stephen_speicher

You are confusing Plato with Eratosthenes. Aristotle was amongst the first to estimate the circumference of the Earth, but he was off by a large amount. It was not until many years after Aristotle that Eratosthenes provided a relatively accurate value. Depending upon how certain Greek values are defined (Eratosthenes made use of the distance in stadia between Alexandria and Syene), Eratosthenes' estimate for the circumference was indeed within a few hundred miles of the current value.

There are much better sources than this if you want to explore that point. I have debated this person many times and I can say, as one who prides myself on the extent and depth of my knowledge of Einstein, relativity, and the history of both, that Reany is a very poor choice. Einstein was an extremely prolific writer -- the Einstein Papers Project at Caltech will eventually publish 25 volumes of his writings, 8 of which are currently in print -- and his philosophical utterances varied greatly over the course of his life. The philosophical writings of young Einstein are quite different from those of his middle and later years. For instance, Einstein was much less allied to Kant in his earlier years ("Kant seems quite weak to me."[1]), when Einstein's main work was done, and more allied to Kant in his later years, after relativity had been created. Einstein explicitly rejected Kant's synthetic a priori[2], and it was only later that he began to embrace some aspects of the Kantian methodology.[3] It is easy to cull quotations from amongst Einstein's varied work in order to make him appear to support differing scientific and philosophical views. Einstein himself has noted that as an epistemologist he can be seen alternatively as a realist, an idealist, a positivist, and a Platonist or Pythagorean.[4] It is important to identify in Einstein those ideas which weaved their way through his entire life. I personally have no problem with "what if" scenarios, but let me state most emphatically that a proper identification of Einstein's methodology in the development of relativity is far from the fanciful way it is portrayed by some. Einstein once wrote: "If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds."[5] That is very sage advice, and when applied to Einstein one finds a proper inductive method to be at the root of the development of relativity. I have written about this elsewhere, and have documented the essential facts. This very issue will be a portion of a book I am preparing on Einstein and relativity. [1]--Albert Einstein, letter to Paul Ehrenfest dated 24 October 1916, in "The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein," Volume 8, The Berlin Years: Correspondence, 1914-1918, _Princeton University Press_, 1998, Document 269. [2] "The Advancement of Science, and It's Burdens," Gerald Holton, _Harvard University Press_, p. XXVII, 1986/1998. [3] "Kant's Impact on Einstein's Thought," Mara Beller, in "Einstein: The Formative Years, 1879-1909," Einstein Studies Volume 1, Don Howard and John Stachel, editors, _Birkhauser_, 2000. [4]--Albert Einstein, "Reply to Criticisms," in "Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist," Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, _Harper Torchbooks_, pp. 683-684, 1949/1951. [5] Albert Einstein, "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford on June 10, 1933, reprinted in Albert Einstein, "Ideas and Opinions," _Three Rivers Press_, 1954/1982.

I am afraid that several have misunderstood what I said about metaphysical possibility, possibly confusing it with a much different discussion recently on HBL about things which may be known for which there is no metaphysical possibility of error. The issue mentioned here is much different, and much more simple. Isaac claims: "'Metaphysically possible' is a contradiction in terms." So then, it is not metaphysically possible for a ship on sea to be wrecked? Of course such a metaphysical possibility exists, and it is a purely metaphysical statement. This is a totally different statement from the epistemological issue as to whether or not there is any evidence for a particular ship to be wrecked. Note how Ayn Rand uses the term "metaphysically possible" in her letter to philosopher John Hospers. "It is metaphysically normal and possible for man to travel; since man is not omnipotent, it is metaphysically possible for a traveller to be caught in a shipwreck; but if this last were the rule, not the exception, then man would have to abstain from travelling by sea." ["Letters of Ayn Rand," p. 551.] DPW claims: "A pig has the potential to have wings and fly." No, you have that backwards. There is nothing in the nature of a pig -- it is not part of a pig's identity -- for which there is a potential for flight (other than just being a physical existent). It is, however, metaphysically possible to graft a set of wings onto a pig and equip the pig with a source of power, in order to have a flying pig. But, doing so would change the pig's identity, so it is not the cultivation of a potential which enabled the pig to fly. Erandror says: "Is it possible that men create a pig that flies? Someday, yes!" Okay. But that is what I meant by metaphysically possible. Also, I would distinguish the metaphysically possible from the metaphysically impossible. For instance, it is not metaphysically possible for contradictions to exist. Or, it is not metaphysically possible to have a physical existent which is infinite in extent. Or ... well, I think you should get my meaning.

