Shading Inc.

Is that your view or the common objectivistic view? And either way, why is it as you say it is? Where's the argument? I can't make sense of time as "the relative change of various entities relationships to one another" if I don't have an idea of time already. Your explanans seems to presuppose the explanandum. Might as well say "time is time". Not saying that that's not correct, but it's not like it has a lot of explanatory value.

That depends on what you take 'to have control over something' to mean. I might say my computer's processor has control over what I see on my monitor, yet I wouldn't want to call my computer's processor volitional. You'll probably want to object that my computer's processor doesn't control what I see on my monitor, but rather that it is merely one of the many factors determining what I see on my monitor. It doesn't have control, you'll want to object, because it doesn't have a choice but to do what is its fuction. It obeys it's nature. The question then, is whether man is in control of his environment, or whether he is just following his nature too.

More complex, more simple... Whatever be the case "more perfect" would be accurate right? Interesting btw. I don't know whether Aristotle calls God a rational animal too. Then again, it's never very clear what Aristotle is saying when he talks about God. I'll see if I can find something about it somewhere.

I bet she did. Then what are the philosophical grounds of Rand's disagreeing with Aristotle on cosmology? How am I to interpret this? Are you saying that the universe (= being?) is eternal (that is, temporal, but without beginning and/or end), or that it is timeless? Or are you saying that whether it is eternal, timeless or whatever is besides the question? Or what..? That seems more like a vague paraphrase than an explicating definition.

That is exactly what I carefully avoided saying. That way even diehard determinists may accept my conclusion.

I'd say that someone wanting to become a millionaire but who doesn't make any reasonable efforts towards it, doesn't really want to become a millionaire.

What I'm saying is that if you aren't already, you can't choose to 'from now on be volitional'. Things don't start (or stop) rolling without something to initiate that rolling. I'm talking about the principle of inertia here, basically. That means that unthinking / non-volitional people are powerless to do something about their situation. One either has to be born volitional, or be as fortunate as to somehow become volitional during one's life. But non-volitional people can't become volitional all by themselves.

Then how do you suppose higher level mental functions would function? You said you think there're neurons that encode concepts, and also ones that encode for principles. How do the higher level mental functions fit in the big picture?

You seem to be describing a bottom-up kind of awareness. But, what's the use of the top of the pyramid? That is, does the thing that calls itself 'I' and 'me' still have a function? I can't imagine it does, in your pyramid. I mean, if all the forming and analyzing of concepts and principles is done by neurons, that doesn't leave 'me' much to think about, does it? If my meager knowledge of objectivism serves me right, awareness should be thought of as a top-down kind of thing. The top does the thinking and deciding, the lower levels do the encoding and transmitting, resulting in actions.

A fire can't kindle itself. There has to be a spark if ever la lumière naturelle is to shine. What motivates a man think - to really think? I don't know, but one thing's for sure: It's not the unthinking man himself.

I think any new-born baby (mentally handicapped ones aside) has roughly the same potential for greatness. (Can't get around genetics these days, can we?) Of course a child's environment may do a lot to either stimulate or supress (or even kill, I guess) its potential for greatness. And there is also the lame factor of plain good or bad luck. Little greatness among adolescents caught in fatal car crashes. My conclusion is that because greatness has a lot to do with character, and because character is something built up in the course of one's life, the initial roughly equal potential for greatness will either wither if the character does so (regardless of whether it does so because of environmental causes or not), or flower into an actual greatness - again, if the character does so.

Ayn Rand was obviously inspired and influenced by Aristotle's work, but for some reasons I can't imagine her view (if any) on cosmology to be like his, so - what is the Randian cosmos like? As in, where do man and the universe come from; what is time; etc.? Did Rand adopt the popular scientific theories, or what? I'm interested in the metaphysical implications, especially those concerning the difference between Aristotle's identification of the prime mover and Rand's. Thanks, Jan.

You mean you consider yourself part of your environment?

I don't know whether this is of any interest to you, but following Aristotle (who is commonly credited with dubbing man as animal rationale), the explanation is that animal means something like 'ensouled entity' (the Greek 'anima' means soul). Aristotle distinguished between five parts or functions of the soul: Growing, perceiving, desiring, moving and thinking. Plants only grow. What we nowadays call animals also do so, but they have to move around to get the food needed for their growth, so they need to be able to desire moving to their food, and if they are to be able to do so, they must be able to move in the first place, and moving without knowing (that is, somehow preceiving) where you're going (or where you need to go, in the first place) is no good, so they need to be able to perceive as well. As the animal soul is more complicated than the plant soul. The only thing more complex still is the human soul, because it also has the function of thinking. Because there is no other entity that has a soul equipped for thinking, animal and rationale are the necessary and sufficient constituents of the definition of man.

