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I've studied Kant with a few professors, and it is they who misinterpret him. As Daniel said, most of them see him as basically Aristotelian. A cursory glance at Nichomachean Ethics on the one hand and Metaphysics of Morals on the other should make it obvious that this isn't the case. I don't think I can convincingly reproduce the argument that Kant was Aristotelian. I'll say that those that I've encountered that are Kant-fans generally point me to Kant's "What Is the Enlightenment", and avoid all discussion of the transcendental deduction. (And it is very interesting to note that, in accord with Amy's experiences, Kantians don't object to identity being the disqualifying element of consciousness--but object strongly to the notion of Kant being anti-reason.)

So then you can deduce (some) knowledge from the axioms? (This was my question.)

What about all the metaphysical corollaries like causality, or the fact that the universe is a plenum? That's not a rhetorical question. I really don't know if you would call them deductions or not.

Yeah. I think the swan example works as an example of why enumeration isn't induction in a certain way: no one really induces that way. It's an example that David Hume types made up and called induction, and then refuted. Try giving an account of enumeration that would validate: "A free mind and a free market are corollaries", "Evasion is the root of all evil", "There is a universal gravitational constant", etc. I guess my real point is that saying... Market1 works and men are free Market2 works and men are free ... MarketN works and men are free -------------------------------------- A free mind and a free market are corollaries ...is an asinine account of the induction of that principle.

The swan example is so unbelievably pervasive that it's hardly surprising that your subconscious handed it to you when you asked it for an example. I'll give it a try a better one. Actually, it's really hard to give an example from induction without giving a lecture on science. So... I'll just steal someone else's. My favorite example is Dr. Peikoff's from his lectures on induction this summer. He was making the point that certainty can--and often does, especially for particularly important theories--come from one observed instance. The example was of Benjamin Franklin's lightning experiment. Franklin, pre-experiment, sat down and over a long period of time compared everything he knew about lightning (it's smell, the circumstances under which it arises, its effect on what it strikes, and so on) to everything else he knew. He came up with 12 essential similarities of lightning to 12 completely different categories of knowledge, and then decided to make the hypothesis that lightning was electricity. Then he set up his experiment with the kite and the key contained in the jar with copper coils. When lightning hit it, he observed the heat of the jar, the sparks flying everywhere, and so on, and from this one observation concluded conclusively that lightning was an electrical charge. Now, you might say, didn't all the comparisons and observations he do before the experiment count as instances, which added to the probability, which finally neared 100% when he did his experiment? No--not in the sense you mean it. Nothing about the number of instances mattered. What mattered is that he related, integrated everything he knew about lightning to everything he knew about everything else, thus making sure that any knowledge and hypothesis he might have did not contradict any of his previously validated knowledge. He didn't simply enumeratively associate the possibility of it being lightning from watching these examples, like a behaviorist's rat associates pushing a petal with getting a food pellet. He abstracted from what he knew to form a hypothesis. And then he set up the experiment, which, in one instance, reduced his hypothesis to the perceptual level. This is dramatically and fundamentally different from enumeration, which goes: swan1=white swan2=white ... swanN=white --------------- swanX=white I think it was Amy Peikoff who called those that advocate this description of induction/inductive certainty "The swine with the swan." This is not a description of induction. It bears no resemblance to what Franklin did. The swan example is much closer to a description of faulty deduction, where the conclusion follows from a small number premises after applying the Law of Contradiction. Well, in induction, the conclusion follows from the premises, but it is nothing like in deduction. "Premise 1" is the entirety of your validated conceptual knowledge. "Premise 2" is the new observed phenomenon (i.e., the lightning electrifying the jar). OPAR has an excellent discussion of reduction and integration as the prerequisites for certainty. Also, I highly recommend Dr. Peikoff's lectures on induction when they come out on tape. Note: this is from memory and from notes I took this summer. Any mistakes in the above account are mine and not Dr. Peikoff's. Ash, you heard the lectures with me... anything you think needs to be added?

I hate the swan example, but if you must use it: You see a handful white swans, observe their mating habits, integrate this with your knowledge about other birds, natural selection, etc., etc., etc., and then you are certain that all swans are white. Certainty has little or nothing to do with enumeration (as has been conclusively proved by skeptics again and again) and everything to do with integration and reduction.

