An Objectivist on Vacation

Metaphysics and Epistemology
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Today, I’d like to introduce the notion of a ‘Vacationing Objectivist’. Definition:

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A person who holds doubts about the essentials of Ayn Rand’s philosophical system, but does not currently have a definitive refutation or replacement for said essentials.

Thus, a V.O cannot call himself/herself an Objectivist, but can nevertheless continue to admire Objectivism and the work of Objectivist intellectuals and institutes. He/she can also entertain the possibility of ‘returning to the club’ one day, after clearing all doubts. As a V.O myself, here’s a small sample of my doubts, mostly targeting the O’ist metaphysics. (This thread is the evil brother of another thread of mine, where I attempt to defend realism.)

**§1. Mind-independence is not claim-independence**

Do I have stray thoughts, or not? The answer can be true and false, because that fact is independent of any human claims. Therefore, 'claim-independent truth' is not the same as 'mind-independent truth'.

**§2. Nothing can be deduced from the 'externality' of facts **

Facts are 'external' to human claims. Fair enough. Let's move on to the next step. The Hyperuranion is external to human claims. Er... what the frick is 'the Hyperuranion'? Precisely. Deducing a so-called 'physical realm' from the externality of facts is as arbitrary as deducing the [Hyperuranion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperuranion).

**§3. The mind is permanently related to itself**

To conclude whether a claim is true or false, my mind must look 'outward', at reality. I start with the proposition 'I have stray thoughts', so I look outward at... wait, 'outward'? Yes, because 'outward' and 'inward' reveal an important fact: the mind is inherently a _self-relation_.

**§4. "All of your examples are about introspection, not extrospection".**

Glad you noticed. Actually, all of my examples are about the inner-sense, rather than the outer-sense. The so-called 'outer' sense is still a _sense_, which makes 'intro-' and 'extro-' a matter of semantics. I deliberately use introspective examples in order to prevent the knee-jerk equivocation between 'outer-sense' and 'outer-realm'.

**§5. Mental states can represent themselves**

I'm engrossed in thoughts about yogurt; that's a first person perspective. I snap out of it, and see myself being engrossed in useless thoughts about yogurt; that's a third person perspective on my previous mental state. The latter (M2) is a mental representation of the former (M1).

**§6. Doesn't M2 exist independently of M1? The same way a physical banana exists independently of the visual percept of a banana.**

No, and this reveals the unity of 'percept' and 'object'. Does that unity make logical sense? No. Does it happen anyway? Yup. A man will deny he has a nose if logic and/or some dictionary tells him otherwise.

**§7. If M2 represents M1, where does M1 come from?**

Let M1 stand for 'the percept of a banana'. To find out where this image comes from, you have two options: either accept it as given, and move on to doing something more fun; or: speculate about its provenance (or lack thereof). Speculation is more of a spiritually fulfilling pastime, rather than a necessity; the practical side of life remains the same, whether you know M1's provenance or not.

**§8. "We grasp physical objects through our senses, not our senses through a second group of senses." **

Pure speculation. Plus, it's not about a group of senses grasping a secondary group of senses; it's about the unity of percept and object. More precisely, 'percept' and 'object' are two perspectives on the exact same thing. 

**§9. "Why does experience cohere? If I exit the room and return, all objects are exactly where I left them".**

Because experience coheres. The only positive claim we can make is that we experience coherence, but not the _source_ of this coherence. We can speculate about its source, but that's about it.

**§10. "Value implies 'to whom' and 'for what'."**

No, it implies only a 'for what'. For the task of sending a banana to Mars, a spaceship is good. 

**§11. "But, _who_ benefits from that interplanetary delivery?" **  
 In that example, nobody.

**§12. "Does that mean that morality is not a thing anymore?"**  
 No. It means that a pleasant, amazing life is an _intrinsic_ value. That's right: a good life has no utility, so let's scrape the 'for what', shall we? And a pleasant life is pleasant, _period_ (even if you happen to hate it); so let's scrape the 'for whom' as well. Does epistemology support 'intrinsicism'? Nah. Nevertheless, is a good life, good without qualification? You bet. So a 'good' thing is not good merely because it's useful; it's good _only if_ its usefulness pertains to some _intrinsic good_, i.e., for life.
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  1. What do you mean by claim independence? If your point here is that some truths are independent of what somebody claims but are nonetheless dependent on something about their mind, that seems to be exactly what Rand thinks about emotions, and any kind of judgment that involves emotion. 

  2. Consistent with how Rand thinks knowledge ultimately comes from induction.

  3. In what way would Rand disagree? I would not say she said anything explicit about this, but it looks fine.

  4. Actually, even the claim about how consciousness is an axiomatic concept affirms how Rand sees introspection and extrospection as a form of sensing. 