Well then perhaps a good argument as to why not everything one could ever wish for should be provided for, is that it would be impossible to realize. However, if one extreme of the continuum is absurd, does that mean we should clutter at the opposing extreme? Good old Aristotle advocated a golden mean... But that would of course be an entirely different argument - one I do not want to examine right now. Yes, but that doesn't mean that government-provided healthcare is necessarily a crappy thing (that is, not in the way a stone I throw to the sky (in my garden, which is located on Earth) necessarily comes falling down again). I really don't get it. Me falling down a stairs, breaking a leg; barbarians coming for my money, life and wife; or a meteor, just coming - they're all a danger to me, they all bring with them the possibility of my freedom being violated; and (assuming real mad barbarians), none of them can be negotiated with. I will need and want to protect myself from them. The original idea was (but let me formulate it differently now) that it might be a good idea to set up a fund all would contribute to, in order for all to be guaranteed protection and/or compensation when needed. Don't be tricked by the 'for all' in this, because one might as well say that each is doing the best for him- or herself. I have called this obligatory taxation, but one might as well think of it as a very attractive alliance; give up some, gain a lot. We can even weaken the obligatory part: If you don't like the membership fee of this alliance and'd rather be an objective individualist; fine, just make sure to leave our territory and never bother us again. See? If 'involutary taxation for the common good' is not acceptable, how about 'involuntary taxation for the well-being of every single man'?

As I said in my previous post, adding 'deserving' to the picture, though attractive use of language it may seem, doesn't explain anything. What do you mean to say? In both cases of the meaning of 'force' there's the option between violence and submitting means in order to sublimize this violence. In the case of obligatory taxes, the government forces the choice between violence and submitting means. In the case of no taxes at all, the B-people force the moral people to choose between violence and submitting means - or in any case, a choice between violence and submitting (probably) more means than they would have in the case of obligatory taxes. If you accept that death is not an option, then in the case of no obligatory taxes, the non-B-people are still forced to provide, and the B-people are provided for. Therefore, "if A, then B; but B is absurd; so -A" is not a viable argument in this case.

Then let's hope there's not a limit to the number of posts. I'm not presuming; I'm merely saying what things seem to be like to me. I don't think there's any 'deserving' figuring here. If a nation manages, or doesn't manage to survive, this is not because it deserves, or doesn't deserve to; but simply because of the things it does or doesn't. No, there's a distinction between actions in one's own interest that benefit others as well; and actions in one's own interest that benefit no-one else: Me planting a tree in my garden in order for me to have some shade in case of violent sunshine might benefit my neighbours as well if my garden is small enough or the tree big enough; but me eating a sandwich in order for me not to starve benefits only me. I agree with you on this, but it just is not an argument against the original line of thought presented in the first post.

I see a lot of names of composers I like, but I'm just wondering why nobody mentions Orff's Carmina Burana?

I'm affraid you're wrong there. Aristotle's account of nature and the explanations he gives for the natural phenomena have explanatory force only if you accept his 'first philosophy', or 'theology' (this is the translation of a Greek word Aristotle himself employs; I can look up which word if you like). The goal-directedness, or teleology of nature he posits is theological through and through, and is essential to his account of nature / philosophy. I must admitt that I feel little urge to prove this to you. However, the idea that every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics has proven to be of significant instrumental value, and I do think that counts for something. You're right; the physicist doesn't need to know. That (knowing stuff) isn't what science is all about; it's about being able to do things. If the supposition that the Earth is flat figures in your account of astronomy, yet this proves to be no problem to you (because all you need astronomy for is knowing when to sow and when to harvest), does it really matter that in fact the Earth is sphere-like? Well perhaps to some (perhaps even a lot of) people this would matter, but science is primarily instrumental, not some perfectionistic quest for Truth. Science justifies its right to exist pragmatically, just like everything else. You may think it a sad thing, but in the world as it is, Truth has no value in itself; it only has value in an economic kind of way. Well if he (the medieval philosopher) could explain it, he couldn't claim the explanandum to be unknowable, could he? If it was, he wouldn't be able to explain it. Of course there're those really mystical thinkers like Eckhardt, but I don't think he (or any other distinguished metaphysician, for that matter) ever made the mistake of claiming to be able to know the unknowable. Either they said that their metaphysical ideas were perfectly knowable (the medieval rationalists), or they said that of course the unknowable can't be known or understood, but that it could be 'experienced' or something (the medieval mystics). I distinguish between Kant and Kantians. I'm no expert, but I don't think the former really claims to be able to explain the unknowable. Or is that not what you where getting at? Too easily interpreted as such, I'm sorry. Allow me to rephrase: "The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory is about can be known or not; the question is whether we have observations of the explanandum so we can actually talk about it, or whether we don't have observations of the explanandum, so we can only speculate about it - to begin with its existence or non-existence for example." Technically speaking, yes, I would consider that a possibility, since there is no evidence that there is no Santa Claus. However, at the same time there is no evidence that there is a Santa Claus, and one might say that if there had been one, there should have been clues implying his existence. Thus, if I have a belief about the existence of Santa Claus, it's probably that I think it highly unlikely that he exists. (Wow, did you just trick me into a formal statement about Santa Claus's existence? ) Jan.

