Critique of the Objectivist Ethics

[Zavier]

Has anyone else encountered this? After reading through it once, I can see several holes and misconceptions. It seems to be getting copied quite a bit. Before attacking this myself, has anyone else seen it?

http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand5.htm

[DavidOdden]

Has anyone else encountered this?

It comes up here every so often. You can read these threads: A, C, D, E which links to Richard Lawrence's retort.

[JeffS]

Dr. Ghate and Dr. Huemer had a debate at CU in Boulder, which I was lucky enough to attend. Someone taped it and you can listen to it here.

[brian0918]

Paul McKeever has posted a great video critique of Huemer's critique.

[Zavier]

Thank you for the replies! I had since found McKeever's video (which was funny) and Ghate's debate (which made Huemer look like an idiot.)

I'm reading through Lawrence's paper now.

[gurugeorge]

I must say I really enjoyed that debate between Heumer and Ghate - both were very able defenders of their positions.

I also have some sympathy with Heumer. I believe there must be some essential element of ethics that is to do with other-regard. I would ground the intuitions Heumer talks about in evolutionary psychology, so I believe he is talking sense. Those intuitions are there for a reason, even if it has not been brought to conscious awareness (it is implicit).

However, what I thought most amusing was to reflect that probably even a substantial proportion of even some of the hostile people in the audience would have admired Ghate's presentation, the refreshingly lofty level at which his analysis operated, and the cogency of his ideas - but more importantly, and amusingly, would have felt the very same tug of intuitive agreement with some of the things Ghate said as they felt wrt to saving the child!

What this means is, I would say, that elements of both an Objectivist type of ethics and the more traditional other-regarding ethics are part of our intuitive sense of ethics that Heumer talks about. IOW, our intuitive ethics is about both self-regarding and other-regarding action. Objectivism appears to get convoluted at this point - even Ghate couln't avoid sounding a bit lawyerish when he turned every instance of other-regard into an instance of self-regard exclusively. No: one does good to others for their sake, not necessarily for one's own: this should be elementary and self-evident.

It is also clear that other-regarding action, in and of itself, is not logically tied to the concept of sacrifice. The infestation of ethics by the notion of sacrifice is the great enemy of humanist ethics (along with the accompanying forced dichotomy between schmoo vs selfish brute, as Ghate adroitly points out), not the self/other distinction (wrt to who or what one's actions should be aimed at benefitting).

I am more inclined to go for an ethics that allows and encourages both self- and other- regard, in due proportion. To see what I mean, consider the Robinson Crusoe example Ghate uses - Objectivist ethics has something to say about Robinson Crusoe's actions (virtues of productivity, creativity, etc.). But when the good Scotsman gets back to civilisation, he will find he encounters people. What does ethics tell us should be the relation one should have to those others, then? It's not enough to have a hall of mirrors pointing back to the self at this point. That aspect does exist, and the relation of trade is a noble one. However, something seems to be being evaded here, blanked out. One needs to directly come out with it and admit that one cares for the good of others. The absolutely crucial point is that sacrifice of self to other is not a necessary part of this idea.

Also, there is the argument pointed out in this critique of Objectivism from the point of view of the rationalism of Brand Blanshard: egoism and altruism are just two sides of the same coin for the rational realist whose concern is for the benefit of the rationally-concatenated whole of which each individual is a notional, and necessary centre.

(Slightly rambling aside: in fact "altruism" isn't actually the right name for Rand's target. The point is that target has no name, it is the unnamed, precisely because generations of "priest/kings" have been trying to pull the wool over peoples' eyes. This idea of sacrifice of anything to anything else has no name, and altruism does not fit it, because altruism is the idea of concern for others' good, not sacrifice to others' good; and the fact that concern for others' good has been twisted into sacrifice to others' good is a mere artefact of the Will to Power of generations of "priest/kings", a carbuncle on ethics.)

[JeffS]

I would ground the intuitions Heumer talks about in evolutionary psychology, so I believe he is talking sense. Those intuitions are there for a reason, even if it has not been brought to conscious awareness (it is implicit).

Where is "there"? What is the locus of these "intuitions?" If a baby is born with intuitions, how come empirical tests demonstrate babies are extremely ego-centric for the first few years of their lives and need to be taught that others sense the world through their own perspectives?

What this means is, I would say, that elements of both an Objectivist type of ethics and the more traditional other-regarding ethics are part of our intuitive sense of ethics that Heumer talks about. IOW, our intuitive ethics is about both self-regarding and other-regarding action.

So, some times I should be altruistic, and sometimes I should be selfish? What determines when I should be one or the other? Should I save the child even if it would cost me my life?

It is also clear that other-regarding action, in and of itself, is not logically tied to the concept of sacrifice.

How do you define "sacrifice"? Do you agree with Rand in that sacrifice denotes giving up a higher value for a lesser value?

To see what I mean, consider the Robinson Crusoe example Ghate uses - Objectivist ethics has something to say about Robinson Crusoe's actions (virtues of productivity, creativity, etc.). But when the good Scotsman gets back to civilisation, he will find he encounters people. What does ethics tell us should be the relation one should have to those others, then?

What should Crusoe do then? Ditch his productivity and creativity so that he may be of service to whomever wishes to use him?

This idea of sacrifice of anything to anything else has no name, and altruism does not fit it, because altruism is the idea of concern for others' good, not sacrifice to others' good; and the fact that concern for others' good has been twisted into sacrifice to others' good is a mere artefact of the Will to Power of generations of "priest/kings", a carbuncle on ethics.)

Here are various definitions for "altruism":

"unselfish concern for the welfare of others"

"individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve, or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self interest."

"opposed to egoism or selfishness"

"Regardful of others; beneficent; unselfish; -- opposed to egoistic or selfish"

" individuals give primary consideration to the interests and welfare of other individuals, members of groups or the community as a whole."

Notice any common threads?

[softwareNerd]

I also have some sympathy with Heumer. I believe there must be some essential element of ethics that is to do with other-regard. I would ground the intuitions Heumer talks about in evolutionary psychology, so I believe he is talking sense. Those intuitions are there for a reason, even if it has not been brought to conscious awareness (it is implicit).

Again with this 'evolutionary psychology' argument? even if one grants that the human appendix evolved for some very good reason, it does not follow that we must find a use for it. If some other body part still has use, then its relevance is that it still has use not that it once did. Analogously, with ethics, it is completely besides the point when understanding Ethics that some mode of thinking developed because it was once more useful.

I grant that when we study psychology, the pre-existence of some such modes of thinking would be of great relevance. However, it is ethics that would tell us what to do about these modes: whether we need to encourage them, or whether we need to be alert for them and act consciously against them since --- regardless of whether they were useful to my great-great-grandsire -- they harm my interests in today's context.

Edited July 16, 2009 by softwareNerd

[gurugeorge]

Where is "there"? What is the locus of these "intuitions?"

In the brain, they are generated as tendencies. Since it's partly genetic, the distribution will vary slightly. (i.e., just as "folk psychology" and "folk physics" and "folk economics" intuitions vary, so do "folk moral" intuitions). It's like this: genetics throws out variant dispositions, but because of evolutionary constraints, the majority of properties cluster round some central point of a bell-curve, in terms of distribution in the population. Hence our "common sense" varies, but we can expect it to be broadly on-point in terms of reality. As Heumer points out, slavery, for example has always been somewhat contested even in societies that practiced it. (And there are intermediary positions: e.g. slavery was originally a "right" of victors with regard solely to the vanquished, but even someone who accepted that right might contest the extension of the right to the vanquished's progeny.)

