- will often be acting out of selfish motives. To suss out their specific motivations in any given instance, and to relate those to the outcomes where the quality of their life is concerned, is a horrendously difficult project. This is why we must approach this topic via principles. It isn't that a given "altruist" cannot be happy at a given moment in their life; it's that altruism does not lead to happiness. Welllllll... I agree that what you've said above is a Christian sentiment, but we ultimately run into walls where Christianity is concerned, because God doesn't exist and so forth, and as I've said, there are a ton of inconsistencies. Anyways, I'd argue that the business of the Christian -- really -- is whatever God says it is. Christianity requires of the Christian that he surrender his own mind, judgment and will; that he turn them all over to a "higher power." And, once again, there's no such thing as the direct pursuit of salvation. Salvation is triggered through Grace, which is divine, unearned charity. So if anyone's business is salvation, it can only be God's. Which falls in line with the greater Judeo-Christian message; what counts, really, is God's glorification. If a man could earn his own salvation, then he could take credit for it. But this would be Pride; taking credit for that which came from God. A "Christian" who took credit for his soul's salvation would be branded a heretic. He must instead repeat the litany that man is a worthless sinner, and that God deserves all of the credit and all of the gratitude for saving his soul. "Like to believe"? This has nothing to do with what I'd "like to believe." If I could magic wand the universe, it'd all be unicorns and rainbows, I assure you. And further, if Christianity were less toxic than I've otherwise concluded, I would count that a good thing. But I'm afraid that the fact that you've not seen these types of behaviors don't demonstrate that Christianity doesn't lead to them. We're agreed that people are mixed bags, right? Christians come from all sorts of backgrounds and accept strains of all kinds of different (conflicting and inconsistent) philosophical beliefs and tenets. There are "Christians" who never read the Bible or go to church. There are New Age Christians who argue that all religious traditions are ultimately equal. Even a fundamentalist, who are typically thought of as being "extreme" in their faith, when we meet them in modern Western society will have been raised in an environment of relative political liberty and a tradition of tolerance for other creeds, etc. Why don't the Christians on Main Street, USA whip themselves? I think it's less to do with Christianity and more to do with Main Street, USA. After all, how "serious" are the Christians you've met about their faith? As serious as Torquemada? As serious as the Flagellants of the late Middle Ages Europe? What I'd argue is that the "more Christian" a man becomes, the closer he comes to these sorts of mindsets. Fortunately for us all, 21st Century Christianity is regularly tempered by a more-enlightened environment, which does not allow Christianity's full "fruits" to manifest, either in society or in an individual man's soul. That said, Christianity preserves its tendency, which is precisely what we must determine -- not the behaviors any one or handful of particulars -- if we want to examine Christianity, as such. Whether "meaning" and "purpose" contribute to a man's happiness is utterly contingent on the content of that meaning and purpose. If my meaning and purpose involve the wholesale destruction of others, I will not have lived a "well-lived life." So we can't abstract meaning and purpose and say, in isolation, that they are "important ingredients." If religion provides "meaning" and "purpose," that doesn't mean that religion thereby contributes to man's happiness. A religion that provides the meaning of "you are God's pawn" and the purpose of "bow down and worship your master" will not lead men to happiness. I'm neither equipped nor inclined to discuss the particulars of your decision at present. Suffice it to say that, if you're prepared to abandon whatever religion *should* it be shown to lead to your personal pain and ruin, that's enough for me for now. To tie it back to the main theme of the thread, that's the very standard -- your happiness and life versus your pain and ruin -- that should apply. Altruism, contrarily, would hold that your personal happiness versus pain, is immaterial; that instead, you should do whatever is best for others.

