Plasmatic
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Posts posted by Plasmatic
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30 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
Indeed, if someone is claiming to be honestly confused about something, it is best to encourage them to ask questions.
Why the constant form of affirmation then denial in your posts?
Like, "Yes, I disagree".
Your statement is a completely different "if-then", that would be a contradiction of the one your quoting.
Why not just state your contention for why the previous conditional is false?
Edit: Notice that my initial comment to SN leaves open the question at issue.
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Dustin, Ms. Rand repudiates the concept "egotist" in The Virtue of Selfishness. She makes a sharp distinction between rational egoism and hedonism, as well as "predatory egoism"....
You would do well to look these up.
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Software, if Dustin is trolling, then by his own comments, he was encouraged to do so by a moderator "privately".
I would hope that gives you a cause to reflect on both your Mods and Dustin....to be fair.
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SK said:
QuoteIf all Objectivism refers to in its metaphysics is epistemological relations between metaphysical concepts, then it is only talking about Being qua concept, but not Being qua Being.
Being is a concept. The referents of that concept is metaphysically all the entities that exist. (All other "existents" are epistemically isolated from entities)
edit: but your criticism of Louie is correct in that context. Metaphysics is about what exists apart from epistemic relations (cognitive neccessity). That is why epistemic "fundamentality" as regards "similarity"-essentiality, is not about causal priority.
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Grames said:
QuoteFundamentality" can be applied to the realm of epistemology, and it can be applied to the realm of metaphysics, and it can be applied to the realm of physics, and what is found to be fundamental can be (in fact, IS) completely different referents in all three contexts.
Could you give examples to clarify what you mean here? Because, as stated, I don't recognize this notion as anything Oism holds. If the hierarchy of knowledge is a ladder then what is philosophically fundamental is below what is physically fundmental but what is fundamental in physics will always be a species of what is philosophically fundamental. It is an iterative process.
In ITOE Rand does make a metaphysical vs epistemic fundamentality distinction where the metaphysical is referring to the causal, or "by means of which" (to use Searle's terminology) , the characteristics that give rise to or make the most others possible. Ms. Rand herself called this sense of entity the "primary" sense in the appendix while discussing metaphysical vs epistemic "priority". There, "society" can epistemically be called and entity but is in fact metaphysically dependent on the individuals that comprise it.
Edit:
Are you simply meaning that epistemic fundamentality is about what is "most essential" to cognition and that may be any given characteristic, which doesn't really have to do with hierarchy qua logical invariance across all concepts? How would physics fit into that?
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I don't think that either Harriman or Dr. Peikoff claims that there was a question of whether there could have been a non-entity as a cause of what we know as atomic weight.
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Louie said:
QuoteI know you're not, so I stopped talking about abstraction and focused on metaphysically primary.
No, you need to review your own sequence of comments. You made one post and I asked for clarity. You clarified you were referring to your "last paragraph" after "Plasmatic". You stated "I explained the issue with what you said" in your next post following the "Plasmatic" paragraph and then you asked for me to "clarify". In that sequence of posts I already did clarify what you asked about.
I'll address the rest tonight.
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DW said:
QuoteEven to consider an atom as fundamentally an entity, physics had to integrate the data from many disparate areas to arrive at the atomic theory, as explored in both The Logical Leap, by David Harriman and the parallel audio presentation of Induction in Physics and Philosophy, by Leonard Peikoff
Do you happen to know where this is claimed in either reference, that the axiomatic concept entity had to be induced as relates to the instantiation of it in atoms?
The very idea is ridiculous. Imagine If one said we have to run an experiment to verify if atoms have identity.....
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Philosophy does dictate to physics however, that it cannot violate metaphysical principles. What is meant by "fundamental entity" is not a physics question. What qualities those fundamental entities have, is a physics question. Notice that quote does pressuppose that what is "apart from mans form of perception", is "objects".
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SK, the referents of all epistemic primaries are metaphysical primaries. Louie doesn't understand this.
All "perceptual" primaries are the result of metaphysically given facts. The fact that there is nothing mind independent but entities. There is nothing optional about first level concepts. That part of epistemic hierarchy is metaphysically constrained.