If a baby is born with intuitions, how come empirical tests demonstrate babies are extremely ego-centric for the first few years of their lives and need to be taught that others sense the world through their own perspectives?

This is of course a contested field. My understanding of the evidence is that they have to be taught the art of taking a perspective in the first place, and that that comes packaged as a two-sided concept (the individual learns that there is such a thing as taking on a perspective, and that therefore they have a perspective they can take on, and that others do too). Babies actions are actually impersonal (i.e. they are unconscious and automatic), because they have not yet taken on any perspective, they still act largely on instinct (although as they learn to take on consciously the persective of a self, that changes, and they start becoming volitional, goal-seeking, etc.).

What actually happens is that children are taught both self-regard and other-regard, and it accepts those grafts because its psychology is somewhat predisposed to both; but the degree to which either is emphasised by the surrounding culture, and/or corrupted by the principle of sacrifice, varies from culture to culture, ideology to ideology.

So, some times I should be altruistic, and sometimes I should be selfish? What determines when I should be one or the other?

No, you ought to be (almost) always both altruistic and selfish. Like this: (almost) every action you do will have a de facto effect both on yourself and on others; morality merely tells you that you should strive for those effects that touch upon others to be beneficial. So half of ethics is indeed pretty much Objectivist, and that half would be in effect even on a desert island, as Ghate says. And it is quite correct that that part of morality pertains to you and your own life. But the other half of morality says: as soon as your actions impinge on others, you should strive so that effects of them should be beneficial.

The twist here is that there is an informational assymetry: since "ought" implies "can", you cannot be expected to do things for others with the same degree of specificity as you do for yourself. You are at the centre of a web of effects of your actions, from the centre (you) to the periphery (people on the other side of the world). Morality says you should strive for those outgoing effects to be beneficial. But because of informational assymetery (you know most about your own case, others about theirs) the only way you can benefit others at your periphery, lacking as you do detailed information about their concrete circumstances, is to follow the abstract (liberal in the true sense) rules of justice, and to strive for justice in society. These will create the conditions that ease others' attempts to better their own lives.

Clearly, what's best for others is that they can take control of their lives and flourish in their own regard. In order to benefit them, your actions must conform to abstract principles that, universalised, enable them to take control of their lives and flourish.

Consider: one accepts from a good friend the kind of "meddling" that one would reject from someone at the other side of the world, because (on the hypothesis that they are a genuine friend), they do have some reasonably detailed knowledge about your life - not as much as you, but far more than that person on the other side of the world has. And since you trust them, and you can see that it's possible they might have a slightly more objective view of the matter than you do (perhaps you are in the heat of some emotional turmoil) and their advice might be good, their actions more likely to actually benefit you (than the interference of someone at the other side of the world would, based as it would be on a paucity of information about your concrete circumstances), you may be inclined to accept "meddling" from them, and even thank them for it.

Should I save the child even if it would cost me my life?

Could you live with yourself if you didn't save the child?

How do you define "sacrifice"? Do you agree with Rand in that sacrifice denotes giving up a higher value for a lesser value?

As a first approximation, I'd define it fuzzily as a kind of negative image of Pareto-optimality - someone must suffer.

Rand's definition captures something important, but one has to bear in mind that value is fundamentally subjective (in a sense parallel to economics' use of this term), and evaluation is a ranking in one's personal scale of values (which, to be sure is an estimate of the objective situation, but a private estimate). (Hence it's not a sacrifice if one "sacrifices" for one's children.)

I'm still trying to pin it down myself. Sacrifice is a deep, deep concept. I connect it with Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment - it is the revenge of declining life against ascendant life. (i.e. it is the result of "priestcraft", or the "witch-doctor" syndrome)

What should Crusoe do then? Ditch his productivity and creativity so that he may be of service to whomever wishes to use him?

Why should what I said imply what you've just suggested?

Here are various definitions for "altruism":

"unselfish concern for the welfare of others"

"individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve, or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self interest."

"opposed to egoism or selfishness"

"Regardful of others; beneficent; unselfish; -- opposed to egoistic or selfish"

" individuals give primary consideration to the interests and welfare of other individuals, members of groups or the community as a whole."

Notice any common threads?

Of course, but this is part of the corruption I am talking about. That's what people think altruism is supposed to be, but logically it's not that. Compare and contrast: people think Objectivist "selfishness" means dog-eat-dog, but logically it's not that.

i.e., just as with "selfishness", people haven't penetrated philosophically into the true meaning of "altruism", and its public meaning has been corrupted by priestcraft over the centuries, so that we have that false dichotomy between schmoo and villain. Again, by "priestcraft" I mean broadly the "witch-doctor" business Rand talks about. And actually, in peoples' intuitive sense of altruism, as Heumer pointed out, altruism does not automatically imply self-sacrifice, since other-benefitting acts that are not self-sacrificial are also called altruistic.

[gurugeorge]

Again with this 'evolutionary psychology' argument? even if one grants that the human appendix evolved for some very good reason, it does not follow that we must find a use for it. If some other body part still has use, then its relevance is that it still has use not that it once did. Analogously, with ethics, it is completely besides the point when understanding Ethics that some mode of thinking developed because it was once more useful.

I grant that when we study psychology, the pre-existence of some such modes of thinking would be of great relevance. However, it is ethics that would tell us what to do about these modes: whether we need to encourage them, or whether we need to be alert for them and act consciously against them since --- regardless of whether they were useful to my great-great-grandsire -- they harm my interests in today's context.

I largely agree with what you are saying: I wouldn't go with Heumer the whole way to say that those intuitions should be the standard. They need to be investigated.

[Jake_Ellison]

I would ground the intuitions Heumer talks about in evolutionary psychology, so I believe he is talking sense. Those intuitions are there for a reason, even if it has not been brought to conscious awareness (it is implicit).

Yep, I'm gonna address the same quote as everyone: "for a reason". First, let's differentiate between reason= "man's rational faculty" and reason in the sense we are using it here, of a causal relationship between two entities-the cause and the effect) :

The reason I am asking this is because I am curious. That is my reason, and it consists of curiosity. My curiosity is causing me to ask this, that is the causal relationship ("the reason"), between 'Jake a curious person' (the cause) and my question (the effect).

1. Between what two entities does your causal relationship ("reason") exist? One, the effect, is the intuitions, what is the other entity, the cause?

2. What does that "reason" consist of? In other words how does the causal relationship between the unnamed cause and the effect (the intuitions) work? [in my example, it works because it is in the nature of a curios man to ask questions]

Some people answer 1.God and 2.unknown [it works because it is in the nature of God to do mysterious things]. Objectivism's answer is that, when we talk about morality, the reason is the individual, and the causal relationship is his rational faculty: the other "Reason"; but the effect is not intuitions, it is a rational value system.

Heumer's answer is Evolution, and the way it works is psychological. Well then, my request is twofold:

1. Let's prove this, before we go on, since it is a scientific theory about the human brain.

2. Let's dismiss it (when it comes to morality), just as we dismiss the urge to rape hot chicks on the street, or byte someone's nose off when we're mad, because evolution, as softwareNerd pointed out, was not designed to help us lead long, happy, comfortable lives, all while occasionally flying around in metal boxes at 20.000 feet. (boy would that end badly if Boeing was using even an ounce of intuition) Evolution acts as a blind agent, aiming to select the strongest, kill the weakest. So, unless we're aiming to be killed unless we pass a test (which would be simple enough to put in practice), let's not go by some theory about what evolution's "reason" was. We have a rational faculty, so let's trust it instead, to make rational decisions. There is enormous amounts of evidence (including a bunch of equipment on the Moon) that man's mind works just fine, when it comes to achieving goals, and our alleged "instincts" or "intuitions" don't. In fact they work far worse than even those of a domesticated chicken or cow- we wouldn't recognize a predator we never saw or heard of if it was stalking us, or the signs of an earthquake, a stupid chicken or parrot would in an instant, instinctively, and look how far it took chickens and parrots.

