Randy Morantes

I think so. I'd like to elaborate, but I currently don't have the time/internet access to do so. I'll get back to you when I can!

Hey RB, this is my understanding of your position: - I prefer enjoyment to non-enjoyment. - I am aware of the nature of deep sea fishing. - I do not enjoy deep sea fishing. - I am aware of the nature of motorcycling. - I enjoy motorcycling. - I will act to gain and/or keep motorcycling. This is the logical continuation of your position, according to (my understanding of) Objectivism: - If I value motorcycling, then I must value consciousness. - If I value consciousness, then I must value life (the biological state). - If I value life, then I must value existence. - Existence exists. The reason your position is "objective" is because you have a casual, logically consistent explanation as to why you value motorcycling, which can be traced all the way to the axiom "existence exists". To my knowledge, that is as fundamental as things get. On the other hand, if you were unable to explain your position past "I enjoy motorcycling", your position would then be "subjective" because in this case your desire to ride motorcycles is "whimsical". So, because the value of motorcycling can be objective or subjective, it would seem that values, in themselves, are neither objective or subjective. Rather, values can only be objective or subjective within the context of how well they compliment a group of other values. Oxygen, by itself, is neither objective or subjective. But if one requires oxygen to live, and one wishes to live, things change. Is this anywhere near correct?

I've been trying to understand the Objectivist take on the concepts of "objective" and "subjective", but I found this explanation to be very confusing. How can I tell if my values are "correct" values (thus, "objective" values?). Also, how can I tell if my values are "incorrect" values (these would be "subjective" values?). My best guess at this point is: "objective" values are those values which, based on one's observations of reality, one has deduced to be the values that are most likely to promote the value of one's life (the flourishing sort) when pursued. "Subjective" values are those values one has chosen for no particular reason. These values might be "correct" values in that they further one's life when pursued (unlikely, but even a broken clock is right twice a day), but they are still "subjective" values due to the random nature of their selection.

There are contexts where suicide could be a plausible choice. Generally, a rational person can avoid the dreaded life of misery, but there are tow kinds of contexts where that you not be true. One would be if you suffered an incurable medical disorder that caused unending agony. The second would be if one lived an impossible life of slavery under a despotic dictatorship, where one really were not free to pursue any goals that constituted "living". I'm having some difficulty here. In your "incurable medical disorder" example, it would seem that the reason suicide is permissible is because one feels an extreme amount of pain that will never go away. In your "despotic dictatorship" example, it would seem that the reason suicide is permissible is because one is not free to pursue the "goals that constitute living". Two different approaches seem to be evident: Approach 1 (incurable medical disorder) - One (pursues pleasure/avoids pain), and sets goals in order to (achieve this pleasure/avoid this pain). Suicide is permissible only when the following preconditions are met: 1) The pain of one's life greatly outweighs the pleasure. 2) This ratio of pain to pleasure (will never/is unlikely to) change. Approach 2 (despotic dictatorship) - One pursues "goals that constitute living", pleasure follows as the result/reward of achieving these goals. Suicide is permissible only when the following preconditions are met: 1) One is unable to pursue the goals necessary to live (flourish). 2) This inability to pursue one's goals (will never/is unlikely to) change. My understanding of Objectivism is limited, but I believe it uses the 2nd approach. So, my understanding of the first example is that the individual suffering from the incurable medical condition would be justified in committing suicide not because he suffers from unending agony/pain, but because this unending pain physically/mentally prevents him from pursuing the "goals that constitute living". Would this be correct? Thanks!

"Welcome to the forum smile.gif" Thanks!

"So the next logical step I take in my interpretation of your philosophy is that you don't believe in or accept any notion of 'rights' (moral or natural - however you wish to consider them) - be they applied to animals OR humans. Is that correct?" Hmmm. It would seem that I don't accept the notion of "natural" or "objective" rights; rights that exist independent of minds. However, I do accept the notion of "moral" or "subjective" rights; rights that originate from minds. So, this would be an incorrect interpretation of my philosophy. If it helps, my understanding of "rights" is synonymous with the concept of "laws" (the legal sort).

So, if I interpret your philosophy correctly, if applied to a different person with different subjective values, the following could be "right"; I feel good when I cause pain to animals so I should slaughter as many of them as possible. Or; I feel good when I cause pain and misery to other people so I should do so to whatever extent I can avoid being caught and punished for it. Would this be correct according to your philosophy? Yes, this would be a correct interpretation.

