nanite1018

The fetus (as well as all infants) are incapable of rational thought, to say that the woman is guilty of wrongful imprisonment would indict every parent on Earth who uses a play-pen or a stroller. I am saying the woman is choosing to not have the fetus removed through an early birth (or c-section, etc.). The woman is choosing to keep the fetus inside of her rather than "giving birth" (in some manner) at that point. To say that a woman, who could have the fetus removed and it survive on its own, can decide that she wants it to remain inside her so that she can retain the ability to kill it is ridiculous. That is what I am really saying. I mean a period in the intensive care unit. When I say "specialized medical care" I mean something that is outside what any regular baby has (given the context of the civilization). Brain activity is just that, the electrical activity in the brain as commonly measured by an EEG. Brain waves are a concrete measurement of the activity of the brain, which is the activity of consciousness. When the brain activity is characteristically human (which has been determined to be somewhere in the 5th month of pregnancy), then the fetus can be said to be human, because our distinctively human consciousness is our distinguishing feature above and beyond all else. Brain waves are a measurement of brain activity, certain types of brain activity are uniquely human and are largely absent in the animal world. The nature of humans, which is the types of activity our brains can do that animals to a very large extent cannot, gives us our rights. "Brain waves" don't give you rights, your human consciousness does and brain waves are how we can measure it when it is impossible to interact with the person directly (as in the case of fetus in the womb, or a stroke victim, etc.).

I don't deny them. My position is that the fetus is for all intents and purposes a separate organism and at that point it is only the whim of the woman that is keeping it inside of her. Birth is not the rational place to make the dividing line for "independent living thing", because it can happen at any time, can be induced for any reason, etc. The point at which the fetus can survive outside the womb without specialized medical care and has recognizable human brain activity patterns is the proper demarcation point. At that point, the woman is the only one keeping the fetus "dependent" on her. It isn't a requirement of the fetus's continued survival, it is not demanded by nature, it is simply her own decision, made for any number of either rational or irrational reasons. If she whims that it be removed alive, then she has no right to kill it. But if she whims that it remain inside her, then why does she then have the right to kill it? The nature of reality determines morality and rights, not whim. I do not recognize how any coherent moral/socio-political system could declare that someone can make a decision that ensures that they can kill something when they could not otherwise. There is no other thing I can think of which is analagous to that idea where it would be considered moral or allowable by rights. That is why I believe that at about the start of the third trimester the woman no longer has the right to terminate the existence of the fetus (she can terminate the pregnancy, by giving birth in some way).

I have not read the entire thread, just the last few pages, simply because it has grown to an unwieldy length. I agree that a clump of cells is not a man and cannot be said to have rights. A parasitic organism cannot have rights either. Therefore during the first trimester a fetus is yours to do with as you wish. However, at some point around 6 months or so the fetus exhibits human brain wave patterns and is capable of learning on a basic level, and also can survive outside the womb without specialized medical care. At that point, it is for all intents and purposes a baby that just happens to still be growing inside the womb rather than outside. Now, obviously if the woman will die if the baby is born (naturally or by c-section), then the baby is infringing on her rights (its basically attacking her) and so must be taken care of in the only safe available way, that is by a late-term abortion. But barring that, the woman has known that she was pregnant for months already (no period is a clue for the first trimester, second you get the stomach bulge, no one, or almost no one, doesn't realize their pregnant by 4ish months). As a result, she has decided, consciously, that she wants to continue being pregnant. If she changes her mind after the baby is fully capable of surviving without specialized care outside of her, well then remove the baby via birth of some kind. If she doesn't want it then she can put it up for adoption immediately. That meets her desires, unless she simply wants it dead for whatever reason, in which case her motive is the same as in infanticide and that should be illegal. Parenthood is a contract essentially, with the child. They come with certain responsibilities and requirements, including providing adequate food and shelter, etc. For children there is such a thing as criminal neglect, because the parent is responsible for another human being and has a contractual duty to uphold, and the only way out of it is adoption. A pregnant woman who has decided to carry the fetus to the point where it can survive just like any baby outside her womb has decided to allow it to become a baby who happens to be located inside her. She does not have the right, at that point, to kill it. She has the right to remove it and put it up for adoption, certainly, but just because the baby is at that time dependent on her body does not give her the right to end its life. I don't see why that is irrational, and it fits pretty much with the way abortion is done currently in the US.

This is a beautiful sculpture. I think the wings add to it by invoking a sense of flying into the heavens. Even invoking the concept of an angel isn't necessarily bad, after all they are meant to help human life in various ways, are morally perfect, have immense power, and come from heaven (an ideal world). Sounds like a description of a great inventor or businessman, or John Galt. Even mystical references can be uplifting and supportive of human life. Just because it came from a mystical background doesn't mean it can't be changed to be pro-life, as in the redefinition of the feelings of exaltation, reverence, etc. in Objectivism from their corrupt religious meanings.