I'm hoping you can clarify this for me. How is the "feeling of happiness" not relevant? Happiness, as I understand it -- as I've experienced it -- is more than simply a mental assessment; it is certainly a feeling. Further, if not for the feeling of happiness -- that it is a pleasant emotional state -- I don't know that we would pursue it. Or do you think that the pursuit of happiness (to coin a phrase ) is wrongheaded? Do you think people ought to pursue things that they've determined to be good for their "life" (which here must mean "physical survival"...?) and trust that happiness will be the byproduct? Or is that last not even important? Should people not care whether their actions result in happiness? I don't know. I've found (or perhaps imagined) some ambivalence on the matters of "life" versus "happiness" versus "pleasure." I think that the pursuit of pleasure is wholly moral, and understandable, and good. Of course that's in context; of course not if it makes one unhappy; not if it is adverse to one's life. But why do we act to preserve our life in the first place, if it is not for the continued experiences of pleasure and happiness? A life without pleasure or happiness would not be a life that I'd find worth fighting for. I just don't think that pleasure or happiness or life can be set against one another; take any of those three away, and I don't see that the other two can stand as values. (Because, frankly, I'm not sure that "happiness" can exist without pleasure.) And I certainly can't yet agree that "the feeling of happiness is irrelevant." That's certainly true. But that doesn't make happiness irrelevant, does it? Isn't it appealing to the relevance of happiness as a long-term goal? Meaning that, to maximize one's happiness, one should attempt to be happy for one's lifetime, rather than seek a momentary "happiness" at the cost of long-term pain, suffering and sadness? And further, and as we learn and understand more, isn't our "momentary happiness" really dependent on our long-term understanding of our life in context? Meaning: suppose I watch the film Titanic. I can enjoy the movie, and experience mental pleasures and et cetera, which we'll call "happiness" here. But that's only in context; if I'm watching that movie while aboard the ship Titanic as it sinks into the Atlantic...? (Ignoring here the issues of time-travel involved.) It's unlikely I'll be able to enjoy the film. While I agree with you that one should do his best to assess whether things are "going well" or not, in a true and long-term sense, I don't know that this makes the feeling of happiness irrelevant. Instead, I think that the pursuit of that happiness provides the motive fuel necessary to make that "assessment" in the first place. If it were not for the possibility of happiness, why should we care whether things were "going well" at all? For their own sake? Again, this just doesn't sit right with me. When we talk about "life" being the standard, we know that we don't just mean the biological facts of respiration, excretion, etc., right? We're talking about a certain *kind* of life. And I have to believe that happiness is integral to the kind of "life" that we mean. It isn't that "happiness is the standard," but that (physical) life, happiness, and pleasure are all irreducibly a part of the (fuller-sense) "life" that we do hold as the standard. This feeling of happiness, then, is not sufficient alone (devoid of context) to be the standard of ethical inquiry, but neither would it be irrelevant. Or am I completely mistaken? Feel free to set me straight, please.

If the definition of altruism "is as broad as some here would have it"? Let's not waste our time with broad definitions of altruism which don't make any sense. Obviously, if we extend "altruism" to mean all sorts of things it isn't, then we'll be forced to conclude that altruism is both good and bad; impossible to discern, in principle, because our conceptual starting point is so muddled. Let's keep it to: selfishness is action on behalf of the self; altruism is action on behalf of others. If, in shielding/saving Dagny, Galt is acting in order to preserve the value of his own life, he's acting selfishly, even if this is a very good thing for Dagny. Obviously your assessment here is correct. So much so that I'd even quibble that "sacrifice" is not quite correct. If spending this time and effort creates something of great value for Diana, I'd guess that it would be more proper to say that she's "investing" that time and effort, or something closer to that. This is clearly not altruism. Or, again, if this *is* altruism, then we have no hope of ever figuring out what altruism entails or leads to, because we've defined it so broadly that it includes basically all of selfishness as well. If you know that this isn't altruism, and I know that this isn't altruism, then let's not bring it up again. Let's work on those things that matter to this discussion and save us all some time. But having a definition of altruism so very broad would be... how do I put this... ...dumb? This isn't something taking Diana "away from her own productive work"; this is her productive work. And as for her working on "something to benefit others"... while I've no question that her work will benefit others, do you suppose that this is the primary reason why she's engaged in it? Or is her work primarily undertaken because she's trying, first and foremost, to advance her own life? For (what I can only hope is) the final time, something which happens to benefit others does not define that person's ethics as "altruist." The question is one of primary motivation. That's the only question. Can we put all of this other non-essential stuff away now? Which we're not. Which we cannot be, if we want to have a productive discussion. Well sure, because then you're also considering selfish people and selfish motivations and selfish actions; the net is too wide. If we call things which are not