agrippa1

Don't get me wrong about the conspiracy theory. It's just a thought that hit me while reading the autobiography and was fun to consider, and it seems to fit well into the story. But there is no proof or hard (or soft) evidence that this is really what happened. But, man, wouldn't it be great if things could really happen the way they did in AS. (I did some googling and the theory has been around for at least a few years on odd sites here and there, so I guess I can't claim credit)

It is government force trying to dampen out natural downturns that causes the great busts, but business cycle is part of the normal process of a capitalist economy. I think Rand refers to the boom-bust cycle as creative destruction (or something to that effect - basically, the busts clear out the weak businesses and open opportunities for the next boom). (typo)

Now, Thomas, I know we've established an adversarial stance on these forums, but please don't be so dismissive so quickly. Control theory certainly pertains to economics, and it puzzles me that someone as intricately analytical as Greenspan would be oblivious to the effects of resonant feedback. I believe he may be one of the few people in the world who fully understands how the money supply levers actually effect the broader economy, and his claims of ignorance don't ring true to me. I've read Capitalism several times in the past few months. I was particularly interested in Greenspan's pieces on antitrust and the gold standard. I liked his "attack on integrity" piece too. I read his book after I had thoroughly digested his old essays, and with a specific eye to any changes in his outlook over the intervening 4 decades. Other than his dismissal of Rand's voluntary taxation (which he does not address in his old essays), I saw no evidence of a rejection of Objectivism. Quite the opposite, actually. I'd suggest you read his book. There's a lot there between the lines.

I'd suggest you read the book. In it, he is very admiring of Ayn Rand, and his dismissal of Objectivism consists entirely of questioning Rand's proposal at voluntary funding, which we know was a placeholder, as she said, the last of many steps in creating a free society. Rand was in the Oval Office, along with Greenspan's mother when he sworn in as an economic adviser in Ford's White House. He was at Rand's funeral in 1982, and he apparently remained close to her her entire life. He also speaks positively about the gold standard, saying its main weakness is that most people aren't ready to accept it again.

Does anyone know any good sources for economic systems analysis? (I'm talking systems analysis applied to economics, not analysis of economic systems) In control theory, the outputs of a system is fed via a feedback loop into one or more of its inputs in order to control system behavior. For instance, an aircraft altitude control system would measure altitude and feed surface controls to climb or descend in order to keep altitude steady. One of the principles of control theory is that resonances normally exist in an untuned system. In the example, if there is a delay between the climb/descend command and the actual climb or descent of the aircraft, you end up with a porpoising effect caused by overcorrections. In free-market economics, the system feedback is provided by money supply. As investments soar during a growth spurt, the amount of money available from banks drops, interest rates rise to reflect a shifting supply/demand point for loans, and the attractiveness of the investment decreases, stalling the bubble. The phase relationship of interest rates to economic growth sets up the porpoising resonance known as the business cycle. (Simplification, but the principles hold true) One mistake in control theory is to try to control the system too tightly. In the airplane example, this would be illustrated by a system which pitches up sharply to climb, then when passing through altitude, immediately pitches down to descend. Looking at an altitude indicator, you might see a system which is holding very tightly to its altitude profile, but stepping away from that one parameter, you would see an aircraft pitching violently up and down in order to keep the one parameter steady. This is a system in resonance, and it will continue in this mode until the resonance becomes too violent to counteract, at that point, the system "blows up" (figuratively and literally). A properly designed system is analyzed for all physical forces and actions and "tuned" to remove resonances. It allows some looseness in control as a trade off for stability. Taking this back to the economic world, the proper role of the Fed (assuming you see no value in a natural business cycle's purging of inefficient businesses), is to tune the economy so that the business cycle is dampened out and the economy can grow steadily. Two ways of doing this: In a proper tuning approach, you would try to sync the phases of the money supply and business activity so that money supply started dwindling sooner in the growth phase. This reduces, but does not eliminate the business cycle resonance, and creates a stable economy (not necessarily growing). In a tight control approach, you would jerk the controls up and down in response to the week-by-week behavior of the economy, not looking at long term stability, but only trying to hold one specific parameter in place. I believe we are in a tight control paradigm, and while the economy may seem pretty steady (though a little jittery) the controls are in a violent resonance that seems to be growing, and seems to have been growing since the late 90's. Now the question: Did Greenspan know so little about control theory that he allowed himself to be sucked into a tight control approach in order to maintain economic activity? Or, Did he analyze all the interactions and intentionally start a slow growing control resonance, knowing that it would be beyond control by the time he left the Fed, and that it would go critical long enough after he left to avoid serious blame? Or to put it simply: Did Rand's "Undertaker" cast himself as D'Anconia?