Nonlocality is instantaneous action-at-a-distance, and it is easy to show philosophically why that contradicts identity. Here is just a part of my many discussions about this on HBL. This one focuses more on the "instantaneous" part, because you asked "why can't an action occur instantaneously?" The idea of the 'instantaneous' or the 'immediate' is an invalid concept, at least as far as an actuality is concerned. To say that any effect occurs instantaneously is to assert that the effect occurs without any means. Just as physical existents must be finite in size, so too the separation of causally connected events must be finite in time. To quote Dr. Binswanger: "The idea of an infinitely small amount of length or temporal duration has validity only as a mathematical device useful for making certain calculations, not as a description of components of reality." Any causal process must be connected across a period of time, lest it lose all meaning in regard to causality. Note that when we speak of causality, ultimately we mean the actions of entities. To assert that a change to a physical system "instantaneously redounds throughout the whole" is to assert that a change occurs absent of action. An action without duration is an action without identity. I strongly believe that nonlocality is not just wrong, but that it is an invalid concept, just as defined by Miss Rand. To remind, in ITOE Miss Rand says that invalid concepts are "...words that represent attempts to integrate errors, contradictions or false propositions, such as concepts originating in mysticism -- or words without specific meanings, without referents..." p.s. I chose to ignore your personal remarks. If you do not tone it down and just deal with the facts, do not expect any further replies. This issue of nonlocality is tiresome to me because I have explained it many different times, and in many different ways. I do not need too much of an excuse to walk away from it now.

"JRoberts," to meet your need of finding a book "that speaks in detail of the different varients of Hominids and their evolution," the one suggested is: EXTINCT HUMANS By Ian Tattersall and Jeffrey H. Schwartz Westview Press ISBN: 0813339189 I am told it is available on amazon.com in both new and used form. Enjoy your studies.

I usually bypass most "horror" stories, having seen more than my fair share of them throughout the years, but I must say that this one is virtually beyond belief. I suppose the only good part is that the commercial was made primarily for a British audience. If that commercial aired on CBS I think I might go back to using roller skates!

Water waves and sound waves are traditional mechanical waves which propagate through a medium. In an elastic media more than one wave can travel through the same space independently. The reason for this is that it is not the medium which moves -- a mechanical wave such as water or sound transmits energy from one part of the medium to the next, in effect creating a disturbance which propagates through the medium itself. There is no bulk movement of the entire matter of which the medium is composed. The problem with your "self-sustaining electrical and magnetic fields that propagate through space, even in a vacuum" is that either a field is something, or it is not. I grant that electromagnetic radiation need not, of necessity, be propagation through a medium in the same sense as with mechanical waves of water and sound. But, if electromagnetic radiation is decribed through the field equation, then the field equation is primarily a description of the medium. Clearly there is something missing in terms of the physics describing this phenomena. What is missing is the separation of electromagnetic behavior into its particle nature and its wave nature, with each being a physical existent. The field concept is, if you will pardon the metaphor, an attempt to have electromagnetic radiation, and eat it too. That statement has been refuted so many times, in so many ways, that I even lack the motivation to argue anything beyond stating, most emphatically, that it is philosophically absurd. If you are going to appeal to the words of others, then I would appeal to someone more knowledgeable of Objectivist philosophy. About a year ago on HBL I stated: "My position on nonlocality is unequivocal and unbending: it is a philosophical absurdity and a scientific insult. No physical action occurs instantaneously or without any means, and to do so would violate the law of identity." To which Harry Binswanger replied with two words: I agree.