altruism, "altruism," we're bound to come to all sorts of interesting (though self-contradictory, and ultimately useless) conclusions. Even if I granted this "broad," useless view of altruism which also incorporates selfish activity, I couldn't just give you "the research." At that point, if I were really engaged to do it, I guess I'd have to start asking questions as to the methodology of the research and such. It's not quite so simple as "science says this," as I'm sure you probably know. Just as "research" isn't quite so simple a topic, neither is "that many of them." It isn't a question of all of humanity dividing neatly into two camps, selfish and altruist. Real, complete, 100% altruists? I'd go so far as to say that zero exist. The (ultimate) problem with altruism is this: if put fully into practice, it would lead consistently to death. Even if Christianity fully advocated altruism (which we've already agreed is not 100%, given the potential for the divine reward of heaven), it couldn't be consistently put into practice by even the most devout Christian. Instead, we must confront the fact that most people don't live consistently selfish or altruistic lives. Our study of altruism versus selfishness must therefore attempt to isolate the two approaches, to better determine their effects even in complicated and mixed real-life examples. Part of the problem of deciding what's true of "an Altruist" (and also correctly interpreting the "research" you've suggested earlier) is knowing when a person rightly earns that label. Again, because the question of altruism is one of primary motivation, we'd have to know a person very well indeed to know if he were truly an Altruist. Indeed. I feel I've been consistent in the definition I've proffered -- is that not so? Do you disagree with my assessment, or have any other reason why we shouldn't proceed with what I've submitted here? Or, if anyone else wishes to take issue with my formulation, I'm always willing to entertain corrections. In the first place, "charity" (as is conventionally understood) is not necessarily synonymous with altruism, as I hope is clear by now. If you'd like to argue for charity, please recognize that this is a completely separate argument/discussion than arguing for altruism. Altruism is also not kindness or benevolence. Conflating altruism with charity, kindness and benevolence implies that there could be no selfish reason for acting in these manners, which I disagree with wholeheartedly. In the second place, a "Christian" who acts purely to get to heaven is acting selfishly. But if we're discussing the nature of Christianity, then we must recognize (as I've brought up before) that this is not why/how Christians are supposed to behave. A Christian who does what he does on the expectation of personal, divine reward would be regarded as unworthy of that reward. He's supposed to act as God wills, for nothing other than God's sake and God's glory, and out of utter submission and duty. And then there's the matter of "grace" that I've also brought up; one does not work his way into heaven, per most branches of Christianity. If the contention is that "Christianity is a confused mess," we're agreed. But the overarching character of Christianity's ethics is clearly altruistic: act for your brother, act for your God, do not act for yourself. Do you really mean to contend otherwise? Thirdly, I don't mean to speak for Objectivists. Speaking for myself, at least part of my apprehension with your above formulation is due to the fact that heaven does not exist. But I've also noted in this thread that, even given the Christian God, my problems with him would run very, very deep. The reasons for this extend mostly beyond the scope of this thread, but suffice it to say that the Christian God, per the Bible, is profoundly awful. Obedience to such a creature in hope of reward would be little different to me than obedience to Hitler in hopes of becoming SS. You've never seen it... therefore... it doesn't exist? And isn't your use of "serious Christians" a bit of question begging? But that's not really important. Yes -- it is dramatic. Christianity is dramatic. It's about God descending to Earth, and bleeding out on the cross, and resurrecting, and insane things like that. The expression of the Christian church has been quite dramatic at times, too, in such well-known episodes as various witch trials, inquisitions, pogroms and crusades. Also on a smaller scale in far less-publicized ways; you might find windows into peoples' personal lives through, I dunno, various documentaries, such as Jesus Camp. I'll leave most of the legwork to you in further research. If "modern" Christianity does not (appear) to express itself so dramatically, I don't think this is accounting to any change of the nature of the religion itself. We have a separation of church and state, after all, and a powerful tradition of rational, scientific thought. What your Lutheran neighbors do or don't do is not necessarily indicative of Christianity's influence in their lives, nor what Christianity represents as a philosophy, as a religion, as an ethical statement. Your neighbors are probably grounded in those same Western influences I've already cited, which are not of themselves Christian, but do go some way in tempering what we now regard as Christianity. The real question to ask is: what does a Christian look like when "Christianity is in charge" of him? What does the world look like when Christianity is in charge? To assess such a thing, we must go well beyond a simple, superficial examination of the "Christians on the block"; we must look at what the religion, itself, says. And, moreover, what it means. We must look at the history, and how Christianity has impacted societies. We must investigate Christians of various stripes, and over time, and far more deeply than just observations of their day-to-day behavior. We must have an understanding of underlying philosophy. We must bring all of this knowledge