Evolution is not intelligent. It does not have a mind, let alone our best interests in mind, so it's "reason" is not the same as our "reasons". Saying that it ought to be (we are talking about ethics here), saying that we should submit to evolution is the equivalent of saying we should submit to earthquakes, or floods. There is a reason for a flood, so why should we not consider that, when we devise our morality, why does it make sense to run away, or try and swim?

Edited July 16, 2009 by Jake_Ellison

[JeffS]

In the brain, they are generated as tendencies. Since it's partly genetic, the distribution will vary slightly.

What's your evidence for this?

This is of course a contested field.

Actually, that babies are ego-centric is not contested at all. There is literally reams of data supporting it. I would like to see your evidence that they are not, or that they need to be taught to have their own perspective. I haven't seen any babies who need to learn to see, feel, hear, taste, or smell. I've not read of any who need to learn to eat, or learn to cry when there is something wrong with them. If that doesn't show regard for self above all others, I don't know what does.

Regardless, since you argue regard for others is genetic, how come children need to be taught it at all?

No, you ought to be (almost) always both altruistic and selfish.

So, I should only follow my moral code as much as possible? I don't need to follow it all the time?

Like this: (almost) every action you do will have a de facto effect both on yourself and on others; morality merely tells you that you should strive for those effects that touch upon others to be beneficial.

What action could I take which would not have a de facto effect on myself and others?

Could you live with yourself if you didn't save the child?

Depends upon the child. If he just killed someone, for example, I might jump in and speed along the process. So, should I save the child even if it would cost me my life?

As a first approximation, I'd define it fuzzily...

Well, maybe that's the problem, George. We can't really discuss a concept unless you know what it is, can we?

Why should what I said imply what you've just suggested?

What I quoted. You wrote that Crusoe's selfishness works on a deserted island, used the conjunction "but" to indicate an exception to this thought, and followed it with "when the good Scotsman gets back to civilisation, he will find he encounters people." You ask what ethics tells us regarding how he should relate to those people. Objectivism is very clear on this point. Since you're arguing against Objectivism, I inferred you would argue Crusoe should sacrifice his wants and needs to those un-named others. Is this not what you meant to imply? If not, then what should Crusoe do? What does the morality of "regard for others" tell us?

Of course, but this is part of the corruption I am talking about. That's what people think altruism is supposed to be, but logically it's not that.

So, let me see if I got this straight. A concept is given a name and a definition. That name and definition are agreed to relate to that concept, but that's only what people think the concept is supposed to be? That logically, the concept isn't what everyone thinks it is, it's what you think it is? Interesting.

And actually, in peoples' intuitive sense of altruism, as Heumer pointed out, altruism does not automatically imply self-sacrifice, since other-benefitting acts that are not self-sacrificial are also called altruistic.

Actually, other-benefiting acts that are not sacrificial are called mutualism. Do you have any evidence to support your use of the concept altruism to mean mutualism? What do you call behavior by an individual that increases the fitness of another individual while decreasing the fitness of the actor? What do you call the concept of someone trading something of high value for something of low value?

[gurugeorge]

1. Between what two entities does your causal relationship ("reason") exist? One, the effect, is the intuitions, what is the other entity, the cause?

The cause is our nature (as human beings who need to co-operate to survive and reproduce) and the nature of our environment - and both of these in the context of differential reproduction and natural selection, the requirement to have stable societies so progeny can themselves grow up to reproduce, etc., etc.

2. What does that "reason" consist of? In other words how does the causal relationship between the unnamed cause and the effect (the intuitions) work? [in my example, it works because it is in the nature of a curios man to ask questions]

Blind evolution leads to a certain degree of co-operative behaviour - e.g. kin altruism. Kin altruism then forms a sort of "Schelling Point" that makes the evolution of co-operative behaviour with strangers more likely (more of a default). As soon as beings become reflective, this reinforces itself.

Also, you can look at that game-theory business about TIT for TAT and all the rest of it - it might not have been the case, but it turns out to be the case that even blindest, dumbest, memory-less competitors, even in the most zero-sum of encounters, will, if those encounters are repeated, eventually evolve to take "nice", co-operative strategies. It just happens to be the way this Universe is made.

It's not that the innate stuff is specific enough to mandate anything, it's a grab-bag of parts-of-ethics that just happen to have come together; but if there are social factors that encourage one aspect or another, they will find "hooks" already in the psyche. And the fact that we are born with those parts-of-ethics shows that there is "something to them", some objective logic, out there in the world, that leads to their being buried in our psyches. So we can tease out the logic, make explicit and extend what was implicit - and also clarify, so that we only accept those parts of innate ethics that actually apply to our own situation (as opposed to left-overs from our ancestral environment).

1. Let's prove this, before we go on, since it is a scientific theory about the human brain.

Well, the fat lady hasn't sung yet, but it's looking promising. Evolutionary psychology is a fairly robust paradigm that seems to be becoming widely accepted (with reservations and conditions, varying according to the ideology someone held before they heard about EP). The combination of evolutionary psychology and modern cognitive science seems to be fulfilling the promise Darwin saw (ultimately) in evolutionary theory - a chance to really understand ourselves and our ideas.

2. Let's dismiss it (when it comes to morality), just as we dismiss the urge to rape hot chicks on the street, or byte someone's nose off when we're mad, because evolution, as softwareNerd pointed out, was not designed to help us lead long, happy, comfortable lives, all while occasionally flying around in metal boxes at 20.000 feet. (boy would that end badly if Boeing was using even an ounce of intuition) Evolution acts as a blind agent, aiming to select the strongest, kill the weakest. So, unless we're aiming to be killed unless we pass a test (which would be simple enough to put in practice), let's not go by some theory about what evolution's "reason" was. We have a rational faculty, so let's trust it instead, to make rational decisions. There is enormous amounts of evidence (including a bunch of equipment on the Moon) that man's mind works just fine, when it comes to achieving goals, and our alleged "instincts" or "intuitions" don't. In fact they work far worse than even those of a domesticated chicken or cow- we wouldn't recognize a predator we never saw or heard of if it was stalking us, or the signs of an earthquake, a stupid chicken or parrot would in an instant, instinctively, and look how far it took chickens and parrots.

Evolution is not intelligent. It does not have a mind, let alone our best interests in mind, so it's "reason" is not the same as our "reasons". Saying that it ought to be (we are talking about ethics here), saying that we should submit to evolution is the equivalent of saying we should submit to earthquakes, or floods. There is a reason for a flood, so why should we not consider that, when we devise our morality, why does it make sense to run away, or try and swim?

Agree with a lot of this - as I am saying, we ought not to just kowtow before our innate drives, we need to investigate them and discover what is true and necessary relative to our own situation.

But the observation that some key elements of ethics (both self-regarding and other-regarding) are innate seems to me to be pretty inoffensive, true, and even a tad heartening.