I am aware that I am making a choice from a number of options. I explain that as a natural result of the way my brain must operate, in order to find the most optimal solution to any given problem (since our conceptual/reasoning faculties are not perfect or "automatic" in the sense that an animals instincts are) we must brainstorm a few options that seem on the surface like a good idea and select from among them. I am conscious of the fact that it is possible that any of those options are open to me, should I pick that one (obviously since otherwise it wouldn't even be on the table). My selection process however seems like it must be a result of how my brain works, a deterministic (or perhaps semi-random), result of everything I know, my conditions, the world around me, etc. When I make a decision about something, I know that given everything I am it couldn't have been a different way, because I chose it. My identity is all my knowledge, beliefs, experiences, my emotions, my "gut-feelings", my thoughts, my reasoning, and my body itself and when faced with a decision given all that I came to a conclusion which is an expression of who I am. Many people seem to have a problem with determinism because they feel as if determinism means they aren't actually making a choice, or are somehow not in control of themselves. That is silly. My view is that "I" make a choice, and my choice is a direct result of everything I am. I make choices based on what I am which in turn affects in numerous ways what and who I am. Isn't that self-determination and self-control?

Yes, actually. If I make an error, at that exact moment in time it is impossible for me to know that I made one (since obviously, at that point I believe I was correct). It is only at some later time, for example when I am double-checking my reasoning, that I might find it. THere is no guarantee that a volitional being would find their mistake. Determinism isn't about categorical "fates", such as what you described above. Just because a person makes an error now does not in any way mean that they must continue with that error for the rest of their lives. By the way, how would a volitional being find out if they were correct or if they had made a mistake? They would apply a particular method, reason, and after they had checked their conclusions a number of times, and made sure everything fit together nicely, they would have no reason to believe that they had made an error. The only way for them to find one at that point is if they ran into a contradiction at some later date. If you have no reason to believe that you are incorrect then any claim of error (without actually pointing one out) is arbitrary and can be dismissed. Your argument about whether a deterministic person could distinguish between herself being correct or if she was making an error is the same as the one a skeptic makes for a volitional being, "Man can make mistakes, so you might be wrong, even if there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that you are." That is an arbitrary claim and can be rejected. Until someone actually finds an error in the deterministic person's thinking (whether themselves or someone else) then any claim of error is at best arbitrary skepticism.

If I am tabula rasa at birth, then the "I" I have, all my experiences that made me me, from birth, are the result of whatever programming I got by my society, teachers, parents, etc. That doesn't make the "I" any less meaningful, and as far as I can tell it does not make logic or knowledge impossible. I know that the mind does not remain on the facts of reality, and I know that logic requires non-contradictory identification. The point is not that I must "take the reigns of my own mind" but simply follow the only logical method for gaining any sort of knowledge about reality, and that is discovered by basing it on the axioms of existence and the nature of man's senses and mind. I don't see why volition is necessary, in the strict sense that at any given time I can actually do any of the things I consider doing. They don't seem related, what matters is which path I take, not whether I had a choice.

Well I'll give you my view of how I think about it. What you require of volitional entities, namely that they check out everything in their minds against reality, make sure that their predictions match reality (as a way of finding contradictions), etc. are all possible to a determinist entity, in principle. Sure, they may make an error, but if they are applying the correct method (just as in volitional entities), they will, by the nature of reality, have to come across the problem. That doesn't mean they have to correct the error, after all evasion is always an option, as is simple oversight, but the evidence is there so long as the entity looks for it. So, if a deterministic entity cannot find any evidence to the contrary, and has applied the correct method (basically the same as a volitonal one), then there is no error in its context. It seems odd to me that Objectivists will claim that "if you do everything properly, i.e. follow the method we set out, then if you don't find an error there isn't one", but then will say "just because you are determined, following precisely the same method and finding no error means simply that you can't find one." The method seems to be the key, and obviously if you apply it right then there is no error (or at least, any claim of the possibility of error can be dismissed in the same way as one deals with any skeptics in Objectivism, as arbitrary). Because by the nature of any conceivable system, anything at all, it will not be able to accurately predict what it is about to do (before it actually makes a decision). Therefore it is obvious that we would not be able to predict what we'll do, and that any and all options we think up will seem possible to us (because they literally are, as far as our own knowledge of the workings of our mind can say at that point). Also, we are determined by the workings of our brains, but our brains are us, and so we are still the ones making decisions and deciding what we do. So the feeling that "I decided to...." is totally valid, as was our perception that any of the possibilities we dreamed up were available options at the time (since we could never under any circumstances know the future state of our minds with perfect accuracy). So I don't think that I am denying almost any of what introspection tells us, I am denying an assumption we then make based on it, namely, that given exactly the same conditions we would have been able to do something different. That isn't what we sense, we sense that as far as we can tell we could do any of our options, that doesn't mean that is absolutely true in the strictest sense. Because our introspective observations are a component of our nature as a physical system (and as a conscious entity, as a sub-set of that), as described above. It is an explanation why we introspect what we do. Similarly science explains why we see the visible spectrum, why we have the four major flavors we do, why we are sensitive to certain smells, we our sense of hot and cold can be fooled by placing warm and cool rods near to each other on your skin, etc. It is an explanation for why we see what we do, why we sense what we do, and I think it is perfectly in line with how science, and determinism (I don't think it really applies, but okay), addresses the senses.