"As a male fitness model, I have met ONE vegetarian model/bodybuilder. Soy protein has so many negatives in the male body (pubmed.org) that he admitted having to rely on an overuse of steroids to maintain his physique. FTR, he is no longer a model or a vegetarian." Well, I suspect this has more to do with the rarity of vegetarians/vegans than their diets. Soy isn't the only veggie source of protein out there, should one wish for an alternative. Personally, I drink a lot of soymilk, and have yet to start lactating. I'm also in reasonably good shape, in that I can run two miles in 13 minutes, and do 70ish push-ups and sit-ups within separate two-minute time-frames (Army PT test). Though I'm hardly a bodybuilder.

"There is one more thing I'm wondering about: You say you're a vegan, which as I understand means that you don't consume eggs or dairy products, either. But if eliminating pain is the objective, why refrain from those? I think milking cows does not cause them any pain, and removing eggs laid by hens certainly doesn't!" Good question! Originally, I was a vegetarian. I didn't understood why someone would want to be a vegan, until I found out about battery cages, the conditions dairy cows are kept in, and of course, the origin of veal. Veganism, then, was the logical next step. There are a number of gruesome videos floating around, should you wish to view them. However, I'll just link some informative articles. [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battery_cage#Animal_welfare ]: "Animal Welfare scientists have been critical of battery cages because they do not provide hens with sufficient space to stand, walk, flap their wings, perch or make a nest, and it is widely considered that hens suffer through boredom and frustration through being unable to perform these behaviours." [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veal ]: "Though veal can be produced from any calf, most veal comes from male calves of dairy cattle breeds." [ http://www.peta.org/mc/factsheet_display.asp?ID=98 ] ~ Milk: A Cruel and Unhealthy Product [ http://www.peta.org/mc/factsheet_display.asp?ID=99 ] ~ Poultry and Eggs: Industries That Abuse Chickens