Yeah, I'm wrong in my last comments about integration of random inputs. There must be a processing element already present in the visual cortex that recognizes boundaries for us, just as the eyes focus light from reality onto sensing cells. These, in addition to the tactile, taste, smell, and hearing senses, provide a means of sensing physical interactions of reality. This all implies an innate "understanding" of the nature of reality, which has been evolved in humans over millions of years to optimize our ability to efficiently perceive. How do we consider the long-term (multi-generational) impact of perception, trial and error on our sense organs? Can we consider this a sort of "meta-perception" that has guided the evolution of our sensory capabilities and has provided us with the equivalent of experience regarding the nature of reality? (There's a trap there, in that it leaves open the possibility that other factors of human behavior, beyond perception, might be innate, though ["self-evidently"] ruled by a volitional, rational mind.) So, if we perceive boundaries, further auto-processing could reveal shapes, and further could reveal 4-D entities directly to our perceptive consciousness... Okay, I'll buy that we could perceive entities directly through visual inputs, and that discerning attributes could require conscious deconstruction of our perceptions. (But I still hold that the other senses present attributes that we can only transform into entities through conscious effort.) That's it for me. I'm way over my head philosophically, and I need to go learn some basics, including terminology. Thanks, ~A

Okay, these are fair. Entities exist. Existence exists. Reality is the source of all sensory inputs. All entities have attributes and are identified by them. Attributes can not exist without entities. Here's my problem with entities being primary, from the beginning of perception (i.e., birth or in utero): perception of an entity (which is being defined here as an object in reality, made of matter, with a definite boundary) requires the brain to organize the inputs of rods and cones to perceive the boundaries that define an entity. If the brain, at the moment of first perception, is able to make assumptions about the relative positions of the individual rods and cones input signals, in order to perceive shapes, it means that at that instant the brain must know the nature of the geometric relationship inherent in those neural entry points (into the visual cortex). This implies that the brain must know something, at least about itself, prior to the first input of sensory perception. This is a contradiction. To resolve the contradiction, I posit that the brain receives what appear initially to be random neural inputs from all its senses. It begins correlating movements, shapes, etc. to create a model of reality that is consistent with its sensory inputs. As we gain experience in resolving the sensory inputs into entities, we transfer that function to a subconscious so to the adult it is as if we just perceive entities. We perceive the attributes of entities and the entities themselves seemingly simultaneously. I back this up on two fronts: First, that it is impossible for us to make positive assertions about first perceptions by looking at our adult perceptions. Second, that I believe I've shown at least two examples of conscious integration of heat and taste sensations into entities. The feedback question is interesting, because there certainly is a "feedback loop" in which consciousness can alter reality. It's called "action." (But, no, perception is unidirectional from reality to the mind)

Okay, so what about glass? What about caramel? What about honey? What about maple syrup? Where, in the spectrum of viscosity, do you draw the line between entities and "secondary" entities (whatever that might mean). I assert that the distinction based on "fluidity" is arbitrary and evades the principle of what an entity truly is.

Nothing could be further from the truth. I'll quote myself from my post: Where in that do you find me claiming that attributes exist with entities? Could you please provide a definition of "primary" and "secondary" in this context? I'm not real good with floating abstractions. Thanks, ~A

"An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities." - Leonard Peikoff "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 3. I want to stress that this is not an argument against Objectivism, only against a specific interpretation by one individual. I know that you do not mean "rational" when you write "rationalistic." I think I made the distinction perfectly clear. Could you please provide a definition of "rationalistic?"