Okay, well first off I was invoking the possibility of any "uncertainty" because I thought you might claim it existed. I don't think it does either, I agree with Objectivism's position on certainty. Determinism still allows that people reduce all their knowledge to the perceptual level, so your first paragraph seems to simply be addressing the question of what is required for certainty, rather than any problem inherent in determinism as a position. So that leaves your explanation for why determinism is wrong at simply "It doesn't fit with what we see introspectively, and so by placing one form of perceptual evidence (the sciences) against introspection you are invoking perceptual indeterminism which does not allow for real knowledge." Okay, I think I can deal with this without much trouble. The trouble is simply what I have described the whole time in the above: My perception that I may have done otherwise is not actually what I perceive. I perceive that any of the courses I am considering are "possible" (since I am considering all of them as a course I might want to take), and then select one of them. I then say "well I could have done otherwise", but that simply involves me recalling the lack of knowledge I had prior to my decision, not an actual characteristic of reality. Essentially, I am explaining why we introspectively feel we have choice in much the same way science explains why we see colors, how touch works, the workings of our sense of smell, why some thing are registered as pleasant while others painful, etc. I do not deny that we see ourselves making decisions from among several seemingly possible options, or that given our knowledge at any given state of time any of the courses of action under our consideration are in fact "possible." I explain that we would of course feel that way because we cannot ever know what we will do next (until we decide it) because our brains cannot jump in front of themselves with any accuracy. That explains why we can't know what we will be doing in the future until after we decide. That explains what we find when we introspect. We don't see anything "forcing" us to do something, because indeed nothing did make us decide what we did in any directly traceable or meaningful way, we came to the conclusion ourselves and if we had made a different decision (which is only possible if conditions were different) then we would have done something different. Introspection is not, as far as I can see, invalidated by my explanation, my explanation is a reconciliation between physics and introspection, and as such does not destroy knowledge but creates new knowledge.

Ah, okay, now I understand exactly where the supposed problem comes in. Okay now this simply seems silly. We know poeple are fallible, yes. But following certain standards of epistemology greatly decreases the likelihood you will be incorrect, and therefore it is still valuable. Even if you had volition and followed the proper epistemological method there is no guarantee that you are correct in your conclusion, it simply means that you are unable to find any evidence otherwise. What if I volitonally pick the right answer, then second-guess myself and change it? Its the same thing. No one can declare that you will never again be able to look over your results and check for errors (for you will probably run into a problem, since you did make a mistake). It is equally possible that a volitional man would make a mistake and never think to go back and check for an error. And what if you volitionally decide to make no choice? What exactly is the difference? Doesn't seem meaningful to me, either way you have "decided" to not think, and the consequences of that will be yours to bear. This is exactly why I thought the stress on the absolute reality of "could have done otherwise" in Objectivism is unnecessary and possibly a holdover from mysticism. I will quote OPAR p.181, he is talking about skepticism, and this is his refutation: "Skeptic: 'Man is fallible. Even with the best of training and intentions, he is capable of error. So how can you be certain you are not wrong?' Objectivist: 'Man's general capacity to err does not warrant a hypothesis of error in a particular case. And I have validated my conclusion; I have demonstrated that in this case I am right' S: 'But your validation itself might be fallacious. How do you know it isn't?' O:'Can you point to any sign of such fallacy, such as a logical flaw in my argument, or a neglected fact, or an improperly defined term?'" And that is my reply to you, for all intents and purposes. If that is what is required for certainty, than you can still be certain of your conclusions even in a deterministic world. If you cannot point to any evidence to the contrary for your ideas (which you cannot explain), and no one can point out a flaw, then what reason could there possibly be to doubt your conclusion (beyond whatever doubt you'd have automatically since your context might grow and the conclusion might need to be modified), even with determinism? That is why I feel there is no real conflict between determinism and the rest of Objectivism.

I remember the discussion of encirclist as an example of a misintegration based on a non-fundamental characteristic (I think that was the point of it, if I remember correctly). I understand why that is a misintegration. I do not understand why I must have the ability to make a different decision while trying to find knowledge in order to integrate my percepts based on a fundamental distinguishing characteristic. I understand that I must adhere to reality, check myself, and integrate all of my percepts (and later concepts) into a coherent whole but I still don't know why I must have the ability to have made a different decision in order for my knowledge to be valid. You see this is the only stumbling block I can see for determinism, the problem of knowledge. Morality is pretty well covered as I've explained before, as are justice, etc., so long as man can still have knowledge and attaining knowledge requires certain processes, etc. So this topic is, in my mind, the central issue in the debate we are having. After all, if determinism makes knowledge impossible then obviously volition is axiomatic. But my point of contention is whether that is actually the case. I still don't see why it is the case, and the discussion in OPAR simply doesn't explain why in an objective or satisfactory fashion (more relies on using negative words and images to evoke a negative emotional response, it seems to me).

