A type of Platonism?

[Acount Overdrawn]

How my statement re the source of knowledge differs from what -- Rand's axioms? But I thought that is exactly what Rand herself held (i.e., the source of knowledge is uncontradicted experience).

How do you reconcile that fact with the fact that Objectivism grounds itself -- tries to axiomatize philosophy -- in concepts? I'm saying that in my view the base of knowledge isn't concepts of any kind, and that that assumption is a type of Platonism.

If the "source" means "the beginning," then yes, Objectivism would agree that the source of knowledge is our experience of reality, our awareness of it.

But the "base" of man's knowledge, the "foundation" is the axioms. When Rand says that the base of man's knowledge is axiomatic concepts, she means "all other concepts, all axioms, propositions, and thought" (p. 55) She does not mean that explicit axiomatic concepts are the base of our experience as such, at least that is how I understand it.

By forming the axioms, Miss Rand simply pointed out in conceptual terms the things we were implicitly aware of, if not explicitly in some people's cases. Philosophy is concerned with explaining to man what is fundamental about reality and man's relationship to reality--this has to be done explicitly, which means: in terms of concepts. And in Objectivism's case, since it is a body of knowledge, its basis is the axioms it starts with.

There's nothing Platonic in this because the Objectivist theory of concept-formation is not Platonic. For something to be Platonic, it must have certain fundamental relationships with Plato's view on concepts--which Objectivism doesn't share in the slightest.

[KendallJ]

How do you reconcile that fact with the fact that Objectivism grounds itself -- tries to axiomatize philosophy -- in concepts? I'm saying that in my view the base of knowledge isn't concepts of any kind, and that that assumption is a type of Platonism.

If experience is hte base, what is the substance? In other words, what is different about a mental contstruct called an axiom to make it platonic and whatever form of knowledge you seem to think is properly made up. An axiom is a concept and it is a form of knowledge. Concepts are heirarchical and they build upon one another, unless you have a different system of epistemology. As such, what is so special about this particular base of knowledge? Soem concepts are going to be at the beginning. What is platonic about that? Are concepts not heirarchical in your system? or do chair and freedom both derive from experience in exactly the same way?

[softwareNerd]

Trivas7, Have you read "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology"? Knowing what you have read will help people frame their replies.

How do you reconcile that fact with the fact that Objectivism grounds itself -- tries to axiomatize philosophy -- in concepts?

Objectivism does not ground itself in concepts in the sense you seem to mean it. i.e. concepts are not the starting point, with everything else coming after. According to Objectivism every concept comes from observation and the processing of those observations in a certain way, by the human mind.

As David said , perhaps the term "axiomatic" is what's causing this confusion. Objectivism does not hold axiomatic concepts to be "a priori". Nor does Objectivism try to derive the rest of its philosophy from these axiomatic concepts. The rest is "grounded" in them, but not derived from them.

Of course, one can disagree with Objectivism and say that axiomatic concepts are "a priori". However, from what you've said, it appears that you do think we know by experience that existence exists. So, is it true to say that you think concepts come from observation and experience, and that you're only questioning whether Objectivism agrees?

Edited March 26, 2008 by softwareNerd

[trivas7]

If experience is hte base, what is the substance? In other words, what is different about a mental contstruct called an axiom to make it platonic and whatever form of knowledge you seem to think is properly made up. An axiom is a concept and it is a form of knowledge. Concepts are heirarchical and they build upon one another, unless you have a different system of epistemology. As such, what is so special about this particular base of knowledge? Soem concepts are going to be at the beginning. What is platonic about that? Are concepts not heirarchical in your system? or do chair and freedom both derive from experience in exactly the same way?

In my view Rand's axioms come at the end of a long chain of conceptualization, not the beginning. How is an axiom a form of knowledge? From what fact(s) of existence does it derive? How does it differ from an a priori?

Like other critics I find Rand's account of concepts incoherent. For her they are, at different times for different arguments: units, mental existents, mental integrations ("blendings"), or mental operations that perceive.

[trivas7]

In my view Rand's axioms come at the end of a long chain of conceptualization, not the beginning. How is an axiom a form of knowledge? From what fact(s) of existence does it derive? How does it differ from an a priori?

Rand says: "[T]here is a way to ascertain whether a given concept is axiomatic or not: one ascertains it by observing the fact that an axiomatic concept cannot be escaped, that it is implicit in all knowledge, that it has to be accepted and used even in the process of any attempt to deny it"[iOE, p.59].

