stephen_speicher

Second question for "ragnarhedin": I asked: "ragnarhedin" answered: If "ragnarhedin" says he has "no idea how or whether it could be the case," then why did he bring it up? As I stated in my question above, his thought experiment is "self-contradictory and contrary to experience and common sense." The "thought experiment" should either be retracted, or defended. "ragnarhedin" continued: I have not deduced "this stuff from axioms," but I have shown that nonlocality does contradict the axioms. Why isn't this enough?

"ragnarhedin"'s answers are puzzling and raise more questions. I'll take his answers one at a time to keep the postings from getting too long. I asked: "ragnarhedin" answered: Well, does it imply that a series of motions could take place in no time? Why or why not? Since "ragnarhedin" says he is certainly not speaking for David Harriman, it follows he is talking for himself, which is what I assumed in the beginning. So let's get back to my first question for "ragnarhedin": If there is a meaningful distinction between "instantaneously," "immediate," and no "time delay," what is it?

And Tarantino has made that exact point. Explicitly, in words. He likens his use and acknowledgement of the earlier genre to the even earlier genre acknowledged in Raiders of the Lost Ark. But, in a manner which surpasses what Speilberg and Lucas accomplished, Tarantino strips the genre down to its essence and recreates it in a far superior way than the original. (Note: my remarks are confined to Kill Bill: Vol. 1. Nice identification. "The Bride" is a larger-than-life character. Well, with Vol. 1 I have joined the club.

Again, I realize I am not liked. The fact is, I did directly address this position in my post. The essence of my argument was: We do not get our fundamental philosophical principles (identity, causality, etc.) only from an observation of a teeter-totter, which for a thick-enough board it may appear there is no delay between a force applied and the movement of the whole. (Of course, scientifically we know that the interatomic forces are transmitted internally at the speed of sound in the material. But, here we are discussing philosophy, not science.) We have many, many other observations of the connection between a cause and an effect, and of the time delay between the two. Even a child bending a stick observes and grasps that, in "ragnarhedin's" own words, "the action at A can cause a change at B," and that, in fact, we do see the time delay. It is from hundreds, thousands, and more of these observations that we learn that a causal process must be connected across a period of time. That is what causality requires. So, we develop our philosophic principles based on these and other observations and then, if we see something like the teeter-totter, we do not throw out causality and identity. Since we know causal connections must be connected across time, we realize there is a time delay, even if it is too fast to see. In fact, just as with the stick that appears to be bent when in water, our observation is giving us additional evidence about reality. For the bent stick -- refraction of light. For the teeter-totter -- elastic deformation. Just as we do not discard our philosophical principles because we see a bent stick, we should not discard our philosophical principles when we see a teeter-totter.

"ragnarhedin" wrote: Okay, I will grant that "ragnarhedin" does not like me. But, instead of personal accusations, perhaps we can focus on the facts. Here are some questions for "ragnarhedin." (1) I wrote: "In this context there is no meaningful distinction between 'instantaneously,' 'immediate,' and no 'time delay. All are expressions of nonlocality, which was refuted by arguments I have presented." "ragnarhedin" disagrees. If there is a meaningful distinction between "instantaneously," "immediate," and no "time delay," what is it? They all look the same to me. (2) "ragnarhedin" wrote: "Maybe the ether is one big entity, and an impact here on earth causes an instantaneous change in the next galaxy - a change in the *same* entity. Tortuous deductions from axioms cannot tell us one way or the other." How can our galaxy and the next galaxy be the same entity? They are separate, distinct things with separate properties and denoted by separate words ("our," "next"). Is "ragnarhedin" saying that something -- let's say a beam of light -- can move from our galaxy to the next galaxy either "instantaneously," "immediately," or with no "time delay?" Or, is he saying that since our galaxy and the next galaxy are really the same entity, that the light beam isn't really moving anywhere? Either one seems self-contradictory and contrary to experience and common sense. (3) "ragnarhedin" wrote: "But the Harriman quote, or at least his example, deals with the case of a single entity that is set in motion." I went back to the Harriman article (http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/dh_tew.htm) and it began with this summary: "In my judgment, violations of the Bell inequalities in 'double-delayed-choice' (DDC) experiments have proven the existence of "non-local" interactions." So, the context of his remarks are the experiments. The DDC experiments involve two separate particles moving in opposite directions through space, and two individual detectors separated by miles. How can they be an examples of a "single entity" or a "rigid body" that acts as a whole? Or are the particles not really moving in opposite directions but really moving in unison somehow? How can something be "rigid" and have internal, separately moving parts? (4) Does Harriman endorse nonlocality? In the cited article, it certainly seems as if he does. If so, what does he mean by "non-locality" which is different from what I have objected to?