to bear on our investigation, and leave as little out as possible. It's not a light undertaking. What I say regarding Christianity is more than a statement of "Objectivist understanding." I don't know how much I can claim in the way of Objectivist orthodoxy, since I haven't been an Objectivist more than a decade or so, and I'm sure I disagree with several people here, who are more knowledgeable and practiced in the philosophy than I, on various matters. But my experience with Christianity includes a lifetime of struggle and thought and learning. I've long investigated religions, having read the Bible, Koran (though in English, so...), the Book of Mormon, the Bhagavad-Gita, etc. I have a degree in history, and have personally pursued information on the early Christian churches, and the evolution of Christianity over time. You have a Lutheran neighbor? I was a regular attendee of Bible study with a Lutheran minister, who was also a good friend (and excellent ping-pong player!). My best friend, since 2nd grade, is a Methodist; I currently have regular religious discussions with a Methodist minister. I've never been really close with Catholics, though my Dad was raised as such, but I did once marry an ex-fundamentalist, so... there's that. I say all of this, not to declare myself "an authority" -- I'm far from that (as though it would matter anyway) -- but to say that I'm not speaking lightly, or off-the-cuff. I'm not "dramatic" in discussing Christianity because I think it sounds better. I'm dramatic when discussing Christianity because I really do believe that this religion is a blight, and I say that on the basis of an extended and extensive and ongoing study. I am dramatic because I believe that the subject demands it. Am I? I don't feel any hysteria. Did you take me as saying that "there are no happy, prosperous, productive Christians"? That's not what I said. Again: "...to the extent that it is practiced, Christianity is bound to bring people pain and ruin." There's no hysteria here; I mean what I say, coldly. We cannot make the mistake of believing that, because one claims the title "Christian," that therefore they are a pure exponent of Christianity itself. Even C.S. Lewis doesn't get to wear that mantle. (By-the-by, how would we go about assessing the internal states of Tolkien, et al.? Maybe you've read some of their personal memoirs or letters or something...? Or is this speculation?) You think that "meaning" and "purpose" are conducive to happiness without regard to the content of that meaning or purpose? Not so. Soviet Russia, to take a convenient example, was chock-full of folks who had "meaning" and "purpose." What one devotes oneself to will go a long way in determining whether one achieves "happiness and joy" and everything else, or whether one winds up in a gulag. Because, at the very minimum, I take ideas seriously. Don't you? If not, why are you here talking about this?

Some of Rand's protagonists could be said to be altruists? Well-known Objectivists could be said to be altruists? How so? "...as they give up their time and resources to further a cause." :I I've tried before -- and will try this once again -- but you're not understanding what "altruism" is at all, here. It has nothing to do with "giving up time and resources to further a cause." (!) Nothing. When I go to work, I am giving up my time and resources to further a cause. My cause, in specific, is the well-being of myself and my family. This is a selfish pursuit, not an altruistic one. The difference between selfishness and altruism lies in this question: who ought to (primarily) benefit from an actor's actions? Selfishness answers "the actor." Altruism answers "others." Does that mean that the actor cannot ever benefit from something he does altruistically? Of course not, but it isn't relevant to the question of whether he acted selfishly or not. Does it mean that others cannot ever benefit from something the actor does selfishly? Of course not, but it isn't relevant to the question of whether he acted altruistically or not. An earlier example I gave was a man selfishly attending college rather than stay home to care for his parents. An altruist could make the argument that the man ought stay home as his "Christian duty" to his parents. But note: the man could just as well choose to stay home to care for his parents selfishly. That this involves other people, that it cares for other people, that it could be seen as "charitable" has nothing to do with whether it is a selfish action or not; the only relevant question here is: why did the man choose to stay with his parents? If, in the end, he did it out of his love for his parents, the pleasures they share, etc. -- if he did it because he judged it to be the best thing to do for himself, and better than going to college -- then he did it selfishly. To complete the scenario, an altruist may well demand that this man go to college instead, because he has some special talent that he "owes it to the world" to develop. Beyond that, I think you're portraying Christianity falsely if you insist that its ethics are selfish. Christians are not supposed to act in expectation of reward. In fact, most denominations (to my knowledge) would insist that it's impossible to "act" one's way into heaven at all; that salvation is a matter of God's grace, which is an unearned (and unearnable) blessing. No, man instead should act out of Christian charity, which is selfless, and in the name of the glory of God. "Not man's will, but God's will be done," and all of that. Is there the pretense of individual spiritual reward? Sure. Christianity is wildly inconsistent in just about every aspect. But, again, you're not supposed to "be Christian" in order to attain heaven; you're supposed to "be Christian" because God created you, and because he supposedly set the terms on morality. And what is moral to the Christian God? Self-sacrifice. Self-denial. Self-abnegation. Obedience. Martyrdom. Would you