Hmmm... I think I want to retract my last post... Since "his life" obviously does not mean his state of being alive, in the biological sense, it must mean something else... Okay, I'll take a stab: "His life" is that which has the highest value to a man. Is that close?

Okay, you caught me. By "life" I meant the literal definition of "life" not the broader meaning, which includes the right to live life as you see fit, without fear of force against you or those who you value. By that broader definition, I will agree with your objection. The context of this discussion, however, was whether it's ever okay to give up (as opposed to "sacrifice") one's life in exchange for something of greater value. By Objectivist (i.e., rational) standards, I think we can agree that a life lived at someone else's whim very nearly approaches zero value. In the context of such an existence, the laying down of your life for the sake of your loved ones' escape from the same existence could be rationally justified. "Any action that a man undertakes for the benefit of those he loves is not a sacrifice if, in the hierarchy of his values, in the total context of the choices open to him, it achieves that which is of greatest personal (and rational) importance to him." - Ayn Rand, "Ethics of Emergencies" VOS 45.

I'm not sure what is meant here by "rationalistic," but it appears to be a substitution of an imprecisely chosen word* with negative connotations for the more applicable word: "rational." The method used by the rational mind to perceive, identify and integrate the material provided by the senses is: logic. Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. So let me restate using the correct term: "The problem is that you are being rational in order to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities." Yes, I believe I'm being rational, but no, the conclusion is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?). Peikoff's exclusion of fluids from entities leads to contradictions which are resolved only through the fudging of terms. To allow contradictions to exist under the cover of an undefined modifier, "secondary," is a violation of logic and an abrogation of reason. Without a precise definition, "secondary" is a floating abstraction, which apparently means: "any entity which does not meet my definition of entity." A kind of circular anti-reasoning. I've searched for a definition of "secondary," and the closest I've found is "an entity composed of other entities," referring, in two cases, to "society" and "culture." These are abstractions which can only be recognized by the rational integration of perceived entities. I suspect that was the original intent of "secondary," and it is indeed a useful and discriminatory term. Air does not meet this definition of "secondary," because I can see it (in the presence of suspensions of solid or liquid particulates) and I can feel it, not only its radiated heat, but haptically and kinesthetically, when it blows against me. Water, another apparently excluded entity, most certainly can be touched and seen. This observation is not a rejection of Objectivism; it is meant to explore and resolve an apparent contradiction in a specific interpretation. (which contradiction I don't believe existed in Rand's writing) * This assumes that we have the same concept in mind when using the term "rationalistic": "The doctrine that reason alone is a source of knowledge and is independent of experience."

I think the point Rand is trying to make is that the individual is responsible for the value he puts on things, including his own life. It's "okay" by Objectivist philosophy to value someone else more than your own life. The trade, of your life for theirs, is then a net gain based on your values, even though you're not around to "enjoy" it. This makes it apparent that Rand approved of volitional suicide (I think she mentions in the Donahue interview that she would kill herself in an instant if she believed in an afterlife), which is right in line with the supremacy of the individual in personal decisions. What is evil is making those value judgments for someone else, whether it is their life or a loaf of bread you are valuing for them. So making the judgment that no one should kill themselves for another is a mistake.

This is an interesting problem. A loss is incurred for negligent behavior, so the compensation is an attempt to fairly distribute that loss between the perpetrator and the victim. I say that because it certainly can't be intended to be a fair compensation for the victim's loss, to the point where the victim would willingly incur the same loss for the given compensation (that is, make a value profit on the exchange). In contrast to typical market exchanges which necessarily provide both sides with a value profit, the compensation here should be intended to balance, as fairly as possible, the loss of the "exchange." The problem is that with market exchanges, the value judgments that determine mutual profit are subjective, that is the seller must value the buyer's money more than the product, and the buyer must value the product more than the money, else the exchange will not happen (assuming no force). Here the "exchange" (or at least half of it) is a fait accompli, and it is up to the court to determine how much the victim "values" his loss, as well as how much the perpetrator will value the loss of the penalty amount. Trying to balance those is necessarily a subjective process (and that's not even counting the additional loss to both sides incurred by legal counsel). I don't know that you can get around requiring a rational evaluation of the specific circumstances, including to some extent the subjective values to each side.

