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Seeker

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  1. It can choose and learn. The question is whether it can do so freely or is determined, however. The problem is that you are defining free will in such a manner as to admit determinism, whereas the definition accepted here entails "not determined". Your robot example simply demonstrates that your idea of free will is compatible with determinism, not that it is the correct idea of free will, i.e. that which pertains to humans. By contrast, the idea of free will that I have is that I am not wholly determined by factors external to my conscious awareness. The robot in your example, if it is self-aware, is aware that it is determined. That's the difference. Then you have introspected and found yourself to be determined as opposed to free? Agreed, but as I understand it, the reason why volition is considered axiomatic is because volition is an attribute of human cognition, to commitment to reason and truth, and to focus - so that because focus and cognition are implicit in an attempt to deny free will, free will also is. But to say that volition is therefore an axiom doesn't demonstrate the necessary ingredient which is the point at issue here - namely, that volition is an attribute of human cognition. That's a fact "available to any act of introspection" which precedes the understanding that volition is axiomatic. The basis for the specific point we are arguing is a fact determined by introspection. Because of this, pulling out the "axiomatic trump card" (to coin a phrase) is unlikely to persuade anyone who doesn't already accept volition as an attribute of human cognition.
  2. Ifat, I think it would help to avoid dealing with ethical consequences and such until we get a handle on the epistemological aspects of the disagreement, because that is really what's important. The ethical, moral judgments can't be made until we know what man is in this respect. Here is the phrase that troubles me in what you said: "When the robot makes a choice, it feels for the robot (and the feeling is in fact real) that it was the robot itself that had made the choice. ... The robot is like a human." What this implicitly asserts is that free will is nothing more than a feeling. I do not think that is the case. Rather, it is a fact of oneself that one knows by introspection - consciousness that is conscious of itself. In epistemological terms, one cannot physically point to "that" and say "that is freewill". The observation is mental, internal, direct, and factual. To attack this position requires attacking introspection as a valid means of self-knowledge. I want to examine this point in detail because it's critical. Either introspection is a valid means for man to know himself, or it isn't; if it is valid, then it cannot be dismissed as a mere "feeling" or apparition. What your argument suggests is that free will is not strongly supported enough by introspective evidence to withstand even barely encroaching arguments from the neurological sciences. That, I think, is where much if the disagreement here lies.
  3. RationalBiker, are you saying here that "the chemistry and 'wiring' of [one's] brain" are separate and distinct from oneself, or is that simply your characterization of Ifat's position?
  4. Well sure, but I don't see that as an answer to the charge of determinism as such. It just emphasizes what the free choice is about. The determinists will assuredly argue in response that the firing of neurons determines whether you focus or not just as it determines whether you eat pancakes or waffles for breakfast. The way to attack this is at the juncture of the brain versus the mind, how we know what each is and what separates the two concepts. Make sure to retain the context of the mind, not merely the brain, and free will is irrefutable.
  5. I think there's more to it though - that's just clarifying the type of decision, right? Not whether it's determined or not, which is the essence of the argument. So whether the decision is to focus or not focus, or to eat pancakes or waffles for breakfast, the same arguments are still going to be made on either side, no? I think the confusion runs deeper, down to the level of epistemology in regards to the human mind, what it is and how we know it.
  6. How about an ounce of intelligent writing. The only thing more painful than seeing this movie is seeing anyone with low enough standards to not hate it. Let's try and raise our standards people.
  7. Do you mean contested as to their validity, or contested as to whether they belong to Objectivism?
  8. Thank you for the clarification. The problem I see with that position is that it entails Rand making philosophic statements in her official publications that she did not integrate with the whole of her philosophy. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. If anything we ought to presume that she did indeed integrate all of her philosophic positions, especially those officially published - and if the supporting arguments given in print were not as exhaustive in some areas as in others, chalk that up to editing decisions. I do not see why our judgments as to how thoroughly she argued a particular point should affect whether it constitutes part of her philosophy. That a given position was not painstakingly argued in print is no evidence that it was not painstakingly thought through and integrated. Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand whether she explained it to our satisfaction or not. In the case of Thought Control, she didn't merely raise an issue or ask a question, she made a definite statement on a matter of philosophy in her official publication. Given a philosophic position the task is to reconcile it with the whole of her philosophy, not toss it away because she didn't explicitly connect the dots for us.