Hey David! Before answering your questions I should probably attempt an explanation of my personal philosophy, so you can get a better idea of where I'm coming from. I describe myself as a moral relativist, where "right" is that which furthers my interests and "wrong" is that which contradicts them. I suppose I could also be described as a hedonist, where the concept of "pleasure" includes the more abstract emotions/desires such as the desire for love, or for a good book. Because I wish to maximize the experience of pleasure, I find it best to do so through the application of reason, as this is apparently the most effective way of affecting reality (in which all desires are grounded). At it's core, my philosophy consists of the objective pursuit of subjective values. For an alternate format, see the following: - I exist. - Something else exists. - This "something else" is able to affect me, and I am able to affect it. - These interactions appear to follow a pattern, such that I am usually able to predict the consequences of my actions. - Upon realizing this, I am faced with a choice: To what end do I act?* - I experience "desires". - I have observed other apparently conscious entities pursuing desires that I do not feel. - It is possible for entities to desire different things. - Desires are subjective in nature. - I am apparently free to pursue whatever desires I want, in whatever fashion I wish. - I desire to fulfill as many desires as I can, to the fullest extent possible. - Some desires are stronger/more important to me than others. - Some desires, if pursued, conflict with other desires. - I cannot pursue all of my desires. - I have chosen to pursue happiness, which I understand as the optimal achievement of my values (which I understand as those desires I have chosen to pursue), as the ultimate end towards which I will act. - Which desires will I choose as values? - By what means will I pursue these values? - Help! "My first question is, why do you value lions at all?" When determining the moral relevance of animals, I make a comparison to Sasha, a dog I once cared for. I enjoyed her wagging tail, her silly antics, the way she would slip her head under my hand to be petted as I lay on the couch (the leash in her mouth as often as not). Apparently, I was able to make her happy. My nature is such that, if through my actions I am able to cause others happiness, I am thus made happy. The opposite is true; if through my actions I cause pain, I feel pain. I understand this emotion/desire to be "compassion", or "sympathy" (distinguishable from "empathy").** Because she caused me pleasure, I valued her. And because I valued her, I assign a certain amount of value to all animals as potential Sashas (although the "slippery slope" complicates things). This, I believe, is why Ayn Rand valued complete strangers, as they had the potential to be John Galts. "How do they enable you to live qua man?" I don't know what is meant by "man qua man", so I'm unable to answer this question. "Second, your overpopulation objection ignores leopards, hunting dogs, cheetahs, jackals and hyenas which also control the zebra population. (The proposal on the table is to eliminate the lions, not all predators). Additionally, the plain can sustain more zebras, and when it can't there are other mechanisms (lack of food) which resolve the problem. Remember, "overpopulation" is not an intrinsically bad thing, and thus killing lions will not destroy or even damage the ecosysem, except by eliminating a predator." The intent of this scenario, I assumed, was to demonstrate the implausibility of killing predators as a means of reducing the overall amount of pain experienced by the inhabitants of a given environment, excluding humans (not because humans are, as a rule, the moral equivalent of animals, but because I envisioned the area in question to be uninhabited). The logical extension of this policy (to prevent pain by killing lions) would be to kill every predator in existence, which (in the long run) would clearly do nothing to reduce the pain experienced by the surviving animals. "Third, lions are a very serious problem for humans because they also kill humans and make it very difficult for people to survive in some areas. If you value humans more than you value animals, you should support the extermination of this feline pestilence." If the lions pose a significant risk to human life, then yes, I agree that they should be put down. "Fourth, your argument based on "hiring people and consuming vast resources better spent on solving human problems" presupposes -- quite contrary to fact -- that this plan involves a major tax-funded government boondoggle. This plan does not consume resources, it creates them, first by the creation of a supply of lion meat for dinner, and second by the creation of safe lion-free zones where man can exist." This was under the assumption that we were trying to eliminate every predator in existence. In the more limited sense that you are speaking of, I agree that killing the lions would consume a negligible amount of resources, and that humanity would stand to benefit. "The problems with your argument seem to stem from the one assumptoin that man is a higher objective value than animal. If you reject that assumption, these objections would have sway; the question is whether you will check your assumptions and discover that your hierarchy of values is not what you thought it was." Hmmm. I think what you're saying here is that I might say I value humans more than animals, but I really value them equally. Apparently because I failed to mention the negative impact of lions on humans in my response, thus implying that this impact was of little significance. If this is the case, then there seems to be a misunderstanding. Due to my understanding of "subjective" and "objective", I'm unable to conceptualize an "objective value"; for not only does the concept of "value" presuppose the existence of an entity capable of holding values, but it also presupposes a reason for the entity to hold said values (assuming the entity is rational and volitional).*** The only reasons I'm aware of are subjective: "I act to gain and/or keep X because it feels good". The lions have value because I choose to assign value to them, as I assign value to humans, as I assign value to anything. I generally value humans more than I generally value animals because humans are generally more capable of causing me pleasure (I cannot hold a stimulating intellectual conversation with a lion, nor can I fall in love with one). However, I am open to the possibility that I might value some animals (Sasha) over some humans (child rapist/murderer, or Terri Schiavo). Sorry I took so long! * Well, why have I ever done anything in life? To get to where I am now, I've been required to perform a huge number of actions. What motivated me to do so? Ultimately, at the core of every choice is a desire. Without desires, any action of mine would be completely arbitrary. Without hunger, why would I eat? Without sympathy, why would I act to minimize the pain of others? Without the discontent of having no purpose in life, why would I ask any of these questions in the first place? ** This is my understanding of the relationship between "compassion" and "empathy" [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empathy ]: "Empathy is the capacity to recognize or understand another's state of mind or emotion. It is often characterized as the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes", or to in some way experience the outlook or emotions of another being within oneself. It is important to note that empathy does not necessarily imply compassion. Empathy can be 'used' for compassionate or cruel behavior." *** This is my understanding of the relationship between "objective" and "subjective" [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy) ]: "While there is no universally accepted articulation of objectivity, a proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are "mind-independent"—that is, not the result of any judgments made by a conscious entity. Put another way, objective truths are those which are discovered rather than created." "In philosophy, an objective fact means a truth that remains true everywhere, independently of human thought or feelings. For instance, it is true always and everywhere that '2 plus 2 equals 4'. A subjective fact is a truth that is only true in certain times, places or people. For instance, 'That painting is beautiful' may be true for someone who likes it, but not for everyone."

