Acount Overdrawn

So why are you arguing with us? If you don't have a proof that Determinism is true, then why bother arguing? I've given a validation of free will and its axiomatic status, and what it entails, but you're basically saying that you're not convinced that your own position is correct (there's merely evidence suggesting, you say). If you're going to argue, could you please have a definite position for something, not just against free will?

No, and I think Olex and David have explained why. Ignoring the implication that you're an automaton for the moment, I disagree that you have any evidence whatsoever of my will not being free, of all of my choices and actions being determined. I argue that you could never give one instance of my chosen actions actually resulting from a determinist chain of causes and influences. But there's something more fundamental going on here: I've shown that Objectivism doesn't consider free will to be a violation of cause-and-effect, your statements notwithstanding. If a free choice exists, the Objectivist law of causality would say, then it is caused and necessitated by the entity which engages in said choice. Since you still argue that free will is a violation of cause-and-effect, the question that must be answered is: just what is your view of causality, since it obviously isn't Objectivism's? To this effect, I'll add something at the end of this post. I've argued that Determinism gives a faulty account of causality, and therefore is an invalid position, whatever its conclusions on human will. Neither Martian nor yourself have yet to demonstrate why this is not so. I've given arguments on free will and its axiomatic status; how about you guys argue for your position now? This is not what Objectivism states; that "could have been otherwise" applies to all things in existence, conscious or not, alive or not. "Could have been otherwise" only applies to the higher-level actions of a volitional consciousness--it is these actions which are not necessitated by antecedent factors. Antecedent factors can be causally relevant--they can be influential in making a particular choice as opposed to another (or multiple others)--but such factors are not sufficient to bring about a specific choice. What cannot be otherwise is the choice as such to focus or not; this choice is sufficient to bring about a specific choice, whether focus or non-focus, but which one is chosen by the actor--whereas higher-level choices (thinking, acting) cannot be sufficiently brought about by the choice to focus or not--choosing to focus doesn't necessitate that one think, or (physically) act, it simply makes sufficient the action of raising one's awareness. Now, to Rand's Razor: Ifatart: what are your axioms?

I don't have ItOE on me, but in the appendix there's a similar objection raised on "exactness." I can't quite think of what was said, but wasn't it to the effect of "this is exact to within such and such measurements (e.g. millimeters)"? And wouldn't this apply to "straightness" as well--that there's a context for straightness, in that any deviations can only go such-and-such nanometers or whatever until it can no longer be considered "straight"? Of course, a person can determine the context for "straightness" in a given instance, but this doesn't mean that "straightness" doesn't exist--it means that it is contextual.

My my, this is quite funny. How exactly did you know things exist, or that they possess identities, unless you also possessed consciousness? Consciousness is also an axiom; it is implicit in every awareness, just as existence and identity are. It is not reducible to just existence; all things exist, strictly speaking (as in the only "things" I'm talking about are the things which exist), but not all things are conscious. You can also only define it as a restatement: consciousness is simply the awareness of reality. To suggest that introspection is necessarily subjective is to accept a premise from Immanuel Kant--that consciousness is inherently an agent of distortion and cannot reach objective truth. From my reading of Critique of Pure Reason he never proves this assertion, he just states it as a fact that's supposed to be unquestioned, much in the same way you seemed to [you did say "from your understanding" though, so I'll assume I can convince you otherwise. Of course, this means I think you possess free will, so take that for what it's worth]. Introspection is not subjective, just as extrospection is not subjective; both are actions possible due to the identity of the entity acting, both are instances of causality, of lawfulness, not arbitrary subjectivity. Introspection is the active observation of one's own mental contents, whether thoughts, emotions, memories, imaginations, or anything else that applies. Actually, your inference about introspection being subjective, and free will subsequently becoming an unjustified subjective conclusion, reminds me of a point Leonard Peikoff made very early in Objecivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, about how one should avoid asking questions at random on philosophical issues, since you'll have no way of answering them. His conclusion was: OPAR This invaluable knowledge applies to your limited knowledge of introspection; evidently you do not know what ideas give it context, definition, application, or validation. It would do you well to learn such things, since I would think introspection's very important for your life. Regarding "objective/subjective," did you ever think that maybe Objectivism's definition of "objective" might differ a bit from how it's used in mainstream philosophy and in modern language? Within Objectivism, I think there are three criteria for being "objective" in one's activities: -the entity doing the action must possess a volitional, conceptual consciousness. Animals on the perceptual level act neither "objectively" nor "non-objectively," they simply act as the given environment and their biology dictate. -it must adhere to reality. One's thoughts, to be objective, must deal with the facts; there's no "objective" method of ignoring or evading facts. -It must employ the method of logic. Facts can only be dealt with on the understanding that contradictions do not exist; to identify and deal with facts is to deal with them logically. As far as axioms go, free will is an axiomatic concept; it is an implication of the consciousness axiom. Not all conscious beings possess free will; those with the conceptual faculty, however, do. Unfortunately, Thomas M. Miovas Jr. has convinced me to not post anymore after reading his last post. If you think that we don't have introspective capabilities, or that it is subjective, or that you yourself have it but refuse to engage in it in an attempt to act on your definition of introspection, then discussion really is pointless with you. If an action is capable to a certain entity, then to suggest that the action is subjective or baseless is itself a baseless claim, a claim made by someone assuming he's omniscient and simply "knows" what actions a given thing has "grounds" to do and which don't. This same knowledge applies to introspection and to those who claim it is subjective. Now, I would continue the discussion if you accepted that consciousness is an axiom, and that introspection is not subjective.

