Plasmatic
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Posts posted by Plasmatic
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39 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?
I am not attacking mental causation as such. Your formulation of mental causation as performed by some set of mental entities within the physical entity possessing consciousness is what I object to.
Also, you are dropping the context of the absolute necessity of using words as "perceptual concretes" in order to transform concepts into mental entities. This is what enables us to treat concepts as though they were perceptual concretes, without forgetting that they are not, that the words are nearly symbols that are substituted for all of the concrete units in the class.
Abstractions do not happen to man. Man performs abstraction.
ITOE:
"In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of Visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, ie, that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. [...]Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. "
Don't forget that "concepts serve as units and are treated epistemologically as if each were a single (mental) concrete—always remembering that metaphysically (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of actual concretes of a certain kind. " ITOE
You are treating the epistemological sense of concepts as though this is a metaphysical status apart from the concretes they are substituted for.
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On November 20, 2016 at 9:59 AM, MisterSwig said:
Rather in the mental and concrete senses--keeping in mind that by concrete we don't mean a physical entity, but a mental one.
Here it is laid out. There is no such thing as a mental concrete. You fundamentally misunderstand the role of words/language as providing concepts with concreteness. Introspection without language/concepts is limited to animal level consciousness. (And I mean language above first-level concepts and into abstractions)
Seriously, answer my first question in this thread clearly and you should see a problem for your formulation.
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8 hours ago, MisterSwig said:
So it seems that the mental realm is without space, and thus without dependence or independence among its various mental entities. Which is not to say, however, that mental entities cannot have an existential dependence upon physical entities such as the human body.
Consciousness is spatially located in the human body/brain. Are you saying that mental phenomenon are a separate ontological realm inhabited by mental entities but that is causally dependent on the physical? Or do you think that the mind is ontologically separable from the physical?
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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Meaning and mental content in general constitute the premises which inform decisions which are the substance of choice and free will, the generator of human action...
Be careful to note that this can be taken as meaning substance dualism. Particularly in the context of a conversation with someone who is expressing a dualist ontology.
I'm really just a bystander... who has injected himself a bit over much here as regards what others are saying... I do hope what I am saying by way of addition is at least somewhat useful.
Hope I don't sound like I am beating you up.
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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Meaning and mental content in general constitute the premises which inform decisions which are the substance of choice and free will, the generator of human action... if you have not by this already repudiated consciousness as causative in the universe you are at the very least building a slippery slope toward it.
I think you interpreted "meaning" in my comment in a way I didn't "mean"..... I wasn't talking about meaning itself, the subject of semantics.
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5 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Of course there is no "separate metaphysical realm". This I think is either a result of misunderstanding or miscommunication or both. For myself I did interpret this from Mr. Swig's posts (and I certainly do not claim it myself) as alleging this.
There is however something unique about our view of the one metaphysical realm. In real ways we are not cut off from reality, but ALL things other than what we ARE, are cut off from what it is like to BE what WE are. This follows from identity.
The fact that a bat or a machine or an alien intelligence can NEVER know what it is like to be a human, have a human feeling, have a human thought process, be humanly conscious, means there IS something about reality which WE see and experience as humans which is unique and are not viewable from any other point of view. NO third person description of it can be adequate to a non human to cause such a knowledge, nothing short of a supernatural temporary transformation of identity would suffice, and such is impossible. In this and perhaps other ways the mental is completely distinct from the "out there", we CAN and DO see it, and nothing else could. Introspection and mental content are a special kind of thing happening, amongst the vast multitude of various things happening, in the one metaphysical realm.
This reality is unavoidable... it should not be dismissed.
Yes, what you are referring to is called the first person nature of consciousness. I explicitly accept that as true. However, swig has attached something else to this premise which is false. I am sure of it. Perhaps reread his comments?
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9 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Meaning and mental content in general constitute the premises which inform decisions which are the substance of choice and free will, the generator of human action... if you have not by this already repudiated consciousness as causative in the universe you are at the very least building a slippery slope toward it.
My point is very simply that actions are actions of entities that entities are their attributes. We dont need a seperate metaphysical realm to except that man does what he does consciously, because of what he thinks.
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2 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
One should attempt to avoid false dichotomies between body and mind. Rand was not a dualist and Objectivism does not point towards dualism. It also does not point toward mechanical determinism.