Given your stipulations for the thought experiment that I am forced to conclude that there is no way you can avoid the bus. By the way, that is exactly what I have been saying all along, I was simply describing the difficulties with such a device and why I think it is impossible. If the crystal ball actually can know what the future will be, and more importantly know what you will do after hearing any given prediction, and has then found a prediction which will occur even after your actions change due to the knowledge, then you will be hit by the bus whether you like it or not. Your preference is what made you do it, but it was made up of the interactions of the particles in your brain, which (if certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are correct) could have turned out differently and so you may have had a different preference. The mind is the experience of the interactions of the particles in your brain. Essentially, it is a model of external reality which has grown so complex that it actually includes a model of itself, creating self-awareness and then expands to include the senses and memories. Your mind is basically your brain, its just how you experience the actions of your brain. They only don't seem real because your senses almost always aren't lying to you, and it seems extremely out of place. They don't necessarily tell you something about your brain, not directly. Its not like a sign flashes and says "hey, this isn't real, its just your eyes telling you that your going crazy." You have to figure out that your senses are fooling you. What does it matter if your senses can lie to you only when you are under the effects of drugs or if your brain is diseased? It doesn't say anything about the proper functioning of the senses, and it isn't overly difficult to tell when your senses are screwing with you. The only thing that matters is that your senses are almost always right and when they aren't it is fairly obvious. If that is the case than sense-perception is still perfectly valid.

Well here is the thing that bugs me. To me, if I can explain your actions in terms of the interactions of particles, and its all physics, then why talk about volition at all? You simply did what physics worked out to have you do, and even if on some level it is stochastic and so I cannot actually know what you will do in the future, it still doesn't mean that you have "volition". Do you understand what I'm saying, I'm afraid its difficult to make myself clear in this instance. Yes, I read ITOE and OPAR, and I'm familiar with reduction. But I'm afraid you didn't describe in the above where volition is necessary. I mean you said "you have to choose to make that comparison" but that really seems to mean that in order to have knowledge you have to make the comparison, and if you don't you do not have knowledge. My question is very specifically: Where in the process of gaining any sort of knowledge does the requirement to have made a different decision enable the gaining of knowledge? Its the thing I haven't been able to pin down, and it seems vital to the volitionist insistence that it is only volition which enables knowledge.

Big things are made up of small things. We can make generalizations about the big things, come up with laws (for example Newton's laws), but there are certain cases where they are not fully applicable, such as at the level of the extremely small or when something is moving extremely fast. But if you want to know how an object will behave under any and all conditions, then you have to examine it with the finest lens you have, otherwise you will miss things. You are right that causality is about identity and time. However part of the identity, in fact the thing which makes up all other components of an objects identity, are its constituent parts and the nature of their interactions. A man cannot jump off the Empire State Building and be expected to survive. Why? Well, yes, its because he is "man" but more specifically it is because the enormous force of his landing will shatter his bones and tear most of the tissues in his body, and it will do that because of what those tissues and bones are composed of etc. etc. I have just reread OPAR's section on volition, and while I understand most of Peikoff's points, I cannot reconcile science and volition. To be self-caused in the strictest sense of the term (that is, to be untraceable, even in theory, to anything else, ever) is a fundamentally anti-science mystical position. The mind and brain (more generally the body but particularly and most importantly the brain) are one and the same in Objectivism. In order for one to make a choice which could have been otherwise, then the rules governing the actions of the particles in the brain must allow for multiple possibilities. That can, probably, be reconciled with science (though I'm more comfortable with the idea that our knowledge is inherently limited and as a result multiple futures are possible given our knowledge). However, the part which cannot be, as far as I can tell, is the idea that somehow the mind is able to pick one over the other for a reason other than random chance. The mind is the brain. And so basically Objectivism is saying that the particles of the brain do something as opposed to other possible things because they just did, but it isn't random. That doesn't make sense, and the only way it could is if there is some "other" force, which cannot be examined by the natural sciences ever, and as a result is supernatural. I have a question about the argument for volition from an epistemological viewpoint: What about the ability to choose enables you to know that you are adhering to reality, that you actually legitimately know something, etc.? I understand somewhat why determinism might not be fully compatible with knowledge, since you can't help but thinking what you are thinking and so how do you know you are adhering to reality? But I want to turn it around and see why volitionists know they are adhering to reality, just because they think they are choosing to. Then I would be in a better position to compare the two.

And I was describing the process by which the crystal ball would go about doing that. Obviously it would have to include the effects of its predictions in its calculations, which would tend to cause an infinitely long recursive loop (each prediction causes events to change, causing a different prediction, which changes events, etc. etc. etc.). The only solution to it is if it were able to formulate a prediction or vision of the future which could not change. I don't know if that is possible, it would seem to be in a state of constant flux. This does not mean that the future isn't determined however, it simply means that you can't know what the future will be. Since your crystal ball cannot exist, any problems which arise with it are likely due to the fact that we are stipulating the existence of something which cannot exist, rather than in the thing we are trying to examine through it. Btw, having something simply do something other than any prediction we make about it isn't really evidence for free will, as I can make a short program that will spit out a number other than the one you predict it will say. That isn't hard at all. My argument is that we cannot violate the laws of physics. Physics is deterministic (even quantum mechanics if you take the wave function as reality). As a result, the future is determined. It doesn't even matter if there are multiple possible futures, because my point is that there is no little man standing outside the universe selecting one path over another, somehow controlling the future course of the universe. We are a part of the universe, and we act in the way all things in the universe act. We make decisions, and can even be said to have "free will" because we do decide from various conceivable options, and even it might be possible that we could have selected a different flavor of ice cream other than chocolate had the quantum stuff worked out differently. My point is that free will requires that there be something nonphysical, something nonstochastic and nondeterministic and outside of physics, which somehow interacts with the universe in order to select one path over another. Otherwise it is simply a result of the laws of physics playing themselves out. The whole point of physics is that it tries to explain how all the constituent pieces of everything in the universe act. Those laws are all deterministic (or maybe stochastic, though I don't think that's a good interpretation of quantum theory). Either physics controls everything in the universe or there is extra-physical (i.e. supernatural) force which exists in people which embues them with free will. Your brain and your senses are intimately linked. If you are presented in your mind with an hallucination, then your senses are lying to you. The whole point of hallucinations is that they seem as real as your normal interaction with reality, they exhibit themselves as from your senses. Your eyes are nothing if you have no visual center in your brain. If that center is affected somehow by something, causing its functioning to change, then your senses are actually lying to you. They are showing you something which does not exist, a figment of your diseased/impaired brain, not reality. Talk to any schizophrenic or LSD user and I'm sure they'll tell you that your perceptions can lie to you.