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20 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
I'm referring to all of my post after I said "Plasmatic", as in the very last paragraph I wrote in my first post. It's problematic to me what you were saying. I saw the quote you posted. Yes, they are perceptual primaries, that's all the quote shows. Says nothing about metaphysically irreducible. Just to clarify, especially with regard to SK's questions, would you explain more what precisely metaphysically irreducible is?
You keep playing this game. I already did "clarify" that I am not referring to "abstraction" by saying "No Louie, integration is here a metaphysical term.". Your "sounds like abstraction" is a question about what I meant by "integration". You require no more clarity than my express denial of what you thought it "sounded like". I have quoted the relevant other excerpts many times over the years and you still respond as though you have no idea what Rand has to say on metaphysical primaries! Shall I point you to the many posts where I have pointed out the direct quotes about metaphysical primaries that you keep pretending doesn't exist?
What does "observer based metaphysics" mean?
Edit:
What more can I say about metaphysically irreducible than "not made as a result of integration of other entities into a new whole."?
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Just now, Eiuol said:
This would sound like observer-based metaphysics which I don't think Objectivism is or aims to be. I mean, I explained the issue I see in what you said, you're welcome to show I'm wrong or to clarify. The only confusion here is what you mean (that's exactly why I am asking).
I don't understand what the above is saying.
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33 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
Specifically in the given Peikoff quote, only primary entities are spoken of. Primary in that sense was immediately available to your perception. This would not indicate that primary entities are metaphysically fundamental, only that they are fundamental to your recognizing those other existents. If they were metaphysically fundamental, that sounds like observer based metaphysics to me.
Objectivism considers entities as the "only metaphysical primaries" and the cause of action. You are simply not taking the whole context of what Oism says about entities as primaries and that is the cause of your many year long confusion of metaphysics and epistemology in relation to entities.. EDIT: Entities are perceptual primaries because there is nothing else to observe! Even regarding the discovery of fundamental constituents Ms Rand agrees you have to bring it back to the perceptual.
QuoteWhen you talk about discovering the ultimate constituents of the universe, remember that in order to discover them, no matter by what calculations or by what machinery, you had to bring them to your perceptual level. You would have to say "this particle" is that which acts in such and such a way on subatomic particles, which act in such and such a way on atoms, which act in such and such a way on molecules, and all of that results in a material object such as this glass as distinguished from other material objects such as this ashtray. Unless you bring it back to the perceptual level, it's not knowledge. That is what has to be kept in mind always in speculating about ultimate causes, which have to be discovered by some, at present, unknown means. You still always have to bring it back to your sensory-perceptual level, otherwise it's not knowledge.
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37 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
Plasmatic, isn't this sense of fundamental you are speaking of in an epistemic angle? You said "not made as a result of integration of other entities" which would sound like abstraction, when things like atoms are not abstractions. I am not sure if SK is speaking of here about being metaphysically irreducible, or epistemologically irreducible, but I think metaphysically irreducible is the point.
No Louie, integration is here a metaphysical term. Ms. Rand used the terms "welded together physically" to refer to the singular status of being a "whole" as against a collection of "parts".
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1 hour ago, SpookyKitty said:
So which entities are fundamental? Are fundamental entities more like people, rocks, and chairs, or are they more like subatomic particles?
I think that they are more like subatomic particles.
The answer is found in the meaning of the concept fundamental. That means irreducible, not made as a result of integration of other entities into a new whole. Both fundamental entities and rocks are instances of "1" regardless of whether they resulted from integration. Your previous error was precisely treating fundamentals as "0" ("nothing").
1 hour ago, SpookyKitty said:1) Can an entity act on itself?
2) Can a fundamental entity act on itself?
3) If one entity acts on another, is it true that the other also acts on the first?
4) If entity A acts on entity B and entity B acts on C, does A act on C?
EDIT:
Oh and one final question, do actions exist in the same sense that entities do?
1). If it the kind of entity that does have self generated action (LIVING ORGANISM), certainly. Do other entities act on themselves? Depends on how broadly you define "self generated action"
2). See above
3). That is called an "interaction"
4). This is the reason Aristotle developed different causation types. To attempt to deal with these types of contextual questions.
5). That is difficult to answer due to the ambiguity possible because of the axiomatic nature of the concept "existence". They both "exist" but actions are entity dependent, causally.