say that there are few Christians that live up to this "ideal"? Obviously; it's an ideal that cannot be lived up to. And Christians are made to feel guilty and wicked -- "sinners in the hands of an angry God" -- because of it. Christianity, broadly and in specific, is a horror show (and not in the "good" Alex Delarge sense) to those of us who value... you know... life. Whatever your arguments for "being charitable" (which -- again -- is not necessarily altruism), certainly Christianity cannot carry your banner. When people take Christianity and its ethics really very seriously, do you know what happens? They start flagellating themselves, or they become anchorites. They perform self-mutilations, give up sex and food and money and even speech. They prostrate themselves, spiritually and physically, before the altar of an unknowable, terrible deity. To the extent that they're able to remain in society, they're all screwed up. They misinterpret science to try to salvage their bizarre cosmology and handicap their children's education to "keep them in the fold." This latter practice, which I've seen personally with Bible education upwards of three nights a week, is something akin to brainwashing. They turn their personal associations into opportunities to proselytize and witness and they anticipate with relish the "end times" when everyone supposedly less moral than themselves will be consigned to everlasting torment in the name of "goodness." It cannot be practiced in full, as Christianity is too irrational and too internally inconsistent, but to the extent that it is practiced, Christianity is bound to bring people pain and ruin. There is nothing, nothing to like about Christianity, and nothing about Christianity which could be expected to make a rational person "happy." But doing things which benefit others? Often that's a great thing. I act to make my wife happy, my family happy, my friends happy, with regularity. I do it because they enrich my life, and acting in that manner is completely selfish of me. Could I act for the benefit of strangers and thereby continue to act selfishly? It would depend on the context, but yes, it's possible. The appearance of "charity" does not answer the question of why I've acted in the manner I have -- the question of my motivation, and whether or not I am the primary beneficiary of my actions -- which is the only relevant question to ask with respect to selfishness versus altruism. If we'd like to discuss altruism here, that's well and good, but let's at least take care to understand what altruism is so that we can approach the topic honestly.

Re: Christianity, I think it's a mixed bag. While there may often be an implied promise of "heavenly reward" (temporarily leaving aside the question of whether heaven exists), ethically people are still expected to act without thought of themselves. "Self-sacrifice" is held up as a moral ideal. So, imagine a person who (selfishly) goes to college instead of staying home to care for their parents, having deemed such to be in their best interest. Someone may well tell that person that it is their "Christian duty" to abandon their own interest -- to sacrifice their personal happiness -- for the sake of another. The argument is not typically made "stay at home with your parents because that will get you into heaven." This latter argument would obviously appeal to the person's self-interest... and I suspect that this is why an argument like this is seldom made (at least, to my knowledge). I think Christians implicitly understand the conflict between "Christ's sacrifice," and the injunction against selfishness, etc., and their quest for heavenly bliss. And so they try to focus on the sacrificial elements, and stress that this duty is good for its own sake, or for God's glory, etc., as opposed to being a personal mission for reward. I suspect that if a man "acted as a Christian," explicitly saying all the while that it was just to get into heaven, that he would be endlessly chastised by all around him for pride, and un-Christian motives, and so forth. He would be told that he wasn't really a Christian at all. After all, he's not supposed to do it for himself. He's supposed to do it for God. Practically, where life on Earth is concerned, this means that a Christian always has the "high road" in insisting that others abandon their personal ambitions/goals/values for someone else. And it means that when people knowingly act in their own interests, they often feel unworthy and guilty. Sounds like a general nastiness to me, and while I've known (and befriended) more than a few Christians in my time, I've never known them to be "happy" in the way I'd aspire to be. The most deeply Christian folks I've known have always had... a real sadness about them. A sort of cosmic resignation. I don't know better how to describe it, but to say that they speak of "good news" but rarely, genuinely smile with delight. Would all of this be justified if the Christian God actually existed? I doubt it. A God that would insist on an ethics which turns life on Earth into an exercise of self-denial and self-torture sounds more like my conception of a devil than anything else. I wouldn't trust him or his heaven to do anything for me. But it's also important to note that this God doesn't actually exist (though, of course, that argument belongs in a different thread), and there is no heaven. Which means that all Christian self-sacrifice is completely in vain. And since they must be confronted with that truth from time to time (though struggling against it mentally, inviting the cognitive dissonance this entails), can you imagine how harrowing that must be? "Dark night of the soul" indeed! How happy can a person ultimately be -- in reality -- if the premise of their ethics is a pack of lies, and reality must be continually blocked out in order to maintain the self-deception? What good could possibly come of such a thing? And does it sound like the recipe for happiness?