Are you saying that Aristotle's metaphysics wasn't theological? It is my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. Do not that I'm not saying that we can do so now, or that it will ever be worthwhile to do so. In the end, I would say, everything we can sensibly talk about is physics. And personally, I don't think it very sensible to talk about whether feathers are real, whether the laws of nature are immutable, or whether necessary connections between events exist. There're facts, and there's speculation, and when we want to objective, I think we shouldn't make claims within the domain of the latter. That was really the point: Philosophy as the genus for metaphysics and physics; religion as the genus for christianity and wicca. The different species would concede that they are the same sort of thing (that is, a philosophy or a religion), but not that they are exactly the same sort of thing (so wiccans don't consider themselves christians, and people claiming to objective should want to call their thing 'metaphysics'). There is of course the problem with the things we call sciences nowadays, using to be called philosophies until at least well into modernity. Let's not embark upon that subject. And whereas physicists may adhere to, or presuppose philosophical positions, I don't think physics does. Any metaphysical views a physicist may have determine his physics only in a negative way: His views on physics depend on his views on metaphysics and epistemology only insofar as he will allow them to - but there is no need to do so. That is true. A person may do research in evolutionary biology yet attend church every sunday; there's no possibility therein. The point is rather, that evolutionary biology is not a religion. For as far as I know, the story about Andronicus editing Aristotle's work is not an accepted historical fact. If you ask the metaphysician, he will tell you that of course he is not explaining something unknowable, because if it was unknowable, how could he ever explain anything about it? My guess is that if we'd ask Aristotle whether his philosophy should be considered a physics or a metaphysics, he would choose the former. The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known. I don't understand the point you're trying to make with the first line of this section. As for the rest, I already expressed that my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. It may be useful to utilise a set of abstractions and pseudo-laws governing these, but that does not take away this belief of mine. It all depends on when you consider evidence 'sufficient'. I will not claim there is no Santa Claus, but I will let the facts speak for themselves. Jan.

