nanite1018

I understand Objectivist epistemology stresses integrating data from experience and using logic to come to conclusions. However I find that Objectivists stress induction too much. Once you've formed a concept, if you perform deductive analyses using it, you reach true conclusions (provided the initial concepts are valid). So, if Rothbard, or the Austrian economists, begin with true premises which we can validate inductively are of essentially universal applicability, then the deductive conclusions they draw are necessarily of essentially universal applicability as well. That's the beauty of Austrian economics, in my view. They begin with a small set of universally applicable statements about human beings, and then build up all of economics on that foundation. Any issues with the economics then are either a result of invalid deductive method, or an issue with the fundamental concepts/statements used. Induction must provide you with concepts and those statements, but from there you can validly deduce a very large amount of information. Which is, in my opinion, a wonderful thing, which sometimes it seems many Objectivists avoid because they're more cautious about not being rationalistic than they need to be. I've read ITOE for instance and I don't see why using deduction, keeping the context of your premises in mind, could be a problem.

In his The Ethics of Liberty he discusses natural law and the fact then men need to use reason and produce in order to survive. He also makes an explicit logical argument for why it is simply necessary that each individual have an absolute right of control over themselves (self-ownership), namely that the other alternatives for control of people lead either to internal inconsistency, infinite regress, or the death of humanity in a matter of days. So, from that argument, you have to "own" yourself (have a moral right of control over yourself), and then he goes from there. Perhaps he doesn't say why it is immoral, but he makes an argument which I find satisfying that the only logical possibility is that it is immoral, and any other assertion leads to inconsistency (is that a good enough reason? I think it is). The only application I found in that book that I didn't like was his conclusion about children, and there I think he made a logical error in his reasoning, rather than a systematic error in approach. The key is that a child is by its nature dependent and incapable of surviving without someone else. He argues that you have the right to claim "ownership"/guardianship of the child and thereby exclude everyone else from helping the child, but then not provide for its survival. The nature of a child however means that you are making a decision to kill it, i.e. to violate its right of self-ownership. You, by taking on guardianship must agree to provide for the child, if you choose not to do that, you forfeit guardianship and someone else can step in and take over for you. As for abandoning a child, I'm a little fuzzy as for why that would be wrong, as you are basically putting it up for adoption (now dumping it in a garbage can is a different story altogether, that would be attempted murder). His other conclusion I'm not so sure about is anarcho-capitalism. His argument rests on a) taxation is theft (we all agree on that) and you should have a right to secede, which results in no logical stopping point until you get down until, at least, the level of an individual piece of property owned by an individual person. That part I'm not sure about, though I haven't heard secession talked about much in Objectivist circles, and I haven't worked out exactly why it would be politically prohibited (though perhaps morally it would be inadvisable in many instances). Overall though I found, with those exceptions, his "Ethics of Liberty" a great book, good arguments, and a well-though out system, which happens to agree nicely in nearly every respect (politically) with Objectivism, and one needn't debate morality for a few dozen hours with someone before you can get anywhere in your political argument (which is easier for me, because once someone agrees there, it is easier, I've found, to at least sway them in the direction of Objectivist ethics and epistemology).

My suggestion is that we keep our study of "is"'s separate from our study of "oughts". The behavior of scientists doing research is informed by ethics (so they can't, for example, torture people, etc.). But the science itself, the actual study, should be kept separate from ethics, because they can be and at least at present, need to be. It serves no purpose for every scientist to continually be making moral pronouncements on the conclusions of their work, or, more particularly, to claim that such a thing is a necessary part of being a scientist. An ethicist or philosopher can take the data given by all the other sciences and make pronouncements based on it. That is why it is a separate field of inquiry. A physicist or an economist, within the bounds of their respective fields, do not make ethical pronouncements about the facts of reality they discover. If they do, they aren't "economists" anymore, they are now in the role of "ethicist". The same person can move between the fields, but certain things are in one field, and certain things are in another. Normative pronouncements are in the field of ethics, non-normative factual statements are in the "sciences", i.e. economics, physics, mathematics, biology, psychology, etc. To say economists must make moral pronouncements (as well as all other scientists) is to eliminate the field of ethics entirely, as it has disappeared into everything else.