Don't bother RationalBiker; his insult was intended for someone who assumes free will; I do not assume free will, and have never said I do in my posts on this thread. Also, my "Good luck" was genuine; the Free Will/Determinism issue is one of the hardest in philosophy in my opinion. Seeing your "Good luck," I could see how mine could be construed as an insult. I thought I made my non-assumption of free will clear when I said: . What I don't experience in my introspections is being determined in any way. I've got a better approach to this; it just came to me. Rand’s razor, which is directed at anyone who enters philosophy, states simply: “name your primaries. Identify your starting points, including the concepts you take to be irreducible, and then establish that these are objective axioms.” [OPAR, p. 139] Before engaging with me any further, would you please identify your theory's axioms?

I could give plenty of examples. Let's say you're getting ready for school, and you're making a decision about what you want to wear. You decide you'll wear jeans today, and there are several pair in your closet. You don't particularly care which brand or color you pick, so you simply grab one of them. It was possible to pick the other jeans (or even put two or three on at once), but you chose one specific one, and that wasn't determined by any "antecedent factors" or biology or whatever. There's the example of me evidently wasting my time posting examples of free will as opposed to studying for my logic exam this upcoming Wednesday. I could also show you that I'm not determined to post on this thread by not posting anymore. That's always fun. Good luck with debating the merits of Free Will and Determinism.

But that isn't what the law of causality states: that it allows us to make predictions as you are positing. I'll take a few quotes from OPAR to get my point across: Rather, it states that there is a necessary connection between an entity and its actions, and the action will be an expression of the entity's identity. If Determinism posits that given certain factors, only one specific action is possible, but there are examples of that not being the case (such as free will), then the problem isn't with free will: the problem is with Determinism making declarations to the universe, arbitrarily casting aside other possibilities when they arise, as illusions or as "random." In other words, regardless of what "input" or circumstance a human is in, if he is alive and other bodily/mental conditions being equal, then he must perform a specific action, the action expressive of his identity: he must choose focus or non-focus. This is all the law of causality states regarding humans and the primary choice.

I don't see why you make a distinction between calling yourself "I" and "brain process." On your theory, they are one and the same. Is there a deterministic need for using two words for the same fact (in your argument, at least)? On your theory, it wouldn't matter if we could give you a complete account of free will, citing both introspective evidence, and scientific data linking the exact relationship between the mind and the brain. You knowing all these facts would not suddenly make you "free"; you would simply be determined and somehow know that humans possess free will. That's why I don't see the point in a Determinist asking for a proof of free will; it's not like they can somehow change their position if it's shown that they're wrong. The result, at best, would be a determined man who believed he was free. That is, unless the Determinist completely rejected his entire system, including his view of cause-and-effect. But even this assumes that he actually possesses free will. Martian, you should consider this: your whole point in bringing up this issue was to find out why Determinism and Objectivism were incompatible ideas. Others and myself have provided what I think is sufficient evidence for why it is so. Even if you could formulate a complete and true theory on Determinism, it still wouldn't be compatible with Objectivism. Arguing that free will doesn't exist is a position contra to Objectivism, not a position that will lead you to uniting Objectivism and Determinism. Really, I don't see the point in continuing this, unless it is to become a general Free Will/Determinism thread.

