Evasion, Honest Errors, And Irrationality

[AndrewSternberg]

While they are false, do all wrong ideas, whether they are arrived at by evasion or simply an honest error, constitute an instance of irrationality.

I have other derivitive questions, but they mostly pertain to ethics and not epistemology so I won't ask them here. If this part of the conversation can be restricted to answering the above question alone, appreciation will spew forth from mind. (wow, that is an odd way to say that, but rather then reword it, ill leave the sentence as is)

[DavidOdden]

While they are false, do all wrong ideas, whether they are arrived at by evasion or simply an honest error, constitute an instance of irrationality.

An idea that is reasoned but based on false premises (especially incorrect knowledge) is not irrational -- "irrational" refers to not following reason. You raise an interesting question, though, about "honest errors of logic", and I haven't thought about exactly what things "irrational" refers to. I would not say that careless reasoning is not irrational -- I would reserve "irrational" for the willful denial of reason.

[stephen_speicher]

While they are false, do all wrong ideas, whether they are arrived at by evasion or simply an honest error, constitute an instance of irrationality.

Reason is the only proper method for arriving at truth, so the use of any other method would be irrational. But since we are neither omniscient nor omnipotent, one can still use reason and be in error.

[AndrewSternberg]

Thank you both. You both confirmed by understanding.

David Odden:

... I haven't thought about exactly what things "irrational" refers to. I would not say that careless reasoning is not irrational -- I would reserve "irrational" for the willful denial of reason.

I think that irrational does carry with it a moral condemnation, which implies that choice was involved, which involves evasion. I agree that honest errors should fall outside the scope of what "irrational" refers to.

And Stephen, you remind me that rational/irrational is in large part a statement about the method one uses, rather than the status of the content. This shifting of emphasis (in my mind) warrents some rethinking to see where it leads me. I may have some follow-up questions as a result.

[Proverb]

Is the human inability to read minds keeping Objectivism from being 'air tight'?

I have read so many Peikoff-bashing essays who's root is the attack on his concept of 'inherently dishonest ideas.' It is said that (because you cannot read the minds of people) it is wrong to attack the ideas of an individual or a group until you ascertain wether or not they are guilty of evasion or are simply in error.

It is obvious that when judging the 'honesty' of an individual there can be one of two cases:

1. said individual is holding an idea through erroneous integration

2. said individual is holding an idea through a process of evasion

My question is: What is the distinction between 'error' and 'evasion?'

If we could clearly define this distinction in a way that does not require the psychological analysis of a person we would have an objective standard for labeling 'inherently dishonest ideas.'

The following is a corollary for me:

If one's process of evasion leads to the same concept as that of a person who came to it in error, is action propagated by such a concept morally different? Is a differentiation possible?

Thank you for your considerations!

[Capitalism Forever]

If a person knowingly accepts a contradiction, he is evading.

[DavidOdden]

If we could clearly define this distinction in a way that does not require the psychological analysis of a person we would have an objective standard for labeling 'inherently dishonest ideas.'

That's a contradiction in terms. Moral evaluation is a psychological evaluation. Mental state is the essence of the distinction between first degree murder and a tragic accident that leads to someone's death. There is nothing at all subjective in judging a mental state. In fact, what these opponents are demanding is not objectivity, but omniscience and infallibility.

[BurgessLau]

For Proverb or anyone else: Did Leonard Peikoff actually use the phrase "inherently dishonest ideas"? If so, where? And what did he mean by that?

I do not understand how an idea can be honest (inherently or not) or dishonest. Isn't honesty a virtue of a person, not of an idea? Likewise, isn't dishonesty a vice of a person, not of an idea?

[Capitalism Forever]

For Proverb or anyone else: Did Leonard Peikoff actually use the phrase "inherently dishonest ideas"? If so, where? And what did he mean by that?

Now we must note that falsehood does not necessarily imply vice; honest errors of knowledge are possible. But such errors are not nearly so common as some people wish to think, especially in the field of philosophy. In our century, there have been countless mass movements dedicated to inherently dishonest ideas—e.g., Nazism, Communism, non-objective art, non-Aristotelian logic, egalitarianism, nihilism, the pragmatist cult of compromise, the Shirley MacLaine types, who "channel" with ghosts and recount their previous lives; etc. In all such cases, the ideas are not merely false; in one form or another, they represent an explicit rebellion against reason and reality (and, therefore, against man and values).

[Proverb]

For Proverb or anyone else: Did Leonard Peikoff actually use the phrase "inherently dishonest ideas"? If so, where? And what did he mean by that?