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Dustin said:
Quote^This video is the real deal, guys. Now you have three choices. You can be part of our collective, or you can be part of their collective, or you can be trampled underfoot by their collective. Randian individualism is not going to be a choice in the future. I hope you make the right choice, guys. I really do.
Given the above statement and your stated desire to defend the homeland from "their collective" with no alternative but "our collective" you appear to be saying rather clearly that "if your not for "us" your against "us" ".
It's interesting your point about "moderates" enabling extremists. Folk's like Hanoi Jane coddled the reprehensible evil that was the communist advocates of such great immorality as the force wielding North.
Leonard Peikoff admonished against the "Kissinger's of Philosophy" in the 1976 lectures. I recommend anyone here who values Objectivism to read "The Anatomy of Compromise" by Ayn Rand
I consider you every bit as extreme as your "their collective" and that is not a "moderate" position.
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50 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
Which part isn't necessary? I am only trying to show that it didn't seem like you understood the Objectivist position of the way a concept is reduced to perception. It doesn't mean finding the particular (if by particular you mean a concrete object) of the concept unless it is first-level (as in things like apple, firetruck, dog, etc). We aren't looking for a "gravity particle" necessarily for example.
This is a very confused statement. All reduction terminates in perception, which is always of particulars.
Second, why do you think scientist are looking for "gravitons"?
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3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:
So if you don't believe something, it is invalid to question it or consider its existence?
I have no idea how you got this from what I said.
3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:But no, the two things are not the same, because gravity is not a metaphysical concept but a physical one.
Yes, but you are questioning both for the same reasons. You don't see how gravity is differentiated from anything because you see it as ubiquitously present in everything you can point at. (blue sphere or a cup makes no difference)
3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:You have misunderstood the nature of the question. If epistemology claims that all valid concepts arise from distinctions among entities (concrete or abstract) and if you have a valid concept (in this case, gravity) which does not arise in that way, then there is a problem. Either the account is false and must be modified, or gravity is an invalid concept. (Or gravity is a valid concept consistent with the standard account of concept formation, in which case it must be proven that it is).
Your claim that this is not the case is a denial of simple logic.
First, axiomatic concepts are not formed the same way as other concepts and that is the type of concept you were struggling with how to form previously. You see what appears to you a similarity with gravity. Second, It is you who are making a logical error. If you need epistemology to tell you if gravity is a valid concept you cannot use gravity to tell if your epistemology is valid because you need to know what a valid concept is first...
3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:Hierarchy inversion is when epistemology is used to prove or disprove an empirical claim or vice versa. But gravity is not an empirical claim. It is a concept that is used to explain emirical facts, and its validity is open to philosophical scrutiny.
Gravity is not an empirical claim? You are more confused than I thought. Even philosophical concepts are empirically based. What on earth is your definition of empirical then? All concepts are open to philosophical scrutiny concerning validity. Its the availability of the facts that differentiate a concept as related to one science or the other, because the methods used are necessarily different, given the availability of the facts.
3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:Yes, exactly. A scientific concept can fail to be valid, in which case it would not contradict the epistemological claim. If gravity is an invalid concept, then there is no problem.
But you cannot determine if gravity is valid without knowing what the standard of validity is! How do you not see the self refuting nature of your statement?
3 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:Well General Relativity considers them as such, so tough luck.
Oh and mass-energy actually curves spacetime, so there's that.
Heh, this is a refutation of your repeated claim to embrace the special vs general distinction between philosophy and science!
"Relativity says these concepts are causes so the philosophical science that is responsible for defining what constitutes a valid cause is out of luck"
I think I'm wasting my time here...
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2 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:
There is no "foil" or a "rejection" of anything. When something can be questioned, I question it.
Questioning is good, when your questions are valid ones! Your questions are indeed the result of your current skepticism-rejection of the very things I mentioned.
Your comment:
QuoteTo illustrate the problem, let's say that I say that I have discovered an entirely new thing, and I call it "nuyp". When you ask me to define "nuyp", I point to a random object in the room and say, "That is nuyp." And we go on like this for a long time until you finally give up on trying to understand what "nuyp" even is. You then tell me, "This isn't working. Just tell me, in plain English, what a 'nuyp' is."
Is indeed a reiteration of your earlier claim that ostensive definitions are not sufficient for defining metaphysical concepts because they don't reduce to perception
Those two, skepticism and questioning are not mutually exclusive.