  5. Sounds great, it’s only a doubt to the extent that I don’t think Rand said anything about this one way or the other. 

  6. I think that Oist review one perception is that percept and object is unified as far as the act of perception is concerned. That flows from the Aristotelian nature of what Rand says about perception. He was quite explicit about the unification of the perceiver and the object being perceived. 

  7. Not sure I see the objection.

  8. Your doubts seem to be coming from a strawman by now. Yeah, you are trying to preempt an objection, but who would come up with that kind of objection? 

  9. Seems consistent with the way Rand argued against God. Just because reality coheres in a certain way doesn’t mean that it had to come from a creator. I know that’s not what you’re addressing, but the form of the argument is the same.

10 & 11. These are the only doubts that I think even count as doubts. But it is such a minor doubt, it’s more of a semantic disagreement. 

  1. This is the only substantial doubt you’ve listed. 

Most of it is stuff that is entirely consistent with Oism, and the people you’re disagreeing with probably are not thoroughly versed in Oist epistemology. Then again, I find that there is some kind split about views on the nature of consciousness within the Oist community. The question “can AI ever become conscious?” shows it just about every time. It’s not that the answer to the question itself is what makes a difference, but it’s a quick way to get a sense of their underlying views.

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22 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

. . .

§6. Doesn’t M2 exist independently of M1? The same way a physical banana exists independently of the visual percept of a banana.

No, and this reveals the unity of ‘percept’ and ‘object’. Does that unity make logical sense? No. Does it happen anyway? Yup. A man will deny he has a nose if logic and/or some dictionary tells him otherwise.

 

So you reject the logic of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience (A189–211 B232–56) and his Refutation of Idealism? (B274–87)? Why?

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22 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

. . . 

§8. “We grasp physical objects through our senses, not our senses through a second group of senses.” 

Pure speculation. Plus, it’s not about a group of senses grasping a secondary group of senses; it’s about the unity of percept and object. More precisely, ‘percept’ and ‘object’ are two perspectives on the exact same thing. 

. . . 

Modern developmental cognitive science is not “pure speculation.” One need not posit a second group of senses to explain how the child comes to acquire the notions of her senses or her mind. It is an empirical question which today is being uncovered by developmental cog sci and neuroscience.

Can you give an example of a percept and a specific object manifest in the percept being the same thing? The morning star and the evening star are two perspectives on the same thing, namely, the planet Venus. That was a discovery by observation and reasoning. How would one come to know that observation and the celestial body observed were the same thing? By an argument for neutral monism? By an argument for the Identity theory of truth? 

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22 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

. . .

§4. “All of your examples are about introspection, not extrospection”.

Glad you noticed. Actually, all of my examples are about the inner-sense, rather than the outer-sense. The so-called ‘outer’ sense is still a sense, which makes ‘intro-’ and ‘extro-’ a matter of semantics. I deliberately use introspective examples in order to prevent the knee-jerk equivocation between ‘outer-sense’ and ‘outer-realm’.

. . .

 

Where you say “semantics,” I think you mean merely a matter of labeling. Semantics in the sense meaning is more substantial than that.*

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23 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

. . .

§3. The mind is permanently related to itself

To conclude whether a claim is true or false, my mind must look ‘outward’, at reality. I start with the proposition ‘I have stray thoughts’, so I look outward at… wait, ‘outward’? Yes, because ‘outward’ and ‘inward’ reveal an important fact: the mind is inherently a self-relation.

. . .

Kant was correct in noticing that I think or these thoughts are mine can be truly attached to any human cognition. Today we would investigate how far that is so for a young child or for higher animals besides us.

However, one can acknowledge this insight of Kant’s without taking self-relation of the mature human mind as subversive of or more primitive than the mind’s self-to-things-not-self relation. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas expressed the truth that if one thinks, then one exists, but without making that into a most assured and primitive truth of human natural epistemology, as was done later by Descartes.


As you likely know, it is a secondary matter, ultimately, what is one's own philosophy or one's own position on various specific issues in their relation to some other philosophy, such as Rand's. Relation of your philosophic views concerning the world and fellow human beings to facts of them is primary. 
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Stephen,

My position is simple: one can doubt that M1 is a representation of a real banana, but not that M2 is a representation of M1. In other words, metarepresentation can be immediately proven, while direct realism cannot.

I deliberately describe metarepresentation as an ‘object-percept’ relationship in order to provoke; all objections to said description will necessarily rest on some presupposition, e.g., on metaphysical realism. And by what standard is metaphysical realism a ‘successful’ explanatory theory? I say, a metaphysical theory is successful insofar as experience vouches for it. For example, people who commit to determinism must forfeit their beliefs when dealing with the law, since responsibility implies free will. Thus, I am open to the possibility that more than one successful system is possible (unless proven otherwise, of course).