"Reason's ember," excuse me for butting into your conversation with another. You make a lot of very interesting points, each worthy of a separate discussion, and I do not intend to splinter the discussion you are having. I do, however, want to make a single point, one which I think you will find interesting about Objectivism. There is a distinction between that which is metaphysically possible and that which is epistemologically possible. It is metaphysically possible for a pig to have wings of such a nature that the exercise thereof would enable the pig to fly. I suppose one might also say that, metaphysically speaking, it is possible that a pig could possess some other form of propulsion system. But, if we include into our epistemology all things metaphysically possible, then, apart from axiomatic statements and perceptual knowledge, we can never be certain that any of our knowledge is, in fact, knowledge. Such a standard would ignore the objective nature of knowledge, in the manner in which I previously discussed truth as a relationship between a proposition and the facts of reality. Either we have knowledge, or we do not. We cannot impose a standard of omniscience upon knowledge, since man is man and not some ghostly god. All things metaphysically possible is not the same as all things epistemologically possible. In addition, and, this is for a separate discussion, when you reduce the knowledge you have of an entity to its nature -- to its identity -- that process itself excludes all things metaphysically possible. Identity trumps possibility.

Here are two different wordings. (1) Belief is not [knowledge], as Ayn Rand defined knowledge on p. 35 of ITOE. (2) Belief is not [knowledge] --ITOE p.35. The first expresses that I, kesg, think that belief is not knowledge, and if you go to page 35 of ITOE you can find Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge. The second expresses that if you go to page 35 of ITOE you will find Ayn Rand stating that belief is not [knowledge]. You very well may have meant (1), but you said (2), and (2) is not correct. Do you see the difference? In addition to this, I also pointed out that "belief" has two different meanings -- one as rational conviction, one as not -- and that it is important to look at the context to see the intended meaning. I even gave you an example where Ayn Rand herself used "belief" to be synonymous with "knowledge." The reason I pointed this out was because I think you did not fairly see the context of "Reason's ember's" statement of belief, and instead of discussing ideas it seemed as if you used ITOE as a weapon to batter something which "Reason's ember" may not have meant. Look, "kesg," like yourself I too do not equate knowledge with belief, if we are to take belief to be something other than rational conviction. But, "Reason's ember" said much more than simply equating belief with knowledge, and if we are to discuss ideas with non-Objectivists I think it important to grasp what they mean, and not just respond with what might appear to them as Objectivist jargon.

Please read what I actually said, as well as what you yourself wrote. Your words: "A belief is what you have when you haven't fully grasped a fact(s) of reality, either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason [logic] based on perceptual observation. ITOE, page 35." To which I responded: "The above is a misuse of an actual definition in ITOE. The citation is a definition of the term "knowledge" by Ayn Rand, and "kesg" just forms the negative of that definition and presents that as if it were evidence for the Objectivist defintion of belief." If this was not clear to you, let me try again in slightly different words. You assume that the definition of "belief" is the negative of the definition of "knowledge," and you then use Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge, presented in the negative, as demonstration that such is "belief." You have assumed what you wanted to demonstrate, and you have done so by appealing to Ayn Rand, when in fact Ayn Rand presented her definition of knowledge, yet you used her words in a manner as if she had defined belief.

The above is a misuse of an actual definition in ITOE. The citation is a definition of the term "knowledge" by Ayn Rand, and "kesg" just forms the negative of that definition and presents that as if it were evidence for the Objectivist defintion of belief. Assuming what is meant to be demonstrated is bad enough, but appealing to Ayn Rand in the process makes such an assumption even worse. There is more than one dictionary definition of the word 'belief," and one such definition, from the OED, is the "acceptance of a proposition ... or to a fact or truth on the evidence of consciousness." I suspect that something like this may be the sense in which the original poster intended his use of belief, especially since his use of belief is qualified by "justified" and "true." I also suspect that that is the sense which Ayn Rand herself intended when she wrote "how do I reconcile my atheism with my belief in free will." [Emphasis mine.] I am quite confident that Ayn Rand's notion of free will was on the epistemological level of knowledge, not faith. Clearly there are other usages of the term belief, and we can usually discern the intent of the writer by the context. I think that the original poster's words are deserving of some criticism in terms of precision of wording, but not deserving of a metaphorical spanking by a misuse of ITOE as the weapon.