  9. Well, I think I know what your argument is - I just haven't posted it myself so that you would have an opportunity to do it (which makes sense since it is your argument, not mine) - it is, as I recall, that the nature of Objectivism demands that it be integrated and that Rand, if others were to later discover an error in her philosophy, would want only the remainder that others found correct preserved as Objectivism. It is not an argument that a given proposition isn't philosophical, only that it is wrong - nor does it state that philosophy as such has to be correct and integrated or it isn't philosophy. I don't agree with the position not only because Rand (to my knowledge) never stated such an intention, but primarily because Objectivism is not a matter of "what if's". Objectivism is what Rand thought it was. She cannot change her mind now no matter how persuasive the argument might be. Objectivism has a particular identity that cannot change. A more fruitful basis for argument might be that a particular position was an application of her philosophy rather than part of her philosophy, for instance that the ideas presented in Thought Control passage are not sufficiently philosophical in nature to qualify as part of Objectivism. Whether or not that is correct (and suffice to say I don't think it is) it would still be a much better argument than an argument for severability within Objectivism. Another basis might be that although Objectivism cannot change, that the portions that one judges to be incorrect are not controlling within one's own life. That would hardly be a novel proposition - no one should submit to the control of anyone's ideas but his or her own, based upon one's own convinced judgments. So far so good, but that is a far cry from saying that Objectivism changes when one finds fault with it. In any event, I see no reason why it would be improper to state one's opinions in this very thread. The question is not merely a debating point but a substantive question about Objectivism that deserves an answer, consistent with the purpose of the forum. I cannot speak for others but I for one am eager for all views to be expressed in a proper and open way, right here, and am prepared to give them the care and consideration they are due.
  10. The Passage from Thought Control, Part III spawned a debate about whether it is Objectivism, and the question "what qualifies as Objectivism?" Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Should one treat a philosophical position taken by Ayn Rand as part of her philosophy if one judges the position to be untrue and incompatible with the remainder that is accepted? I will begin the discussion with my answer: yes. There is nothing about the concept "philosophy" that demands correctness (most of the philosophies in history have been incorrect), nor is there a requirement for it to be integrated into a coherent whole. Because of this, to say that one of Ayn Rand's philosophical positions cannot be part of Objectivism because Objectivism is wholly correct and integrated begs the question, and more: by one's own judgment, it isn't. One simply disagrees with it. Such disagreement, however, does not logically enable one to exclude from "Objectivism" those positions with which one differs. Objectivism has no severability clause. It is the entire philosophy of Ayn Rand, which includes all of her philosophical positions.
  11. Excellent, this is just what I was hoping for. Thank you! Agreed. If someone wishes to debate this particular point, I will begin a separate thread about what qualifies as Objectivism. So be it, but please observe the caveat in my post which demands full knowledge of the article, at least in the opening stages of discussion - a limitation which all should agree is rational.
  12. The passage below from "Thought Control, Part III", The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. III, No. 2 (October 22, 1973) has appeared in various discussion threads on the subjects of public decency, child abuse, and may have implications for the wider subject of civil law. There is disagreement however as to its meaning and place within Objectivism, which has tended to complicate those discussions. Therefore, I would like to resolve the questions raised by this passage head-on, namely: Is it Objectivism? If it is, then what is its relationship to other parts of Objectivism? Does it have implications for areas other than sex? What is the meaning of "the freedom not to look or listen"? Feel free to ask your own questions about this passage here. This thread is an opportunity to bring rational principles to bear so that we may reach agreement in furtherance of our discussion of related topics as well as to better our understanding of the passage itself. In the event that the discussion spawns debate over underlying issues, separate threads will be started as appropriate. A caveat: for now at least, the discussion is open only to those who have read the entire article and are thus able to put the quoted passage in its full context. For others, if someone is able to share how to obtain the full article, that would be helpful.