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10 hours ago, Boydstun said:

Modern developmental cognitive science is not “pure speculation.” One need not posit a second group of senses to explain how the child comes to acquire the notions of her senses or her mind. It is an empirical question which today is being uncovered by developmental cog sci and neuroscience.

I took the point to be that there are some senses which are meta-representational. Memory, for example, is entirely meta-representational. Having senses is enough to say that existence exists, but claiming direct realism is true requires some more reasoning. 

Rand is absolutely clear when she says that awareness is an active process. Awareness, for her, is largely the act of perception, so when she says awareness is an active process, perception is too. The perceiver is interacting with the perceived. No, the perceiver and the perceived are not the same thing, but as perceptual acts are concerned, the perceived and the perceiver are nothing more than different perspectives on the same perceptual act. The perceptual act only exists because both the perceiver and the perceived are unified, and any separation of the 2 eliminates the perceptual act. In other words, they are part of the same thing in such a way that the thing (the perceptual act) exists because of both of them operating in unison. 

 

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18 hours ago, Eiuol said:

I took the point to be that there are some senses which are meta-representational. Memory, for example, is entirely meta-representational. Having senses is enough to say that existence exists, but claiming direct realism is true requires some more reasoning. 

Rand is absolutely clear when she says that awareness is an active process. Awareness, for her, is largely the act of perception, so when she says awareness is an active process, perception is too. The perceiver is interacting with the perceived. No, the perceiver and the perceived are not the same thing, but as perceptual acts are concerned, the perceived and the perceiver are nothing more than different perspectives on the same perceptual act. The perceptual act only exists because both the perceiver and the perceived are unified, and any separation of the 2 eliminates the perceptual act. In other words, they are part of the same thing in such a way that the thing (the perceptual act) exists because of both of them operating in unison. 

I think this is good. I am a big fan of the priority of understanding the problem over any specific solution. And I am a big opponent of what I take to be a hand-wavy and strawman-y way of doing philosophy.

The connection between appearance and reality is a basic starting point and leads us to these themes of realism vs idealism, thus the accessibility of reality becomes a question. Once we start taking about perception, another basic theme that emerges is the question about the active or passive nature of the mind. If there is a mind-independent reality, one possible way of coming into contact with it is by being a passive recipient of information originating outside of it.

If we look at our best physiology and optics and so forth, and we start seeing that the mind is more more active, then we get the pushback against the passive model. It is now easy to caricature the view. And if then, on the other hand, minds have a much more active role, it’s easy to say that reality is then in some sense dependent on them. Then we extend that to saying our perceptual apparatus is not the only way that mind conditions reality, but our conceptual schemes as well. It’s not far to full blown idealism from there. 
 

The question is partially whether any of that really follows from the initial premise. The question of primacy is a different, but related one that follows the accessibility issue. If there is no way to hook onto a mind-independent reality, in what way can it hold any prime significance in our schemes? And if we have to jettison our active picture of mind in the process, why hold onto an inaccessible something that can’t be checked?
 

Defeating direct realism becomes a matter of simply pointing to the activity of the mind and perception. Pointing out that direct realism does not imply the passive “bucket theory” of perception becomes important. But, it is to be stressed, that isn’t the same thing as saying direct realism is a product of some proof or deduction. It becomes more a question of how and how not to defend direct realism.

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In The Evidence of the Senses, David Kelley maintained that consciousness is not metaphysically creative (1987, 58–59, 69–70). That passivity is not overturned by the facts that our sensory receptors are active and follow-on information to and within the brain is actively processed. That stream of processing is automatic and the associated awareness, whether in laboratory testing or the course of ordinary perception in the stream of daily consciousness, is passive throughout that entirely automatic (in a context of trained-by-nature living neural nets) neuronal perceptual process. Perceptions in which we engage in voluntary active maneuvers in order to better identify what is being perceived and sort effects of the sensors from external objects, activities, and conditions (e.g. ferreting out floaters or after-images in visual perception of a scene) also does not overturn the metaphysical passivity of perceptual awareness.That is because what maneuvers we make and the outcomes of them are determinate rather than drifting free in some arena of no determinate character. One can take a realist “spectator view” of actions, their possibilities (just as in geometry we can take a correspondence view when stating [what is now thoroughly proven] that it is not possible to trisect an angle using only a straightedge and compass), and their outcomes in service of perceptual awareness. 