Well then you just dumped the fact that bacteria and plants have values, because you just defined "one" to be "a being of volitional consciousness" (when used in the definition of "value"), which you criticized the idea of "rational value" for doing. I'll agree with you on "act" though. In any case, whether we want to call the broad category of "that which one acts to gain or keep", sans the need for the object which you are acting to gain or keep furthers one's life, as "value" or something else, does not preclude the fact that we need such a category. Economics is the study of how every single person achieves their goals/"values"/"things they want" without regard to whether those aims/wants/"values" are good or bad, in a condition of scarcity. So whatever you would like to call the category of "the aim of any action taken by a human", that broadest of broad categories is what economics is concerned with, and deciding upon the morality of any of those aims is the place of ethics (and such considerations may be informed by the analysis of the science of economics, just as with all other sciences). Sciences, i.e. the study of the facts of reality (excluding ethics, as it is its own thing), do not make normative conclusions about their objects of study. One last point on "value"", many words have more than one definition, to describe similar though different things, particularly with regards to use in the sciences. "Value" could then have two definitions, "that which one acts to gain or keep" that presupposes the need for an organism to live, and "anything which one acts to gain or keep" that concerns itself with all object of human action and which finds specific use in economics (one would then say, if one were to use such a statement in conversation "value, in the economic sense,..." just as one does in, for example, a discussion of fruits and vegetables, which have different definitions in botany than in common parlance).

A value is something which one acts to gain or keep. The only things which can act to gain and keep something are things which are animate. It is nonsense to say, for example, that a proton "values" an electron because it "acts" to attract one and form a hydrogen atom. That completely takes the concept "value" (and perhaps the concept "act") outside its bound. I agree with Rand that the concept value depends on the question "to whom?", that is, it only applies to living things. This does not require, so far as I can tell, that "value" be defined specifically as "things which one acts to gain or keep that affirm one's life". Indeed, I do not know why considering life-affirming separately from value doesn't acknowledge that values arise in non-human organisms, as they too can act to gain and keep things which support their life (indeed, as they do not have volition, they must). Hold on though, to say "value is that which one acts to gain or keep" makes absolutely no sense at all when applied to anything inanimate. Again, it makes no sense that, as another example, molasses values house flies because it acts in such a way as to prevent them from flying away (that is, it "keeps" them). Value requires something to behave in a goal-directed manner, or else one cannot be said to be "acting to gain or keep" something. The definition of value then requires goal-directed action, and the only things that have goals are living organisms.

We have established rules of grammar for clarity in understanding and communicating ideas. I think you would have to change the definition of "valuing" (verb form) to fit your definition of value, rather than leave them as contradictory forms of the same word. Or, as I suggest, use "that which one acts to gain or keep" as the definition of value. I do not see how making "value"'s ccd "action" makes the difference between rational and irrational values seem insignificant. Life-serving actions are non-life serving actions aim at enormously different things (life and death, respectively). So rational values are those that are life-affirming and irrational values are those which are not. How does that preclude reducing the abstraction of rational and irrational down to observable consequence? Rationally derived values affirm life, irrationally derived values (generally, barring luck) do not. That isn't by definition, but can be derived by an analysis of rationally derived values. That is exactly what reducing the abstraction of rational/irrational down to observable consequence, and makes it explicit (by saying "rational value" rather than simply "value"). That seems like it would add to intellectual clarity. Life is acknowledged automatically in the concept "value" anyway, as the only things which may act are things that are alive, and so the ccd "action" brings in the concept life, while the subcategories of value (rational and irrational) can be distinguished either by "rationally derived" or by "life affirming", as the two go hand in hand, as Rand showed.

Well, again, I think that a value (noun) is something that someone values (verb). So, for example, the heroine addict values heroine (I think you would agree with that statement). Now, I think that a basic rule for conceptual clarity is that if I can use a noun in the form of a verb, then the subject of the verb should thus be an example of the noun. So in this case, value can be used as a noun, "Cocaine is a value (implicitly this has 'to [insert person here]' tagged at the end, just as with all values)", and a verb "I value cocaine" (I don't, but as an example to make the distinction clear). So when I say "I value cocaine", to me that should be identical to "Cocaine is a value to me." Otherwise, I think we'd be having trouble with grammar/words and thus with keeping concepts straight in our heads. In that schema, "rational value" and "irrational value" would both be hierarchically dependent on the broader concept "value", neither being a borderline case. That strikes me as a far more satisfying and clear conceptual hierarchy (more along the lines of "dining table" and "desk"). At the very least, there would have to be a term that describes everything that people act to gain or keep. And Mises' epistemology was completely off base, I agree with you. But I agree with him insofar as I think the "laws of economics" are of a similar calibre as the laws of logic or mathematics (though obviously slightly lower on the ladder, as economics would proceed via logic and perhaps mathematics), in that it can and should be based on statements that apply to everyone everywhere. That was the strategy Rothbard took, saying that the "axioms" of praxeology/economics were derived from experience in the same way that the laws of logic are. That does not strike me as out of line (necessarily) with Objectivist epistemology.