To put all this another way: yes, it's true that evolution's concern is pretty brainless - mere reproduction, copying down through the generations - but if, in order to facilitate that brainless goal, some vague (and of course variably-distributed) tendencies have evolved in us to behave intuitively in an intelligently moral way, conducive to a life of mind, and the fulfillment of goals undreamed-of by Mother Nature, that shouldn't be surprising. It's part of the logic of the Universe itself, the way the Universe is. Or, to put it yet another way, the standard is always life - at the level of the blind evolution that led to these innate tendencies to moral behaviour, the standard was the life-long-enough-to-reproduce of our ancestral environment. That's a pretty dumb standard. But it's still a bit of the kind of life we are concerned with when we look at the standard for fully-developed morality for conscious, thinking, volitional beings; so there's something the same, some core continuity there, no matter what you call it (parallel to the situation with knowledge in the other thread). So the simple, abstract, innate tendencies are fragments of ethics/moralities; but they are continuous, logically, with their respective fully-developed systems.

[Grames]

Of course, but this is part of the corruption I am talking about. That's what people think altruism is supposed to be, but logically it's not that. Compare and contrast: people think Objectivist "selfishness" means dog-eat-dog, but logically it's not that.

From Christ on the cross, to the intrinsicism of St Augustine, to Kant's concept of duty, to August Comte's coining of the word altruism the logic of sacrifice in ethics has been crystal clear. It is your own misunderstanding which has contradictory elements in it.

[gurugeorge]

What's your evidence for this?

I am following the evidence talked about in books such as those by Dawkins, Pinker, Dennett, Wright, etc., etc. (those books have references to the sources and experiments).

I haven't seen any babies who need to learn to see, feel, hear, taste, or smell. I've not read of any who need to learn to eat, or learn to cry when there is something wrong with them. If that doesn't show regard for self above all others, I don't know what does.

It can't be regard for self because it's not conscious. The intuitions don't show up until the appropriate environmental conditions are met - i.e. conscious interaction with others.

(As to babies' egocentrism etc., it's not actually all that germane, precisely because of the point I make just below - plus, I don't have the time for gathering that kind of specific evidence for the post, sorry. Suffice to say, I recall having read about some experiments that support my position - but I am aware that there are different points of view.)

Regardless, since you argue regard for others is genetic, how come children need to be taught it at all?

The ability to walk has a genetic component (there are gadgets in the brain that are designed for it) yet a child still has to learn to walk - I think the situation with morality is parallel.

So, I should only follow my moral code as much as possible? I don't need to follow it all the time?

Not sure what you mean.

What action could I take which would not have a de facto effect on myself and others?

Ultimately, none (although some are totally negligible). The question is: what kind of effect should it be? What kind of action should you take with regard to yourself, and what kind of action should you take with regard to others?

Depends upon the child. If he just killed someone, for example, I might jump in and speed along the process. So, should I save the child even if it would cost me my life?

It's up to you and your sense of life, and it really depends on the concrete circumstances of the case. Hard cases make bad law (I am as sceptical of the value of these sorts of "emergency" thought-experiments as Objectivism is - and I'm not convinced by Heumer's analogy to science.)

I know I couldn't live with myself if I let the child drown, so I would save it (presuming it hadn't murdered someone - but what if that someone was Hitler? Just kidding )

Well, maybe that's the problem, George. We can't really discuss a concept unless you know what it is, can we?

I know it when I see it Defining it more precisely is what this kind of discussion is all about! At the moment, my concept is "fuzzy", but that is not a rationally illegitimate thing in the circumstances. (Compare Wittgenstein's example "stand here" - does this need to be specified to the micron? It depends.)

This carbuncle on morality has only recently been drawn attention to (by such as Nietsche and Rand) so it's not surprising we haven't quite got it clear yet. It has been the unnamed, as I said, precisely because it is an attempt at bamboozlement by "priestcraft".

used the conjunction "but" to indicate an exception to this thought,

Ah, there's the problem - "but" in that context didn't indicate an exception in that sense! The relation with others is added on to the relation with oneself. Neither is exclusive. The "but" was meant merely to signify the distinction between the self-regarding aspect and the other-regarding aspect, which latter only becomes apparent when you actually interact with others.

So, let me see if I got this straight. A concept is given a name and a definition. That name and definition are agreed to relate to that concept, but that's only what people think the concept is supposed to be? That logically, the concept isn't what everyone thinks it is, it's what you think it is? Interesting.

People can be wrong and misguided. Concepts (especially those in the public domain, as it were) can be vague enough to mean totally different things sometimes. I repeat: if you haven't got a problem with Objectivism saying selfishness doesn't mean what people think it does, you should have no problem with me saying altruism doesn't mean what people think it does!

Actually, other-benefiting acts that are not sacrificial are called mutualism.

Yes indeed, mutualism is the whole of the morality I'm talking about, in a sense. Altruism as I'm defining it here is an aspect of mutualism in that sense. I'm not saying morality should be exclusively altruistic, remember (see above re. the "but")

What do you call behavior by an individual that increases the fitness of another individual while decreasing the fitness of the actor?

It could be mutualism or it could be self-sacrifice, depending on the circumstances.

What do you call the concept of someone trading something of high value for something of low value?

Foolishness?

From Christ on the cross, to the intrinsicism of St Augustine, to Kant's concept of duty, to August Comte's coining of the word altruism the logic of sacrifice in ethics has been crystal clear.

Sure, and in the same sense, the meaning of selfishness has been quite clear - it's brute selfishness with total disregard for others, isn't it?

It is your own misunderstanding which has contradictory elements in it.

I don't think so. I'm being consistent. Insofar as an action has effects on oneself and others, ethics says those effects should be beneficial. That covers Objectivist ethics, but it also covers the kind of "nice", non-self-sacrificial altruism that most people intuitively think of when they think of helping and benefiting others. (The altruism people practice in daily life, when they're not being scrutinized by their priests.)

Edited July 16, 2009 by gurugeorge

[Jake_Ellison]

To put all this another way: yes, it's true that evolution's concern is pretty brainless - mere reproduction, copying down through the generations - but if, in order to facilitate that brainless goal, some vague (and of course variably-distributed) tendencies have evolved in us to behave intuitively in an intelligently moral way, conducive to a life of mind, and the fulfillment of goals undreamed-of by Mother Nature, that shouldn't be surprising. It's part of the logic of the Universe itself, the way the Universe is. Or, to put it yet another way, the standard is always life - at the level of the blind evolution that led to these innate tendencies to moral behaviour, the standard was the life-long-enough-to-reproduce of our ancestral environment. That's a pretty dumb standard. But it's still a bit of the kind of life we are concerned with when we look at the standard for fully-developed morality for conscious, thinking, volitional beings; so there's something the same, some core continuity there, no matter what you call it (parallel to the situation with knowledge in the other thread). So the simple, abstract, innate tendencies are fragments of ethics/moralities; but they are continuous, logically, with their respective fully-developed systems.

I don't understand everything in this, and vehemently disagree with the parts I understand. You are not saying anything that is connected to reality, you are using "floating abstractions". I don't know what they are.

but if, in order to facilitate that brainless goal, some vague (and of course variably-distributed) tendencies have evolved in us to behave intuitively in an intelligently moral way, conducive to a life of mind

Are you talking about emotions, or something separate from emotions? If it is separate, give an example of it and of a concrete manifestation of it, because I have never experienced anything like this, I have no idea what it is, other than a string of letters.

It's part of the logic of the Universe itself, the way the Universe is.