I do not see how talk of the distinction Kelley makes between two perspectives on perception—causal neuronal sensory pickup and processing (called external perspective, as when a brain surgeon is looking at the living brain) and perceptual awareness [called internal perspective])—is sensible conception without laddering up from the distinction one got early on between what is outside one’s body and what is not. Any sense that any occasion of distinguishing between something external to consciousness and something internal to consciousness can be logical and legitimate when one has kicked away that conceptual ladder or ignored it is only habitual thinking, not real logical thinking. That goes also for notions of representations and for the idea of giving a conceptual priority over objects to the subject or priority to the relation between object and subject, but I’ll address that in the balance of my ongoing series on Kelley’s Kant (the balance of what Prof. Dipert had to say). Similarly the conceptual ladder for “grasp in consciousness” is planted in grasp of an object in one’s hand.

2046 mentioned the importance of understanding precisely what is the problem, and for the present topic, I’d like to point to the sustained pursuit of what exactly is or is not the problem in A. D. Smith’s The Problem of Perception.

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I think the discussion is in the right place. I was calling into question whether transcendent claims can be proven or disproven. A brain-in-a-Vat can endlessly bicker that ‘Vat-Theorists’ don’t doubt the existence of brains, vats and scientists. Does that prove anything? No. It merely turns attention to what philosophy can and cannot do. In other words, I can defend realism in the face of objections, but I can never conclusively disprove idealism. To claim otherwise is to overstep the limits of philosophical inquiry.

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5 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

. . . I was calling into question whether transcendent claims can be proven or disproven. . . . I can defend realism in the face of objections, but I can never conclusively disprove idealism. To claim otherwise is to overstep the limits of philosophical inquiry.

You don’t need to disprove idealism any more than you need to disprove skepticism or theism. Though they don’t know the names for them (or for anything) at the time, every human being (with intact brain) begins as a natural realist, not an idealist (nor possessed of the concept of the transcendent); as a dogmatist, not a skeptic; and as an atheist, not a theist. That is why Bishop Berkeley had to do all that work composing arguments against the idea of matter, against the idea that being requires no perception of it, and that God exists. 

Justified belief does not begin with discursive proofs. The idea that realism; that access to physical environment, as it is, in actions and in mentation; and that all the real is physical needs for justification a discursive refutation of idealism (or skepticism or theism), which latter one knows of and has made habitual in mental framework only through higher instruction and childhood religious instruction, is incorrect.

Rand and others correctly discerned that we stand in no need of discursive defense of our knowing the existence of and some particulars of the agent-independent, subject-independent world. She erred in thinking that we do not know the world as physical until at an advanced level of conceptual development. One was dealing with and learning about only the physical world from the start, just as one was interacting with and learning about humans not oneself before one had a concept of them (and oneself) as animals with potential of rationality.

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Regarding ‘early development’ arguments, I take a more conservative stance. We also start as flat-earthers, but it doesn’t follow that we should dismiss the spherical earth just because we had to perform complex calculations to prove it. Berkeley never once denies that we experience ourselves as embodied individuals in a spatio-temporal world subject to causation; he provided a theory about the ‘source’ of this experience, and realism does the same. 

Perhaps a lingering confusion is whether idealism is compatible with physiological theories of perception. The answer is a resounding yes. In this thread, I am solely concerned with the status of claims that can’t be verified by experience (cosmic intellect, mind-independent realm, Hyperuranion etc.); I have no beef with wholly verifiable claims, such as those of neuroscience.

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7 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

I was calling into question whether transcendent claims can be proven or disproven.

What do you have to say though about doubting Oist metaphysics? You seemed to present yourself as diverging somehow, but I really don’t see it. 

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56 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Regarding ‘early development’ arguments, I take a more conservative stance. We also start as flat-earthers, but it doesn’t follow that we should dismiss the spherical earth just because we had to perform complex calculations to prove it. . . .

To take this as a right analogy to the standing of realism to the world vs. idealism is to presume your thesis concerning the standing of realism and idealism to the world.

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3 hours ago, Eiuol said:

What do you have to say though about doubting Oist metaphysics?

Perhaps I’m mixing up who said what? I’ll have to think that over.

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2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Perhaps I’m mixing up who said what? I’ll have to think that over.

I mean, you made the thread about doubting some claims in Oist metaphysics, except I don’t see what claims you are doubting. It seems that you want to say that you agree with idealism on some points in opposition to Oism, but are watering it down to say “well, it’s not completely unhinged.” When basically all your posts are about idealism, it’s hard to see what your point is, especially when your so called disagreements are mostly addressing bad arguments against idealism. When I see bad arguments from Oists, I think it’s usually because they don’t get what Rand’s position actually was. 

Rand seems to address idealism by saying that the fact cognition is active and perception as well to an extent, doesn’t make it harder to “access” reality. In fact, that’s what we would expect. Sure, it might look like her claims are nothing more than “your eyes work, therefore idealism is false, you stupid moron”. And yes, I think she oversimplifies her hatred of Kant. But the meat of her ideas goes deeper than that, into the nature of perception being unified such that any disjunction in access to reality just isn’t coherent.