I was sincerely hoping no one would ask. Or, at least, not until a large number of others had chimed in. But, now that the jig is up ... I wil just say, without further explanation or justification, that I consider Kill Bill: Vol 1 to be one of the great films of all time, and Tarantino to have established himself as one of the great directors in the history of film.

Sure it can. All you need is a telescopic photometer with interference filters inserted along the path of the electromagnetic radiation. It is a relatively simple matter to determine the wavelength composition. In fact, Edwin Land used a very similar setup in his famous experiments on color vision two decades ago. As a further way to underscore exactly what is an objective fact of the external world, and what is a consequence of our particular form of perception, consider an alien visitor from the Vega star system whose sensory apparatus is such that he directly perceives atomic structure. By contrast our knowledge of atomic structure is an inference based on other perceptual data, and based on other conceptual inferences we have made. Are we and our alien visitor perceiving different realities and are we each at a loss to communicate with each other? I say (at least in principle) that the alien visitor will infer the macroscopic objects (chair, table, etc...) which we perceive directly, just as we infer the atomic structure which is directly perceived by him. The main point is that the form in which we perceive reality -- the particular sensory apparatus each has -- provides evidence for the very same facts of existence, but the path to reach knowledge of those facts requires a conceptual faculty capable of valid inference. Any difference we have in form of perception from that of an alien race, is of relatively small interest and concern as compared to what we share as a result of our conceptual faculties.

You're welcome. And, I always like to refer people to her books on aspects of Objectivism, but not only because she is such a delightful person. Rather than repeating Objectivism in the form and style by which it was presented by Ayn Rand, she breaks the issues down into their component parts and reassembles them into ideas which are fresh and uniquely worded. In other words, she really grasps the principles and communicates them in a style all her own. For those of us who are quite familiar with the Objectivist literature, it is a bit like hearing the ideas communicated in a language which you did not know you understood. (Okay, enough gushing ...) "justified true belief is a bit of a redundancy on "true." In Objectivism true already implies that one is justified, i.e., that one has used the proper epistemological method to arrive at the truth. The only way in which I can see using the term "justified belief" at all, is if you were to determine that what you held as a truth, is not. One then could say that "At the time I concluded that such and such was true, but I realize now that I was in error. I never really really had the truth, but rather I had a justified belief." See, facts just are -- what exists, exists -- and facts can be thought of as being the standard of truth, a metaphysical part of reality. But truth depends on the existence of a consciousness, and it refers to the relationship of a proposition to the facts. If this is what you mean when you mentioned the "mind-dependence for the truth," then we do agree. But, if the "mind-dependence" is meant to be subjective, meaning minus objective standards to reach the truth, then in that case we remain in disagreement. As to your comment that "different fields of knowledge have different criteria and methods of justification," I have no problem with that if what you mean is the specifics, the specialized knowledge and techniques unique to a given field. But that would be focusing more on the content of a field, not on the epistemological principles which remain the same regardless of what area of reality those principles are applied to. First and foremost in this regard would be logic, the method of using reason, and that applies to all conceptual knowledge, regardless of which field we investigate.

... is to read them yourself. I do not agree with the poster's assessment of various scholars, and I do not care to debate the issue, but I do want to point out that, though not exactly a "contemporary" since he died two decades ago, John Herman Randall, Jr. is generally acknowledged as one of the finest historian of ideas in the past century. Randall's book on Aristotle, as well as his several seminal papers, makes for excellent reading. I also highly recommend the various writings by Aristotle expert Allan Gotthelf, himself a long-time Objectivist. In particular, to see a proper accounting of the genius of Aristotle in the field which he so much loved, biology, see "Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology," Cambridge University Press, 1987. Gotthelf has some contributed articles in that book, and he also edited the volume along with James G. Lennox.

