Icarus

I assume we all agree it is not wrong to try to survive. Furthermore, we probably all agree preserving one's life is, in general, a noble end at which to aim one's actions. So why does the survival motive of the theft make the theft more heinous in your eyes? Are you arguing that one must sacrifice his self-interest to morality contrary to AR's assertion, as I understand it, that morality is defined by one's enlightened self-interest? If not, please demonstrate how theft is not in the theif's self-interest. Why do you think a theif must lack reason? Ultimately, you are arguing that by initiating force the thief is betraying an essential principle which makes man's life worthwhile and more significant than that of an animal. My question is why is non-initiation of force essential to man's meaningful existence? When I kill a turkey to feed myself to survive another day, you believe I am a rational man. When I kill or steal from a man to survive another day, you allege that I am no longer a man qua man. What quality do I lack after the initiation of force that is so essential? Is it simply the respect of my fellow rational men, who can now reciprocate the force? I agree that reciprocating the initiation of force of a thief is not wrong. So if you mean that initiating force lowers the thief's status to that of an animal in the esteem of other rational men in that they would not mind returning force, we agree. There remains the question of whether the reciprocated force should be scaled to the amount of force initiated (should a thief be executed?). If, as I believe, the answer is yes, there are degrees of status between that of man qua man and man qua animal. And if you mean that initiating force lowers the thief's status to that of an animal in the esteem of other rational men in that they would not mind returning force, why couldn't a rational man choose to sacrifice this relationship with other rational men in order to survive? Ultimately, isn't the mutual relationship held because it is in the interest of all parties? If so, when it no longer becomes mutually beneficial, why wouldn't the relationship be abandoned? To summarize the above seven paragraphs and nine questions: As I understand it, AR asserted that morality is defined by one's self-interest. It has been asserted that theft is always wrong, implying it can never benefit the thief. Why not?

Me: "Isn't life in anarchy better than no life at all?" Lathanar: "Only if you wish to survive as an animal." Me: "Given the choice of existence as a lifeless corpse or as an "animal" that has the ability to eat, sleep, breathe, think rationally, and act accordingly, what existence would a life-loving, selfish man choose?" Dbc: "You are dropping the context within your own post and, as a result, offering us a contradiction. If a man is able to 'think rationally[] and act accordingly' he is not living like an 'animal'." The contradiction was deliberate. I meant to show that Lathanar's assertion that a thief is only capable of the life of an animal is unwarranted. A thief is capable of rational thought and action, an animal isn't. Lathanar has yet to demonstrate how theft nullifies man's essence, be it rationality or some other quality or faculty.

Given the choice of existence as a lifeless corpse or as an "animal" that has the ability to eat, sleep, breathe, think rationally, and act accordingly, what existence would a life-loving, selfish man choose?

This is true. But in the scenario I presented, the thief steals because it is the only way for him to survive. Isn't life in anarchy is better than no life at all? I agree that usually initiation of force is irrational. But is it always irrational?

I wasn't very clear in my last post. I'll try again. The following is my understanding of the standard Objectivist response to my question: My response: Yes, man must use reason to survive and achieve, but to say that force is the rejection of reason is too vague. Force is specifically the manipulation, suppression, or rejection of the victim's reason. In my scenario, by stealing, the man supports his biological life. As I see it, he does not reject his own reason; he adheres to it. He only violates his victim's self-interest and reason. He violates his victim's reason because the victim must now act in ways which would otherwise not be in his self-interest. Before the initiation of force, according to the standard Objectivist response to my question, the potential initiator of force should not be taken into account by the potential victim's rational reasoning, nor should the potential victim be taken into account by the potential initiator of force's rational reasoning. This is what I'm challenging. I don't see why the two parties shouldn't see each other for what they are prior to the initiation of force: a potential victim and a potential initiator of force. It's assumed that a rational person will not initiate force, but why couldn't initiation of force be a rational action in certain situations? In summary, my problem with the standard Objectivist response to my question, as stated by myself, is this: A clearer restatement of the first sentence of my statement of the standard Objectivist response is: "Man survives and achieves by rational action informed by reason." Worded this way, the fallacy in the second sentence becomes clear. The initiation of force is not necessarily the rejection of rational action. I have yet to see an explanation apart from the one in question of how theft cannot be rational. As such, initiating force is not necessarily the equivalent of rejecting one's own life.