Different contexts? The first is my primary view. The second was talking about your crystal ball thought experiment, in which I stated that the ball would calculate everything without its prediction, then include its prediction, see how it changes things, then include that one, etc. etc. etc. on and on until finally it reaches a stable future prediction. It essentially was about the method by which the crystal ball would go through in order to reach its prediction, not an actual statement about the future state of the universe. The third was talking about the definition of fate and why it is apt in the discussion of a crystal ball which gives predictions about the future having already taken into account how you would react to the prediction, thus making it inevitable that the event would occur. They aren't at all contradictory, except perhaps so far as the crystal ball is impossible to build and how its existence might cause problems, but I don't think even then.

They aren't natural sciences, they are the study of human behavior. The study of how people make decisions and why they make the ones they do is perfectly legitimate. Neither of those has ever found any evidence that given exactly the same conditions a given person would make a different choice. I do have a lot invested because in my mind the alternative is determinism or magic, and if its magic then there's no point in anything. However, my point in the area you quoted was saying that determinism has to carry over because it logically does. If I were to build a computer advanced enough to model a system with all deterministic subcomponents and had perfect precision with the starting conditions, then it would always churn out the same result every single time. Why? Because a system completely composed of deterministic subcomponents which interact in deterministic ways is deterministic. They do it in chaos theory all the time, in fact chaos theory is at least in part the study of how sensitive to initial conditions and complex the behavior of a deterministic system can be. Our senses don't let us see everything at all scales. And so we have to build machines which allow us to see more and more and more. So yes, our "imperfect" senses allow us to build, while not perfect, more "perfect" machines. It is a shame we don't have better eyes, ears, etc. I hope one day we will rectify that. But the whole reason for instrumentation is to allow us to see what we cannot, to allow us to interact with and control that which we cannot with out bodies directly. Schizophrenia, LSD, sleep deprivation, heat exhaustion, etc. etc. etc. That was sooooo difficult. Now you could say "well no, that's in our brain", but really all our senses are in our brains, all the important parts, and if there is anything wrong with the brain it can impede the functioning of our senses and literally have us see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things which are not there and do not exist. I've never said that. My explanation for the origin of our sensation of having free will is that prior to making a decision we come up with a few seemingly plausible courses of action. At that time, we think that we could very well end up choosing any of them, and of course that is what we would think (and in fact, for all anyone can know at the time, it is a correct feeling). We then go through a selection process, and end up with our final decision. My point is that the nature of the brain, and any computational system, is that it cannot know its result until it goes through the process to get there. However that does not mean that the process was not deterministic, it simply means that you must go through it to see what the answer is. That in no way is "volitional deterministic forces", it is embedded in the nature of any computational system, such as the brain. Dogs are not conceptual, they cannot apply reason, and as a result do not have rights. It was I that decided when to stop wiggling my finger. But I am my body, I am a system of particles which behaves deterministically. You seem to insist on having an "I" that is not physical, and thereby requires an external force to make it do something. I decide when to stop, but that is the same as saying that the system of particles that makes me up went through a process which eventually led me to stop wiggling my finger after x times.

I have first-hand experience with the above, and wish my parents and teachers had worked harder to teach me to judge myself by my own standards, not those of other people. In fact, I am willing to say that for most of my life (perhaps even now) I was a second-hander, and worked for high grades not because I necessarily wanted to learn (though I do enjoy it) but because I wanted to prove I was smart and hopefully smartest (as well as a number of other things second-hander-y). If the point is to help children develop and/or preserve their self-motor then I agree with the author (I don't think that was her point however), as I am still trying to rebuild mine.

