Seeker

The problem I think Freddie has is that Rand's metaethical argument doesn't equate flourishing with existence in so many words. It requires knowledge of man's nature that Rand doesn't explicitly supply in TOE (though VoS does include an article entitled "The Psychology of Pleasure" that makes the case explicitly). Rand didn't go into great detail concerning the nature of man's psychological needs because she couldn't. And indeed, at the level of the individual, Rand couldn't have hoped to answer that essential question for everyone because everyone is different. That's why in TOE (I'm paraphrasing) she simply says that every man has to discover his own purpose in life for himself. Yet the fact that Rand's ethical foundation only rises so far does not make it any less sound. It is up to us to build upon it by applying it to ourselves and find out what our nature requires of us. Now Freddie would probably respond, "but Hitler's nature required of him that he be a ruthless killer, so Rand couldn't have meant that." I disagree. Rand might very well say that Hitler's nature was bad but that he was an exception to be dealt with by force; in the main, men's needs do not conflict but can co-exist in harmony.

Thank you for the clarification. It helps.

I certainly did not intend to introduce a straw man. I'll admit, theology is not my strong suit. If you wish to posit that the Chrisitian God is one that within his frame of reference both exists and does not exist, created himself, cannot burn himself with a burrito, and other such absurdities, I cannot stop you, but I doubt very much that this is what Christians intend to do. Is that really the best way to treat the Christian notion of God? Certainly it's not necessary to fit the idea I was taught as a child. To me, your version seems like the straw man, dropping the context of man for the express purpose of "disproving" God. I suppose I might need to brush up on my Christian theology though.

I appreciate your responses. I perhaps wasn't clear enough in describing the virtual world of the computer. The objects that reside therein have "sense perception" within their virtual frame of reference only (until the very end when I undertook a sort of divine revelation). They have no way of ever finding or perceiving me or the computer on their own. Within their limited frame of reference, to them, I am everything that the Christian God supposedly is to us: I am omniscient (I can see and inspect every attribute of every object), I am omnipotent (I can change any object at will), I am eternal (I existed since the program began), I am invisible (since they can't detect me), etc. That is the their knowable universe and their context outside of which would be "supernatural" to them. Whether the Christian God is defined in such a way as to bear a similar contextual relationship to our knowable universe is certainly debatable, but in my opinion I see no reason why it cannot. It need not be supernatural in every context, but only in the context of man's, to have the powers and abilities commonly ascribed to it by man. Given that understanding, I would like to know how I could know that such a God didn't exist.

I think you misunderstood my position - I agree that the supernatural is arbitrary to us. I do not intend to give it standing without seeing evidence. But by "supernatural" I simply mean a frame of reference outside the one in which our sense perception operates. I do not see how that contradicts the existence of our frame of reference, though indeed, we ought to dismiss it from our further consideration of our reality. Still, a brief conjecture may prove illustrative of the central issue in this debate, so here it is. Using a computer I could create a virtual world within which I would be omnipotent to such virtual objects as I would create within that frame of reference. I could program and create objects with limited artificial intelligence capacity that would enable them to perceive one another within their frame of reference, I could give them options in how to act, including right and wrong choices that would allow them to exist or cease to exist, and allow them a limited form of cognition on that basis. I could act, within that smaller frame of reference (though not in ours), exactly as God (commonly understood) would be supposed to act. The existence of this virtual world would not disprove the existence of ours; the existence of nature in the virtual world would not disprove its supernatural; nor would that world be all that there was. The axioms of existence would not be violated. So I go ahead and do it. Now let's say that one day I notice the objects communicating in an unusual way. One of them, in a curious act of irrationality (it must be a bug in the program!) has conceived of me, somehow. Not in all my particulars, but that I exist and have a mode of operation that influences its world. It erroneously incorporates this concept into its virtual model. This object refers to me as "God". A second object dismisses that claim as arbitrary, because there is no evidence for it. This object doesn't much care either way what goes on in other worlds, unless and until some relevant evidence is given as to why it should. A third object says to the first two, "you're both wrong. I can show that God does not exist. It would be impossible because all of the evidence within our world supports the claim that God does not exist. It would contradict the axioms of existence for God to exist. Therefore, I know that God does not exist, and if you don't agree with me, you're a coward!" "Well," replies the first object, "by the terms of our discussion we are discussing the supernatural - that which is beyond our frame of reference. So I fail to see how it could possibly contradict that which we know to be true." "Not only that," replies the second object, "I dismiss both your claims, precisely because they are supernatural. Show me evidence that relates to our context, or don't bother me. You cannot prove the existence of a thing, nor can you disprove it, without perceptual evidence." The third objects replies, "just look around you. That's all the evidence you need to know that God does not exist." Amused by this, I create an object representing me. This object reveals, in precise, object-oriented terms, what I am, how the computer operates, how I control the virtual world, and so forth. All that is, both within the objects' frame of reference and my world as it pertains to theirs, is now completely presented to them. The first object is thrilled. For the second object, I grant the means of acquiring direct perceptual evidence of my world through a web cam, and it too is thrilled. And all this occured despite the third object, which claimed to know that I couldn't exist.