Well, this is a really good one, even from someone posting with anonymity. It truly stretches one's imagination to be accused of misrepresentation by providing an accurate quotation! In fact, Harriman created three different versions of the offending phrase, all of which were refuted when originally presented, and are refuted by what I said here. Here are the three different versions, in chronological order. 1) (On the Yahoo group TEWLIP) "Furthermore, we cannot even deduce that all interactions must 'propagate'; metaphysics cannot rule out the existence of 'rigid bodies,' i.e., physical systems that are interconnected in such a way that a change at one location instantaneously redounds throughout the whole." (2) (On the Yahoo group objsci) "Furthermore, we cannot deduce from metaphysics that all interactions must 'propagate' between the parts of a physical system; perhaps certain actions upon some physical systems cause an immediate change to the system as a whole." (3) (On HBL and as modified on objsci) "Furthermore, if an action at location A causes a change at location B, metaphysics alone does not tell us that there was a time delay while something moved from A to B." In this context there is no meaningful distinction between "instantaneously," "immediate," and no "time delay." All are expressions of nonlocality, which was refuted by arguments I have presented. At least one conclusion is perfectly clear: "ragnarhedin" chose not to respond with argumentation against any of the substantive arguments which I made. Instead of arguments, all he offered were unwarranted personal accusations and unsubstantiated opinions.

Can you please tell me what it is about the physical nature of a swan which makes it metaphysically impossible to be other than the color white?

Whether or not it is true right now, as we speak, is an epistemological issue, one for which there must be some evidence. That it is metaphysically possible, as I am using the term, is not evidence, one way or the other, for whether it is true right now, as we speak. Metaphysical possibility carries no significance for epistemological assessment of an actual existent. But I am not making the claim that there are "three aliens ..." A horse with a horn is a fictional character -- there is no evidence that such an animal actually does exist in physical reality -- but a horse with a horn can be a referrent in my consciousness, or in a book, or the subject of a painting. The reason it can be those things is because a horse with a horn is metaphysically possible. However, not only is there no evidence that a square circle actually exists in physical reality, but it cannot be an actual referrent in my consciousness, nor in a book, nor the subject of a painting. The reason a square circle cannot be those things is because it is not metaphysically possible.

I have devised a somewhat unique approach which should make the book of interest to both the layman and the expert. As to when ... This is a long-term project, and I cannot even make a reasonable estimate yet. I pay a great deal of attention to detail, and getting every historical and technical fact right takes a lot of time and effort.

Exactly! Until I saw Vol. 1 I knew virtually nothing about Tarantino. I watched the "Making of ..." on the DVD, and sought out interviews with him about this film, and it is now perfectly clear that every aspect of that film was consciously chosen, completely puposeful. He himself is very single-minded about film -- film is his life -- and his awareness of the art and craft of filmmaking is simply astounding. Yes! The battle with O-Ren Ishii in the snow was particularly exquisite. Literally every moment of that scene could be separately framed and hung on the wall as a work of art.

And, she is incredibly capable, single-minded in purpose, and beautiful to watch.