Volitional Consciousness is fundamental to all of Objectivism, its very concept of consciousness, any intelligibility to its epistemology, the very meaning of ethics. Careful integration of volition with nature which makes it possible is what is required.
Stray away from consciousness being a first cause in human action and all of its consequences, and you have not just had a quibble with Objectivism and Rand, you have utterly rejected both.
Did you mean to direct this at me? I don't see how you could derive this from what Ive said.
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On November 19, 2016 at 7:02 PM, MisterSwig said:
Consciousness is not "all action." It's mental entities in action.
If you accept the mental realm, then you must accept mental existence. And if you accept mental existence, then you must accept the mental units (or entities) from which you abstracted the concept of mental existence.
Here is the fundamental mistake swig is making. Oism is not a metaphysical dualist philosophy. There is no "mental realm" if you intend to mean by that a ontological category apart from concretes. Even the linguistic tools used that transform concepts into "mental entities" are concrete physically causal aspects of the only metaphysical realm there is.
Yes swig is presenting a platonic view in his ontology of consciousness.
It follows from swig's view that abstraction is a taking out from the physical into a platonic, spiritual realm.
Swig, do you also think that the self, or will, inhabits the physical body like a soul but is not causally derived from it?
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19 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:
Abhorring is not precisely the adjective she chose. It does suggest that she is calling for greater precision in the agreement on terminology.
Let me rephrase my question: Do you think that a unique conceptual vocabulary is warranted, or new discoveries have to be made in the mental realm in order to sanctify it?
I don't think that the primary axiomatic concept of entity changes with context....
I think we have all the info we need to understand how concepts are only entities in a derivative, non primary sense.
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5 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:
Rand, in the appendix referenced earlier by MisterSwig, stated she was against neologisms. Given the degree of difficulty of the subject, are mental entities/mental somethings just a matter of agreeing on the terminology, or is more needed to flesh out in order to warrant a unique conceptual vocabulary for articulating the mental realm? I'm leaning toward more clarifying differentiation is needed.
Where she mentions abhorring neologisms she specifically says that she doesn't mean mental "entity" in the sense of primary substance qua Aristotle. Meaning its not the kind of thing that constitutes a cause.
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Remember that what exists in the primary sense are entities. The category "existent" is cognitively useful to differentiate manmade, abstract phenomenon from metaphysical primaries.
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21 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
To your comment, not sure what you mean by "use concretes to symbolize them". are you essentially saying a feeling is only an entity if we can identify concrete feelings such as fear, anger, pleasure?
No, a feeling qua experience, is not an entity at all. The concept of a feeling is only a mental entity by the device of concrete substitution in language via a word.
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SL (good to talk to u)
You do realize though that Ms. Rand herself qualified this sense of entity as precisely not what swig wants it to be in the appendix of ITOE? Concepts are only entities in as much as we use concretes to symbolize them. And that in a substitution sense.
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Strictly, the first person nature of conscious awareness is not an argument for "non-physical" causation, or treating concepts as causal agents.
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I hesitate to log in to post in this thread because I have temporarily tabled this very topic with some Oist Academics....
Mr Swig's position on mental entities is wrong and fundamentally misunderstands a very simply aspect of the process of abstraction.
Anyone can reduce this treatment of "mental entities" as causal agents of some non physical kind to absurdity by asking themselves "what final act in the process of abstraction "transforms concepts into mental entities"?
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Don, conspiracy theories are subject to the same justification process as any other truth claim. Many folks behave as though a conspiracy is species of logical fallacy. Whats funny is that I find within short order these types actually assert a conspiracy to dismiss one.
"This video is a fake contrivance to prove the claim X".
Dont get me wrong, I generally don't waste time investigating C theories but I don't then claim they are false without having checked the claimants evidence.
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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:
1) that which one seeks to gain or keep
2) that which one seeks to gain or keep to further their life
It's not that there is a radical difference, but they certainly specify the context and if [...]This would be necessary epistemologically because it allows you to keep in mind how you induce or develop your ethical theory. You can't understand value as something that furthers your life without first understanding that people seek, desire, or keep things for all kinds of reasons, even irrational reasons. I'll listen to the relevant lecture again soon probably.