Well then it leaves traces, a way to prove it exists. What are they?

But it's still a bit of the kind of life we are concerned with when we look at the standard for fully-developed morality for conscious, thinking, volitional beings; so there's something the same, some core continuity there, no matter what you call it (parallel to the situation with knowledge in the other thread).

I don't know what you mean. (this is the part I don't understand) You'll have to be more concrete about this core continuity. How does it behave, what does it consist of?

So the simple, abstract, innate tendencies are fragments of ethics/moralities;but they are continuous, logically, with their respective fully-developed systems.

Continuous, I'm assuming, means that they must be inside every human being. "Abstract fragments of ethics" might mean something like "red triangles" except much more complex.

When I say red triangle, or any other abstract concept I may use, I can name examples of concrete instances of it.

Like the (A,B,C) triangle, where AB=BC=AC=3 cm. In fact, before people started naming a thing triangle, they first saw a bunch of these shapes they did not have a name for, then they started recognizing them, they integrated their fundamental attributes, and got themselves a concept. That's pretty much how all abstract concepts are formed, except the elusive floating abstractions.

It would really help me if you could name, photograph and post, or just describe a concrete instance of what you call a continuos, abstract fragment of ethics. If it's inside the human body, there must be some trace of it that I can see or even just experience within myself.

[gurugeorge]

I don't understand everything in this, and vehemently disagree with the parts I understand. You are not saying anything that is connected to reality, you are using "floating abstractions". I don't know what they are.

I'm sorry Jake, I have a habit of shaping my generalisations, in my head, so that they're pre-defended against a number of known counter-arguments, but I am stupidly taking it for granted that most people here are familiar with these matters at that level of abstraction, and have a sense of the referents - there are, after all, widely-available popular treatments of these ideas. But I guess if you aren't already familiar with authors like Dawkins, Pinker, Robert Wright, Dennett, etc. (generally, "edge" science) it must all look annoyingly floaty. I'll try to pepper more concrete examples throughout from now on.

Are you talking about emotions, or something separate from emotions? If it is separate, give an example of it and of a concrete manifestation of it, because I have never experienced anything like this, I have no idea what it is, other than a string of letters.

I am talking about folk intuitions about what's right and wrong. They manifest themselves in (and sometimes as) hunches, in/as a "still small voice", in/as, emotive responses of revulsion or attraction, as thougtful, or articulate, but sometimes even off-the-cuff responses when they are asked "what's moral?"; faint tugs of conscience, homespun wisdom, things like that. People have these hunches, act on them, and tell the story of what happened to them when they acted that way. Or, people observe how others act, have moral hunches about the rightness or wrongness of those actions, and observe the consequences as those actions play out their effects in the world - and, again, talk about it with each other (especially women, who by virtue of their close contact with children, and this mutual sharing of moral intutions - which, at its worst, can descend into what is called "gossip"! - are the main moral guardians of society). Eventually, certain semi-consistent clusters of such ideas become common sense (relative to a given culture). Eventually common sense comes under scrutiny by science and philosophy, and what was previously implicit can become explicit.

(Note: the idea of sacrifice seems to have intruded from the nascent science/philosophy we call religion, IOW, one can trace, as Nietzsche did, the genealogy of morals from priestly twisting of the common sense folk ethics that arose first from the spirit and vitality of strongly coherent and powerful communities and cultures - e.g. the "Greek spirit", or whatever. IOW, "priest/kings" (shorthand for that whole "witch-doctor" thing, but I disagree that it comes from "primitive" or "savage" times, it comes more from "priest/king" times, from the necessity to have serfs and cannon-fodder for large agriculture-based communities) were the first to reflect on the common sense moralities of their communities, and twist and distort them to their own ends, by insinuating the idea of self-sacrifice into them.)

Now it's certainly true that there's feedback from consciousness down to the depths where those hunches come from, but it's a two-way street. Moral hunches pop into consciousness that come from older layers in the psyche too.

There is of course a problem of distinguishing such moral hunches from learned and automated responses - and that's the kind of detail the kind of science I'm referencing goes into. I am satisfied that the relevant sciences think a distinction can be made, and that experimental evidence can support the distinction.

I don't know what you mean. (this is the part I don't understand) You'll have to be more concrete about this core continuity. How does it behave, what does it consist of?

Continuous, I'm assuming, means that they must be inside every human being.

They are in everybody, in varying degrees (bell-curve distribution for any given moral intuition). But "continuity" refers rather to their being at the foundation of both working morality (day to day actual moral decisions) and fully-articulated moralities proper.

Put it this way: if someone has a moral hunch that x is good, and someone else has the reasoned-out conviction that x is good, it's the same objective x is good that's been "noticed", on the one hand by a blind system (as the last man standing in an evolutionary process), on the other hand noticed by a conscious, reflective system. It doesn't matter that the hunch came from the blind process, x is still good. The hunch evolved because x is good, and it's seen by a sentient being to be good because it's good. (This is pretty much parallel with the knowledge argument on the other thread - this is a general pattern, as simple evolves into complex, "blind" to reasoned, automatic to conscious.)

Now, to complicate this picture, what you actually have is clusters of moral ideas - to an extent, in certain environments, these underdetermined hunches produce odd results (e.g Aztec civilisation), and in certain parts of the world, there might be quite a lot of variation. But there is sufficient commonality inherited from our ancestral environment (which I appreciate was not monolithic throughout the species). Fundamentally, our hunch morality, our sense of folk morality, is small-band (20-30 people), hunter-gatherer morality which contains a mixture of self-regarding and other-regarding elements that do not have sacrifice as any part of them (every member in a small band is valued, and all depend on each other). (Again, as above, the sacrifice element comes in in from the Late Neolithic onwards, with the rise of agriculture, city states, that whole shebang - the Bronze and Iron ages, etc., etc.)

(To forestall a certain possible line of criticism, I am not extolling the "noble savage" here! Although I am excoriating the rise of heirarchical communities based on co-evolution with animal and grain monocultures. That's the root of war (as opposed to mere violent conflict) right there, and the root of a whole parcel of troubles.)

"Abstract fragments of ethics" might mean something like "red triangles" except much more complex.

When I say red triangle, or any other abstract concept I may use, I can name examples of concrete instances of it.

Like the (A,B,C) triangle, where AB=BC=AC=3 cm. In fact, before people started naming a thing triangle, they first saw a bunch of these shapes they did not have a name for, then they started recognizing them, they integrated their fundamental attributes, and got themselves a concept. That's pretty much how all abstract concepts are formed, except the elusive floating abstractions.

It would really help me if you could name, photograph and post, or just describe a concrete instance of what you call a continuos, abstract fragment of ethics. If it's inside the human body, there must be some trace of it that I can see or even just experience within myself.

Well I pointed to one example in my first post in this thread when I said that even people hostile to Objectivism would likely feel that Ghate was talking some sense too - they would feel "tugs" from Ghate's exposition, little tiny "yes!"s. (People aren't absolutely insensible to the kinds of virtues Rand is talking about - they are part of everyday discourse too, albeit played up or down at varying times in varying cultures, and indeed in perpetual opposition with the imposed sacrificial culture.)