I don't think you know what I meant by a hierarchy inversion. You have to use the science of epistemology to discover any fact. You don't use a discovery of special science to question epistemology for that reason. The question you are asking doesn't even depend on the theoretical conception in GR, or of gravity to be asked. The question "are there concepts that are valid but do not reduce to a base in perceptual entities" does not depend on any special science knowledge whatever and there is no special privilege granted to any special science concepts that exclude it from philosophical scrutiny.
Edit: "Does gravity reduce to perception"?
a special science concept, particularly one involving theoretical objects could fail to be a valid concept and still not answer the philosophical question "are there concepts that are valid but do not reduce to a base in perceptual entities".
2 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:Your calling this geniuine epistemological problem a "heirarchy inversion" is just a cop-out to avoid having to think.
On the contrary, I have done quite a lot of thinking on the Philosophy of Science and Physics. It's one of my favorite subjects. Enough thinking to know that neither "events", nor "space", nor "time" constitute special science concepts and that none of them qualify as "causes"... Whatever the particulars that possess mass interact with, it isn't any of those three.
2 hours ago, SpookyKitty said:No, mass does not "cause" gravitation. A cause is a relationship between events in spacetime, according to GR. Neither Stress-energy (which includes mass) nor spactime curvature are "events", so it doesn't make any sense to say that one causes the other. They are related, but the relationship is not causal. Rather, the relationship between them is that of a physical law.
See above. I only mentioned mass because I don't recognize the rest as qualifying as causal agents. (Even here there is a question for me because the Ricci tensor is 0)
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On May 11, 2016 at 11:18 AM, Eiuol said:
If going "smaller" towards fundamental objects is valid, it would seem like going "bigger" is valid too. If an atom is made of objects, and we treat it as an object, then it may be possible the sum of all objects, e.g. the universe, is an object.
You are reiterating what has already been dealt with in this thread. Entities are an integrated whole making them "one". You keep making the "pin cushion" error concerning entities. Attributes are not "parts" of an entity, they are the entity. Entities are not empty vessels that contain attributes.
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Its instructive to note how the skepticism of both ostensive definition and a reduction of a concept that applies to all contexts, is being reiterated here just as it was laid out in the "foundation of physics" thread.
The concept of gravity was a rhetorical device, a foil for the rejection of the reduction of fundamental concepts to perception.
"Either reject gravity or reject your epistemology" is a rank hierarchy inversion.
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SK said:
QuoteGravity, by contrast seems to be caused by nothing at all, ....
This is not true anyway. Look up the relationship of mass to GR for the Consensus view of gravitation.
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SK, aren't you simply trying to discuss the ontology of forces?
Your question about gravity is essentially asking, "what do I differentiate gravity from to form the concept if it is universal", right?
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SK said:
QuoteAn abstraction is precisely the collection of its particulars.
No, the meaning of an abstraction is its units, past, present and future. Abstraction qua abstraction is a cognitive process.
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/unit.html
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/meaning_(of_concepts).html
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SK said:
QuoteAbsolutely not. No result of a special science can invalidate a philosophical concept. If a special science employs a concept that has no referents, then the special science is in philosophical error. That a special science committs a philosophical error is not itself an empirical claim which a special science can contradict.
This is all correct. Now, does this mean that you are claiming that the theoretical concept gravity is philosophically vetoed by an epistemic or metaphysical violation? It sounds like you are....?
Another edit:
I guess your question in the OP about "floating abstraction" answers the above.
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25 minutes ago, AlexL said:
My only expectation was a certain level of civility : when one is engaged in a debate and wants/has to interrupt it in the middle, one signals it, for example by a "sorry, I can't/won't continue right now" ("sorry" being optional).
I'll consider the notion that that is an instance of politeness. I havent considered it as such before, in a forum context. It seems to go without saying that there is no onus to post.
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34 minutes ago, AlexL said:
Oh, there is no urgency, after more than a year of patience I can easily wait another year...
When one has sincere premises and questions they don't rush to meet others expectations, because they are products of a personal value hierarchy. I do only what I want, when I have nothing better to do.
How others interpret the time frames involved doesn't matter to me.
Questions About Entities and Actions
in Metaphysics and Epistemology
Posted
One more thing:
Philosophy most importantly specifies that physics be consistent with Philosophy.