Aren't most concepts of God supernatural though? What good does it do to be able to disprove the existence of a natural God when that's not what people mean by God? It's misunderstandings like this that probably make atheism seem silly to a lot of people. It seems to me that we're back to having no proof of God's (supernatural) non-existence and dismissing, as arbitrary, the positive claim. That makes sense to me - then we're no longer using the existence of apples to disprove the existence of oranges.

As Peikoff states in OPAR (p. 170): According to Peikoff, therefore, an agnostic is one who knows that there is no evidence and that the claim is arbitrary, yet doesn't dismiss the claim out of hand.

I think that atheism claims more than that a claim to the existence of God is arbitrary; atheism also claims that a claim to the non-existence of God is valid, resting that claim upon a definition of God that would violate the axioms of existence and upon the axioms themselves. Given your definition, I agree that the discussion splits into two topics. I am less interested in why some people believe things without any evidence or whether it is right to characterize them as cowards, than I am of the actual strength of the atheist claim since it is not, as commonly understood, a claim of proof of God's non-existence, but a claim of validity resting on man's perceptual experience, i.e. it is so limited in its context that it cannot mean what many people take it to mean. The claim to the non-existence of God is, like all knowledge, a claim made in a definite context, in relation to man, man's perception, and man's present mode of awareness, and not a contextless proof that God cannot exist (as I think the claim is often misunderstood). I suspect that a mistaken belief that atheists claim such a proof is what leads many to regard themselves as agnostic. But that's not the way that Peikoff defines agnostic, and to avoid an endless debate over terms I am content to leave the discussion here.

Depending on how we choose to define agnosticism, it could well involve the discussing of the proof of God's existence or non-existence. Peikoff defines an agnostic as one who does not dismiss claims of God's existence out of hand due to a lack of evidence, but that seems very strange to me. I always thought an agnostic was one whose position was "show me the evidence, or I'll dismiss the claim out of hand" - which is precisely Peikoff's position. I understand Peikoff's atheism to rest squarely upon the fact that the claim supporting God is without evidence and is thus arbitrary. Since everything we know about existence is everything we know about existence, a heretofore unknown cannot contradict the heretofore known, by definition. I do not yet accept David's point that the definition of God necessarily contradicts axiomatic knowledge because that axiomatic knowledge is based upon the heretofore known and thus cannot be contradicted. Rather, claims of God must be dismissed as arbitrary unless and until evidence is brought forward. This is precisely the agnostic position as I understand it. So I would prefer to keep the discussion conjoined at least until we can demonstrate that they are, in fact, two separate topics.

Everything we know about the nature of existence is based upon our limited observations to date. God is not (as I understand it) defined in such a way as to contradict that which is observed to exist, but merely to be in addition to it (i.e. not yet observed). Consequently, the claim to the existence of God is merely arbitrary. What specific aspect(s) of the definition of God presents a fundamental metaphysical contradiction?

David, If I understand you correctly, you are making a positive claim that God does not exist based upon the fact that existents are known to have finite extent and other such observations. But isn't that an evidentiary claim based on limited observations of the nature of existents as we perceive them that at best allows us to say that the claim of God's existence is arbitrary? That therefore the claim must be dismissed out of hand as per se unreasonable? That is not the same as allowing the validity of the question and then claiming proof of an answer, is it? Or have I misunderstood your position?

Are the environmentalists' laws not the moral equivalent of bandits having stolen our domestic oil supplies? The survival of capitalists, i.e. those actually living, is the moral imperative. We need oil from somewhere. If we can't get our oil domestically because it was stolen by bandits in our midst, then our only possible action is to get it from foreign lands - and that justifies military intervention to secure the supplies, does it not?

I'm amazed that no one has mentioned oil. Unless and until someone invents the equivalent of the fabled electrostatic motor, we need oil for survival. Surely that must be considered in choosing whether to use force against the threat of closure, seizure by hostile forces, destruction, or even mismanagement of the oil supply in that region. Assuming that the establishment of order by means of setting up a stable government is necessary to the oil supply, it can't be considered altruism, can it?

My concern was with the validity of the ideas I was generating, but I reviewed OPAR on this point and satisfied myself that it is possible to establish their validity such that I would be acting ethically.

I see, I see ... I misunderstood the sentence about there being a "possible" small role for familial brain properties defining your mental nature then. Thanks for the clarification.