That's not it at all. You have to realize that not every concept can have a definition, in particular definitions of the senses and of axioms are simply restatements. This is precisely what Thomas M. Miovas Jr. was talking about when he said we have to start with the observed. Would you say that "sight" has a definition? Not really: it's merely a restatement of what sight is, something like "an instance of visual perception." What about existence? Again, no: it's simply defined as "being" or the "sum of all existence." Objectivists are only asserting that the same applies to free will; we learn about free will by the same means we learn about consciousness, by introspection [my thinking is that extrospection is involved in understanding consciousness, but one has to introspect to fully grasp what consciousness is]. Regarding consciousness, we introspect and realize that in order to do many of the actions we do in reality, and even to think of such things introspectively, we have to be conscious, that is, aware of reality. Regarding free will, we introspect and realize that some of the actions we perform, like thinking or having fun with friends, are freely chosen by us when other alternatives were possible; we make the choice for things to happen and for other things to not happen.

While possessing consciousness is a prerequisite of having free will, I wouldn't necessarily say that free will hinges on self-consciousness. I would argue that very young children possess free will but are not necessarily conscious of themselves making choices; they simply make them. I would just stick with "entity." A process is what entities undergo or carry out; they aren't equivocal. Well, now you seem to be switching from Metaphysics to Epistemology (or perhaps the other way around). I don't think this is the right philosophical approach, to make demands to reality that it conform to what you identify as "rational" and "logical," so that you can come to conclusions. "Rational" and "logical" are epistemological terms, regarding our knowledge and how we gain it; a thinking process can be "rational," but the universe cannot be; it is the base from which you judge other things to be rational or irrational, logical or illogical. In other words: if not Determinism, then Indeterminism. As you read more into Objectivism, perhaps you will see why it rejects the Determinism/Indeterminism dichotomy as a false one. As I said in an earlier post, free will and reason are one and the same faculty. The formation and use of conceptual knowledge is a free action, it is not necessitated by antecedent factors. An implication of Determinism's theory is that a given set of antecedent conditions/factors will invariably lead to a certain concept/idea (unless they deny conceptual knowledge), and I very much doubt a Determinist could ever give one example in which this must always happen. If you stick to the "Determinism/Indeterminism" dichotomy, I could see the reasoning for that. Well, we don't know the exact relationship between the mind and the brain yet, so perhaps there's more to it than what you just proposed. I thought what I would go on to say later on covers this: I suppose I have another objection, and this isn't Objectivism's argument (at least none that I've heard or read about); Determinism can't step outside of its system and declare that only deterministic causality is causality. On its account of causality, there's one event, which causes the next event, and then the next event, etc. But then somehow they reach an induction: all events are deterministic. And I doubting that this is a valid step for them to make. At best, they should be able to continue tracking a causal chain, not generalize about all of reality--they would be able to continue deducing, but there would be no inductions. This is why you should be reading about Objectivism's Law of Causality. Objectivism rejects the "action-reaction" view of cause-and-effect, where actions cause other actions. It focuses on entities, as I've said elsewhere. It's your assumption that denying Determinism means violating natural laws, not Objectivism's. And actually, your explanation is indemonstrable; we can't travel backwards in time to observe and verify what you claim here. It could very well be the case that natural laws, such as the laws of physics, do not apply to free will, much like how the principles needed to be a good historian are not derived from the laws of physics. I thought I did earlier, perhaps I'll refresh your memory: And:

I would object to "And all of the mind is the brain." The mind has observable characteristics (via introspection) which the brain does not, so I don't think they are the same. Also "That all emotions and thoughts come from the brain." I don't study neurology, but normally emotions proceed from a previous identification and evaluation of something, which means intellectual, not strictly physical, roots. Without such intellectual roots, a man would feel indifference (or perhaps bewilderment) towards a subject, whatever his "brain state." Possibly, certain parts of the brain are responsible for certain facial/body movements indicative of emotions, such as smiling indicating happy, but the physical movements are not the same as the emotion. Thoughts, in my understanding, come from one's will to engage in a cognitive task, such as problem-solving; it may have specific brain states (again, not a neurologist), but I wouldn't say that brain state(s) cause the thought, as you're implying. Lastly I would object to: "[neurons] are all determinist by nature." My hypothesis is that when and if we fully understand the mind-brain relationship, whatever aspects of the brain involve volition will have neurons which do not operate deterministically, i.e., by merely responding to the previous neural interactions and other physical conditions. There will be first causes (chosen mental/physical actions) which will begin neural interactions which could not be predicted by merely considering what has been happening in the previous moment--indeed, this will be a different type of causation than the Determinist model. And I reject Determinism in total, as a completely false theory of cause-and-effect, precisely because of its emphasis on events or states of affairs (or sometimes actions), as if entities are merely interchangeable.

Hopefully, we'll be able to answer your question in this thread. Free will is the capacity to select from two or more different courses of action possible under the circumstances, where the difference is made by the person's decision, which could have been otherwise. If someone has a better definition of free will, please give it. Isn't this sort of the problem with over-generalizing? Human beings are not the same thing as other animals, or plants, or the wind. To discover what type of causation exist, you have to focus on the identity of what you're studying, and its corresponding actions. You shouldn't generalize that one type of causation exists for this group, and then arbitrarily switch contexts by saying that it applies to this other group (e.g. humans) as well, contradictory evidence notwithstanding. I'll try to answer your question: Determinism contradicts Objectivism because its view of causality is a type of context-dropping. It makes observations about how some events operate, and then applies this type of operation to everything which exists, ignoring the different contexts which prop up. In a way, Determinism makes an unqualified leap; since at first it did seem to be focusing on entities and their actions, but then somehow relates actions to causing other actions, and then finally relating events to other events. Free Will in Objectivism is a natural fact possessed by certain living things (humans), it has a certain identity, and I would argue that it has rules which can be understood, though all of these rules are not understood yet (By saying this part I'm not implying Determinism). I can choose to raise my right arm, to will for it to raise; my arm would not raise if I instead willed my left leg to raise (everything else being equal). And the extent of what I can freely do is limited; I can only raise my arm or leg so high. I cannot shift the particles in my arm and turn it into something else by merely willing it to do so. At its most basic level, free will is the choice to focus or not, to raise one's level of conceptual awareness or to not do so. So long as a human is alive and his brain is intact, it is this choice, between focus and non-focus, that he has to face given his nature. It is this choice which must necessarily occur, but the choice as such and the circumstances are not sufficient to bring about the specific choice of focus, or the specific choice of non-focus; this is for the person to decide. It is merely another instance of causality, but not deterministic causality. Objectivism and Determinism have differing views on causality, with Objectivism concluding that any account of causality which tries to "inventory the universe" by claiming which types of entities or actions are allowed to exist has overstepped its bounds, so to speak. The Law of Causality only relates an entity to its actions, where the action performed is merely an expression of the identity of the entity (or entities) involved. It does not relate events with events (as some theories of Determinism do), because events are not the primary things we must discuss, which is entities; events are merely relationships involving entities and actions, events do not exist without entities. The most distinctive characteristic of humans is that we possess a volitional, conceptual consciousness; this characteristic does not apply to all humans (some have severe neural problems and do not possess free will or concepts), but it identifies what distinguishes us from everything else in existence the most, as opposed to simply saying "a living thing" or "a thing with consciousness." I hope this helps. There's another point that has to be made, actually. This was Ayn Rand's philosophy, and her philosophic position on human nature is that humans possess free will. In her philosophy, free will and Determinism are contradictory ideas, in the sense that free will applies to some aspects of existence (human consciousness), but determinism is an opposing theory which is argued to apply to everything, including human action; in Objectivism these theories are not "compatible" with one another. For more persuasive evidence towards my last sentence, here's a statement from Dr. Peikoff's lecture on Objectivism which was approved of by Rand as an authorized presentation on her philosphy: Ayn Rand Lexicon entry: Determinism, Bold mine. Even if you could show that Determinism is the true theory, it would mean that Objectivism's statements on Metaphysics, Human Nature, Epistemology, Ethics, Politics, and Esthetics (as a result of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics) are all wrong and must be thrown out; the importance of free will in Ayn Rand's philosophy is of the same importance as reason, because they are the same capacity. Everything stated within Objectivism is in terms of concepts, and concepts are formed through a volitional process. To uphold Determinism is to deny free will within Objectivism, and therefore conceptual knowledge, even of philosophy...including Determinism (assuming one wants to keep the two "compatible"). This is an example of Dr. Peikoff's discussion of knowledge being contextual (relational): I think your goal is ultimately hopeless. If you like certain aspects of Objectivism but want to uphold Determinism, then I suggest figuring out Deterministic theories on those aspects, or rather I suggest you fully understand Objectivism's position on causality and free will, then decide if free will is as wrong as the theory of Determinism says it to be.