"It has been said that if one stopped the projection of Siegfried and cut out a film frame at random, it would be as perfect in composition as a great painting. Every action, gesture and movement in this film is calculated to achieve that effect. Every inch of the film is stylized, i.e., condensed to those stark, bare essentials which convey the nature and spirit of the story, of its events, of its locale. The entire picture was filmed indoors, including the magnificent legendary forests whose every branch was man-made (but does not look so on the screen). While Lang was making Siegfried, it is reported, a sign hung on the wall of his office: 'Nothing in this film is accidental.' This is the motto of great art. Very few artists, in any field, have ever been able to live up to it. Fritz Lang did. "There are certain flaws in Siegfried, particularly the nature of the story which is a tragic, "malevolent universe" legend—but this is a metaphysical, not an esthetic, issue. From the aspect of a director's creative task, this film is an example of the kind of visual stylization that makes the difference between a work of art and a glorified newsreel." -- Ayn Rand, "Art and Cognition," The Objectivist, June 1971.

First, I will point out that this is actually part of a package-deal in the full context of Harriman's remarks. The issue of nonlocality arose specifically in regard to the EPR-type experiments, where two individual photons are separated without regard for the extent of the distance between. In principle the separation can be at two ends of the universe. In practice the experiment has been done with miles inbetween. The implication of this "rigid body" was that somehow, by some unspecified means, these two physically separated photons are magically connected as if they were some sort of rigid body physical system, which is patently absurd. Here are the original words from Harriman: "we cannot even deduce that all interactions must 'propagate'; metaphysics cannot rule out the existence of "rigid bodies," i.e., physical systems that are interconnected in such a way that a change at one location instantaneously redounds throughout the whole." Second, if we were to rely only on observation of a teeter-totter for the perceptual data upon which we based our philosophical principles, then indeed we might be misled. But, fortunately, we live in a world in which we make countless observations which contradict the inference drawn from a teeter-totter. Even a child experiences the gradual bending of objects when forces are applied. If the whole world were a teeter-totter we could perhaps develop the Philosophy of Teeter-Totterism, but I am thankful that that is not the world that I live in. An analogy would be: If all we ever observed is a stick bent in water, we would never learn that the stick itself was actually straight. But, that is not the world we live in, and we compare what appears to be the case with other sensory data. The world is not composed of only teeter-totters and bent sticks, and that is why we can develop philosophic principles such as causality and identity, and we can offer, as I did, very specific philosophical arguments against instantaneous action. If we have an observation which appears to contradict those principles, then we need to discover some explanation, but we do not abandon our fundamental principles because we saw a teeter-totter or a stick in the water. The juxtapostion of this latter statement with the accusation of rationalism in the former, is, indeed, quite precious. I suppose if we ignore all of our observations we might make such as a statement as has been made right above.