Assuming that certainty is a function of probability (certainty as 99.999% probability) leads to an infinite regress and total skepticism, as Hume pointed out and advocated. The truth of the science of probability is a probability, and that probability is a probability, and so on, "till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty." (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Book 1, Part IV, Section 1)

Actually, I agree with that entirely. I find it striking how physically and metaphysically accurate Aristotle's account of perception in book 2 is. Touch is a bit dubious, but all in all I think he's got it right, especially the part about the mediums of perception. But in book 3 he starts talking about the "common sense"--what we could call the perceptual level--which is the more important account of perception... and, from what I can tell, it all starts to fall apart. Suddenly perception seems to rely on phantasia, which isn't perception at all but cognition. It seems like the account of the senses given in book 2 is pushed to the wayside. It's all very confusing. (I'm not at all confident in my understanding of this book, and would love to be talked out of this.) EDIT: Also, I'd be eager to know of any worthwhile secondary sources on De Anima. All I've looked at so far is Aquinas's commentary. EDIT: Now that I'm actually looking at the passage that you pointed me to, I realize that it's in book 3, not book 2. I still think it better goes with the discussion in book 2, since he's talking about sensations again. But I'll have to look more carefully at why that passage shows up there.

I'm reading On the Soul too, and I have the opposite impression, so I would be interested in hearing both of your takes.

I don't think the dictionary definition is right. "Random" means "causally unrelated." Patterns have nothing to do with it. Randomness is not a "failure" of perception, and it is only secondarily about predictability. It means, first and foremost, that x event (a coin toss) is causally unrelated to y (everyone's wishes about its results). Your examples are strange and unhelpful. Just PM me if you're still confused, please.

I just explained that. It's random with respect to my wishes. "Random" is a relational concept. Nothing can be uncaused, which is what you mean it to mean.

This is something of a side issue, but to clarify what Ash said, since you (Falafel) seem to be confused about the concept "random": Yes, there are random events in the universe all the time--if you properly understand what random means. Random doesn't mean uncaused, it means causally unrelated to something. The result of a coin toss is causally unrelated to my wishes for it to land heads or tails. But it acts perfectly causally. To bring it back to the nature of the universe: The law of identity tells us that everything has a nature. Causality tells us that everything acts according to its nature. Nothing in the universe violates this, including free will--free will is just man acting according to his nature by causing his own actions. There's nothing uncaused (or random) about that.

I don't think these people are giving the Objectivist position accurately. Both Iraqis and hermits have rights.

We had a thread about the definition of property: http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.php?showtopic=143

[The post this was in reply to has been deleted, so this message is no longer relevant. -Matt] Actually, I've found this thread to be very interesting. I've learned quite a bit from it. And I'd appreciate it if you would not bring up QM, GR, or physics--or if you do, to do it in a different thread. We're discussing specific metaphysical axioms and corrolaries. If you consider this empty sophistry, then butt out and leave us to it, please. I started this thread for a specific purpose, and I think it's done quite well without any special scientific knowledge. As an aside I do sympathize with your objections, perhaps more than most of the others here. But they are errors, they are off-topic, and they will suck the value from this thread. I know you disagree, but please just leave us be; we're headed in the direction we want to be going.

OPAR (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand) has a section on volition. To get the gist of the Objectivist position, I'd read the whole thing, but here's an excerpt from the author's website: http://www.peikoff.com/opar/volition.htm

Nothing in the brain has free will; the brain is a physical system that obeys the laws of physics. The mind is what is volitional. And philosophy aside, I am fairly up-to-date with the current work relating neuroscience to consciousness, and there is no evidence whatsoever of free-will circuitry. (There is a way you could mean "free will circuitry" to make it plausible, but not in the context of AI.) Try reading this thread: http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...wtopic=35&st=0 It's not expressly about volition, but its very related. I really don't want to get into this in detail. It's a very specific aspect of the mind-body problem. But... if you feel like you understand the Objectivist resolution for the mind-body split, and don't understand what I'm saying here, and it's really bugging you, then PM me or email me. Or, go listen to Harry Binswanger's "Metaphysics of Consciousness" lectures if you want the full rationale behind my statements.

Unfortunately, I can't elaborate a whole lot on any my arguments. I probably shouldn't have tried in the first place. My economics is very shaky. I think the first one still stands: no corporation can be sustained without the sanction of its consumers. Alright, I guess maybe you could come up with an absurd situation: one corp owns all land that could possibly produce anything nutritive, and charges high prices for it, and when people try to boycott they just starve. I don't even know what I would begin to say if someone offered that as an argument. I can't refute it, but I suspect its getting dangerously close to the arbitrary. And yes, I think the super-corp would be more likely to innovate, all things being equal. But the corp certainly doesn't have any guarantees. (All things are never equal ) I meant to say this last time, but I forgot: I think you should be congratulated for convincing a group of philosophically inclined students that capitalism is the most moral system, even if they aren't convinced of its practicality. I had to be convinced capitalism was the moral system for a long time before I understood how things like private roads and government funding could even possibly work.