  13. Thank you for those citations. Since there is little specifically on the subject of civilized behavior, I invite others to posit their own theories that are consistent with Objectivism. Drawing on the Objectivist concept of rights I believe that the correct standard for analysis is the standard of value, life qua man. This is important because I believe that the issue of public decency is subsumed within the larger category of civilized behavior, sex is not sui generis in regards to the moral and legal analysis. Fundamentally, public decency (i.e. regarding sex) is but one example of civilized behavior; for the purposes of ethics and politics, the essential justification is what is required for men in civilized society. That is the legal and moral foundation for public decency laws, and may extend as well to areas other than sex. The touchstone of the analysis is reason. Assaults upon another person's rational mind constitute objectively-identifiable harm. In this context, however, there are few bright lines and many shades of gray. Public nudity, for example, might be more harmful to the minds of some persons than others. Within those shades of gray the citizens through their laws may establish boundaries that take into account the needs of all citizens through the democratic process and determine the optimal balance of rights-protection and freedom. Having set such boundaries, all are obligated as a civil matter to act accordingly. Though imperfect, this is the best that a rights-protecting government can do: the abnormally vulnerable will not be entirely protected, and the abnormally strong will not be entirely free, but such a tradeoff is the price of living in a civilized, orderly society.
  14. I took drawing classes in art college which included figure drawing with both male and female nude models. Figure drawing is a challenging exercise - it demands the ability to work around the way one's mind typically conceptualizes and simplifies so that you get a realistic depiction and not something like this: . It requires careful attention. You really don't have the luxury of allowing yourself to become aroused. Though difficult, it is possible to mentally focus in the manner required. This is partly why I am not too sympathetic to the notion that one cannot help but be aroused by the naked figure. You most certainly can help it. You just need to focus your mind properly (which is what you ought to be doing anyway). As to what nakedness means, it is contextual. There is no universal, unchangeable meaning. It depends upon the circumstances. As to the example given, whether or not I went naked would depend on the social context. Regardless of the context, nothing would absolve me of the responsibility for controlling my own responses to others' nakedness.
  15. The lives of men living today have not ended. We know what renders life finite: aging and disease. But I see no reason why cellular aging is any more essential to my life than my appendix. If one day a way to refresh my cells can be found, I'll embrace it eagerly. The solution for disease is to find cures. Death may be unavoidable for us. That does not make it part of life, but rather the end to life. Death is not an attribute of life, but a consequence of aging and disease. Life in and of itself does not entail death. Life is not necessarily finite, though our lives, as presently constituted with our current technology, may be.
  16. I am confused as to how you reached this result. It is true that most concrete examples of life have ended, but that finite nature is not essential to the concept. Life is a process of self-generating, self-sustaining action. Fundamentally, there is nothing that requires it to end. Does "implicit" mean "disregarding the essentials and examining a nonessential aspect that happens to have belonged to most concretes"? If so, I can agree, though I don't know what significance that has. And I respectfully disagree with your observation, if it is intended to mean anything else. Happiness may depend upon life's contingent nature, but not upon finite duration. Contingent does not mean terminal. I don't need to think that my life is going to last 80 years only, as opposed to an indefinite duration, to be happy.
  17. Forget tips, this isn't pizza we're talking about, it's medicine. Ask the ingrateful shut-in how much her life is worth to her.
  18. Surely the point however is that the nut warning is ridiculous when applied to a packet of nuts, as what else is a packet of nuts supposed to contain?