Peikoff's essay 'Fact and Value' uses the concept of inherently dishonest ideas. I have heard it defined as a concept that is 'so in conflict with reality' that it would not have been possible to arrive at it as a result of an 'honest error' but only as a result of evasion. Concepts such as 'Marxism', 'Slavery', ect.

The problem is that it is not clear how to qualify a concept as 'so in conflict with reality.'

[DavidOdden]

I do not understand how an idea can be honest (inherently or not) or dishonest. Isn't honesty a virtue of a person, not of an idea? Likewise, isn't dishonesty a vice of a person, not of an idea?

Ideas are created by people, so the vices and virtues of ideas refer to the mental process required for a person to accept or create the idea. Similarly, a dishonest statement doesn't refer to an intrinsic property of the sounds words, but the ideas that must be held by a person in order to make or believe the statement.

[DavidOdden]

The problem is that it is not clear how to qualify a concept as 'so in conflict with reality.'

Why would you want to qualify such a statement? If an idea is inherently dishonest, what would be the point of trying to look for a way to create an exception, so as to excuse some particular dishonest statement?

[Hal]

How on earth is non Aristotlean logic an 'inherently dishonest idea'?

(This resulted in a more detailed discussion of logic, that has been move to an earlier thread on fuzzy-logic. - softwareNerd)

Edited August 2, 2005 by softwareNerd

[Proverb]

If an idea is inherently dishonest, what would be the point of trying to look for a way to create an exception, so as to excuse some particular dishonest statement?

My purpose is that of introspection. I am trying to understand what an inherently dishonest idea is.

From your statement you seem to know what an inherently dishonest idea is. I apparently do not. Will you share?

I understand that it is not an "intrinsic property of the sound" that defines the 'honesty' of a concept. My quetion is: Is it possible for two people to hold a specific concept as a result of two different processes (error/evasion)?

In addressing all the items on a hypothetical list of all inherently dishonest ideas, is it impossible to arrive at such concepts through honest error? How can you tell?

Is there a basic concept I'm overlooking? Am I suffering from an honest error?

[BurgessLau]

Peikoff's essay 'Fact and Value' uses the concept of inherently dishonest ideas.

Now I am doubly puzzled. How can "inherently dishonest ideas" be a concept?

I will reread his essay. Thank you for the reference.

Concepts such as 'Marxism', 'Slavery', ect.

Did Leonard Peikoff actually say that "Marxism" is a concept? Or is that your identification? (Either way, I think it is erroneous to call a particular set of ideas, labeled by a proper name, a "concept.")

[BurgessLau]

Ideas are created by people, so the vices and virtues of ideas refer to the mental process required for a person to accept or create the idea. Similarly, a dishonest statement doesn't refer to an intrinsic property of the sounds words, but the ideas that must be held by a person in order to make or believe the statement.

[bold added for emphasis.]

Let me see if I can summarize this in my own words.

By this approach, an "inherently honest idea" actually refers not to the idea itself (or even to the character of the person holding the idea), but to the one and only reality-facing mental process which everyone must go through to arrive at it.

Likewise, an "inherently dishonest idea" refers to the one and only evasive mental process that one must go through to arrive at it.

Correct? Or have I misunderstood, so far?

Also, I am unclear whether "inherently honest/dishonest" refers to an evasive/fact-facing process or to the premises in the inference leading to the inherently honest/dishonest idea. Your statement seems to be identifying both.

Which is it, or is it some combination of both?

[BurgessLau]

Capitalism Forever, thank you for the excerpt. I see something in Dr. Peikoff's explanation that has not been explicitly identified in other explanations in this thread, so far. (I admit I am having trouble keeping up with the pace.) The missing element is this: The inherently dishonest idea itself includes a rejection of reason. For example Marxism is the proper name of a set of ideas, one fundamental example being rejection of reason in favor of materialism (which really means instrinsicism).

Now I understand Dr. Peikoff's point: An idea is inherently dishonest if the idea explicitly rejects reason while (at least implicitly) relying on reason for presentation and acceptance.

In other words, an inherently dishonest idea is one that is itself, at least in part, a stolen concept. In this case, the theft truly is immoral and not a simple error in logic.

I still need to reread "Fact and Value" -- or at least the section containing the excerpt -- but I can now see why Dr. Peikoff might thus label some ideas.