When you make a choice you come up with a range of "possibilities", things which at first glance seem like something that might be what you want to do. Then you go through some process to whittle them down to one course of action, then do it. The only reason there are possibilities in the first place is because you have to have some options in order to go through a process of selection on, without creating some options your selection process has nothing to process on. A better term might be "conceivable courses of action" rather than "possible courses of action", since conceivable simply means that you can think that you might do them, whereas possible implies that you may very well actually end up doing them (even with perfect knowledge of the universe). If you focused as much as you know how, rechecked your reasoning several times for errors, and no one else can find an error either, and you don't end up having any problems in reality when you act on your conclusion (which is the final test for the correctness of a proposition), then what evidence do you have that you are incorrect? The only thing that matters is the process of gaining knowledge. If it is logical it conforms to reality, if it is illogical it does not. If I never see any contradictions with reality, then it is as far as I or anyone else can tell logical. I know my proposition is true because I don't see any errors. What is it about the ability to do something different (or more importantly, to somehow stand outside reality and select from among a set of truly possible courses of action in the future) that allows you to have knowledge? In my mind, knowledge is the result of a certain process, and that process does not involve the possibility of a different course of action. Because with it you are more likely to survive? Without a code of values you will die. Without thought, you will die. Just because I can't do differently than what I end up doing does not mean that I am destined to live without effort. If I want to live I have to try to do what is necessary in order to do so.

All quote material is from the Ayn Rand Lexicon's page on Free Will. The above quote seems to boil down to the idea that man does not have any instinctual guides to behavior and must think in order to decide what course of action he will take. That is obvious and I don't disagree. My point of contention is that when you make your decision, that you could have behaved differently. Your brain has to do something in order to think, you have to put an effort forth, if you don't you won't think. The heart functions without thought, the brain does not. The definition of "automatic" in the above seems to be "that which functions without thought", and the definition of "volition" is "that which thinks." I think those terms imprecise and ill-defined, but if that is all Objectivism thinks on the issue, then I too am a volitionist. I agree with this as well. Man has to decide to start thinking in order to think conceptually. It doesn't happen without that choice, and it isn't instinctive or infallible. "Automatic" in the sense I defined above is by definition not compatible with thought. Involuntary, in the sense that the man was forced to do so (coercion, not laws of physics forced) or that he didn't think about it (like the beating of his heart), is also not compatible with thought. Still, that does not preclude the possibility that he could not behave a different way (more importantly, it doesn't mean he somehow changed the outcome of whatever random event in his brain might have been the deciding factor). Next is a long quote from "The Objectivist Ethics" which I will only quote a portion. Where, in the above, does it imply that he must be able to have behaved differently given the conditions for it to be valid. The means by which you gain knowledge obviously have to be learned, but that doesn't have anything to do with volition. Obviously he has to learn, discover, and produce everything he wants by his own choice, because if he didn't decide to it wouldn't happen. But where does that require him to have possibly decided differently? Again, I don't really see any issue with my position in the above, because it doesn't address the core issue. Being "free to focus or unfocus" one's mind doesn't have anything to do with epistemology or ethics. Nature is a noncontradictory whole. Logic is the art of noncontradictory identification, and conceptualization is the integration of one's knowledge into a noncontradictory whole. If you do not focus your mind, then you will likely have more errors than if you focused, and therefore have more contradictions, which will result in a worse life for you then if you had focused. To claim knowledge without checking yourself, without focusing, is absurd, because you have no idea of whether or not you have made a mistake, you haven't even tried to find out. Knowledge requires focus and self-checking (and ideally checking with others as well, just to make sure you aren't missing something for some reason). Man has no instincts, he has to think in order to survive. If you don't think, if you don't focus, then you are undermining your own life and acting against the requirements for your own existence, that is anti-life and as a result immoral. I do not see where the ability to do something different given the same conditions comes into play in any of the above, and yet it is a rough sketch of epistemology and ethics in Objectivism. You have to decide to focus or not, and the decision bears consequences, but you do not have to have been able to make the other choice for the rest of Objectivism to be complete, as far as I can see. The rest of the quotes revolve around the ability to force a man to think or not. Obviously you cannot force a man to think if he does not decide to. Why? Because his decision is necessary for him to think. It is the starting point of thought. In that sense you might say it is a form of self-causation, but I do not see why that means that he could have decided otherwise. In fact, my whole problem with volition is not the idea that someone has to decide to think, and that starts off all the rest of his actions and cognition, the application of reason and all the rest. The decision to focus or not to focus is the first decision and is apparently "self-caused." Obviously it was caused by the motions of matter in his brain since matter is first, then life, then mind, but that does not really have any bearing on it. My problem is with the idea that a person could have decided to unfocus rather than focus his mind. That is my point of contention, and I have seen nothing in any of the stuff on the Lexicon or in any of the books of Rand's, or on these forums, which makes me see why that assertion is necessary for any of the rest of Objectivism to remain perfectly intact.