By "conventional wisdom" and "conventional morality" I meant, in this case, the general belief that theft is wrong. By "true morality" I meant morality according to Objectivism. I'll do that, but I think, thanks to the responses, I'm closer to the answer. Man survives and achieves by reason. Force is the rejection of reason; therefore, one who uses force rejects life. He instead survives on destruction and death. Reason begets life; force begets death. He who survives on force is a cannibal. He who survives on reason is a man. The question becomes: Is the life of a cannibal or a beast better than no life at all? Possible answer: Yes. A cannibal has volition, reason, and a future. The cannibal survives on his own species, but he is not a species. He is one being. He does not live off of his own death, but the death of others like him. My problem is, why should humanity be treated differently than any other resource? Using force against men does treat them like mere animals, resources to be manipulated freely, but while this will result in less incentive for production and violent inclinations toward the cannibal, which could be considered costs of harvesting, why couldn't someone theoretically find it in their best interest to do it?

I discovered this forum just today, but I've read Atlas Shrugged twice, The Fountainhead once, an Ayn Rand biography, and a couple chapters of The Romatic Manifesto (dense reading) since I discovered Atlas Shrugged last fall. I have had this question for a while now, so I was eager to pose it to better read Objectivists on this forum. Write me off as a troll if you'd like, but I would really apreciate it if someone could at least point me in the right direction. My understanding is that morality's foundation is self-interest. This begs the question: what if self-interest flies in the face of conventional morality. Does true morality sometime contradict conventional wisdom, or am I missing something?

Just emphasis. Correct me if I'm wrong, but don't we care about justice because it normally benefits us in the long run by rewarding production, kindness, etc. and penalizing aggression. In my hypothetical, the man will die soon without a transplant. Sure, some people can survive a heart attack for years. He can't and he knows it. It's a hypothetical situation. He will die unless he has a transplant. So he doesn't care if he is treated justly in the future. He will be glad to be alive. He is first and foremost an egoist: an Objectivist [as you pointed out, objectivist=egoist]. I'm God . In this case it is. His options are steal or die.

I am pro-life in the conventional sense of the word -- not in the sense used by Leonard Peikoff in his pro-abortion argument at abortionisprolife.com, but I am not totally resolved on this issue. I know Ayn Rand was strongly pro-abortion rights, as is ARI, and I respect Ayn Rand too much to disregard her opinion on such an important issue. I have listened to Leonard Peikoff's argument linked to above, and it addressed a couple of my questions precisely, but I've yet to be totally convinced. This is my problem: Does abortion=infanticide? What is the difference between a baby and a fetus? 1. Location A baby exists outside of a woman's body, a fetus exists inside. 2. Dependency A baby relies on a woman to a greater extent than does a fetus, though both are ultimately dependent. 3. Age Self-explanatory What is the defining difference that justifies the killing of a fetus and not a baby? A related question is this: does an infant have positive rights to food, shelter, clothing, etc. from his parents? If the answer is yes, it implies all the more that abortion is wrong. If the answer is no, it implies abortion is just.

A question along this line I have is this: Meet Joe: Joe is a lazy bum who sits around all day watching TV on welfare. Joe gets fat and has a heart attack. Joe needs a heart transplant, but has no money, insurance, or other way to pay for the operation. Joe becomes an Objectivist. Joe sees that it is in his best interest to scam elderly people in order to raise funds for the life prolonging operation. After all, his life will end immediately if he fails to get the operation, and life with the risk of arrest or execution is better than no life at all. Should he or shouldn't he do it. Sure he got himself into his mess, and justice requires that he pay the consequences: death. But he doesn't care about justice. He cares only for himself. He is a selfish Objectivist. What would a perfect Objectivist do? Why?

I don't think the answer to encroaching government is to create sweeping prohibitions, even in the interest of making government's boundaries crystal clear. Why not firmly restrict government regulation to law enforcement agencies instead of banning private law enforcement altogether? Or perhaps the crystal clear line should be drawn at no government regulation of private enterprises, period. Victims of law enforcement abuses could sue for damages, creating a powerful economic incentive for private law enforcement companies to respect the law and citizens' rights.