Sounds like a 0 braner to me...

Yes. I'm a philosophy dilettante, so bear with me if this seems unsophisticated, but I am struggling with Objectivism and I think I see light... The attempts at exemplary definition of "entity" do not seem to bear up to close scrutiny, and certainly do not meet with universal agreement (even among those who think they hold the same philosophy). This leads me to believe that entity is a subjective concept, open to interpretation by the individual. Is a forest an entity, is a gravitational field, is air, is reason, is God? Ask a dozen Objectivists and you'll get a dozen answers (well, maybe not to all of those). The same seems to hold true for "perception" which we tie closely to entities, although there is disagreement over whether an illusion or a pattern (e.g., a constellation) is an entity, a perception, both, or neither. Concept seems to be pretty universal, if I read correctly, and refers to pretty much anything you can "get" via sensation, reason, imagination, or any combination (that's probably a weak statement, but let it go unless it's critical). Reality is the place where percepts, concepts and entities tie together to either define (as in Objectivism) or muddy (as in existentialism) the concept (and even the possibility). The problem I have is in the assertions that automatically equate perception to reality in the absence of [something else]. Here's why: I dream. (ok, let me know when you're finished rolling your eyes and groaning...) Every night I have vivid dreams with "real" people, places, situations, etc., and I can't tell, while I'm having them, that they are not "real." Hypothetically, what if (I know... but just go through this), every night, while I slept, someone spirited me to a strange location with strange situations and strange people, so that every morning when I woke up, "things" were different. Further, suppose, that for whatever reason (or none) my dreams, while I was sleeping, maintained a causal constancy during the night and from one night to the next. I "dream" up this scenario, not to argue as children and bad poets (& philosophers) do, that "reality" might be a dream, and what we think are dreams, reality. I enter this scenario only to explore the relationships between percepts, concepts, entities and reality. Don't get me wrong: I know which is reality and which is dreams. But, I know which is real, not through direct, automatic perception, but through rational processing of my perceptions. In the scenario given, if my dreams were consistent and causal, and my waking experience was random and fragmented, I believe I would have a hard time making the distinction; in fact, I believe I might get it wrong. That's not an argument that there's a possibility that we do get it wrong and that we can't fully trust our senses. It's simply an argument that our rational faculties are what we use to interpret the concept of "reality" from our perceptions. When I say "reality" I guess I mean our rational understanding of reality and its nature, not the strictly automatic causal reality that creates response from instinctive beings. In other words I guess I'm redefining "reality" as our rational cognition that reality is "real" as opposed to a non-thinking approach that governs an irrational creature's response to its perceptions, which it cannot conceptualize as reality (or can it?). Reason, in this point of view, is the glue that holds percepts, concepts and entities into a consistent, logical whole which we call "reality" and which provides us with a wholly consistent (and thus "true") model of reality. It is the constancy, consistency and causality of reality that clue us in to its true nature. Of course, I suppose one could argue that I've just transformed a trivial distinction of the definition of fundamentals into a trivial distinction of the definition of reality. I think my ultimate question is whether we come to a cognition of reality (including its nature) through perception or through rational processing of perception. And if the latter, is that consistent with Objectivism? (I think there's enough leeway, but I'm not an expert)

The relationship between percepts, concepts, entities and reality. Unless we can precisely define the fundamental concepts of a philosophy, all conclusions based thereon become progressively fuzzy. Am I wrong is claiming that "entity" is a fundamental concept?

Doesn't an energy field, I'm thinking of gravity, fail all three tests? There is an important philosophical conclusion that depends on the precise definition of "entity." Depending on what that definition is, the definition of matter might come into play.