Hello, I'm Roderick Fitts, welcome to the forum. I had an argument with a former Determinist 9 months ago on the facebook group "Objectivist Ethics and Virtues," and he supported the idea that the laws of physics determine everything (the thread was called "Determinism"). Since I have a little experience arguing with Determinists, I'd like to get right to the point so that this thread doesn't get off track. With that in mind, could you do the following for me (and everyone, really). -Present your argument for Determinism (you've already defined it, so that helps). Also state if you're a Hard or Soft Determinist (Look up Compatibilism and Incompatibilism). -Then state why you think Objectivism should support Determinism, in light of your arguments. Preliminary remarks and objections: -The Objectivist view of human nature is that we are beings of volitional consciousness--meaning that we possess free will, and are conscious on the conceptual level. Specifically, our faculty of reason is our volitional faculty: they are one and the same. Therefore it denies Determinism as a theory on human nature. This site might shed a little light on that: Essentials of Objectivism -You cited the laws of physics as evidence for Determinism, but an Indeterminist (assuming one were here) could point to the randomness (in his view) of particles at the quantum level: the laws of physics do not seemingly apply. My point is that Determinism is not self-evident; as a theory it must be proven, and hopefully you will attempt to do so in your next post. -Within the Objectivist theory of concepts, concepts would be impossible if Determinism were true. Ayn Rand's book, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, discusses how humans should form their concepts, the proper method to do so: one of its assumptions is that human beings are free to use the knowledge contained in her book or not do so. Or as Ayn Rand said very succinctly in Galt's speech: I take "automatic" and "mechanical" to be roughly synonymous with "deterministic." Have fun on the forum, I hope to address your forth-coming argument soon.

Wow, that's an interesting question to ask, and the obvious answer is: yes. If the government wanted to provide the most efficient, least costly type of health-care it could, the logical conclusion would be to get rid of those who drive up the cost of health-care: the old, and those who suffer from the effects of obsesity (maybe there are other categories). Quite a ghastly thought.

I haven't exactly read all of the posts up to today, but I'd like to ask: has the original poster presented his argument yet? Particularly on the basis of rights, and who therefore is entitled to them (and why)? If he hasn't, I don't see much point in debating this subject with him, though I don't think fetuses have rights.

You know your movement's going in the wrong direction when Nature herself tries to show you the follies of your ways . I certainly hope the world is warming, because this is the coldest winter I've experienced in Michigan in recent memory.

I agree with this. I think this is very similar to my point, if not the same thing.

I don't mean to speak for anyone else, but I think Rourke is missing the points made by the other posters, in particular Inspector. In my view, a person is capable of acting rationally without an explicit endorsement of Objectivism; but I don't think it is possible to act rationally in contradiction to the ideas and observations made within the system. For instance, I don't think someone can act rationally on the idea that there's no moral need to be honest to oneself and one's grasp of reality. "I think we need to show a tolerance of other's beliefs, just like we would expect others to respect Objectivism, and that other philosophies can be rational, given a different context." Aren't you equating a "different context" to "a different reality/universe"? I could concede that within certain contexts, the connections within a given philosophy are logical, but I would not say that they are rational. And once I introduce the full context of my knowledge, I would have to conclude that the given philosophy is illogical, as well. For example, given Kant's metaphysics, his ethics follows logically in certain respects, but I couldn't honestly argue that his philosophy was rational. It seems that this view of "context" would be more akin to Relativism, not to the understanding of "context" that Objectivism posits.