How does she know this? How does one observe that a given concept is implicit in all knowledge? By what mode of sensory perception are we to observe this altogether non-sensory fact? How do we "observe" the presuppositions of other people's knowledge ("all knowledge")? Isn't Rand really relying on a priori justification for these concepts?

Edited March 26, 2008 by trivas7

[trivas7]

As I understand Rand in order to form a concept we need a third object to compare to which we can see that two objects are similar. But by this criteria axiomatic concepts are not concepts at all -- they are not formed by contrasting anything with anything: "Since axiomatic concepts are not formed by differentiating one group of existents from others..."[iOE, p.58]

[Acount Overdrawn]

In my view Rand's axioms come at the end of a long chain of conceptualization, not the beginning. How is an axiom a form of knowledge? From what fact(s) of existence does it derive? How does it differ from an a priori?

Like other critics I find Rand's account of concepts incoherent. For her they are, at different times for different arguments: units, mental existents, mental integrations ("blendings"), or mental operations that perceive.

Please answer sNerd's question: Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? You quote the book, but if you have it, then you know, for example:

-From what facts axiom are formed from.

-The difference between a priori and a posteriori (Dr. Peikoff's essay elaborates on this). All concepts within Objectivism are "a posteriori" (Again, something you should know if you've read the book.)

The "critics" who point out such trivial objections aren't even worth debating. Am I being "incoherent" when I say at different times for different arguments that a chair is: a unit, a concrete existent, a concrete integration of atoms, a physical object, a material thing, etc.

Pointing out such a "discrepancy" might show that you don't understand, or reject, the Objectivist epistemology. In one context, the concept "chair" is a mental existent when contrasting it with a concrete existent, such as a physical chair. In another context, the concept "chair" would be a unit when considering the larger concept "furniture" or "man-made object." And in another context, the concept "chair" would be a mental integration when considering the chairs which are subsumed within the concept.

[trivas7]

Please answer sNerd's question: Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? You quote the book, but if you have it, then you know, for example:

-From what facts axiom are formed from.

-The difference between a priori and a posteriori (Dr. Peikoff's essay elaborates on this). All concepts within Objectivism are "a posteriori" (Again, something you should know if you've read the book.)

I have read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Objectivist epistemology is too incoherent to either accept or reject, its problems are multiple: viz., it obliterates the clear difference between sense and reference; it treats concepts as fixed and invariant once formed; it confuses knowledge with justified belief; it doesn't explain how the mind grasps the facts of reality; in short it doesn't defend the validity of man's knowledge.

[DavidOdden]

Objectivist epistemology is too incoherent to either accept or reject, its problems are multiple: viz., it obliterates the clear difference between sense and reference; it treats concepts as fixed and invariant once formed; it confuses knowledge with justified belief; it doesn't explain how the mind grasps the facts of reality; in short it doesn't defend the validity of man's knowledge.

Well, it sounds to me like you have a long list of misunderstandings. Why not pick just one and focus on that. For example, to take the first one, how about sense versus reference? I'd be happy to clear up your misunderstandings on that one.

[Acount Overdrawn]

I have read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Objectivist epistemology is too incoherent to either accept or reject, its problems are multiple: viz., it obliterates the clear difference between sense and reference; it treats concepts as fixed and invariant once formed; it confuses knowledge with justified belief; it doesn't explain how the mind grasps the facts of reality; in short it doesn't defend the validity of man's knowledge.

There's a vast difference between something being incoherent, and you not agreeing with that something.

For instance, your "criticism" that O-ist epistemology is incoherent partly because "it treats concepts as fixed and invariant once formed." The whole point of concepts (within Objectivism) is to subsume a vast number of facts and observations and retain these things in the form of a single mental existent--this would be impossible if the concept is not "fixed," i.e. possesses an identity. Further, this partly isn't true. The definition of a concept, for example, might change, given more knowledge which necessitates a further classification of a group of existents from other groups of existents.

More importantly, why did you bother to ask us, supporters of the Objectivist epistemology, questions? Our answers, "tainted" with the inanity and arbitrariness of Objectivism's view of knowledge, should be completely incomprehensible to you.

Well, fear not, I certainly won't be bothering you anymore with my nonsensical, incoherent blathering.

Good day, trivas7.

P.S. Perhaps in the future you should hide your disdain of a philosophy until after your questions on it have been answered.