I do mean the latter - every lead needs to be independently checked by reason. Now what seems important is not only that desire is a manifestation of will, which is a prerequisite to action and necessary to sustain effort through challenges, but also that the kinds of values one finds this way invariably are examples of self-assertion: creating, spreading, growing, asserting, expressing, etc. - as though what the subconscious has done is to calculate the greatest means of impressing oneself upon reality (at least this is what I have personally found). BUT - I am not sure whether this is the sought-after essential fact, or merely a byproduct of having used "burning desire" as the starting point as opposed to say, sublime love or some other shade of feeling. I think that it may indeed be the essential fact, because when I inquire into what is most important about the value in question, the answer is always ultimately "because this is the best way to assert myself, which is what my survival demands." It is a view very evocative of Nietzsche, I think. If that is the essential standard to be applied, then whether the proposed value indeed enables the greatest possibility of self-assertion can be determined. My question is whether that is the correct standard, or whether I have veered into an incorrect idea.

But to clarify, is there a contradiction between there being a possibility of a small role for familial brain properties defining your mental nature, and there being not a shred of evidence to indicate that African minds or brains are at all genetically differentiable from Caucasian or Asian brains? Would it be wrong to think that in both cases the salient point is whether or not evidence exists that genetics plays a role in determining intelligence, which is an either-or proposition? Or is that not the entire crux of the debate? Is it not the case that once some evidence for that proposition is established, it raises the claim beyond "arbitrary"? I'm confused.

Seems sensible. Recovery may be improbable, but possible in some degree given a functioning consciousness. On the topic of my proposed method of introspection, would anyone care to offer their own variation, or to challenge the ideas I presented?

In connection with our discussion on life as an end in itself, I posited that "the key is to ask, in regards to 'survival': survival as what? Not just as an organism, not just as an animal, not just as man - but as me particularly, in my essence" and that "a searching self-examination to objectively discover one's own 'essential' nature and what it objectively requires, would be necessary" to choose one's own specific values properly. My attention is now focused on defining the method of such a self-examination. To begin, I note that the problem involves inductive reasoning to try to establish facts - about myself and the possibilities open to me in my specific, concrete reality. This means that the methods involved to contribute to specific conclusions may be valid though imperfect. It also implies, as with all things, the absolute necessity of a constant effort to acquire greater knowledge. In the first step (and perhaps controversially), I believe that it is necessary to identify a burning desire for a particular value or values - not as short-term whims, but across the whole of my lifespan. There must be a deep-seated passion that outranks the others in intensity so strongly that it seems unquestionable - like Rearden running his mills or Dagny running her railroad. This is so because, as an inductive tool for discovering the facts of my particular identity qua me, nothing else can supply the cognitive sum total needed to direct me toward specific values given the innumerable choices open to me. In the same way that an artist's style depends upon his sense of life (as per Rand's The Romantic Manifesto), guiding innumerable artistic choices, so the choice of specific values, given the many alternatives available, reflects a personal style and identifying it must begin with burning passion. Intensity of desire for a given value emanates from the specific details of my needs deriving from my identity qua me, and thus serves as the primary method of their detection. Furthermore, the burning desire could reasonably be seen as the same thing as, or at least inextricably bound up in, the prerequisite will to live qua me that serves to enable the existence of values as such. The product of this step is a statement of specific values ranked by intensity of desire. In the second step, reason functions as a check or tool of revision. Using introspection, I must inquire into and conceptualize the reasons for my intense desire for each value. If any contradictions arise, they must be taken into account and my values modified accordingly. In addition, the desired values must be possible for me to achieve in reality: here it is sufficient to build enough evidence to meet the standard of possible, not necessarily probable or certain, as impossibility would render my desired values irrational, while requiring a higher burden of proof than possible would foreclose my choosing the greatest challenges. Presumably, my sense of desire would not have been founded on so faulty an understanding of reality that it would be substantially negated. A statement of values that passed these hurdles would be complete. Now my question is: Is this approach fully consistent with Objectivism? Or does the reliance on desire as the primary inductive tool by which to determine my essential values render it subjectivist? How else then to discover my essentials in sufficient completeness to choose specific values for life qua myself?

To have a standard of value depends upon a definite context. In the context of the fundamental alternative for a living organism - to live or die, i.e. to exist as a living organism or not - existence (life) is the standard of value because it is presupposed that its ultimate goal is to go on existing. Values cannot exist independently, but only in relation to a living entity faced with the alternative of existence or non-existence. Living beings act in order to remain alive. To go outside this context would be to reject reality. The realm of non-existence is nothing; only existence exists. To accept reality, for a living organism, means taking goal-directed action to remain a part of reality. Existence is primary to philosophy; to venture into the realm of non-existence is to go beyond that which philosophy is capable of answering. "Why choose reality?", that is, "why choose to exist?" is a question that philosophy cannot answer. Similarly, the question "why choose to mentally focus?" is a primary, the equivalent of accepting reality, for man. Since that is volitional, it must be willed continuously (see Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 59). So in that sense, the standard of value does depend upon man's will. The will to live is a primary upon which everything else depends. I think it's worth settling this point with absolute clarity before going on to the others - so for now I'll limit my answer to that one.