Thanks. Yeah, despite my last paragraph in the previous post, I completely agree with you. I suppose this point has been answered by Anarcho-capitalists, but I am curious: why would anyone engage in the large-scale type of economic activity necessary to build and fund a government without a prior acknowledgment that if someone defrauds them, there would be an agency in existence to use retaliatory force? There was something more to what I'm trying to say here, but I can't articulate it, at least not right now. Perhaps I'll comment again a little later.

Proving a negative is incorporated within the larger principle of logic: the burden of proof. I wrote this in a paper: "The “burden of proof” principle states that the person who asserts the existence of something must present evidence which supports his claim, and further that a person must never attempt to prove a negative." The burden of proof principle, to my understanding, is itself based on the logical rule that contradictions don't exist (Aristotle's Law of Non-contradiction, which could be considered a corollary to Objectivism's Identity axiom). It is a contradiction to present evidence which follows from the non-existence of something. If something doesn't exist, it has no effects upon reality; no effects "follow" from its non-existence, because in order to have effects on reality, it must have already existed in reality. You should not "prove a negative," the burden of proof principle says, precisely because it cannot be done--you literally could not present evidence which follows from something's non-existence. In your example, your opponent's assertion is contradictory; he's conceding that you're using it, but argues that it doesn't exist. I would consider it an arbitrary assertion, not even a false one, and so not worth my time. He's also stealing the concept of "using."

My entire problem with Anarcho-capitalism is somewhat two-fold: 1: If one accepts the objective theory of concepts, then Anarcho-capitalism rejects the "non-initiation of force" (NAP) principle. Anarcho-capitalism allows for any type of agency to be established to protect whatever the funders of the agency deem it necessary to protect. AC would have to allow socialists to make socialist agencies, communists communist agencies, and so on, because it cannot deny them their "freedom": to do so would be to "initiate force" upon them. This theory ignores the fact that statist institutions, whether small or full-blown governments, are statist because they violate rights, i.e., they are the ones initiating force. Rather than positing that the Objectivist government violates the non-initiation of force principle, I would argue that the underlying assumptions within Anarcho-capitalism lead to a violation of said principle, if one accepts the objective theory of concepts. This would mean that AC, and not Objectivism, contradicts its ethical base (NAP) and its political conclusions. Which is not surprising to me, as I associate AC within the broader philosophy of Subjectivism. 2 (related heavily with point 1): Understanding that individual rights is the basic principle of politics, any political system which violates them is an immoral system that should not be respected or maintained. Anarcho-capitalism does not protect the sovereignty of individuals; it places them at the mercy of whatever form of agencies people want to fund. Part of my objection here to AC is that an individual does not have the right to violate someone else's rights, and therefore, he has no right to ask others to do so, i.e., he has no right to form a rights-abrogating agency, even if he personally objects to representative government. My point here is diametrically opposed to Anarcho-capitalist thought: no matter the amount of wealth a person, or even a group of people, holds, that person/group has no justification for funding a system which violates individual rights. The only solution I can think of is for the "market anarchist" or "anarcho-capitalist" to only allow competing capitalistic agencies. The problem is that it's "restricting" the ability of people to fund whatever they want, i.e., the problem is that it's beginning to disconnect its association with Subjectivism (though not completely). The "strengthened" position would then reject the anarchist-subjectivist-pay-for-any-system-you-want framework, in favor of competing systems of Capitalism. The problem I have with this largely relates to the general theory of Anarcho-capitalism, and is (part of the reason) why Rand and Objectivism take it to be a gigantic floating abstraction: its stealing of the concept of "competition." A "competition" is taken to mean a contest amongst two or more parties wherein there are winners and losers; in any kind of contest, there are rules, and repercussions for breaking one or more of them. More importantly, these rules and the means to enforce them exist before the competition begins, otherwise there are no means to know whom won or lost. Another thing I'd like to note is that the rules, and their enforcement, are not carried out by the competitors, but by some third-party who should be impartial towards the competitors. To my understanding, this "competing" system of Capitalism would merely be two or more different countries which are capitalistic, with the only thing needed to be done being the re-drawing of the nations boundaries, which I would think is very important considering the need of a protection agency to protect its customer's soil. Sorry if this last part seems unnecessary, it's just me thinking out loud, so to speak.