"Could you elaborate on "unnecessary" ? What criteria would you use to distinguish unnecessary pain from necessary pain?" Certainly! I came across this question while attempting to create a utopia. According to my point of view, a certain amount of pain/displeasure/conflict/resistance (not quite sure how to put it) is required in a person's development in order to provide a proper (optimal) context for the experience of "pleasure". Going through Basic Training, I found it amazing the things I once took for granted, and I feel this new appreciation was a direct result of the "pain" I experienced (it must be nice having your own toilet!). This might also account for the stereotype of "spoiled rich kids" who have led a relatively sheltered (pain-free) existence. However, I feel that there is a point of diminishing returns, and that pain exceeding this point would be "unnecessary". How is this point determined? That's something I've been leaving for another day, for when I have a better grasp of philosophy and psychology. "Suppose that somebody proposes to kill all lions using some completely painless method (e.g. a lethal injection that anesthetizes them and makes them unconscious before killing them). This procedure would cause no pain to lions, but it would eliminate a lot of pain for zebras and other animals that lions prey on--so, it would seem to me, it is a suitable way of eliminating unnecessary pain. Would you support it?" I wouldn't, because not only would that be killing the lions (a painless death is better than a painful one, but death still results in the loss of that which I value), but the zebras would soon overpopulate their environment, only to starve to death. Thus, killing the lions would accomplish nothing. More to the point, as much as I value lions and zebras, I value humans more. By hiring people to kill every lion (and every carnivore, by logical extension) I would be destroying the ecosystem and consuming a huge amount of resources that I feel would be better spent on solving human problems. Good questions!

First, it's important to understand that unrealistic situations, or emergencies, are not the basis for ethical or moral theory. The purpose of ethics is to guide rational beings through their every-day lives. Agreed! No tin-foil hats or dream-catchers. Our difference of opinion here seems to lie in the evaluation of what is "realistic." It is my belief that within my lifetime, our technology will have advanced to the point where the implausible is suddenly plausible, and I want to be morally equipped before the fact, versus waiting for an "emergency" to happen. For a glimpse of this, read the Dehumanization (Frankenstein argument) section of [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transhumanism...ein_argument.29 ]. Does such an entity possess rights? I might need to know the answer in a few decades. "But to answer your hypothetical; yes, she would. Rights exist because they are a requirement of our survival as rational beings. Specifically, to negate the initiation of force in all social interactions between men (Rational beings). If, somehow, we were to discover another race who were not "men," but who were similarly rational, then yes, they would have these rights as rational beings." Ok! The purpose of that question was to verify that the Objectivist take on the concept of "rights" is not determined by an entity's species, but by other factors. I'm still not quite sure what these "other factors" are. I'm interpreting your statement (in conjunction with Tenzing's Post #8) to mean that Objectivists believe that if an entity possesses such a nature that it absolutely cannot sustain it's life by any other means than the application of reason to it's environment, then, and only then, can it possess rights. Is this correct? "I think you are misunderstanding what rights are, as well. A "right" is simply a recognition of the fact of reality that, to survive, man must not be coerced into taking actions that his rational faculty knows will hurt him. It is not a gift, or a whim, imposed by man on other men." I have been staring at this (and similar comments) for over five hours. This is what I'm getting: 1) In order to satisfy their values in the most efficient, optimal manner possible (versus living an animal, sub-human existence), humans should be free to pursue their rational self-interest, i.e., their happiness, because that is the nature of their values (freedom itself is a value). 2) Not all humans respect the interests of others, thus, many humans are not free to pursue their rational self-interest. 3) In an attempt to rectify 2), the concept of "rights" was invented as a means of protecting rational men from irrational men, because it was in the rational self-interest of the rational men to do so. 4) Rights do not exist independent of man; rights are the result of man's thought-process. This makes sense to me, but I'm not sure if it represents Objectivism. I have another question: What is the relationship between the concepts of "whim", "desire", and "value"? I've been having some serious issues telling them apart. Thanks!

"I would be careful there: one can raise questions about the rights of plants as well as animals." Agreed! It is this "carefulness" that led me to veganism in the first place. The problem I ran into during my ethics class was that I could not draw a hard and fast line as to what constitutes a morally relevant entity (or, what made an entity worthy of "rights"). It was referred to as "Domino Theory", or alternatively, the "Slippery Slope". Consider the following: [ http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/monkeymirror/html/intro.html ] "As infants, humans and chimpanzees have nearly identical skills and habits. Both babies grab at objects, smile at friendly faces, and scream out their frustration when unhappy. For about a year, humans and chimps develop along a strikingly similar line: for instance, a baby chimpanzee can complete puzzles designed for a human of the same age. This similarity begins to disappear around the age of one year, when a chimpanzee's learning curve levels just as a human's is taking off." I do not assign moral relevance on the sole basis of an entity's potential to become rational, because this would mean I would have to hold a zygote and an adult human being as equal in value. Personally, I value adult human beings more than a non-sentient collection of cells, and assign them a greater degree of moral relevance/protection/rights as a result. So, because I assign value based on the actuality of an entity, versus it's potential, I am forced to equate one-year-old human infants with one-year-old chimpanzee infants, because they are roughly equivalent in terms of intelligence (intelligence being what I value about them). But what happens when both subjects are a year and one day old? Two days? Three? At what point should I draw the "line"? Appreciate the response!