I only recently joined this group, but looking back to the original post the question seems to be: "there's a red chair in a room, and two people enter the room. One is color-blind and the other has perfect vision. One sees a gray chair and one sees the red chair. How does the man who happens to see the objective fact convince the man that it is an objective fact?" The answer is rather simple: The objective fact(s) in the external world is not the color, but rather the wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation emitted from the chair and its environs. Color is the perception of those objective facts by our sensory apparatus, not something which resides in the object itself. The most you can say is that the form in which the color-blind man experiences the wavelengths of the electromagnetic radiation is different from the form in which it is experienced by the other. But they both experience the same objective fact; the senses unerringly report the evidence of reality. This is like the old Mersenne problem of the stick which appears bent in the water, used by Descartes to speak of the supposed "error of the senses." The stick feels straight when we touch it, but it appears bent in the water. There is no error in what is reported by the senses. The visual sense provides additional evidence for the fact that light refracts as it passes from the less dense medium of air to the more dense medium of water. The axiomatic nature of the validity of senses cannot validly be disregarded, since any attempt to deny its validly itself depends upon the validity of the senses.

You're welcome.

Glad you enjoyed it. But, Ayn Rand said it all first.

I appreciate the thought, and the smiley, but, alas, I'm missing the point. Could you explain what you meant?

"oldsalt" asks a number of physics-related questions. (Best to be moved to the Science section?) There is one issue common to all of the questions, a basis which should be understood before dealing with each. It is important to discern (at least) three different categories: 1) Popularizations of physics -- These tend to be a more fantastical perspective on physics, focusing on what seems strange, bizarre, counterintuitive, or contradictory to what the average reader might expect. 2) Theorists -- A relatively small group of theoretical physicists who, for the most part, lack a good epistemological grounding and generally have an alice-in-wonderland sense of metaphysics. These are the few who typically fuel the popularizers mentioned above. 3) Actual physicists -- These people represent the overwhelming majority of real physicists. In their work these are profoundly rational people who focus on facts, physicists whose work of necessity demands a proper epistemology and contact with reality. If you push these guys on the weekend to talk about broader-ranging theoretical principles of physics, many will repeat some of the verbiage which was invented by the theorists in category 2. However, most leave such notions at the doorstep when they enter their lab. So, unless you work in the field and have regular contact with the actual people doing physics -- if you get your view of physics from various interpreters -- you might think that modern physicists all revel in singularities and trade infinities the way kids trade baseball cards. Not so. As to infinity: Mathematics is a fundamental tool of physics, and in some regard it is a language in which physics can be expressed. Most physicists are well-grounded in mathematics, even though not as concerned with foundational issues as are many mathematicians. Infinity as a concept of method is used throughout mathematical physics, and is routinely accepted as such. Amongst popularizers and theorists you will often hear of infinities as if they had a metaphysical existence, mostly mathematical singularities (places in the mathematics where operations become undefined or properties are unconstrained) which are then given some sense of physical existence. But, those who are actually doing the physics do not spend their time looking for places where reality is undefined or where properties of entities increase or decrease without bound. It is typically categories 1 and 2 who are guilty of such nonsense, not the real physicsts in category 3. As to chaos: This concept is often conflated with the notion of metaphysical randomness by the popularizers of physics. The root of chaos theory lies in the fact that, in some cases, extremely small changes in the starting conditions for some physical process can lead to extremely large differences in the result. It is not that there exists some metaphysical randomness in some physical process, but rather that the dynamics are such that our inability to specify the initial conditions with infinite precision leads to difficulty in predicting the outcome of what is, nonetheless, a physically determinstic process. Atmospheric disturbances, turbulent flow in liquids, and some aspects of orbital dynamics are areas where this sort of problem is studied. As to the universe: This term is bandied about by popularizers and theorists, sometimes so much that it is difficult to nail down a precise meaning in every case. Generally speaking, in cosmology the Big Bang theory literally means that the space of the universe is being created as there is expansion. But there are other cosmologies in which there are multiple universes, with a single universe being that which we are capable of knowing. The term universe is used in so many different ways, is stretched and pulled so far and in so many directions, that, in my view, it is best to just try to understand the notion the theorist is advocating, and do not attempt to connect to a concept of universe at all. With that said, most actual phsyicsts think of the universe as all of that which exists, just as we Objectivists use the term. May I suggest that any further questions be put in a separate thread in the Science section, mainly so that those interested in the subject will stand a better chance of seeing it there.