Regarding Matt's questions about Dirac and the ether: I do not know whether the confusion is in the text which Matt used as a source (do not be surprised that such confusion abounds) or whether Matt is misremembering what was said. In either case, the brief description is not at all correct. The reference is to what is known in the literature as the Dirac Sea, which had some value as a transitional theory in the development of quantum mechanics and has since been superseded by much more generalized approaches. Briefly, in the late 1920s Dirac was disturbed that a number of physicists, including Heisenberg, sort of accepted a relativistic quantum theory of the electron which Dirac knew not to be consistent with his own approach (transformation theory). Dirac recognized (correctly) that the negative-energy solutions in that approach conflicted with what was then known about atoms. In a rather brilliant and daring move, Dirac postulated that these negative-energy levels were already filled and therefore could not accept any further electrons, and he hypothesized a sea of infinite charge density along with a sea of infinite negative-charge density. In a 1930 paper Dirac suggested: "Let us assume that there are so many electrons in the world, that all the most stable states of negative energy are occupied, or, more accurately, that all the states of negative energy are occupied except perhaps a few of small velocity .... We shall have an infinite number of electrons in negative-energy states, and indeed an infinite number per unit volume all over the world ... We are therefore led to the assumption that the holes in the distribution of negative electrons are the protons."[1] This is Dirac's hole theory with protons as holes in an infinite sea of negative-energy electrons. What Dirac failed to recognize was that, rather than protons, he had described anti-electrons -- the positron! Just two years later, in 1932, physicist Carl Anderson of Caltech discovered the positron, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1936. Dirac's mathematics led to anti-matter, but Dirac did not realize it at the time. This hole theory of Dirac's never provided exact solutions, and going beyond first approximations, solutions were either infinite or meaningless. Because of Dirac's stature the mathematics of these holes in a sea of negative-energy electrons was utilized for several years, but then gave way to a theory of Pauli and Weisskopf, which Yukawa used in 1937 to formulate the advance of the relativistic meson theory. It is hardly necessary to point out the gaping philosophical flaws in the theory, but regardless it could not even lead to further advancement as physics itself progressed. As an aside, in my view Dirac is an overrated genius in regard to physics. There is a group of ether supporters -- typically also supporters of Bohm -- who have a somewhat displaced connection to Dirac. While Dirac certainly deserves a great deal of credit for his work in quantum theory, his basic approach and philosophic bent is a bit strange. Dirac was passionate about beauty in mathematics, to the point where the mathematics had a life of its own, independent of any physical theory. Dirac noted: "a good deal of my research work in physics has consisted in not setting out to solve some particular problem, but simply examining mathematical quantities of a kind that physicists use and trying to fit them together in an interesting way regardless of any application that the work may have."[2] And, "... physicists generally have come to believe in the need for physical theory to be beautiful, as an overriding law of nature. It is a matter of faith rather than of logic.... The moral of the story is that one should have faith in a theory that is beautiful. If the theory fails to agree with experiment, its basic principles may still be correct and the discrepancy may be due merely to some detail that will get cleared up in the future."[4] There is no question that Dirac was brilliant and that he contributed to quantum mechanics, but, nevertheless, he was a bit of a strange-thinking man. [1] P.A.M. Dirac, "A Theory of Electrons and Protons," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, Vol. 126, No. 801, pp. 360-365, January 1, 1930. [2] P.A.M. Dirac, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 21, pp. 603-605, 1982. [3] P.A.M. Dirac, Letter, The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 268-269, 1954.

In this post, and in the immediately prior one, you have asked a couple of scientific questions that I would be most happy to answer. However, before we move on to science I want to make sure that we are in agreement about the more fundamental philosophical principles. So, rather than "Assuming for a moment ..." I would first like a direct response to the philosophical issue which you initially raised, and which I directly addressed. I offered philosophic arguments as to why nonlocality is a violation of identity. At least one noted philosopher has even stated that such philosophical arguments are not even necessary and that common sense is sufficient to refute nonlocality. So, I ask you directly: Do you or do you not agree that instantaneous action-at-a-distance is a violation of identity? I am leaving shortly and will gone for most of the day, but when I return I will look for your response, and if we are in agreement on the philosophy, I will be delighted to move on to the scientific questions. If you are not in agreement with the philosophical issue of nonlocality as described above, then please tell me your reasons why and let us debate that issue before we move on to science. I also noted an interesting question from (if I recall correctly) MinorityOfOne. I will also respond to that question, and others which may arise, when I return late in the day.

Which is what I clarified when I wrote: "There is nothing in the nature of a pig -- it is not part of a pig's identity -- for which there is a potential for flight (other than just being a physical existent). It is, however, metaphysically possible to graft a set of wings onto a pig and equip the pig with a source of power, in order to have a flying pig. But, doing so would change the pig's identity, so it is not the cultivation of a potential which enabled the pig to fly." And, which ties in to what I said in my original post: "... when you reduce the knowledge you have of an entity to its nature -- to its identity -- that process itself excludes all things metaphysically possible. Identity trumps possibility." I wouldn't go quite that far. For instance, it is metaphysically possible that some atoms become arranged to spell out IBM, which would not require man to create, just to read.