Not really, since I have never really claimed you could literally predict the future course of all events in the universe. My main point is that the future is static (or the range of possible futures is static, as is required by quantum mechanics). Our decisions obviously make it what it will be, but our decisions aren't a different form of causation since they are the result of the actions of the matter which makes up our brain and bodies. I changed my behavior because the result of my interaction with the crystal ball will change my future courses of action. Everything is determined, and the crystal ball obviously determined that telling me I will get hit by the bus will ultimately lead to me getting hit by the bus at the appointed time, somehow. It can, after all, "see the future" for all intents and purposes, including its own actions. Perhaps that is another rhetorical question, but no I do not believe in god or gods, I haven't at all for at least 6 years (and was off an on before that for another two or three). Fate is an appropriate term for an event of the future which, by definition, is inevitable. The only way for me to do something different than what the crystal ball predicted is to have some of the matter in my brain behave differently than the laws of physics allow, and so either physics must always be incomplete or I have a soul. There are many interpretations of what quantum mechanics means. My personal favorite is the Bohm interpretation, which is effectively a hidden variable theory and which behaves deterministically. So, the path of any given subatomic particle is absolutely defined but our ability to have knowledge of that path is limited, thereby resulting in the stochastic results of quantum mechanics. Even the traditional Copenhagen interpretation still prohibits volition though. The only way the predictions of quantum mechanics would hold is if the collapse of the wave function was truly random. All the evidence suggests it is (if you go in for the idea of a collapsing wavefunction in the first place). Now, the only way choice comes into the picture is if somehow a conscious entity could affect the collapse of the wave function, an ability which cannot exist according to our knowledge of physics and which would require something nonphysical in order to allow it. Again, I reach the choice between magic or reality and I choose reality. I have not read any philosophers really, except Rand. I have purchased two books on the nature of consciousness and volition from other people (both are scientists and one is a philosopher as well), but have not read them yet. I have read Rand, not all (though I have purchased them all), but ITOE, Atlas Shrugged, The Fountainhead, Anthem, and OPAR (not Rand, but still a major work in the philosophy). I will do that, but in a separate post, as this one is already veering a bit long.

Actually this is what the introspective-volitionists do all the time, and volitionists seem to generally. So that really isn't an issue that I alone have. Also, you are oversimplifying my post in order to make it sound absurd, which can be done with almost anything. Well, that depends on what you mean about the nature of the device, really. If it is simply a computer which knows everything about everything except itself (meaning, it calculates the universe without taking into account the consequences of its answer), then obviously the answer would be you could avoid the bus, since your foreknowledge of the event would not have been included. Now, if your crystal ball could somehow (magically we'll say, since that's the only way its possible) know everything about the entire universe with absolute precision, and could include its own functioning into its program (again, magically), and thus actually creating a perfect roadmap for the future, then I suppose that is not actually possible for you to miss the bus. After all, the crystal ball already took your knowledge into account when giving the prediction, the changes in your behavior, and your reaction to its new prediction, ad infinitum until finally it ended up with this final, stable, prediction. Such a case would be similar to the consequences of time travel in the newest movie version of The Time Machine, where the man repeatedly tries to change the future (to prevent his fiancee's death, and he only tries once, which is an issue with the movie), and ends up being unable to. Everything he does to avoid the fate simply causes it to happen a different way. Actually, your thought experiment sets me up to give the above answer, as there is no other possible answer to give. "If you had a machine that could predict the future perfectly, could you do something other than what it predicts you will?" obviously has the answer "no." Also, later on in your post you talk about me not knowing whether quarks behave deterministically or nondeterministically. They behave deterministically, according to the quantum wave function (that is, the wave function is deterministic, their actual movement is stochastic and guided by the wave function). My main point is that they do not behave volitionally. I have given this issue a large amount of thought in my (albeit short, I'm only 18) life, and I have come to my position as a result of it. Your declaration that I am not being honest can just as easily be applied to you as well. You are obviously dead-set to believe in volition, apparently no matter what argument is given. I am certain of my position, because I have thought about it. I come here to see if I am correct by interacting with other people of opposing viewpoints, and as yet I have not found any problem with my position I have not been able to answer to my satisfaction. That is why I am, as you say, determined to believe in determinism (though that isn't strictly true). To Grames especially, though everyone more generally as well: If every interaction between every particle and every other particle (and between every set of particles) in the universe can be described by a set of deterministic equations, such that given an exact state of the universe (which the universe is in, say, now), then there is only one possible future. Volition requires that not be the case. Volition requires that something in that set of assumptions be incorrect. The only solutions volition has are either that there is no such set of physical laws (in which case I'm not sure how the universe could continue to exist), or there is something magical that makes particles behave in a different way which cannot be characterized in any fashion by any mathematical abstraction even in theory. To me, the two options seem virtually the same, and both seem fundamentally opposed to the proposition that the universe is knowable.

It is obvious. If I have a starting point for my system, a certain set of positions and momentum's for every single individual particle, and a set of physical laws which describe their interactions with full accuracy, and then say "what will it be like at time t?", I will always be able to find the answer. It might not be immediately obvious, but it still is there. The only conceivable problem is if your equations are incapable of handling all the interactions involved (or you don't know how to do the math, etc.), but then you didn't meet the conditions set up in the first place so it really doesn't matter. This is not to say that I could necessarily predict what will happen. I am also ignoring the effects of imprecise measurement of all the values involved. Chaos theory is the field which describes that. Actually, chaos theory is a good example. Chaos theory is all about what sort of unexpected behavior arises in deterministic systems which are extremely vulnerable to changes in initial conditions. But no one has ever demonstrated a nondeterministic and nonstochastic system ever arising from such a base. The reason is because everything in it is deterministic. I really don't understand how anyone can think that determinism is not a quality which can exist at the level of the basic constituents of everything in the universe, but then say that the large-scale world is not deterministic. If every single event everywhere in the universe (I am talking about the realm of particles here) is deterministic, then the universe is deterministic. I really don't see how you could think otherwise.