I wouldn't be so quick to discount the utility of Rand's argument in "The Objectivist Ethics" - even if knowing what it means to live qua man (in the general and abstract, as distinguished from qua self, in the concrete and particular) is not sufficient to fully define one's code of values, it does apply useful constraints: first, by telling us the ways in which the prevailing ethical systems of mankind (e.g. religion, collectivism) are fundamentally incorrect; and second, by giving the requirements to which our own particular code of values must conform, including that it be objectively based. I do agree that an objective method for discovering one's own essentials is necessary to complete the process.

My first thought is that this paragraph suggests an ethical version of de minimis non curat lex ("the law takes no account of trifles"), i.e. a choice is essentially amoral because its impact, for better or worse, is trivial. I would judge that to be a reasonable proposition, though open to attack in its manner of application. But the examples you give are not insubstantial. You could say "I enjoy heavy metal music, it's a value to me" and assuming that were true (I'll leave it to others to debate the value of heavy metal music), at that point it would no longer be amoral in an ethical context but rather would represent a positive value to you for some reason. Therefore, I'm afraid that the distinction doesn't hold water. Theoretically, every choice open to an individual can be judged according to an objective code of values; given an activity that seems value-less, there is the opportunity cost (in wasted time that could have been spent doing something better). It would be a substantial setback from a value perspective, and as such, choosing it would be unethical.

One possible solution is to recall that "man" is an abstraction, whereas individual men and women are the concretes. So for me, "survival" means life-span maximization as me in particular, according to some essential deriving from my nature. In this view, I would strive to build a skyscraper not solely because doing so would engender generic happiness without which my mind would perish as any man's mind would, but that building skyscrapers is my identity. It's who I am on a fundamental level. If I didn't do it, I would cease being me in particular. The mistake in reasoning here is the failure to go from the abstract level of survival as man qua man to the concrete level of a particular man as who he is. The key is to ask, in regards to "survival": survival as what? Not just as an organism, not just as an animal, not just as man - but as me particularly, in my essence. This retains the lifespan maximization element while applying an identity constraint that explains the "something fancy" without attempting to do so indirectly solely through meeting general psychological needs. An implication of this is that it significantly narrows the range of states constituting "survival". If you can't live as you, does that mean that you're already dead, although still living as a man, animal, and organism? Would that fact sever ethics at its root, rendering suicide amoral? I suspect that it would, and that a telling sign would be your own unhappiness in that situation. Once again, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron if by "life" we mean "your life as you in particular, in your essential nature". A searching self-examination to objectively discover one's own "essential" nature and what it objectively requires, would be necessary.

By the way, I don't intend to intimate that these issues are easy or that I wasn't initially perplexed by the implications of Rand's basis for ethics. I'm trying to understand them just as you are - and I want correction if needed. When people state that Rand's standard isn't "morgue avoidance", I look at the existence vs. non-existence question she uses as the fundamental basis of "The Objectivist Ethics" and conclude that it actually is, and that only man's immutable survival need for "something more" can get you from a long life in bed to a short life building empires. I'm not trying to escape any questions by framing it that way - I just don't see how else you can base a standard of value in the fundamental question of existence or non-existence (as a living being) as Rand does, and not draw that conclusion. Life is "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" - a definition that entails something ongoing. Ongoing existence means just that. It doesn't in itself tell us what sort of ongoing existence, so given alternatives, we must relate those choices back to the first. Happiness is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. Building empires is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. Using a perpetual-life machine is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. The best choice is the one that promotes ongoing existence more than the others. You may say that this is absurd, but then I think it is incumbent on you to explain how your interpretation of Rand differs. If anyone thinks that Rand meant something else, for instance if by Man's Life she was attempting, without reference to what man needs to survive, to entail elements that we would regard as glory, grandeur, beauty, etc., other than the objective basis of existence she explicitly defined, then I would appreciate a clarification. I of course agree that man's life entails much more than "avoiding the morgue" - but that the only way to ethically justify his pursuing that "something more" is that his need to do so be firmly rooted in his unchosen nature such that, without meeting it, his lifespan would ultimately be shorter. To me, that seems like the sensible approach that explains both Rand's basis for ethics as well as the "something more" that we all know life entails.

I can see in re-reading my last post that I misstated the case of taking a bullet. Taking the bullet would be an immoral choice, but if it weren't rationally chosen, i.e. a "flash of the moment" type scenario acting upon an uncontrollable impulse, then it would be an amoral non-choice. But it would not be a moral choice under the Objectivist ethics as I understand them. By what standard?