Well, what do you expect? A moral argument is ridiculously short once you've reached the conclusion "the initiation of physical aggression (force) against a human being or his property is immoral in any and all cases," you're done. Here is how easy it is to address issues from that point: Taxes- forcible expropriation of wealth, immoral. Public schools- funded by taxes, enforced through fines and fees, which is forcible expropriation of wealth, immoral. Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, SCHIP, Obamacare, TANF, etc etc.- can only be funded by taxes, involuntary participation, expropriation of wealth, immoral. All economic regulations- can only be enforced through fines and jail time, interferes with voluntary exchange of property titles and voluntary actions, initiation of force, immoral. Wow. The moral argument against any and all government programs (excluding, perhaps, children and the insane) can be formulated in one page. You can't write a book on such a subject. The above is all that is necessary to do a strictly moral argument against all of those things (once you've reached the ban on initiation of force/physical aggression). That isn't going to be satisfying to anyone however. Describing what consequences such activities have, and how capitalism could do it better, is interesting, and is a much fuller presentation. If capitalism led inevitably to misery and pain, even if you could logically derive that it is the only moral system (i.e. the only system where each person is free from coercion and live), you'd have a tough time making people accept your views. So incorporating an analysis of the consequences of X. I'm reading his book "For a New Liberty" right now, and he argues that initiation of force is wrong, and always makes the case that, for example, conscription is slavery, taxation is theft, etc. and then goes on to show the various negative consequences of government action and how capitalism and liberty can make it better.

Rand discusses choosing one's values and even mentions irrational values in "The Objectivist Ethics". "If he chooses irrational values, he switches his emotional mechanism from the role of his guardian to the role of his destroyer." The Objectivist Ethics If you only define "value" as the objective values which support your life, than how can I choose those values? I don't have a whole lot of options, as I either choose "values" or something else entirely, which makes no sense in my reading of that essay. I've also seen articles in the Objective Standard on ethics which take my view of values as well (that crack can be a value to a crack addict, it just isn't a good one). Indeed, that seems to be the point of contention more than anything: values can be good or bad, for life or against it, but they are all values if someone acts to gain or keep them. We can evaluate them as to their "value" as values, but they're still values. And economics is properly concerned with the category "that which one acts to gain or keep", i.e. values in the broader sense.

Well my experience was that I was a socialist (not very widely read, but generally thought it best) up until I was 16, then I read "The Road to Serfdom" by Hayek and "Capitalism and Freedom" by Friedman. Neither made an especially moral case against socialism and for capitalism, but were much more descriptions of what would happen under each system (socialism leads to totalitarianism and poverty, capitalism to freedom and prosperity). I disliked the consequences of socialism and liked capitalism, and so became more of a libertarian minded person (which was good). It was only then that I was at all interested in reading stuff from Rand, and I am almost certain that without that prior experience I would have written "Atlas Shrugged" off, or would have been at the very least far less impressed than I was. Providing the pragmatic argument can soften people up for the moral argument, because many people think capitalism inevitably leads to boom-bust cycles, and big companies squishing all the little ones, and monopolies (which they think are horrible) everywhere, and all this stuff that simply isn't the case. So while you stand there trying to talk about how capitalism is the only moral system, all they are thinking is "but all those horrible things happen under capitalism!" and they simply stop listening to you, often times. Both arguments are really needed to convince someone fully of the morality of capitalism and that it is the best and only way to bring about happiness for people on Earth. I do not see why one must exclude from the concept "value" all things which are not objectively values for the individual. There is a need for two separate concepts here, or at least two concepts that deal with similar things but are different: "value"- that which one acts to gain or keep and "objective/rational value"- a value that furthers your life. Or perhaps you wish to call the former something different. There has to be a term for, for example, heroine in relation to the heroine addict. Obviously he acts to gain and keep it. That needs a term. And whatever concept subsumes both that type of thing as well as life-affirming values is the proper area of economic study, for that is the only concept which encompasses all human activity (and all such activity is open to economic analysis). Well here is where we disagree. I prefer economics be a science along the lines of physics (though with a methodology appropriate for its field of study; economics cannot use experiments, and so must depend, in my opinion, on deduction from validated principles that are universal for human activity). A good economist creates accurate predictions using a proper methodology, just as a good physicist makes accurate predictions using a proper methodology. The economist, acting in his capacity as an economist, cannot evaluate whether or not the results of some action by the government, for example, are good or bad. He can say whether or not it will meet its stated aim, but he cannot evaluate it as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Similarly, a physicist cannot say, as a physicist, whether or not the detonation of an atom bomb is a good or bad thing. Such questions are for ethics to answer, not for science to answer. Now, in terms of my estimation of economists, good economists will certainly be pro-capitalism (in particular for laissez-faire), and if they aren't, I would judge them as either a) bad economists because they aren't coming to correct conclusions or bad people, because they came to the proper conclusions economically, and decided that the consequences of economic ruin and misery that come with socialist policies was a good thing. Economists, acting as economists (as in, scientists) cannot give policy recommendations. But they can, as citizens, use economic analysis to inform their opinions. I think it is best to keep science and ethics as separate as possible, except insofar as ethics should guide the scientists behavior (only epistemology should guide his scientific conclusions).