Everything you say here pertains only to a single persons context. Kaladin is referring to both a general concept of value and a disagreement between Kaladin and another's particular values.
The referents of the teleological differences between Kaladin and this other persons particular value judgements are not the same at all. Therefore, this "principle" does not apply.
Louie said:
QuoteKaladin's friend is talking about a specific ethical theory about value, or just pointing out that some people value power over others.
And that specific difference negates the equation of Kaladins specific ethical premises with this other persons as an instance of this "principle", as I understand it.
Also, any definition of value that does not root itself in the rational self interest of live preserving action is false. This is true along with the fact that there is a general concept of value as against the particular context of ones personal value choices.
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Louie said:
QuoteBut there is no confusion, and the other definition is not invalid. That's the point. If the other definition were not valid, that would pose a problem for developing a normative theory of value.
Which is the "other definition" you are referring to?
This whole thread is confusing because Kaladin is pointing at two different sets of values from two different teleological measurers. The "two definitions" are from completely different ethical contexts and therefore it does not seem relevant to Dr. Peikoff's "principle" (from what I can derive from Grames notes and comments from his older thread on the same topic) :
When Ms. Rand discusses definition change in ITOE it is from within a single persons framework and their context of knowledge.
So far I don't see this "principle" as even necessary epistemologically. I'll download the lecture to make certain.
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Mike, its not clear who and what you are responding to.
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Kaladin said:
Quote2) The "principle of two definitions" says that no equivocation takes place because the same referents are specified and in Objectivism the meaning of a concept are its referents, i.e. two different meanings are not being employed. Now say my friend says power over others is a value (using the basic definition of value) because it is something he acts to gain and/or keep and I say power over others is not a value (using the definition of value wherein the normative perspective of Objectivism is imported - "...neither love nor fame nor cash is a value if obtained by fraud..."). He is referring to the fact that he acts to gain and/or keep power over others and I am referring to the fact that he acts to gain and/or keep something non-conducive to man's survival qua man. Power over others and something non-conducive to man's survival qua man here refer to the same thing yet it would seem like the two of us mean something very different. He is saying power is a value and I am saying power is not a value despite that the fact that both of us mean the exact same thing (colloquially, this assertion would be baffling to most people I'm sure). Therefore what word or concept should be used to explain our differences since it is not true that we mean different things (perspective?) and/or do propositions take on or add an element of meaning beyond that of its constituent concepts?
I dont see this as an instance of the "principle of 2 definitions". I see this as simply a context of a general instance of a concept and a particular instance of the same concept.
A value is something one acts to gain and or keep. To satisfy this range of measurents one must have something one acts to gain and keep but may persue anything as an object to be gained and kept.
Your particular values have specific measurements that fall within the general range of value as such.
Understanding this will help to avoid the fallacy of the frozen abstraction.
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/frozen_abstraction,_fallacy_of.html
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Rand defines measurement it the section of ITOE titled "Cognition and Measurement". I don't see anything there that would require her to define beyond what any dictionary could provide one about what a quantity is, or a relationship.
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I'm curious Mike, are you interested in Objectivism as a system of factual identifications, or are you just working to obtain ideational fluency?
Either way, your doing a good job.
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SK said:
QuoteSuppose that fundamental entities have an inherent characteristic of shape. Suppose that this shape can only be one of two, cube or sphere.
It is possible to decompose such an entity into two entities with no shape.
This generalizes to any collection of characteristics with any possible number of values.
Why should anyone "suppose" any of this? What philosophical principle leads one to do so? What evidence is there that it is "possible" one can decompose any entity into a shapeless boundary that acts?
I have a bunch of catch up posts to do. Particularly about mischaracterizations of my 5 answers. I will try to do so tonight.
Mental Entities and Causality
in Metaphysics and Epistemology
Posted · Edited by Plasmatic
It makes absurd the notion that this sense of "mental entity" is a ontological distinction justifying dualism. It makes no sense to say that perceptual concretes must be used in order to treat a concept as a concrete and thats what makes concepts "mental concretes" in a metaphysical sense. Mental entities are epistemic but we can treat them "as if" they were concretes by substituting real concretes in language. We can treat concepts "as if" they were concretes only because we use concretes to symbolize them.