I feel there's some confusion in this thread. Selfishness versus altruism is not an answer to "what makes us happy?" but "in whose interests ought we act?" Selfishness answers that we ought act in our own interest while altruism insists that we act in the interest of others. Therefore, whether Mother Teresa was or was not happy is besides the point. Whether "being charitable" can or cannot make a person happy is besides the point. If the argument being made is "being charitable can make you happy; therefore, be charitable," then it must be recognized that this is a selfish argument. If it were the case that acting in the manner of Mother Teresa was the way for a person to achieve their greatest happiness -- if acting as Mother Teresa was best for a person -- then surely a selfish philosophy would demand acting in that manner! Whether one should act as Mother Teresa did, in order to achieve their own happiness, is a question apart from selfishness versus altruism. No, the truly altruistic argument would not be "do such, because such will make you happy" -- this is instead the absolute core of the selfish argument. The altruist argument can only be "do such, because such will make others happy." The question of whether the individual so acting will also achieve happiness is irrelevant in the face of altruism; it is not the actor's happiness that is deemed important. If you were considering an action altruistically, though the action would make you miserable, if it makes others happy you should do that thing. (Though more often, I reckon, real actual people will gravitate towards those "altruistic" actions which simultaneously provide themselves some benefit and shun those that would do themselves real harm... and feel guilty for it!) Could certain altruistic actions accidentally provide the actor some measure of happiness as well? I'd suppose so. But given all of this, can altruism itself be relied on to lead individuals to their own happiness? By no means. After all, leading individuals to their own happiness isn't the goal. And if we sneakily make that the goal of "altruism," we're no longer discussing altruism at all, but merely saying that the selfish road to happiness runs through acts of charity and etc., which is a different discussion altogether.

I'll agree that I've been question begging or otherwise circular at times in this thread... (as, frankly, I think we all have; no one has yet offered any conclusive demonstration of why intellectual property is a right or is not one that hasn't come down to a restatement of "it's a right" or "it's not.") But here? I don't believe I'm begging any question, which is an an argument which assumes the truth of its conclusion; I'm asking one. And it's an important question that I'd like you (or anyone else) to answer honestly. I'm asking about the damage done to a man when his "intellectual property rights" are violated, and specifically in the scenario I've offered. If you're saying that "he is damaged because his rights are violated," then we may have a fundamental disagreement on the nature of rights. Allow me to explain. "Rights" such as I'm interested in are not arbitrary creations, but reasonable assessments on what it is right for men to do according to their nature, in reality, in order that they may further (yes, "further"; see below) their survival. "Liberty" isn't a right "just 'cause." It is a right because men need liberty to survive. To flourish. This is true, too, of property and the pursuit of happiness. An assault on a man's rights, therefore, isn't simply some harmless political redefinition, it is an outright attack on man's very ability to survive. That is, it is an attack on man's life. If someone tried to cut off your pinky finger, it would be an outrage. You would act to prevent it. If someone tried to steal your car, the same. And if someone tried to imprison you unjustly, again. This is the gravitas of rights, and what they mean to an individual's life. It's not a word game, but a question of your life and happiness. You can't suffer people to trample your rights, because to allow such without fighting back is to court very real death. And this is the standard to which I'm holding "intellectual property." I want to see how Patent Breaker's flouting of Inventor's "intellectual property" is in fact an assault against Inventor's life. I don't see it. Yet. But this is the matter: if and when I see it, I will conclude that IP is valid... and if I ultimately determine that there is no such connection, I believe that I'll be forced to conclude that IP is not a proper right, but instead a violation of rights. Maybe I mistake you -- feel free to clarify if it's the case -- but I feel as though you've been saying, "No, Patent Breaker doesn't do any 'damage' to Inventor by building the salt shaker. So what?! Inventor's rights are being violated, and that's damage enough!" But if it's the case that Patent Breaker can build this salt shaker doing no actual harm to Inventor -- to his life -- and in so doing increase his (Patent Breaker's) own life...? Then how can I conclude anything but that Patent Breaker is right to build the salt shaker? As a minor note of order, how 'bout we agree not to call one another's arguments "ridiculous" or any similar insult, and instead proceed as though this were a polite and cordial conversation? I don't mean to tell others how to argue here, but I put a lot of thought and effort in my replies and I'd like that to be respected. Otherwise, you're not understanding me. When I say that "Inventor's life must be furthered," I'm not talking about an application of his rights (as is your suggestion of him burning his own house down) but the defense of his rights, as such. It is in our interest to defend our rights, because in defending them we defend our lives. Again, this isn't just an abstract word game, but I mean "our lives." In protecting your farm against those who would steal your crops, you're preserving the food that you need to eat to live. So I ask: what good does it do Inventor to prevent Patent Breaker from building a salt shaker? What benefit does the preservation of this "right" give to Inventor? How is his life furthered? And as to my use of the word "furthered," I thought I'd established its pedigree in an earlier post. Here, again, from Ayn Rand's "Man's Rights" (emphasis added): That's it. That's the theory under which I'm attempting to operate, and the standard I expect "intellectual property" to meet if it is to be regarded as a proper right. It must be "required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life." Inventor must seek to prevent Patent Breaker from building the salt shaker, or take action against Patent Breaker should Patent Breaker build it. Inventor is required by his nature to act in this manner, so that he may better support, further, fulfill, and enjoy his own life. Or, if not, then "intellectual property" is no right of Inventor's, but an intrusion against Patent Breaker's proper rights. Is this ridiculous of me?