Think about your own case - presumably like everyone else you had sacrificial altruism drummed into you, yet when you encountered Ayn Rand you felt a "tug" from her ideas - something was right about them, at first glance, but maybe at that time you still felt some tug from the old altruistic ideas too. Now, I'd guess you still occasionally feel "tugs" from the old altruistic ideas, but the balance is more towards Objectivist ethics being more automatized now, so your self-regarding moral tugs fit right at home with what you have consciouslly come to conclusions about. What I would say is that you had hunches of the kind I'm talking about of both kinds - both self-regarding morality and other-regarding morality seemed right to you, to some degree. (Further, I would submit that in fact there is a legitimacy to both "tugs", and that there is a consistent, rational morality to be found that takes them both into account, and finds them their appropriate - i.e. logically necessary - place.)

Picture it like this: consider, I dunno, an archeology programme on the Discovery Channel - you see the bit of cornice they discovered in Trench A, and a wireframe extends from it, to fill out an impressive Roman bath in wireframe.

A folk intuition is like that bit of cornice. It's a legacy system, inbuilt into the brain, from the past. But it fits into a logic (the wireframe) that can be extended to fill out a complete system. We are composed of lots of bits of cornice, edging, etc. - each of the legacy gadgets (or cluster of gadgets) in our brain that were designed to cope with just that fragment of the whole potential morality that was relevant to the situation they evolved in (in our case, largely small-band, hunter-gatherer). But they are at the same time part of a potential consistent system that can be articulated, the whole of which can be scrutinized by science and philosophy, and consciously accepted (in whole or in part) or rejected (in whole or in part).

My belief is that a wireframe can be extended that takes into account the "cornice" that, slightly extended in wireframe, represents innate individualist (more or less Objectivist) ethics and the "edging" that, slightly extended in wireframe, represents innate other-regarding ethics (I don't actually care what it's called, altruism is the logical name, but alter-ism or any other coinage would do as well, so long as it's understood as not intrinsically involving the idea of self-sacrifice - it is the robust folk ethic of solicitude, kindness and compassion), into a larger wireframe that includes them both in a harmonius system of ethics.

But those core bits of archeology are innate, inherited - and that is why their deliverances (in the form of intuitive hunches that make the heart leap towards both the nobility of individualism and the compassion of altruism) are self-evident to us. And again (in case you missed the tail of my last post to JeffS, which had a response to your previous), the basic thing is this: Insofar as our actions have effects on ourselves and others, morality tells us simply that those effects should be as beneficial as we can make them. In our case, for our own sakes, and in others' case, for their sakes. (No need to twist everything artificially around to be exclusively self-benefitting.) The clarity of this has been smudged by the intrusion of the notion of sacrifice.

[JeffS]

I am following the evidence talked about in books such as those by Dawkins, Pinker, Dennett, Wright, etc., etc. (those books have references to the sources and experiments).

You can't cite a few? The web's a wonderful tool. If you give me a concrete example, I could do some research and find out where these "researchers" are getting it wrong.

It can't be regard for self because it's not conscious.

Babies aren't conscious?

(As to babies' egocentrism etc., it's not actually all that germane, precisely because of the point I make just below - plus, I don't have the time for gathering that kind of specific evidence for the post, sorry. Suffice to say, I recall having read about some experiments that support my position - but I am aware that there are different points of view.)

Actually, it's central to your point. If there is some innate knowledge we possess, the first place we should look for such knowledge is in babies.

The ability to walk has a genetic component (there are gadgets in the brain that are designed for it) yet a child still has to learn to walk - I think the situation with morality is parallel.

You don't make a distinction between "ability to gain knowledge" and "possession of knowledge"?

Not sure what you mean.

You wrote:

"No, you ought to be (almost) always both altruistic and selfish." (emph. added)

So, I don't need to follow my moral code "always," I merely need to follow it almost always. Right?

Furthermore, since altruism and selfishness are opposite concepts, it would be impossible for me be both at any time, much less all the time, or even almost all the time.

Ultimately, none (although some are totally negligible).

Ahh, then why the "almost"? Is that also a mis-understood concept?

The question is: what kind of effect should it be? What kind of action should you take with regard to yourself, and what kind of action should you take with regard to others?

I should take actions which are in my rational self-interest. Those which serve my life and my happiness.

I should take no actions which disregard my rational self-interest. None which detract from my life and my happiness. What do you recommend? Should I pursue actions which detract from my life and my rational self-interest?

It's up to you and your sense of life, and it really depends on the concrete circumstances of the case.

How could it be "up to [me] and [my] sense of life"? Aren't I supposed to do that which benefits others? There is no "me" in "them."

I know I couldn't live with myself if I let the child drown, so I would save it (presuming it hadn't murdered someone - but what if that someone was Hitler? Just kidding )

You couldn't live with yourself? I don't understand why you're so fixated on yourself and your interests.

I know it when I see it Defining it more precisely is what this kind of discussion is all about!

Well, we're in luck! The concept "sacrifice" has already been defined precisely. Do you know what that definition is? I'll guarantee you that Dr. Huemer knows what it is because it's been around since, literally, the dawn of Man. Now, Dr. Huemer might want to redefine it, as you're trying to do, but notice the confusion that results when we try to change the definition of words which already represent valid concepts.

Ah, there's the problem - "but" in that context didn't indicate an exception in that sense! The relation with others is added on to the relation with oneself. Neither is exclusive. The "but" was meant merely to signify the distinction between the self-regarding aspect and the other-regarding aspect, which latter only becomes apparent when you actually interact with others.

Hmmm, well, English uses the conjunction "and" to "add" one clause or phrase to another. Regardless, what do your ethics tell Crusoe to do when he confronts civilization?

People can be wrong and misguided. Concepts (especially those in the public domain, as it were) can be vague enough to mean totally different things sometimes. I repeat: if you haven't got a problem with Objectivism saying selfishness doesn't mean what people think it does, you should have no problem with me saying altruism doesn't mean what people think it does!

Yes, people can be wrong and misguided. Should we then take their incorrect understanding of a concept to be correct then? They are correct because they are incorrect?

A vague concept is no concept at all. Either it has an identity, or it does not. If it does not, it does not exist. Altruism is not a vague concept. I know what it is. I would venture to say everyone on this board knows what it is. I know Dr. Ghate knows what it is, and I would bet Dr. Huemer does too.

It seems the only one fuzzy on what it means, in this context, is you.

Yes indeed, mutualism is the whole of the morality I'm talking about, in a sense. Altruism as I'm defining it here is an aspect of mutualism in that sense. I'm not saying morality should be exclusively altruistic, remember (see above re. the "but")

So, you already have a perfectly good name for your concept, why are you trying to confuse the name for another?

It could be mutualism or it could be self-sacrifice, depending on the circumstances.

Depending on the circumstances? Hmmm, so words change their definitions based upon circumstances? I truly hope your current circumstances are optimal for understanding the words I'm writing sufficient to convey my meaning.

"Altruism refers to behaviour by an individual that increases the fitness of another individual while decreasing the fitness of the actor."

Foolishness?

Why would it be foolishness? Is it foolishness to follow one's moral code? Or, perhaps you're redefining the word "foolishness," too? Besides, wouldn't it be mutualism, or self-sacrifice?

[gurugeorge]

You can't cite a few? The web's a wonderful tool. If you give me a concrete example, I could do some research and find out where these "researchers" are getting it wrong.

Dude, they are all books that have been science/philosophy best-sellers. It's not my fault that you don't get out much

Dennett, Pinker, Wright, Dawkins.

Babies aren't conscious?

It can't be regard for self that's being shown, because the regard isn't conscious self-regard - if there's any self-regard it's "self-regard", shown by the baby's automatic instincts (i.e. it simply acts that way, un-self-consciously). The baby has, little sense of self as opposed to other. It hasn't yet consciously taken on its own perspective. Morality does not yet apply.