Ayn Rand definitely calls philosophy (and metaphysics and epistemology and ethics) a science, with some frequency. "But philosophy is a science that deals with the broadest abstractions..." (Censorship: Local and Express) "...and that there is only one science that can answer them: philosophy." (Philosophy: Who Needs It) "Philosophy is the science that studies the fundamental aspects of the nature of existence." (The Chickens' Homecoming) "'I'm studying philosophy,' said Leo, 'because it's a science that the proletariat of the R.S.F.S.R. does not need at all.'" (We the Living) Etc. But, she distinguished between philosophy and the "special sciences" fairly frequently too. I think the use of the term is contextual. On one hand, "science" has come to be fairly synonymous with the physical sciences. On the other hand, its good to emphasize that philosophy is a science in the sense that it is a rational, integrated, relavent body of knowledge. I think the context of this discussion has made it clear so far what has been meant.

1. Fine. 2. At least perceptual consciousness. 3. A) Volitionally directed, conceptual cognition. B, C, D, etc.) No. 4. No. 5. It doesn't; it must learn this. 6. Life. i. Broadly, the same way all knowledge is "formed." "Discovered" is a more appropriate word here. ii. Usually in adolescence. iii. We humans conceptualize values to guide our actions. iv. Not in any meaningful sense. For relatively insignificant values, like favorite flavor... maybe. v. You tell me. 7. I don't know why you're bringing up this bit about "free-will circuitry". For starters, it's false. Also, this is a philosophy board, not a neuroscience one. 8. All organisms have values. Humans are the only ones that must conceptualize them. See what I mean? This isn't going to help.

I don't mean to be dismissive, but the philosophical answers to these questions depend on a huge hierarchy of knowledge that you don't have. You can't just jump into philosophy midstream and demand answers about the nature of values, consciousness, the mind/body relationship, etc.. It's like trying to learn calculus before you know arithmetic. All I can do is recommend studying philosophy in general and Objectivism in particular.

I'm no economist, but I think the easiest error to point out is that people must choose to buy from the super-corporation. If they are offering a poor product at a high price, and someone else starts up a company to compete, it doesn't matter what the super-corp does to squash competition--if the consumers realize that after they do, the corp will go back to selling crappy, expensive products, then they will choose any other alternative. In short, consumers can think long-range, and make decisions accordingly. I also think there are some more technical errors in the argument. I think a larger company would probably be more, not less sensitive to market conditions. They control a larger portion of the market, after all, so if it fluxuates, the effect is dramatically greater. Also it seems like larger corporations would have to be unbelievably efficient, since investors would always be looking for more efficient competitors, and smaller companies tend to be more efficient. I can't support these points with detailed historical arguments, but they make logical sense. Also there seems to be something about innovation that is neglected. Say, for example, some one company controlled the entire power, water, transportation, and food industries. Their size won't help them if a John Galt comes along and discovers a new, better, cheaper method of power conversation, or if a Henry Ford comes along and invents a flying car, etc.. Markets are never stagnant, and I find it difficult to see how a corporation could have a "monopoly" on innovation.

There are several copies of Anthem floating around online. But very little information (that I could find) is available about why the copyright expired. If Ayn Rand renewed the copyright after 28 years, as is standard, then it would still be under copyright until ~2020 or 2030. The copyright expiry for works written before 1970-something is 28 years, and if renewed, 94 (I think). Works written after the 1970-something date are automatically copyrighted until 70 years after the authors death. Project Gutenberg has a copy of Anthem up, and if I may permitted to appeal to authority, they are very reputable and would have made absolutely sure the copyright was expired before transcribing it electronically. Here's the scant info they give at the beginning of their edition: There's contact info for the publisher there, too. The document is here, if you want to look them up: http://ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext98/anthm10.txt

"'Color' occurs when rays of light acquire varying wavelengths by refracting off objects and then striking the retina. The nervous system/brain then transforms the wavelengths into various hues. Red is the lower spectrum, green the middle, and blue the upper. Above and beyond these frequences, the eye cannot detect light." etc., etc. Perfectly scientifically sound, materialist, physical account of color that a blind man could understand abstractly. But it does not give us the conscious experience of color, which is something completely different (i.e., mental). Anyway, I think this is getting off track. I want a coherant account of a physical consciousness.

Yes! That's a very concise and exact summary of the problem of considering consciousness a physical entity.