Excellent -- thank you. Based on what I've read thus far across these forums, your recommendation carries weight, and I anticipate being an "early adopter" of Understanding Objectivism when it releases.

I'm prepared to give him whatever respect he earns. That's my policy for everyone. You may wonder whether his designation of Rand's "intellectual heir" entitles him to additional respect, prima facie? It does not; titles do nothing for me. However, if his use of the title is irrational -- as I fear it may be, though have not yet concluded such -- then my respect for Peikoff will suffer. From here: To elaborate, I fear that Peikoff might think himself to have some special role qua Objectivism to "identify the errors of others," as I believe you'd suggested earlier in the thread. This seems to me an irrational position, as I do not believe that such a position is available in reality. The identification of errors can only happen by the individual mind, which admits no authority higher than itself. Objectivism cannot have a Pope. On the other hand, softwareNerd has staked out a meaning for "intellectual heir" where many people could lay claim to the designation, with or without Peikoff's (or Rand's) knowledge or blessing: "an intellectual who understands and agrees with her philosophy, and continues to work in that tradition." Per this definition, you could conceivably also be "Rand's intellectual heir," as could I. This view seems fine to me, but I don't believe it's what you take "intellectual heir" to mean. Perhaps I'm wrong? Do you agree with softwareNerd's assessment of the term? What do you think "intellectual heir" means, exactly? I don't know. Incapable of what? Incapable of writing a fiction book equivalent to Atlas Shrugged? Perhaps. I don't know. If Peikoff could do such a thing, would he want to? Too speculative.... But I was addressing a couple of different senses that "intellectual heir" could mean, here. Specifically, I was considering whether Peikoff had shown himself to be a genius on Rand's level. Maybe he has and I just haven't familiarized myself with his work well enough? I don't know. But in that sense of "intellectual heir," I'd be reluctant to give it to Peikoff until I was satisfied that he did have comparable skill and insight to Rand (not necessarily fiction writing, but something). Suppose we were to say that Rand was "Aristotle's intellectual heir," meaning that she was a genius of his stature, every bit as revolutionary and perceptive, or perhaps more. That Rand is worthy of "Aristotle's mantle." Would Peikoff measure up to Rand (and Aristotle) in that same fashion? If you have something specific you'd like to direct me to, by all means. My exposure to Peikoff's works have been limited, and not greatly inspired me to dig deeper. Again, and with respect to softwareNerd's earlier surmise that Peikoff's use of "intellectual heir" was savvy marketing, it actually has depressed my interest in his work. Perhaps sN's right -- perhaps different people react differently to it? Can't speak for anyone other than myself, but personally it's less a question of "belief" and more a question of what the heck "intellectual heir" is supposed to mean. I mean, let's say that Rand came up to Peikoff one evening and said, "Leonard, you are my intellectual heir!" Great. But what did she mean by that? What did Peikoff take it to mean/what does he mean by it on his website? And what am I supposed to think it entails? Again, if it's simply sN's assessment -- intellectual Objectivists working in Rand's tradition -- then I have no problem with it. But that doesn't seem to map completely with how I've seen it used (the timbre of it, if you will), nor how I think you've been referring to the "hierarchy" within Objectivism, or how Peikoff somehow "owns" the philosophy and can name his own "successor." So the issue (again, for me) is less "did Rand proclaim Peikoff to be her 'intellectual heir'?" and more "what is meant by 'intellectual heir'?" No. But then, I don't know that I have reason to believe that Branden was her "first mistake," if I take you right. If we're now discussing Rand's assessment of other peoples' character, I don't know that it interests me a great deal. At that point, we're no longer talking about metaphysics, ethics or epistemology, but the interpersonal relationships of folks from about a half-century ago. If, however, we're talking about Peikoff's (or Branden's) philosophy, then I don't know of any shortcut apart from judging what they say and do on its own merit. Peikoff's claim to "intellectual heir" tells me nothing about whether what he has to say is any good or not. And frankly, the same goes for Branden and the scorn that he's apparently received. I've not read his books and so I can't tell you much about them. Or is this an error on my part? Should I base my assessments of people's beliefs and character on the say-so of my "betters"? My apologies, but I don't think I understand the meaning of your question. I do note the word "expert" however, and I'll simply seize on that for this question: with regards to philosophy, do you think that there is any appropriate time for a person to defer his own judgment to that of an "expert"?