  19. There is also the fact, as I said before, that you can - not only not assume that free will doesn't exist - but actually validate that it does, in fact, exist. When you say that it "epistemologically exists", I am not sure what that means - for something to be knowable to us means that it metaphysically exists, i.e exists in reality - i.e. exists. Let me try to explain my reasoning (which is my own, not paraphrasing Objectivism, I should add) this way. We know from introspection that free will exists. This does not however mean that we can validly infer that the matter comprising brain tissue is somehow atomically different from all other matter in the universe. That would be sophistry, an implication of "cosmic randomness" as GreedyCapitalist put it, and unwarranted. Free will is an aspect of volitional consciousness. What makes it different is not the matter in our heads, but the type of concept it is and how we know it. Human consciousness is different in kind from other concepts. It is based upon knowledge that we gain through introspection, not extrospection. That does not make it unreal. It does however demand that we retain that special context when the subject of determinism arises. Just as we could not make valid inferences about brain matter from our knowledge of free will, neither can we deny that which we know to be true - that free will exists - based on inferences concerning the external world. So my questions to you are these. Do you grasp, based upon your self-knowledge, that you have free will? Can you see that it is a valid and important concept for you? Can you see, therefore, and in context, why it is inappropriate to bring determinism to bear on that concept?
  20. The following is my own position. If one were to ask what are the origins of the fundamental choice to live, one might observe that human beings tend to want to live so long as they recognize sufficient opportunities for success. This would explain the relationship between hopelessness and suicide. Excluding the mentally ill (whose faculty of reason is impaired), one will want to live unless one is confronted with no possibility of a fulfilling life, as in the case of irreversible loss or injury, chronic untreatable pain, or the like. To put it simply: If one is alive and conceives that he is able to continue living (in the Objectivist sense, i.e. flourishing), then he will choose to do so. Note the central role of cognition: for humans, it is necessary to conceive of a way to success. This of course parallels the fact that reason is man's means of achieving it. When one can no longer conceive of a way to succeed, one will no longer try. To put it still another way: Ethics is proper to those for whom life is an option. If it isn't, then ethics does not apply. When existence has already been denied, one's "choice" to not live is merely a recognition of this fact. So that what we call the fundamental "choice" of whether or live or not live is actually a fact, an answer to the question: can I live?
  21. I agree but there is a very important detail which seems to engender a vast amount of confusion. Epistemologically, free will depends on our position as the perceiving entities possessing it. It is not merely that it is our identity that is significant, but that it is our identity. To us, free will is real, and because it is real to us, it is real in the sense of our contextual knowledge because it would be meaningless to go "outside ourselves" to consider or discuss it. The "pinball machine" alternative is unreal because it cannot (at least with present technology) be evidenced; by contrast we have ample evidence by simple self-examination that free will exists. What people want to do is to ask whether free will exists apart from our position as the perceiving entities, which tramples Objectivist epistemology and makes a mockery of the concept of free will. GreedyCapitalist's explanation of the issue is correct.
  22. You omitted the second part of my statement. I said, "You can well experience and validate it yourself personally". Free will does exist AND you are capable of knowing it. Note also that I am not referring to sense perception in this context but to instrospection - not that it matters, since sense perception is our means of knowledge about the world around us, and introspection, about ourselves - but it does not "appear" as you put it. It is, and by introspecting you can know that it is. It's that simple. If your inferences about the universe had led you to the absurd conslusion that you don't exist, what would you do? Hopefully, before denying your own existence you would instead check your premises. Similarly, you are here confronted with another absurdity - and the solution you ought to pursue is the same.
  23. I am befuddled as to how your inferences about the universe have any bearing on your own personal experience of having free will. Surely you can see that free will isn't something you have to take at second hand. You can well experience and validate it yourself personally.
  24. I would like to know the Objectivist position on civility, proper standards of behavior or etiquette, and government's proper role in enforcement of standards of civilized behavior, if any. The issue is broader than sexuality. The recent discussion on public decency laws included references to "Thought Control, Part III", The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. III, No. 2 (October 22, 1973) (the relevant excerpt dealing with pornography can be found here), but rather than debate that subject again I would like to shift the focus from sexually explicit materials to standards of behavior in a civilized society generally (e.g. courtesy and politeness), and inquire into the Objectivist position of whether and on what philosophical grounds laws may be justified to set and enforce such standards of behavior. I would most appreciate citations or pointers to specific written materials that can aid in understanding how Objectivism applies to this topic. Thanks much.
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