I was not arguing the primacy of consciousness position to respond to an earlier point in your post. My argument is that free will/volition is an example of saying "I observe the Sun moving through the sky, so the Earth is stationary and the Sun is moving." That is obviously not the case, but at first glance it seems to be correct. It is the same thing I refer to later in my post. I have never observed that I make choices that could have been otherwise given exactly the same conditions. I have never observed that. I have observed myself coming up with some options, and then selecting one of them. When I think back about it, I think "Well I might have done that instead, and then x, y, or z may have happened." But I don't mean that literally. I am saying that before I made my decision, for all anyone, including myself, knew, I could do any of the possible actions. But I have never in my life thought that I could have done something else literally. I just think "well, if you'd thought differently there would have been a different outcome, so try to think that way in the future." I can think of no experiment that would show that I would have made a different decision given exactly the same conditions. That is why I deny that I do so. Exactly, and all science has ever found are nonvolitional causes (either stochastic, like quantum mechanics, or deterministic, like newtonian mechanics; I put both under "deterministic" since niethe is volitional in any sense). All the evidence of the physical world suggests every single phenomenon is nonvolitional at the most basic level. Nondeterministic/nonstochastic phenomenon (in the absolute sense) cannot possible arise from deterministic/stochastic phenomenon. The idea that it could is ridiculous. People say that that is the fallacy of composition, but it is not. If every single piece is deterministic, if every interaction is deterministic, then the whole must be deterministic. On the surface it could appear not to be (when you don't know the inner workings well, and haven't been studying it for a sufficient time), but when it comes right down to it, it must be. Determinism is something that must carry over. Its not like "tableness" or "chairness" or "humanness", things which are identifications of the mind about what it sees. That is the issue. Either electrons and quarks have volition, or we don't. Since the former is absurd, the latter must be the case. Our senses are not perfect. I cannot see an atom with my eyes. In order to do so I have to build instruments and get increasingly accurate equipment, all eventually tied back to man's senses. But the point is that our senses and common sense explanations are often incorrect. My whole purpose is not to say that our senses are fallible (in that they can literally lie), but that our explanations for what we see, hear, smell, taste, and touch are often incorrect. The two are intimately related in the subject of free will, to the point where almost everyone blends them together into a single thing. My purpose in pointing to the Sun going round the Earth as an example is that for centuries that was the generallly accepted explanation for the observation, so much so that it was deemed obvious and self-evident. Blending "I see an object called the Sun moving in the sky" with "It must be going round the Earth" is what volitionists do when they say "I observe myself making decisions and choices from various options" and "I must have been able to do something else." They are analogous. I have described that the method by which you gain knowledge is exactly the same for volitional and nonvolitional conscious entities, that the morality remains the same, etc. I have explained that the appearance of making "free" choices is a case of blending an observation with an explanation so well that the two become virtually identical in everyone's minds. I see no reason to say that you cannot think something new without volition, you are a new entity after all, and will have new thoughts as a result. You are the one who asks me to dismiss all the evidence of science in favor of a gut feeling. I will not do so.

Knowledge has to be a noncontradictory whole. The only evidence for volition is introspection, which does not in fact prove that you have volition. No one has ever proven to me how they can know that given the exact same situation they would not have done precisely the same thing they ended up doing. No one has ever even come close. All they have is the feeling (before they make a decision) that they have options (which of course, in a general sense, they do) and then the suggestion that because of that feeling they could have made a different choice. There is no reason to believe with the certainty of conviction you and others seem to have that you actually know that you have volition. You only know it feels kind of like it. For reasons I've gone into before, that would obviously be the case for a variety of reasons. Since all introspection can give you on the subject is exactly what you would expect even if you were determined, and all the evidence of physics points to a deterministic universe, then it seems that the only reasonable conclusion is to say that volition (in the sense of being able to do something else, beyond what quantum physics allows for due to uncertainty, given precisely the same state of the universe) does not exist. I will address below the issue of how knowledge is possible without volition, hopefully taking out the only remaining block I can see to my viewpoint. Physics reduces the behavior of all particles to systems of equations. Since their behavior is described with extreme accuracy with equations (and its been getting better since science first came into existence as a real avenue of human effort), there is every reason to believe that they behave in a deterministic manner. Or in a semi-random manner perhaps, but still one or the other. We have no evidence for anything other than deterministic or stochastic processes in nature. And so there is no reason to believe that anything else exists. Such a belief would be arbitrary at best. I addressed that in my last paragraph of my post I believe. The process which by a volitional consciousness uses is to look at reality with full clarity and try its best to understand that reality and integrate all of its knowledge into a noncontradictory whole. Then it would look over it to make sure it can't see any errors, then perhaps present it to someone else, or several other entities, for checking on their part. If no one can point out a problem (that can't be dealt with), then there is every reason to think that that consciousness has correctly understood reality. That process can still be used by a nonvolitional entity. The only difference would be that it would have to ensure that it uses its full capacity for focus (the most it has attained, or more, since obviously it can't really focus more than it is currently given a certain set-up) in order to be certain that it is more likely it will be correct. That's it, as far as I can see. I don't see why free will is necessary for knowledge to exist. I don't see what rational thought is impossible if you do not have volition. Unless, of course, you simply define it to be so when there is no reason to do so (except to be able to say that "without volition reason is impossible" in a debate such as this).