Hmmm... it's interesting. When speaking of an "intellectual heir" to Rand (in the sense you've meant), do I imagine someone who "organizes her ideas"? Or an intellectual of similar stature? The former, while perhaps necessary, sounds... somewhat uninspiring. Almost bureaucratic. No, I think that I'd be looking for something closer to the latter; a profound mind with an unparalleled command of reason and rhetoric. Someone able to take us the next step down the path that Atlas Shrugged, et al., began. Am I judging Peikoff unable to do such a thing? No. That would be unfair. But I'd at least say that I don't think he's yet accomplished anything worthy of being Rand's "intellectual heir" on a historical scale. To go back to Plato, we don't speak today of all of his students or generally pronounce them Plato's "intellectual heirs," no matter how faithful they were to his initial teachings. Those who get mentioned, in my experience, do so on the basis of their own genius. Regarding marketing... I see what you're saying, and I mostly agree. Certainly he needs to reference Rand in some manner. But can we agree that, at best, "intellectual heir" is a problematic formulation? Objectivism's strength above all is that it's grounded in reason. When I hear "intellectual heir" and my reaction is "but no; one cannot inherit ideas; this is nonsensical," then it seems to work contrary to its purpose, which is to entice Objectivism's natural market -- those who prefer their philosophy to make sense. In short, Peikoff's styling himself as Rand's "intellectual heir" has always made me less likely to approach him and his ideas, not more. Further, it leads me to worry that Peikoff does really believe himself to be Rand's intellectual heir in the sense of having received a unique title carrying special privileges. You can see that kind of viewpoint manifest in this thread, here: And here: If Peikoff has similar views -- and his use of "intellectual heir" at least puts me on notice that he may -- then it will be hard to reconcile them with my beliefs that no one owns a philosophy, and that there is no hierarchical authority to "identify the errors of others" apart from my own mind. In my confusion, I might even conclude that Peikoff himself is irrational. Whatever he gains, marketing-wise, can't be worth this, can it? And if he's *really* Rand's heir in the historical sense, then why not just market himself the same way that Rand marketed herself? Write things that shake people to their core and blast them with their honesty and insight. If he wrote Atlas Shrugged Pt. II (not literally that, but something on par, whether fiction or non-), do we think it wouldn't sell today, for some reason? Or if he's incapable of doing something like that, lacking the skill or the genius or etc... then--again--in what sense is he Rand's "intellectual heir"? Let him write Atlas Shrugged Pt. II. We'll read it, and then, should it prove worthy, we'll adjudge him (fairly) Rand's "intellectual heir" in the sense that you've been supporting. But till then, his use of the term only raises fears in my mind (perhaps groundless?) that he believes himself to have some sort of special, particular "ownership" of Objectivism which is not, in truth, in reality, available to anyone.

This is what it says at www.peikoff.com (emphasis added): If I understand you, softwareNerd, you'd say that several people could be Ayn Rand's intellectual heir, according to our (reasoned) evaluation. But the use of the term from Peikoff's site...? I don't know. Suggests to me that there exists only those heirs -- legal and "intellectual" -- designated by Rand; that is, only Leonard Peikoff. It appears to be a title, which makes sense because "heir" conjures "inheritance." Of course, ideas can't be inherited. The sense that you mean, like recognizing the development of ideas from Plato to Plotinus to Augustine, is fine and well, but that's a judgment I'd rather leave for posterity anyways. I can't imagine that Plotinus saw himself as (or would proclaim himself) "Plato's intellectual heir." He probably wanted to be remembered as Plotinus.