Well Mises was a utilitarian. Rothbard was a natural rights theorist. I don't know about the others. But even so, just because the practioners of a particular school of economic thought make some mistakes does not discount the school. Also, making a pragmatic case for capitalism is fine, isn't it? Make the moral case too, but if they can give a rational and powerful argument that it is pragmatically good as well as morally, that seems like it can only be a good thing. I don't know if it is really psychological egoism, though perhaps it might. They define value as "that which one acts to gain or keep". By the very definition, we arrive at the fact that people act to maximize their value, correct? After all, anything you act to gain or keep is a value to you, by definition. So, doesn't the very definition of value that Objectivism uses imply the very assumption you criticize the Austrians for having? You show your valuation of things by what you do, by definition (because if you act to gain or keep it, you value it, and obviously it is a greater value than the other possible things, since you did not act to gain or keep those). That is from Objectivism's definition of value, and also the Austrian's (or at least, Rothbard's, from what I've read of him). These are not values in the sense that they make your life better, they are values only in the sense that you act to gain or keep them. I don't see a problem there, it strikes me as self-evident.

I've concluded, after further thinking and reading, that people can own land, precisely because they bring it into productive use, and since I own my mind and body, and the land was previously unowned, i.e. not exclusively controlled by some individual or group, then I can, by bringing it into productive use, and putting the stamp of my mind, personality, and labor on it (for example, by staking it out, by farming it, etc.), I have a right to it. I've made it an extension of my self, in a manner of speaking. So, no more problems here on my part, it makes perfect sense. There are of course technical questions of property rights, for example, ownership of water ways and airspace above my home, oil 5 km down, etc. which as far as I know have not been settled yet, but the principle that I can indeed own land is one I accept.

Your criticism of von Mises is identical to that of Rothbard's. Rothbard was in the Aristotelian school of epistemology, whereas Mises was in the Kantian school. And so what Mises called "a priori" axioms, Rothbard believed were derived from experience, and so where technically empirical, but were in the same vein as A is A and such statements in that while it was derived from reality, it was universally true/self-evident for anyone with any experience of said reality. Though I'm curious to see why you think that Mises's economics was excellent but his insistence that economics is deductive is false. Rothbard (who believed the "axioms" of Austrian economics were derived from reality, but were universally true) used a purely deductive method as well, in that he started from the axioms and deduced things from them with very little external information about people beyond what they contained, in the same manner as von Mises. Mises does not use econometric analyses to develop theories of economics, at all, completely unlike all the rest of economics (a method shared by all Austrians).

Austrians completely reject using econometrics as a basis for developing economic theory, instead deducing it from axioms and a tiny amount of information about how to proceed. When they discuss maximization of utility, they mean maximizing the values that person has or attains. Those values are whatever the person happens to desire, for whatever reason. It really is self-evident that everyone tries to get as much of whatever they value as possible. Even the ascetic or self-flagellates is getting as much of whatever they value (in that case pain and misery) as they can. Remember, the definition of value is fundamentally different than objective or rational value. Values are whatever you act to gain or keep. Objective values are whatever furthers your life. They are two related but separate concepts. Utility concerns itself with the former, and so does all of economics. Ethics deals with the latter. Again, analyzing what the consequences of having a different property right scheme is a legitimate and important area of study for economists. Why? Precisely because government is changing property rights all the time through legislation. The just system of property rights is something for philosophy to decide. What happens under various systems of property rights is a question for the science of economics. You say that physicists have standards of good and bad physics, and they do. So do the Austrians. They believe that trying to use econometric analyses to gain knowledge of economics is wrong-headed, as the number of causes is essentially infinite as we are dealing with human behavior (and humans have volition). So rather than doing that, they try to build up economics from a few self-evident axioms and limited (very limited) and very very general information about the world. They then apply their analyses to various systems, including an economy free of taxation or regulation, as well as statist communal societies, various forms of state intervention, taxation, welfare, etc. They are most certainly concerned with whether or not their conclusions are in fact the correct ones (i.e. that they predict the consequences accurately). What they, as economists, as scientists, are not concerned with is the justness of any given system. That is something for them as citizens to decide.

