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Looking at my paraphrase now, I suppose it is a bit convoluted. For some reason I felt it was necessary to insert a connective (i.e. &) as well as an existential quantifier (i.e. (Ex)) even though there are no explicit connectives or quantifiers in the original statement. A better, more direct paraphrase would be, simply: Ci Where “C” is the predicate “choose to exist” and “i” is the individual constant referred to as “I”. Though, my intuition is telling me, this is not quite what you had in mind. You may be right. However, if “choose to exist” is not atomic, it is a compound. If it is a compound, it is either truth-functional or it is not truth-functional. If it is truth functional, one can paraphrase it using a truth-functional connective. If it is not truth-functional, there is no need and no means of making the compound explicit. If there is no need and no means of making a compound explicit, one may treat it as atomic. In either case, it is possible to paraphrase “choose to exist”. The only exception to this that I know of might be causal relationships, which are not strictly truth-functional. However, these can still be adequately approximated with a truth-functional connective, namely, the conditional arrow. So, even though they are not truth-functional one should still make them explicit since there is a means of approximating them in a truth-functional way. Possibly you are thinking that I am using the fallacy of arguing from ignorance. For example, it may seem I am saying that because we do not know that it isn’t atomic, it must be atomic. However, I am really saying that treating a predicate as atomic is the default way of treating it. Unless there is some compelling reason within the context that it is given, a predicate should not be treated as a compound. This is because atomic predicates are simpler than compound predicates. So, I am not using an argument from ignorance, but rather, Occam’s razor (No, not my razor, the other guy’s). My first paraphrase violated this and that is why I revised it. I assume you are not using any of these terms in an extremely quirky or unorthodox manner. For example, I assume your not using “choose” to mean ‘red’ or ‘dog’ instead of something like ‘select’. Furthermore, this statement was introduced by you. If anyone should be defining anything it is you. This is unnecessary though, since I only need to understand the meaning enough to identify the logical components in the statement and I do. This is true but that only matters if you are trying to communicate that simple truth. The purpose of paraphrasing is not so much to facilitate communication as it is to facilitate logical analysis. To communicate a simple truth it would be better to state it in a natural language such as English. For the purpose of analysis though, a formal language like symbolic logic is far superior. Its superiority comes from how it reduces the natural language it is based on into nothing but its logical components. By logical components I mean things like individuals, predicates, quantifiers, connectives, etc. This is why I asked my question in the first place. I would like to subject the arguments of Objectivism to a thorough analysis. In symbolic logic, anything that is not a distinct logical component is included in the abbreviation of the logical component it is a part of. The word “exists” as well as “consciousness” by themselves are not logical components of anything and it would be inappropriate to abbreviate them as one. In the context of a simple predicate the convention would be to abbreviate them with an uppercase letter from the beginning of the alphabet. Beyond that I see no meaning to the statement “you haven’t formalized ‘exists’.” How would I formalize a single word? Strictly speaking, ‘P’ alone does not constitute a direct paraphrase of any particular statement. Conventionally, ‘P’ is used as a variable for any atomic statement. So, you are correct, since “I choose to exist” is an atomic statement I could symbolize it as ‘P’. However, this would not be the direct paraphrase of the statement, which is ‘Ci’. Instead, “P” can be thought of as a paraphrase of a paraphrase. It directly paraphrases ‘Ci’ as well as any other paraphrase of an atomic statement. In the case of ‘Px’ the ‘P’ is used as a variable for any atomic predicate, instead of a complete statement(x is a variable for any individual.) To clarify, what did you mean by “formalization”? I took it to mean, roughly, a direct paraphrase according to the current rules and conventions of modern symbolic logic. Secondly, what do you mean by “inter alios” in this context? I took it to mean there are other statements, similar to “I choose to exist”, that also have no correct formalization. So, I read your statement as meaning “…there is no correct way to paraphrase the statement “I choose to exist” using the current rules and conventions of modern symbolic logic. In addition there are other statements that also have no correct paraphrase.” Is this an incorrect reading of your statement? If so, please explain.

David Odden, I've been doing some thinking about what you said in your first reply. I am unable to understand why the statement "I choose to exist" could not be formalized in a fairly straight forward manner. Let us begin by identifying the speaker; the person who "I" refers to. In this instance let's suppose "I" refers to you, David Odden. Then we get: *(Ex)(Dx & Cx) Where- D: _ is David Odden C: _ chooses to exist A direct translation would be: There exists at least one thing such that, that thing is David Odden and that thing chooses to exist. A more natural way of saying this would be: There is at least one person named David Odden who chooses to exist. Or simply: David Odden chooses to exist. I would be interested in hearing what, if any, objections you have to this formalization. *(Ex) is the existential quantifier ( I don't have a backwards "E" on my keyboard) Free Capitalist, That's good to hear. I would agree that venn diagrams and truth tables are in line with Aristotles original conception of logic. I was not sure though if by "Aristotlean" David Odden meant it in a historical or conceptual context. Historically speaking, they might be considered non-Aristotlean because they were explicitly developed long after Aristotle died. My concern was that he might be claiming that any developments in logic that came after Aristotle were somehow no good. Such an argument would almost certainly have to depend on an implicit call to tradition. That is probably not what he meant.

To clarify, by "Aristotelean" do you mean the specific methods and principles explicitly put forth by Aristotle himself or just any system that does not deny any of his basic principles? In other words, are venn diagrams and truth tables non-Aristotelean? Or are you distinguishing it from non-classical systems that deny the law of excluded middle or some other fundamental principle? Thanks.

1. Have the axioms and arguments of Objectivism ever been presented in the formal language of symbolic logic? a. If so, where can I find them? b. If not, is there a reason why? (i.e. no benefit, pointless, etc.) 2. Does Objectivism use a preferred formal system of logic? a. If so, are there any particular pedantic details of this system I should be aware of? (i.e. use of exitential import, etc.) Answers, or directions to where I can find the answers, are greatly appreciated.