I had never heard of Kroy before, and I was not able to locate the book title you mention, but the first book which came up did not seem too promising. The title is "Beyond Being and Nothingness: Introduction to Transpersonal Phenomenology." However, this was offset by another book titled "Rational Existence ... the conditions for objective happiness." This latter was in Hebrew. Unfortunately, there was little descriptive information about either book. I will see if I can find some papers by Moshe Kroy. Since you know of him, and perhaps knew him personally, would you say that he was somewhat mixed in his philosophical views, as might be implied from the little I found?

Well, with biology you will have to read real fast because the field changes so rapidly every day! Biology is an exploding field but, all kidding aside, whenever you are ready, and when you have some idea of just what you want to learn, then, just ask.

You're welcome. Incidentally, one often hears stories from critics of Objectivism about students -- most often students in the early years of the Objectivist movement -- who suppress their personal likes and dislikes which may conflict with those of Ayn Rand. Quite often such stories are exaggerated, and motivated by anything but innocence on the part of the critics. But, there is an aspect of truth there, related to our discussion of sense of life. I think some young students of Objectivism, after reading the non-fiction and, especially, the fiction works of Ayn Rand, are left awestruck with the image of Atlantis and all the wonderful heroes to admire, and, rightfully and gladly so, take away an image of the world as a clear, clean and wonderful place where everything of value is possible. This is a view which, hopefully, they will hold onto for a lifetime. But, their own personal sense of life which they brought to this new world may not be in tune with everything that this new image, and new ideas, imply. Consequently, some feel a sense of guilt when they have positive emotional responses to books, movies, paintings, lovers, etc. which are, in terms of explicit ideas, in conflict with the sense of life implied by the ideas of Objectivism. So, unfortunately, some suppress their feelings towards such things and bury those feelings as a shameful response that they think they should not have. I think that this is the only real source of the sort of stories which are told by the critics and smearers of Objectivism. Of course, the proper response to such a conflict would be, first and foremost, to not suppress that part of you and instead to monitor as carefully as possible those emotional responses which you have. The idea is to identify as clearly as possible the idealogical source, implicit or explicit, in your automatic response, and it is only by a constant process of re-evaluation that such automatic responses will eventually give way to responses tied to your new ideas. And, in the meantime, and this "meantime" could be many years for some, do not be afraid to let your feelings be expressed. It is not shameful if a work of art, which may have some malevolent-world aspect to it, touches a part of your soul. Like all human beings, you need to experience your own sense of life in the form which only art can provide, and you should never be apologetic to yourself or others for that. In the long run, if you continue to choose to function on the right premises, and if you work at identifying and re-evaluating your emotional responses, you will arrive wholly and fully in that very same Atlantis which you loved and admired so much.

Well, as I indicated the problem is that, generally speaking, scholarly works which focus on a single aspect of a field tend to be written on a level which is not always accessible to those who have not previously studied the field in general. However, I certainly know of books in other fields which meet your sort of requirement, so it is possible that my friend may single out a book which meets your needs. However, if cost is a problem, then that may be difficult to overcome since most decent texts are quite expensive nowadays. If the result is that you cannot get a text, I can probably locate a few papers I have around which deal with your issue in one form or another. I have many thousands of papers in various fields that I have collected over the years, most in pdf or ps files. Let's wait to see what my friend suggests, and then we can go from there. p.s. I get the impression you have a serious interest in this, so I would suggest staying away from popularizations, which all to often distort more than they enlighten.