Actually, it's central to your point. If there is some innate knowledge we possess, the first place we should look for such knowledge is in babies.

No it's not central: things can be innate but not activated until the right environmental conditions trigger the trait. A baby is not a miniature adult. You don't necessarily learn about adult human cognition from babies (although you might learn a few things); you learn about baby cognition from babies.

You wrote:

"No, you ought to be (almost) always both altruistic and selfish." (emph. added)

So, I don't need to follow my moral code "always," I merely need to follow it almost always. Right?

No, sometimes moral rules don't apply - cf. Rand's "Ethics of Emergencies", which I agree with, in part. "Almost" is just meant to block off that area (in which moral rules don't apply).

Furthermore, since altruism and selfishness are opposite concepts, it would be impossible for me be both at any time, much less all the time, or even almost all the time.

Altruism as traditionally conceived and selfishness as traditionally conceived are opposite concepts, altruism as traditionally conceived and selfishness as conceived by Objectivism are opposite concepts in another way. Altruism and selfishness as I am conceiving them are complementary concepts.

Well, we're in luck! The concept "sacrifice" has already been defined precisely. Do you know what that definition is? I'll guarantee you that Dr. Huemer knows what it is because it's been around since, literally, the dawn of Man. Now, Dr. Huemer might want to redefine it, as you're trying to do, but notice the confusion that results when we try to change the definition of words which already represent valid concepts.

Again, you could level the same complaint at Rand wrt "selfishness". It's ok for Rand to revalue/redefine a concept, but not for me or Dr Heumer?

OK, I'm beginning to think, from this and the rest of your points, that you are merely nit-picking, so I'm going to stop answering them in detail and refocus on the central issue: any action you take can have consequences either beneficial or detrimental to you (when you are on your own) or to you and to others (when you are in the company of others).

Do you agree with that?

If so, then take note, here is what I propose:

Morality simply tells you that you should strive to do what you reasonably can to make those effects beneficial. There is no necessary implication of sacrifice of one to another.

Wrt terminology: one logical term for the self-facing aspect is "selfish", one logical term for the other-facing aspect is "altruistic" (I mean logical as a word with latin roots, plainly translated, not in terms of the traditional connotation which includes the concept of self-sacrifice as a necessary element), but I don't actually care what words are used in this context (e.g. one could use "alterism" or something like that for the other-facing side, it really doesn't matter, it's just that using "altruism" has the value of re-valuing a traditionally-used term, and causing some thought and controversy, in the same way that using "selfish" is a logical word for what is meant, and, denatured of sacrificial implications, its use in an Objectivist context revalues the term, and causes thought and controversy). Also, even though "altruism" has the necessary connotation of sacrifice in "official" usage, in "bootleg" usage (amongst the people, in folk wisdom, so to speak) it doesn't always have that connotation, and has also a non-sacrificial sense. (e.g., I've discussed this in these terms with friends, and they understand what I mean, and understand that I am using the term without its sacrificial connotation.)

Wrt "innate" an all the rest of it - I've explained it a bit better, I think, in my last post to Grames, so please check that if you're interested.

Hope that's all clearer.

[JeffS]

Dude, they are all books that have been science/philosophy best-sellers. It's not my fault that you don't get out much

I get out quite a bit. I'm not sure what that has to do with reading books, though.

I assume you've read the books? Did any of them present any evidence? Do you remember that evidence? If so, can you present it?

It can't be regard for self that's being shown, because the regard isn't conscious self-regard - if there's any self-regard it's "self-regard", shown by the baby's automatic instincts (i.e. it simply acts that way, un-self-consciously). The baby has, little sense of self as opposed to other. It hasn't yet consciously taken on its own perspective. Morality does not yet apply.

So, an action which is innate cannot be considered innate because the actor doesn't have a concept for "self"?

No it's not central: things can be innate but not activated until the right environmental conditions trigger the trait. A baby is not a miniature adult. You don't necessarily learn about adult human cognition from babies (although you might learn a few things); you learn about baby cognition from babies.

Do you have any examples of innate human behavior which don't activate until the right environmental conditions trigger them?

No, sometimes moral rules don't apply - cf. Rand's "Ethics of Emergencies", which I agree with, in part. "Almost" is just meant to block off that area (in which moral rules don't apply).

So, when I can follow my morality, I should follow it always?

Altruism as traditionally conceived and selfishness as traditionally conceived are opposite concepts, altruism as traditionally conceived and selfishness as conceived by Objectivism are opposite concepts in another way. Altruism and selfishness as I am conceiving them are complementary concepts.

Hmmm, well, that's interesting. Can I conceive of "day" to mean "night"? That could be pretty fun. It would make communication a little difficult, but hey, let's just re-conceive "communication," too!

Again, you could level the same complaint at Rand wrt "selfishness". It's ok for Rand to revalue/redefine a concept, but not for me or Dr Heumer?

What concept did Rand revalue/redefine?

OK, I'm beginning to think, from this and the rest of your points, that you are merely nit-picking,

Perhaps you feel that way because we're having trouble communicating? See, when you enter into a debate, or conversation with anyone, having a common language is imperative so that we may convey to each other the concepts we're thinking of. Since you insist on redefining so many words, I'm not sure what concepts you're talking about. In order to clarify what those concepts are, I need to ask you questions. I'm sorry you feel that this is "nit-picky," but I'm afraid I don't know any other way of communicating. Do you?

Flip down the upswing on the clockwatch banana ring? If to the and were, did clip the zucchini.

any action you take can have consequences either beneficial or detrimental to you (when you are on your own) or to you and to others (when you are in the company of others).

Do you agree with that?

I don't know. Are you sticking with the traditional definitions of these words, or have you redefined any?

We could probably cut through a lot of posts if you answer a few questions of mine you skipped over (which were many):

You argued you couldn't live with yourself if you allowed the kid from Dr. Huemer's emergency scenario to drown. Why did you write that? Why are you so fixated on yourself and your interests? In regards to the same example, you stated that whether I should give up my life to save the child depends upon my own sense of life (and the concrete circumstances of the case.) Again, why would whether I give up my own life depend upon my interests when I have an innate, genetic predisposition(?) to consider the child's interests and act to effect the greatest benefit to both?

What does your morality tell Crusoe to do when he returns to civilization?

[gurugeorge]

We could probably cut through a lot of posts if you answer a few questions of mine you skipped over (which were many):

You argued you couldn't live with yourself if you allowed the kid from Dr. Huemer's emergency scenario to drown. Why did you write that?

Because that's how I feel about that situation. I couldn't bear to think of the poor wee kid's last moments, and me not having done anything to save them. I think it would haunt me for the rest of my life, if I hadn't at least tried to save them.

How about you? What if you didn't have any reason to suspect the kid was a killer? Would you just let him die?

Why are you so fixated on yourself and your interests?

I'm not fixated solely on my interest (i.e. my future mental anguish) - what's tugging at my heart strings is precisely the thought of the situation from the child's point of view. I almost drowned myself once, so I know the kind of fear and panic a child might feel. But even if I hadn't, I still understand a scream of panic and fear from someone else, and am moved to respond for their sake.

In regards to the same example, you stated that whether I should give up my life to save the child depends upon my own sense of life (and the concrete circumstances of the case.) Again, why would whether I give up my own life depend upon my interests when I have an innate, genetic predisposition(?) to consider the child's interests and act to effect the greatest benefit to both?

Any innate, genetic predisposition that you have is yours.