Hmm, I suppose then that such extension would no longer be merely a "courtesy," but based on a principle which integrates what a person can know in a given situation, the issue of rights vs. non-rights, the non-initiation of force, and the uncertainty of trusting a man to not violate rights, when he doesn't respect human life.

I'd like to add something else, which is bringing me closer towards fully supporting extending the rights as courtesies. I suppose you could name it the "non-omniscient" argument. Human beings are not omniscient. We do not have a mystic insight which tells us that one man has no rational faculty and no guardians (and therefore can be captured, enslaved, barbecued, etc.), whereas other men do possess said faculty. If I were to walk around town and see a group of people assaulting a defenseless man, I wouldn't honestly care if they told me: "Oh, it's okay, he has no rational faculty and no guardians. See, I have here his medical documents to prove it." I would still report it to the police as an assault. The same would apply to my witnessing a kidnapping or murder of a person who in fact turned out to have no rational faculty. This is why I'm saying this is philosophy of law area. This mainly concerns DavidOdden's question a few posts back, "What may others do to another person?" It concerns how the existence or non-existence of rights is to be implemented in daily life, as well as I what I said in the previous post. Whether or not the person has rights, an act of force on another man, even if it doesn't properly violate the person's rights, would have to be treated socially as a threat to everyone else. Once a man uses force upon another human, it can no longer be ascertained whether or not he will use force upon a human with rights. Excluding the characteristics which follow from possessing a rational faculty, such humans share all of the other characteristics with humans who do possess rational faculties. As such, I very much doubt that other people could or would deal with men who do terrible things to human beings whom are lacking a characteristic, albeit an essential one. I could then argue that courtesies should be afforded to men without rational faculties on the epistemological grounds that we cannot know if a man who threatens or damages the life of a man without such a faculty (thereby becoming a threat to every individual) would refrain from violating other people's actual rights.

In part, I think it is difficult to answer this issue because it is really philosophy of law area, specifically on how far property rights extend, and if rights can be extended to broken units of human beings. I dislike mrocktor's response: I myself agree that rights are not derived from man's collective nature, which could be problematic when considering the rights that would then be granted to children, or the slightly mentally-retarded. But I don't necessarily agree that we can't extend certain freedoms to broken units of human beings (based on the rights of beings with rational faculties), which allows them to live free of physical force, and free from being treated exclusively as property (like to the point of cannibalism). As a general policy, I'm beginning to understand and then craftily avoid instances of rationalism. This is what the original questioner, and those that now support him, seem to demonstrate to me when their argument basically consists of a deductive process: "(Premise 1)If humans without rational faculties have no rights, then humans with rational faculties can do whatever they want with them (excluding violations of rights of humans with rational faculties). (Premise 2) Humans without rational faculties by definition have no rights. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Conclusion) Human with rational faculties can do whatever action to them which does not violate someone's actual rights." I'd rather that no one takes this as an insult; this is what their argument seems to be, and in form at least, it reminds me of a rationalist method of thinking. I haven't really given this issue enough thought to justify a final answer, but at the moment I side with those who support extending such freedoms as courtesies. A hypothetical example of such courtesy-extending could occur if scientists were capable of restoring certain functions to a damaged brain, which could restore the person's rational faculty, and during the gap between the hospital stay and the surgery, the mentally-deficient man was afforded protection from physical force on the hospital's grounds.

Based on my limited knowledge of this incident, I very much agree with your concern: why didn't the Iranian government simply deny any such Iranian ships entering foreign waters? One could easily suggest that, while they accept responsibility for the action, they deny that someone caught them on video-tape. I find this to be cause for concern: when manned speed boats threaten to blow up members and equipment of our Armed Forces, and an Iranian spokesperson comments that this is considered a regular and natural issue. Does anyone know the Navy's policy on responding to direct threats issued by boats on our waters, especially directed towards Navy ships? If nothing else, I would have fired warning shots and demanded that they pick up the boxes they suspiciously dropped in the water. And of course to leave the area with all haste.