Physics cannot decide whether things are good or bad. It is about how things happen. Similarly, economics cannot decide whether someone is doing the right thing. It describes how people behave, not how they should behave. Economics is concerned with consequences of various actions, and the nature of people's behavior on the market. It is obvious that people try to maximize what economists call "utility", which is basically the same as saying as they try to get as much value as possible. That is obvious. But economists cannot, as economists, define value in the sense that penicillin is an objective value. They must define value as that which someone acts to gain or keep. That is as far as they can go, without including ethics. As economics is a science, it discusses how things are, now how they should be, and therefore does not and cannot concern itself with ethics. Again, I am not overly familiar with Austrian economic theory, but I think it possible to discuss economic behavior without having a system of objective rights. "Property" is simply "that which an individual controls", trade is the exchange of property. Property rights come in, but the analysis of various systems of property rights is within the purview of economics as a science. If you deny this, then you would be saying that every economist who analyzes the results of government policies is not acting as an economist when he does so, as the government action is not based on the correct system of property rights. Obviously that is false, economists certainly can, do, and must analyze the consequences of all sorts of various systems of property rights and economic interventions (which are really alterations in property rights, to some extent). As for rights, that has nothing to do with economics, except insofar as property rights are concerned. Economics analyzes the consequences of various actions, not the morality of those actions. Indeed the very fact that economics analyzes all sorts of different actions and their consequences, moral and immoral, shows that economics does not need a moral basis in order to proceed with its analysis of cause and effect. So it is outside the bounds of economics to say that minimum wage laws are wrong. If you create minimum wage laws, you have changed the system of property rights. Economics takes property rights as givens, and so if you change them, it can tell you what will happen, but NOT whether it is a good or bad action. Economics is not ethics. It takes whatever system of rights you give it and analyzes the consequences, and that analysis is what makes it science. It spits out answers for you to then apply your individual moral system to. Economics, then, is value free, or at least should be, so that we can discuss the consequences of all possible property right systems, rather than only a perfectly Objectivist one. Like all other sciences then, economics takes epistemology, and then applies it to the world, giving you the information you need to make moral choices.

Well, the one thing I think should be remembered is that "value" is defined strictly as what one acts to gain or keep. Economics is a science, and so is value free, in the sense that it does not make normative conclusions (within its bounds as a science). So for economics, as a science, people's values are taken as a given, and have to be (to make conclusions, like that they are irrational, is to include morality, which has no place in science, which simply is an understanding of how the world works, not how we would like it to work). So, for economics, values are indeed purely subjective, in the sense that as an economist your values are beyond criticism and are entirely your own as opposed to controlled by others. The Objectivist theory of value is exactly in line with Austrian view of values (that by acting you demonstrate you value something, and if you don't act to gain something, then you do not value it). What is a rational value, or an objective value, to you is entirely different than what you value. Crack whores value crack and whoring. Serial killers value murder. John Galt values his engine. These are all values. 2 out of 3 of them are not rational or objective values to the valuer, but they are still indeed values. Economics is concerned only with what people value and how they attain those values, not with what people should be valuing. I see no conflict then between a subjectivist approach to value (in the sense that Austrians use the term) and an Objectivist understanding of value, values, and rational/objective values. As for the deductive nature of the Austrian school, I see nothing wrong with deductive knowledge so long as the premises are true. Indeed it is the very nature of deduction that if the premises are true than the conclusions are true. So, unless there is a faulty premise in Austrian economics, or logical errors in their arguments, then whatever they have to say must be true. Since the fundamental axioms of Austrian economics are sound, indeed as the say are basically self-evident, then barring logical errors or the introduction of additional assumptions later (and I have no read any of the major works in Austrian economic thought, so I cannot say if that is the case), then their conclusions must be true.