What does your morality tell Crusoe to do when he returns to civilization?

As I stated in my definition: to act in such a way that the effects of his actions that impinge on others be as beneficial, or at the very least, as harmless, as he can reasonably make them.

Meanwhile, he ought to still be ensuring that the effects of his actions that impinge on himself be as beneficial to him as he can reasonably make them, just as he was doing back on the desert island. Nothing on the self-facing side has changed - but now that other people have entered into the picture, there is a new moral question about his actions wrt those others. How should he act wrt to those others? Basically, benevolently, with some care and consideration. Not just because it will benefit him in the long run (although that is a valid reason too), but because it will benefit them.

So: do you think any such consideration logically has to involve self-sacrifice? If so, why?

(As to your other comments - noted, but suffice to say I disagree with some of what you are saying.)

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

So: do you think any such consideration logically has to involve self-sacrifice? If so, why?

The issue is what you are getting out of it. There is a general benevolence one ought to give to others just because they are fellow humans, unless you have specific reasons to consider them to be less than living up to your standards and not deserving of it. So, helping someone out in an emergency is fine as long as you are not risking your life or major values. It becomes a self-sacrifice if you given them more than they deserve or have earned from you consideration.

It's not really an issue of helping others or not helping them, but what benefit are you deriving from helping them. Making you feel good is a subjective standard, and not compatible with Objectivism. Not that you are claiming to be an Objectivist, but expanding energy and not getting anything in return for your efforts is a sacrifice since the value gained is less than the value put into the effort.

I would even go so far as efforts to explain things to others must be beneficial to oneself. The effort is worth it if they get it and you can have more people in the world struggling for your type of values; but if it is only frustrating, then don't do it. It is not the duty of an Objectivist to save the soul of everyone on planet earth.

Besides, doing good things for other is not the meaning of the term "altruism" -- we use it to mean doing something for others and not getting anything out of it. Some altruists do it for the good feelings, but morality is not about feelings, one way or the other. A rational morality is about benefiting from one's own efforts in a rational manner.

[JeffS]

Because that's how I feel about that situation. I couldn't bear to think of the poor wee kid's last moments, and me not having done anything to save them. I think it would haunt me for the rest of my life, if I hadn't at least tried to save them.

Me, me, me, me, me! What about the kid? Where did you consider his interests? When did you consider what would be beneficial to him? Maybe he wants to be in the water. Maybe he's practicing holding his breath. Maybe he wants to die.

And what about the effects he might wrought if he's saved? Maybe he is a little Hitler and will one day grow up to kill a whole bunch of people. That certainly wouldn't be beneficial to all involved, would it?

How about you? What if you didn't have any reason to suspect the kid was a killer? Would you just let him die?

It depends upon what's in my rational self-interests. See, I couldn't live with myself if I let the kid die just because I didn't want to ruin my suit (as Dr. Huemer first posits). So, it would be against my self-interest to let him die. However, if I've got my own sick kid in my arms, and I'm rushing him to the hospital, and time is of the essence - he'll die if he doesn't get attention soon - then let the other bugger drown. And I'll live quite contentedly with myself and the son I saved. (A scenario Dr. Ghate actually brings up.)

How 'bout you? Would you let someone you cared a great deal for die so you could save the life of a stranger? If your answer doesn't begin with, "Well, it depends upon what would be best for all involved," then you're really just blowing smoke, and even you don't believe in your morality.

I'm not fixated solely on my interest (i.e. my future mental anguish) - what's tugging at my heart strings...

Look real carefully at these two phrases.

Any innate, genetic predisposition that you have is yours.

But it's telling me to consider others before myself. I'm genetically predisposed to be "nice," to consider the effect of my actions on others, to act not for myself but for others. I don't have an innate, genetic predisposition to be selfish, to regard myself before others. Right? So, why would my decision depend upon my sense of life? I'm merely supposed to act in ways which provide the greatest benefit to all. In such a situation, clearly I would sacrifice my life. I must since I'm old, and the child is young. The greatest benefit for all involved would be to save him at the cost of my own life.

As I stated in my definition: to act in such a way that the effects of his actions that impinge on others be as beneficial, or at the very least, as harmless, as he can reasonably make them.

And why should he do this? What are the disadvantages to acting in such a way that the effects of his actions that impinge on others are not beneficial, or actually harmful?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

There is also the issue of emergency ethics, as if what you should do in an emergency defines what is moral. Fortunately, emergencies don't come up that often, so using emergencies to define a morality is dropping the context of how one ought to act in normal, everyday existence. Otherwise, ethics is rather useless, because it doesn't tell you how to live your life. Should I be continuing in this discussion? Well, how should I know, since it is not an emergency. Should I go to work and earn my keep? It's not an emergency, so I have no idea.

A rational ethics is about how to live your life to your own long-term benefit. It's not about dreaming up rare if ever scenarios that one may never encounter. This type of mentality about ethics completely divorces ethics from life and living, which is the point of emergency ethics scenarios.

[Vigilantys]

Because that's how I feel about that situation. I couldn't bear to think of the poor wee kid's last moments, and me not having done anything to save them. I think it would haunt me for the rest of my life, if I hadn't at least tried to save them.

How about you? What if you didn't have any reason to suspect the kid was a killer? Would you just let him die?

I'm not fixated solely on my interest (i.e. my future mental anguish) - what's tugging at my heart strings is precisely the thought of the situation from the child's point of view. I almost drowned myself once, so I know the kind of fear and panic a child might feel. But even if I hadn't, I still understand a scream of panic and fear from someone else, and am moved to respond for their sake.

I actually think Jeff has been rather successful in slowly extracting a more precise definition from you on your morality. You claimed to be a bit of an altruist and a bit of an Objectivist yet clearly that is not the case as that makes as much sense as a wet fire. Your flaw is that you try to misrepresent your own interest with altruism simply due to societal compulsions imposed on you through the same ambiguously suggestive means as you now use. You might, or might not, save the child depending on the spur of the moment decisions but if you do, you'd clearly do it for the selfish regard of self as otherwise the non-action would torture you. Yet, it also makes you feel more justified to insist you'd do it for some greater good and not for a selfish reason. But surely you must understand that any action you do to make yourself feel better about yourself based upon your own morality is a selfish action. However it would certainly be altruistic and sacrificial to save the child if you did it for concern as to what the bystanders might think of you later if you did not save the child. Note however then that in such a case your overall morality is altruistic and sacrificial as external compulsions and not internal convictions make you act.

And I wonder... why does it have to be specifically a child that must be rescued why not just a human being? Are you trying to appeal to my parental instinct and hence make me feel guilty for valuing my own life over the child’s with such formulation? Well I choose to be a rational human being and I reject all instincts to the utmost possible. If my instincts happen to coincide with that which is rational then great! But if not then I must learn to disregard my instincts. All life is of equal value when you subtract personal knowledge about the given life. If my grandmother was drowning beside the now proverbial kid I'd save my grandma and feel fine about it later as the kid is just another human being in a world of close to 7 billion of us already. If the child meant more to me than being just another young human then it might be different. You mentioned "kin-altruism" earlier... what the hell is that? Are you saying that it is "altruistic" to save the life of your own child?

Altruism explicitly implies an action that is not in your self interest. As in- acting based upon societal compulsions and restraints when they violate your own welfare. Yes, that is my own definition but I do not believe it violates the established one. Now by welfare I mean what you, solely, see as good for you and not based on any other standard.

Edited July 18, 2009 by Vigilantys