"I think Tenzing_Shaw's post addresses your questions fairly well. However, I have a question to you too: What is the position of animal rights supporters on predators? E.g., if a lion eats a zebra, doesn't the lion violate the zebra's rights? Should the government punish the lion for that act, and if yes, in what way? More broadly, should the government try to turn carnivores (and omnivores) into herbivores?" An excellent question! The right thing to do, according to my personal philosophy, is to alter the nature of the world so that unnecessary pain is eliminated. At the moment this consists of veganism and "animal rights," in the sense that animals ought to be assigned some form of moral relevance. In the future, this will consist of the application of extremely advanced technology to address matters. Including, but certainly not limited to, converting carnivores and omnivores into herbivores. Thanks!

"This is an often asked question. A use of the forum's search function should reveal several threads where this topic has been thoroughly discussed." Understood sir. In all honesty, I did not understand these arguments, and would rather start a new thread than attempt to answer posts that are several years old. Also, I learn better when I'm actively engaged in the discussion, versus reading what others have written. So there will likely be some redundancy. If it helps, my background consists of 22 years of life (nearly 4 in the Army) with a formal education consisting of an Intro to Ethics class (I got an A!). In addition to Ayn Rand, I've read some of Peter Singer and Bertrand Russell.

Hey Tenzing! A few more questions... "Man is an animal that survives using his mind. No other animal has this property." That we know of. But, what if a non-human animal were to possess this property? Such as Zira from Planet of the Apes? Would she possess rights? "Even humans who are too young or too old to use their reason to survive independently have rights, because they are instances of man, and all instances of man have rights. Rand's argument, as I understand it, is not "reason implies rights" but "reason as a means of survival implies rights" It's my understanding that, according to Objectivism, humans are born tabula rasa. So, the infant in question may not be able to reason initially, but will gain this faculty further down the road, assuming all goes well. Thus, according to Objectivism, because the newborn has the potential to be rational, it is worthy of rights for this reason alone. Is this a correct understanding? "In your question, you repeatedly used the concept "worthiness" when you spoke of rights. This is a mistake, because rights are not a reward for any sort of virtue, which some entities have and others do not. Man is not worthy of rights, he has rights, and these rights stem from his nature." Hmmm. I'm gonna have to disagree with you on this one. I used the word "worthy" because, according to my point of view, "rights" can't be "inherited" as you seem to suggest, they can only be assigned by entities capable of rational thought. The nature of the recipients of these rights is irrelevant; a human could assign rights to a chair if he so wished. Whether it would be in his rational self-interest to do so is another matter entirely. Ayn Rand just happened to believe that the only entities worthy of rights were humans. You said: "if men are to interact with one another in a way which is conducive to survival" Obviously it's in the rational self-interest of most people not to be murdered, assaulted, enslaved, or robbed, or to permit others to do so at will. So, the concept of "rights" (along with "government" and "justice") was invented to prevent these bad things from happening. "Rights", in the sense I am using them, are synonymous with "laws". The Geneva Conventions and the US Bill of Rights are good examples of this, although rights/laws are not necessarily the result of moral consensus. I've got VOS and TPAR, but I've been having some difficulty understanding them. Looking forward to your response!

[Mod's note: merged with a previous thread. - sN] Hello! As a ethical vegan with an interest in Objectivism, I have a question to ask of Objectivists. To begin, my understanding of your position regarding the issue of "animal rights" was derived from Dr. Edwin Locke's essay Animal "Rights" and the New Man Haters, which can be found at: [ http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pag...m_animal_rights ]. Your position seems to be this: 1) Humans are capable of "thought" (reason and choice). 2) Therefore, humans are worthy of "rights" (uncertain of Objectivist definition). 3) Animals (non-humans) are not capable of thought. 4) Therefore, animals are not worthy of rights. My question is: What of humans that are not capable of thought, such as infants, advanced cases of senility, and Terri Schiavo? Does this make them unworthy of rights? Thanks for your time!