I will also be interested in seeing whether Dr. Peikoff makes a distinction between an "inherently dishonest idea" and the view that everyone who upholds the idea is dishonest. For example, was Andrei in We the Living dishonest because he supported the Communist revolution, a revolution whose ideology was Marxist? I think not.

However, the founders of the ideas Dr. Peikoff names as examples would necessarily be dishonest if they offered the ideas and stuck with them. If I remember correctly, from reading his essay when it first came out, Dr. Peikoff holds the intellectuals who propound such ideas -- and should know better -- to be dishonest, and rightly so, but that does not necessarily apply to the many followers, especially to the young ones who may soon leave these movements. I will see what the essay says.

Edited August 1, 2005 by BurgessLau

[DavidOdden]

My purpose is that of introspection. I am trying to understand what an inherently dishonest idea is.

First, I don't know how that relates to your goal of qualifying the idea. Unless you mean quantifying it, but even then this is not a numeric property so quantifying inherent dishonesty doesn't mean anything. Or are you thinking that some ideas might be more egregiously dishonest than others? Let me assume that's the direction you're going. In that case, I suppose the way of quantifying degree of dishonestly is the extent to which contradictions must be accepted to hold the idea. But second, I urge you to limit your use of introspection, when it comes to things about reality -- you can't introspect what communism says, but you can study it to learn what it says. Or, you can observe its effects. (The visible contrast between eastern and western Europe, post-liberation, was a clear demonstration of that effect which anyone can appreciate).

An inherently dishonest idea is one that a rational person cannot both grasp and integrate with everything else they know, without ignoring a contradiction. Take Burgess's example of Andrei -- he did not actually grasp what communism was. Karl Marx, on the other hand, did, since he created communism. Lenin, Stalin and Mao also fully understood communism. They understood the central ethical demand of communism, that no man has any purpose in existing except as a tool to serve an undefined and non-existent abstraction, "the people", and that your primary ethical obligation is to sacrifice your life for -- nothing. Andrei did not understand this (and the consequences of his non-comprehension were tragic).

I understand that it is not an "intrinsic property of the sound" that defines the 'honesty' of a concept. My quetion is: Is it possible for two people to hold a specific concept as a result of two different processes (error/evasion)?

Yes -- above is an example. Let me give you another example. As you know, taking the writings of another person and presenting them as your own without attributing them to the author is plagiarism, which is a serious form of intellectual dishonesty in our culture. In some (Asian) cultures, copying without attribution is not considered a serious offense. Now, in my first teaching job, a foreign student plagiarised some material, and when I said "But that's plagiarism!", the student said "I see. What is 'plagiarism'. How do you spell it?" An innocent error. Any American student who has grown up being lectured for years on plagiarism and the value of intellectual property cannot honestly hold. The distinction really comes down to what you know. In the western context, personal intellectual achievement is a value that is to be rewarded, and a specific form of reward is recognition, following rules established by society. If you don't know that there is such a rule, it is an error to break that rule, and not evasion.

Burgess's identification, in terms of concept stealing (using reason to reject reason) boils the issue down to its essential.

[DavidOdden]

Likewise, an "inherently dishonest idea" refers to the one and only evasive mental process that one must go through to arrive at it.

Yes, exactly.

Also, I am unclear whether "inherently honest/dishonest" refers to an evasive/fact-facing process or to the premises in the inference leading to the inherently honest/dishonest idea. Your statement seems to be identifying both.

Which is it, or is it some combination of both?

I would say both, with the caveat that an erroneous premise may arise by evasive logic. Specifically, misidentifying a conclusion as certain when it is, logically, only somewhat probable, is logical evasion. But you can take that premise, improperly believed to be true, and using consistent logic can combine it with other true conclusions to arrive at an incorrect conclusion. I don't want to say that all erroneous premises are the result of evasive logic, but they often are.

[Proverb]

Thank you Daivd for your replies they are very clear.

I gather, from the arguments here, in respect to the inclusion of error in the integration of a concept is that there are three situations.

1. No error

A person holds a logically integrated moral concept

2. Honest error

A person holds a concept without a necessary distinction as a result of lack of knowledge.

3. Act of evasion

A person holds a concept as a result of a direct rebellion against reason and the facts of reality.

As I reread number two, I recall that in ITOE Rand wrote something to the effect that a concept as held by two individuals, if properly integrated, holds no contradictions and only differs in scope.

If I hold a concept with some lack of knowledge, and if I have integrated it correctly, am I really in error?

[DavidOdden]

2. Honest error

A person holds a concept without a necessary distinction as a result of lack of knowledge.

....