I'm not sure how the creators of the film/comic wanted it to be perceived, but I thought it was a stylized depiction of what superheroes in the "real" world could be. There has been a lot of controversy over Hit Girl, with her cursing and mass murder (not giving anything away, its in the trailer, at least a taste of it). But you know, I don't see what people have a problem with, other than perhaps that much cursing isn't ideal (though, it sort of works for a beat-em-up-n-kill-em superhero). She doesn't kill innocent people, she kills murderers, or in self-defense. She knows the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, and understands the concept of justice thoroughly. She also seems to be quite intelligent, and has a loving relationship with her father. Seems like a pretty good daughter/human being to me. Indeed, I think the visceral cause of the uproar is because she's Hit GIRL and people seem to think that girls should play with dollies and pretty pink horses, anything else being an abhorrent deviation from what a girl/woman should be. Which is offends me, and I'm male. Haha.

Okay, so the key is that until you have evidence to suggest that you are in a new context, you cannot conceivably argue that that is in fact the case because you would have no evidence to suggest it (it would be an arbitrary assertion). And so, while you could conceivably turn out to be in a different context, you have no basis for accepting that as true until you have evidence, for the same reason that you cannot use arbitrary assertions in your cognitive processes: they have no cognitive basis. I see now my mistake. I took the belief you were in the same context as an assumption that must be justified, but in fact it is the assertion that you are in a new context that has to have some evidence for it before it can be entertained seriously. Thank you.

I have been thinking a lot about epistemology lately, and researching "critical rationalism", a philosophy coming from Karl Popper. This question is informed from that, but concerns the contextual nature of knowledge and its implications. I understand that it is possible to self-consistently justify a conclusion within a certain context, for example laws of physics or the workings of a cell or what have you, based on sense-perception and the law of identity, and that these conclusions can be certain, in the sense that they are definitely true within that context of knowledge. My understanding is that, broadly conceived, the "context" of a generalization is all your perceptions in life, and your entire conceptual framework and knowledge. I accept that this is possible, without question. My question is this: what happens in a new context? That is, how can I know that a generalization which is certain within my range of experience, for example, all the past, will remain true tomorrow, as it is a different context? Or alternatively, on the other side of the Moon (for example, Newton's laws of motion), etc.? Our knowledge is contextual, that is, every knowledge statement has the unstated parenthesis "within my context of knowledge". So how can we expand that to the future or areas wider than we have heretofore experienced? If our generalization fails at some point, we know that there is something we do not know, that the context we had before does not include this event, and so we can expand our context and our knowledge by investigating what changed. However, prior this event, are we simply to assume that the context has not changed, even though time has passed, we are in a new location, etc.? Alternatively, if someone comes up with a theory which is identical within our context but which only differs in a context that is wider? For example if someone hypothesized Einstein's special relativity in 1860, well before the Michelson-Morley experiment, or if someone hypothesized the existence of RH factors (or, something beyond simple blood type to determine compatibility) before their had been evidence that they existed. Is the solution to reject those claims as arbitrary? Or is it that "context" means something which cannot change prior to your experience, i.e. it includes your sense-perception, not the actual conditions (so that the context does not change until your generalization fails)? That explanation makes some sense, but there are difficulties, for example how do you explain the failure of the generalization? It had to have failed in a different context than the one where the initial generalization held initially, but by this notion of context, it did not. Contexts obviously change regularly as people make new discoveries and revisions of previous knowledge statements all the time, so it does not seem unreasonable to think that at any given time the context might be different. If that is reasonable, then how do we justify the assumption that we make in our behavior that it is not the case (until shown otherwise)?

This is exactly what I was trying to say. Your actions are "determined" based on everything you are, i.e. your beliefs, your thoughts, emotions, etc., and all of your decisions in the past have led you to this point. It is not even imaginable to track backwards in time, or forwards in time, to find out that you actions are now or will be determined based on what the state of the universe is at present. The reason? Because such an analysis would 1) have to include a full copy of you, and so it would be impossible you would at best be speeding up the rate at which some copy of you thinks, not actually knowing what that person will do prior to them doing it and 2) not include a "you" in the first place. It would be about particles and fields, not about thoughts and "I"s. If you want to figure out what is going on in a person's mind, particles give no insight into minds. After all, thoughts are huge abstractions from particles. No one thinks the precise position of a single atom in the brain makes much difference to your thoughts at any given point in time. Rather, thoughts are massive abstractions, and so while the particles are necessary for them to exist, they are largely irrelevant to the workings at that level. Knowledge of the particles will give essentially no insight into the workings of the mind, as they aren't relevant. A helpful analogy might be to thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics deals with particles and averages certain properties over huge numbers of them to arrive at what are the laws of thermodynamics that have been around for a century or more. The actual positions of individual particles are irrelevant to thermodynamics, and insight into them gives no greater knowledge of thermodynamics (while statistical mechanics is a somewhat broader study, applicable to areas larger than thermodynamics alone). Similarly, the particles in the brain are irrelevant to the workings of the mind. And so, you have volition (because you are the thing that is acting, and the only explanation possible on the level of minds and persons and macroscopic objects is that you chose), even if the universe turns out to follow deterministic laws of physics (as the two levels are effectively distinct).