But, is a photon - is energy - "matter?" (not can it be converted, but is it - I believe this is a semantic question which must be answered by definition, not inspection. Until it is, the discussion loses its conceptual moorings) For me this issue goes hand-in-hand with the one on entities, winding down on the "A is A" discussion. Conceptually we say that a thing "is composed of matter." This implies that matter (or being composed of matter) is an attribute of a thing. Because of the nature of matter, we can say either that it is made of matter, of a certain type of matter, or of a specific set of matter (others?). If I see five golden rings, I recognize first that they are made of matter, then, by closer inspection, that they are each made of the same type of matter, but not of the same set of matter. In addition to being made of a certain type of matter (an attribute which implies a host of other attributes - density, color, malleability - shared by other things made of the same type of matter), the rings have other, non-matter-dependent attributes, such as form, size, orientation, temperature, velocity, etc. The two questions still hanging from the entity discussion are: Does matter necessarily entail entity? (I've gotten two opposing opinions on this question) Does entity necessarily entail matter? (ditto)

Yeah, it's not like the stadiums emptied when steroid use was revealed. What's really scary is Clinton offered this guy Harry Blackmun's seat on SCOTUS in 1994.

If air is not an entity, but air has attributes, then the attributes of air are entity-less attributes. If I'm wrong, where is my error? But Rand asserts: "Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities" - Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 18. How is this not a contradiction? (This is not an attempt at a trap, but a serious question. I do take Objectivism seriously, which is why I question any premise which leads to a logical contradiction.) Thanks, ~A

Sorry, I know I was being a smart-ass, but intended no disrespect. The point of the dialog was to illustrate that the concept "entity" evades attempts at specific exemplary definitions. (or maybe just examples of what they are not) Even Peikoff falls into the trap when he states that air is not an entity*. That example leads us to an entity-less attribute (hot or humid), which contradicts Rand's definition of 'attribute.' The contradiction forces us to challenge the premises: 1 - Air is not an entity. 2 - No attribute can exist without an entity. 3 - Air has attributes. I assert that metaphysically, (3) is true. Therefore, either (1) or (2) must be false, because (1) and (3) disproves (2), while (2) and (3) disproves (1). So which is false? Choosing the principle over the example, I'm forced to accept that attributes belong to entities, and that air is therefore an entity. This leads me to the next tough question: Does an entity exist without perception? If so, and I believe Rand's answer is 'yes,' then the definition of entity as "what is given in sense perception" leads to another contradiction. If the illusions we spoke of earlier are not "entities" then how can they be "given in sense perception." This leads us perhaps to a refinement of entity as "a thing existing in reality which is given in sense perception." This leads us in turn to a new challenge, which is defining "existing in reality" in terms of our sensory perception. That is where the hard work of philosophy takes place, and at first glance I believe it has to do with a recognition of the non-contradictory nature of "real" percepts. (Moderator, since this discussion is off-topic, would it be worthwhile to split it off into "what is an entity?") *: "An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities." - Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 3.

Could you consider the sentence a logical short circuit, because the conclusion is the premise? Is there a term for this? Here is another one: "This sentence is true."

Imaginary conversation, with my imaginary son: "Dad, what's the definition of entity?" "It's self-evident!" "Okay, but what is it?" "An entity is a thing you perceive!" "Like a galaxy?" "No, you have to hold it in your hand!" "What about a pile of acorns?" "No, that's more than one entity! You perceive each acorn, and your mind makes up the concept 'pile!'" "What if they're glued together and I pick them up in one piece." 'That's a secondary entity - you perceived the acorn first, the pile is secondary, even if they're glued!" "What about a popcorn ball?" "Caramel or marshmallow? - no, wait, ... doesn't matter - entity!" "What about a forest, is that an entity?" "That's a secondary entity, because the trees aren't all one thing!" "But if I see it from a mile up, I can't see the trees." "Okay, then it's an entity!" "What if I see it from half a mile up?" "Then the trees are entities, and you make up the forest!" "What if the guy next to me is short-sighted, and can't see the trees, is it a forest to him, and trees to me?" "No! There's only one reality, and it's not different for different people!" "Well then, which is it?" "You're normal; he's abnormal. Secondary!" "What if it's on TV?" ... (etc.) Yup, I'm still trying to figure out what an entity is...