As I reread number two, I recall that in ITOE Rand wrote something to the effect that a concept as held by two individuals, if properly integrated, holds no contradictions and only differs in scope.

If I hold a concept with some lack of knowledge, and if I have integrated it correctly, am I really in error?

You might be, but don't be thinking that errors are evil. Evasion is what's evil. Peikoff's discussion of "certainty" in OPAR helps to make this point clear -- quoting from p. 179:

A conclusion is "certain" when the evidence in its favor is conclusive; i.e., when it has been logically validated. At this stage, one has gone beyond "substantial" evidence. Rather, the total of the available evidence points in a single direction, and this evidence fulfills the standard of proof. In such a context, there is nothing to suggest even the possibility of another interpretation. There are, therefore, no longer any grounds for doubt.

My favorite concrete example is crow color. There are two basic facts which you have to know to evaluate the claim "all crows are black", and while I think most educated people know the first fact, many do not know the second. Namely, coloration in animals is often determined by species, and there is more than one species of crow. In my older uninformed days, I could conclude -- in error -- that all crows are black. In fact, I must conclude that, because I was in possession of no knowledge whatsoever that casts doubt on the black crow conclusion. To deny the conclusion on the grounds "maybe I am mistaken" is the same kind of appeal to the arbitrary that allows skeptics to generally deny that we can have knowledge. However, once I know that there are dozens of species of crow, say goodbye to certainty (and a few months in East Africa really drives that point home since the predominate species of crow in the areas I was in is black and white).

The particular conclusion that all crows are black is in error, but it was arrived at by proper use of logic. The empirical factor that tripped you up was the fact that you didn't know of species variation in crows (in contrast to lions and polar bears).

[Nxixcxk]

In fact, I must conclude that, because I was in possession of no knowledge whatsoever that casts doubt on the black crow conclusion

But couldn't have you said to yourself, "Since many, if not all other animals I have observed come in different colors, and even though all crows I have observed have been black, I cannot conclude that all crows are black." Or would that be an arbitrary claim? (obviously the extent of your knowledge in terms of animals and species and what not is important, but I'm just throwing a possible example to see if it would be arbitrary).

How many crows must one observe before he can be certain that all crows are black, white, or a mixture of many colors?

[DavidOdden]

But couldn't have you said to yourself, "Since many, if not all other animals I have observed come in different colors, and even though all crows I have observed have been black, I cannot conclude that all crows are black."  Or would that be an arbitrary claim?  (obviously the extent of your knowledge in terms of animals and species and what not is important, but I'm just throwing a possible example to see if it would be arbitrary).

Given that (for the purposes of this discussion) you're aware of the relation between morphology and species, and given your observations of variable species such as dogs, cats and cows, then with a "large enough N" where all observed crows are black, if all crows are a single species, you have to conclude that this is a valid law (even if you can't identify the exact genetic mechanism behind it). Large N is really a cheap substitute for knowing that other factors are not relevant (such as environment or family genetics); if you'd like a free number, I like the number 20, but again that kind of extrapolation isn't valid unless you have a random sample. In lieu of which, I tend to like 100.

[dianahsieh]

Let me strongly recommend the last lecture of Peikoff's Understanding Objectivism course for a more detailed treatment of inherently dishonest ideas. The category never made any sense to me whatsoever until I heard that lecture. I suspect that others will find it illuminating.

[jrs]

An idea is inherently dishonest if it cannot be believed, when fully understood, because it is clearly inconsistent with everyone's experience of reality. Thus anyone who advocates it in a seemingly coherent way must be a hypocrite and a liar.

I have heard it defined as a concept that is 'so in conflict with reality' that it would not have been possible to arrive at it as a result of an 'honest error' but only as a result of evasion. Concepts such as 'Marxism', 'Slavery', ect.

The problem is that it is not clear how to qualify a concept as 'so in conflict with reality.'

Why would you want to qualify such a statement? If an idea is inherently dishonest, what would be the point of trying to look for a way to create an exception, so as to excuse some particular dishonest statement?

qualify -- v.i.

.........

2. to attribute some quality or qualities to; characterize, call, or name.

3. to modify or limit in some way; make less strong or positive.

.........

I think that DavidOdden misunderstood Proverb.

Proverb was using sense 2 of "qualify". He wanted to know what one needs to check to determine whether a concept is "so in conflict with reality" as to constitute an inherently dishonest idea.

DavidOdden thought Proverb meant sense 3 of "qualify" -- what can one do to weaken the concept of inherently dishonest ideas for some unknown purpose.