Sure, but a determinist will not accept "volition is axiomatic." Someone's obviously tried that. And to have a backup argument, one based on how it would arise, and how exactly it can be fully compatible with a deterministic physics, is valuable. That is how you can convince someone that they are wrong, if they proclaim themselves to be rational. Most determinists I've encountered are scientists, and so while they may not accept an axiomatic argument, if you can also provide them with a naturalistic one, then they are likely to accept it. Once they've gotten that, then you may go back to that other argument. Having an explanation for how volition may arise, why it is axiomatic (all the reasons it is inescapable, of which I raised at least one that I have not heard before in Objectivist circles), and how it is compatible with a deterministic physics are valuable tools to have in your arsenal. I'm not saying that is the best way to go about it, but if someone will not accept an axiomatic explanation, then a naturalistic one can't hurt (and it may just convince them).

I do get it. Volition is axiomatic. But people will always want to know "But if the laws of physics are deterministic (and we don't know if they are or not, btw), then where's the free will?" That is a legitimate question. Saying "volition exists" does not explain how it comes to be, or how exactly it is compatible with deterministic physics. The point I am trying to make is that volition arises from the fact that it is impossible to describe the huge number of things which affected that decision, all the things in that person's past which affected how they decided, what was going on in their head, all the conditions which may have affected them, etc. You simply cannot do it, no small set of things could ever get you there (or even a large set of things). It is quite possible that the limits of information allowed ANY being by the laws of physics would still make it impossible to know with certainty what someone will do prior to their doing it. And so even if physics is deterministic, it is meaningless to say that that is what made them do it. There were a vast number of possible futures given the conditions (that is, our knowledge, or possible knowledge of the conditions), and so physics is not an explanation. The only meaningful explanation is the very one we give ourselves, the concept of ourselves which we have, which provides us with reasons for our actions, which has intent, etc. My point is that while volition is axiomatic in the sense that Objectivism holds (knowledge is impossible without it), it is also axiomatic even disregarding that. It is impossible to understand anything anyone has ever done, without adopting what Daniel Dennett calls the "intentional stance," i.e. the view of things in terms of people rather than particle-systems, in terms of motivations and desires instead of neural pathways and firings. You can't plan without adopting this volitional "I" in your thinking, you couldn't even function. Our experience of ourselves as volitional entities is not an option, it is a requirement of consciousness, a requirement of life, it is the base upon which our lives are built, upon which we can have this conversation, upon everything anyone has ever done. Volition is compatible with a deterministic physics, precisely because physics does not include people, no list of forces can actually describe "why" someone does something. The only explanation that is possible is that "he chose to." This answer is not optional, it is the only way we can function, it is the basic root upon which our understanding of ourselves is built. We are physical, our minds are physical, their workings are physical. But even given all that, and a deterministic physics, we still have free will, we still have choice, we still "could have done otherwise" in any meaningful sense, and as such are still capable of knowledge and responsibility. Saying that free will isn't magical doesn't reduce it, it doesn't make it meaningless, and trying to figure out what it is and how it functions does not destroy it. I fully understand that volition is axiomatic, just as sense-perception is axiomatic. But that doesn't stop us from trying to figure out how our senses work. Nor should it stop us from trying to figure out how volition works in a universe governed by physical laws (that do not reference choice or consciousness).