Let me provide a little context. I am usually quite a benevolent fellow with a sincere interest in understanding the thinking of other people. I enjoy finding ways to communicate complex ideas to people who want to learn. On the other hand, I do not abide with those who are belligerent or are not serious about ideas. I go by my own name and do not hide behind anonymity. I am not ashamed or afraid to be seen as I am. There are a small group of people who, not being able to get their way on moderated groups, follow me around from time to time on public groups, spreading lies about me and about some things I value. They are mean little doggies snipping at my heels, and I choose to ignore them. It is because of such dishonest people that I no longer discuss Little's Theory of Elementary Waves (TEW) except on groups with rational moderation. Now, I am not accusing you of being one of these same people, but, as an anonymous person, out of the blue you dredged up a two-and-one-half month-old post and responded to a comment by RadCap on the TEW, shortly after I joined this group. I was reluctant to even comment -- and, frankly, sorry that I did -- especially about a subject which has been so thrashed out, so many times, and so misrepresented by some of the very same people to whom I refer. Let's say that, mildly speaking, I have become sensitized to the prospect of less than honest behavior on the part of some people, in regard to certain issues. Now, with that said, if you were offended by any of my words, I apololgize for that. All that I have to offer in way of explanation is what I have written above. But, I do note that, with prodding, I did respond, and the overwhelming bulk of my words consisted of a direct response to the issue of nonlocality which you brought up, even specialized to focus on the "instantaneous" because you had singled that out as a question. Your choice was to ignore all of that content, and to write a longer post focusing on other personal matters. If such was more important to you, that was your choice, and since I have apologized I grant you the right to have done so. But what you do now is also your choice. You can deal with the philosophical arguments I presented, or not.

Yikes! Anyone want to buy a shiny red corvette convertible?

Unfortunately, Vol 2 is not on the same cinematic level as Vol 1. And, lest anyone misunderstand, it is not the particular values which the film portrays (although there are some things of merit), but rather my judgment of this movie is based on every technical and artistic function in a film which elevates it towards an art form. It is the brilliance of the artistic craftsmanship to which I refer, not the philosophical value of its content. I admit I meant this as a "shocker." Fact is, Vol. 1 shocked me.

Yes, but specifically Vol. 1, not Vol 2.

If you liked The Game, you might really enjoy David Mamet's The Spanish Prisoner.

The device would be an objective means to determine the wavelength composition of the light along the same path towards the person's eye. The point would be to show the color-blind person a difference in wavelength which he himself is not able to discern directly with his own sensory apparatus. There are cases where there is cortical damage affecting the color pathways in the brain -- central achromotopsia -- where after the damage the patient reports he sees the world as if it were a black and white movie. The patient knows the difference because before the cortical damage he had normal color vision. But, say you had a patient who had central achromotopsia virtually from birth. I am suggesting to you that the device I described would show the patient that there are differences in wavelength composition that he cannot discern. I do not see any problem, and I do not think that subjective is the right word for what you describe. Introspection is just as valid a method of cognition as is extrospection.

Good. Acknowledging the facts shows honesty, instead of defensiveness. The former is definitely more preferable than the latter.

Well, no one said that the life of a profesional intellectual or scientist was going to be an easy one. But, you are correct; we are not omniscient, so we do not apply an omniscient standard for determining what is knowledge. The fact that someone, somewhere, sometime, failed to account for all the relevant facts in reaching certainty about a particular issue, is irrelevant to us following the proper method in achieving certainty about any knowledge which we acquire. There is really nothing unusal or special about the method required -- we scrupuously validate all of the relevant evidence and determine that we have not excluded any. The same basic thing which reasonable kids do, but now on an adult level. Now, of course, in order to do this properly we need to learn the proper method of reasoning -- the principles of logic -- so that we are mentally equipped to separate fact from fiction. We need to hone our observational skills to make sure that our perceptual base is wide-enough for the proper inferences. We need to have an unwavering commitment to fact and not allow emotional considerations to affect our judgments. We need to develop a character with such a strong sense of honesty and integrity that we will never overlook anything relevant, or attempt to fake anything which we learn. We must be motivated to be scrupulous in our investigation and be prepared to exert whatever mental effort is required. In short, what we need to reach certainty is to operate on a mental and physical level appropriate to man. This is doable. Omniscience is not.

Sorry for the double post. Something strange happened.