(Why won't the quote tag work..?) You didn't display having read beyond the title, though. And yes, I have thought about the implications of the idea. Please note that I'm not actually proposing to introduce this idea. I was just after weighing the pros and cons; as in, a discussion wherein people try to be objective, and consider every point of view. (Didn't Aristotle say that is the mark of a great mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it? Think first, judge later.) If it seems all I do is propose pros, that should probably be attributed to the fact that all you other people do is propose cons. Yes, why not? (Perhaps because breaking a leg is a much more serious problem than not eating for a few days; or perhaps because food is much easier to obtain than medical treatment; or because you can see it coming that you're going to want to eat tomorrow, but not that you're going to break your leg tripping over the doorstep of the restaurant; or because everybody needs (and probably is going) to eat every day anyway, so taxing, then redistribution wouldn't make a lot of sense...) As a general rule, I try to not believe in things whose existence I can't prove. Yes yes, but a decent government-provided healthcare system isn't unthinkable. You don't seem to understand that a universal healthcare system would not just be a demand of others on your life, but also a demand of you on other people's lives - but more importantly; that it may also be a demand of you, on your own life. It may be in your own interest. It may not be irrational to take a risk (I don't see what difference it makes if a risk is calculated or not; a risk is a risk), but can't see how it would be rational to take a risk. If you know your chance of breaking a leg is 49%, and your chance of not breaking it 51%, it would be rational (in an economic kind of way) not to insure yourself for breaking that leg, but I think that actually a lot of people would still get that insurance with this kind of numbers. What on earth is a calculated risk, and what on earth is rational in this case? What's the difference between aliens come to destroy our homes, and a meteor come to destroy our homes? The distinction between natural impediments and agrressive barbarians seems like a rather arbitrary one. Let 'involutary taxation for the common good' be A; 'unproductive people who do not or will not provide for themselves (but are still provided for) B. You say "if A, then B; but B is absurd; so -A". You do not seem to give thought to the possibility that -A may be absurd as well: If a country in need of a defensive military has no involuntary taxation, the defense of the country would depend on people voluntarily providing the means for a military. If everyone would provide, there would be no problem, but there are still the B-people; those who will not provide for themselves, that is, who will not tribute means for a military, but who would still enjoy the protection thereof. Now consider the situation where the entire population of a country consists of B. There will be no military this way. Then some people will get together and decide that if no-one else does, they will provide the means for a military. Their ten-men-army is doomed to lose, of course, so they gather up enough providers-of-means untill they stand a good defense. The same problem thus arises for -A as for A: The B-people are still provided for. Being safe from initiation of force requires just that; initiation of force. Unless of course there would be no man who would not adhere to this principle, but that is just not realistic. A service that keeps people safe from initiation of force requires certain means to operate, and where do these means come from? They are provided voluntarily by moral peope? Voluntarily you say? Not exactly, because if these moral people wouldn't provide, there wouldn't be this safe-keeping service. Seem more like involuntarily. Of course, they have the choice of providing or not providing, but if they want to be safe from initiation of force, they are forced to provide. If there are arguments that may be thought of as countering your points; your points will not suffice to convince a lot of people. That first part sounds very altruistic. If you were to choose between your own death and somebody else's, you'd choose your own? Or if you were to choose between your own death and an hour of the surgeon's time, you would still want to die? That seems noble beyond anything I've ever heard of. Congrats on the insurance plan, btw. That wasn't the suggestion. The idea was presented in the first post of this topic; an obligatory health insurance plan. Note that this would not necessarily mean you paying for other, and vice versa. It may also be thought of as each taking care of his own. However, it may not be equally easy to provide for oneself at every stage of one's life. Therefore, it may be rational to agree to receiving more care than you can pay for during this part of your life, and providing more than you consume, during that part of your life. 1. It wasn't self-evident at all. 2. Allow me to point out that this topic was never meant to be applied to the actual situation of your country. It was meant as a theoretical discussion. 3. In reply to you speaking of 'legitimate questions': Why is anything that appears to be in conflict with Rand's writings unconditionally wrong? That is not a very philosophic kind of view. Isn't it good to test your foundations times and times again? Practical issues can be dealt with, I'm sure. In any case, they're not within the scope of the discussion I had in mind when starting this thread. Besides, I don't think implementational problems that aren't insurmountable (or would you claim that they are?) a good argument in a theoretical discussion in the first place. Why is that impossible with a government-provided healthcare? "Every service the government provides is shitty, because it's a violation of rights"? That my lady, is one crappy piece of argumentation. Either that, or very inaccurately formulated. I'm glad you're consequently thinking this through. It's obvious that it would be great if each had what he needed in order to live a fine life. But it's also obvious there're these unproductive people who do nothing but enjoy being provided for, and that this would be unfair for the productive people, and that in the end it would probably wreck the system. So the one extreme, the government taking care of everyone's basic needs, is not acceptable; but does that necessarily mean we have to adhere to the other extreme? Jan.

Voluntarily or obligatory, it doesn't really matter if it would be rational to rather be safe than sorry - but you say it isn't?

I obviously wasn't through talking at this point. I brought up arguments that are generally thought of as justifying demanding people to pay taxes. These might be false, but you still have to show that they are, before you can expect anyone to be convinced of the wrongness of taxes. I'm not saying that healthcare is a right. Healthcare being government-provided doesn't necessarily mean it's crap. And what if you desperately and acutely need medical care in order to be able to live the life you want to live, but you have not yet been able to save enough money for it? Government-provided healthcare would have been a life-saver, but when there was a vote for it, it didn't pass, because of people like you. Would you feel regret? I have to agree with you here. However, this kind of reasoning wouldn't apply to health insurance. When there's China threatening to invade, every citizen is in danger, and so everyone is willing to contribute to the costs for defense (let's assume there're no people who would abuse all the others paying; choosing not to contribute themselves). But when you have an accident, it's only you in whose self-interest it is to raise money to pay for medical care - and what if you can't raise it? What we see is that with a defensive military, it's only necessary to contribute as soon as a threat arises; but with medical care it might just be a good plan to insure your well-being beforehand. If you claim that the generalization can't be applied to the universal healthcare question, at least bother to tell me why. You're not providing any argumentation at all. Why is it rational to take the risk and don't go into insurances? Jan.

Can you point me to where I state that it is either this or that, and no other? And have you ever heard about relevant argumentation, instead of just claiming something is false? He said 1, yes, but I said that as well, so he should have replied to what I said after I said 1, not repeating what I said and thinking it an argument. He didn't say 2 at all.

I don't think the analogy is correct. People with airbags etc. think they're safe, as in, that nothing is going to happen to them; whereas people who eat extra burgers, or jump from roofs know they're not safe, and that something is going to happen to them. Thinking nothing's going to happen to you is not the same as knowing you'll be fixed if something happens. Also, I haven't specified anything about what would, and what would not be included in the health insurance I talked about, but if you really want to go into those details; it's probably a logical rule that medical care is only provided if it is actually needed. Have you actually even read beyond the title and the first line of this topic?