The process is inextricably complex, and a man's views are the result of countless decisions made by him going back to when he was a small child. You cannot possibly explain a person's present decision by referencing all the factors that created it (i.e. "at age 4...", "on October 19th...", etc.) because it is far too complex, and for virtually every decision there would be hundreds or thousands of past events required in order to create the structure that would justify saying that his behavior was "determined" (that it could not possibly have been otherwise given the past). The task is far more complex a task than anything a human could ever do, the processes are far too complex, far too sensitive to tiny changes in conditions. It would require some god-like superbeing to begin such a task, and it is quite possible that it simply cannot be done (thanks to quantum mechanics and the uncertainty it creates). That is why we have a concept of "self": it is the originator of "our" actions, it is the ghost in the machine, the unified entity that is required for meaningful communication, planning, etc. The nature of human consciousness requires that we experience ourselves as a unified thing, a homonculus pulling levers inside our skulls, because that is what allows us to be a person, with goals and desires and beliefs and values, lets us plan, lets us build, everything we do that isn't simply whatever a chimp would do. Volitional choice by a unified entity called "I" is the only way to understand ourselves and others, the only way to communicate, think, or act. Not just because it is comforting. But to try to dispense with it and say "oh well he had to do it because of..." would be an impossible task. Without an "I" which chooses freely (i.e. volitionally), you cannot explain a man's actions, you cannot ascribe a cause beyond saying "well that's what he would do," which is a tautology and requires an explanation in terms of a detailed examination of what made him that way (which is impossible to complete). Volitional choice is the only explanation for the behavior of human beings, it is axiomatic just as Objectivism holds, but even is required to describe the cause of human behavior (above and beyond the problems in epistemology determinism causes). While the universe may be deterministic (though this is not certain), human beings still have free will in any meaningful sense of the word.

If the universe turns out to be deterministic (that is, the laws of physics are deterministic), there are two major problems with extrapolating that to human behavior: 1) You will always have finite information, and the behavior of the brain and the universe as a whole can be extremely sensitive to small changes in conditions. So while I might now everything to the limit the laws of physics allow me, I will likely still be unable to select a single possible future, but rather be left with many that are possible given present information. So, to argue that "there is one future and you can't do anything to change it" is to blow right by the fact that it is literally impossible for you to know exactly what they future is, and as a result, you must make decisions about how to act based on the possible futures you can project. That faculty is enormously important and powerful in human beings, it is a huge part of decision making. You can't know what the future will be, so you have to come up with what to do based on the possible futures. In reference to a finite being, the future has multiple avenues that all can come to be depending on what decision he makes, as such, he has volition (in that he selects from a number of possible paths). 2) "You", what "you" is physically, made the decision. "You" are not a collection of particles, "you" is a single entity, a concept formed by "your" and "my" mind to describe what that collection of particles does, etc. Dropping the quotation marks, you make decisions about what to do based on possible futures. No one can know with certainty (great probability sure, certainty, almost certainly not, no matter how advanced the technology, for the reason above) what your decision will be prior to you making it, you can't even! When we drop a physical stance on things, i.e. particles and bodies, and move to the "intentional" stance (i.e. of entities with intentions, minds, etc.) then we drop determinism and move into the realm of free choice. You make decisions based on your understanding of the possible futures, you think, you use reason, you integrate your knowledge or disintegrate your knowledge, etc. You did all of those things because of what you thought. No one, in this stance, "made" you do anything, in the sense that (barring force) they deterministically caused your decision. Another way to think about it is this: what caused your decision? Well you made it, so you "caused" it. What made you make it? Well who you are, your nature as a person, what you think and feel, believe and perceive. So the outside world influenced your decision, obviously, but who you are has an enormous role to play in what decision you reached. Well how did you get that way? By making other decisions in the past. And so on until eventually you are an infant and there is no "you" to speak of making decisions. "You" arise as a result of vast number of decisions that "you" made in the past. Eventually, your decisions are enormously caused by all those other decisions, and not just the environment. If you wanted to say "what made him choose that over something else?", the answer in this case cannot be tracked down to any manageable number of factors, it is the result of a vast process with enormous complexity (in terms of the physical process). The only manageable answer is "he decided it." And discussing the "determined" nature of someone's actions gives no further insight, and is basically meaningless in such a context.

Well, they are "born" in that they are founded. A the Supreme Court stated they have a right to free speech because they are simply a group organized by many citizens, and thus have all the rights that they have to speak, etc. So I'm not certain that they cannot. Also, their CEO, and Board of Directors all do have ages, as well as do their stockholders. So since the people who control the company almost certainly are over the age of 25, as are the majority of shareholders, it isn't inconceivable that they may be considered to have the right to hold office. More importantly, I see no reason why a corporation might not run its own candidate for public office, financing his campaign, and maintain him on the payroll while he is in office (unless this is illegal, though I think it may simply be looked down upon, not sure). Even if it is illegal, he can simply leave to go to the job, and then come back to his original position at the company at the end of his tenure in office. No matter what, this is amusing.