Do animals have volition II?

3 hours ago, Boydstun said:

Pages 107-12 of Onkar Ghate’s chapter “A Being of Self-Made Soul” sets out really well the Objectivist concept of free will, if you should ever like to get hold of the Blackwell book A Companion to Ayn Rand (2016) containing this contribution. The Objectivists take free will to be “the power to select among alternatives, with no particular selection necessitated by antecedent factors. Rand’s theory of free will, therefore, is a version of self-determination.” The geological earth is not a self-determining system. A forest fire or candle flame are not self-determining systems. Life and perhaps certain non-living machines invented by intelligent life can be self-determining systems, that is, systems organized with needs and powers for active self-maintenance of the system it is. Then, with that understanding as the proper context of application, we could define free will as a self-determination in which there is power to select among alternatives, with no particular selection necessitated by antecedent factors.

I have the book and have read it through.  I’m not sure I am completely satisfied with the level of detail reached.  Nor do I believe there is quite enough of an integration/reconciliation (this is in reference to the article) with a persistent dichotmously and disparagingly labelled “material world” (label used not in reference to the article).

 

3 hours ago, Boydstun said:

Antecedent factors, internal antecedent factors, at what time before the instant of choice? If the event that is choice itself occurs over a tenth of a second, for example, it could remain an empirical question, it seems to me, how much contingency (159-62), thence continuing possible freedom in the choice there remains at half a second before the choice, three seconds before the choice, and so forth.

An undecided mind is still roving over the possibilities… narrowing in on the choice, the freedom from being wholly determined I would assume must extend continuously until it has been made.  Whatever choice is, if one is ever definitively made and if it is of only a choice of one of many alternatives, then the alternatives I assume must somehow be eliminated  in the process, thrown out of consideration, until literally only one remains.

 

I suppose rather than looking at this process empirically as merely refining one’s ideas of about freedom of choice, we could simply use it to define the moment of choice.

A free choice has been made, by definition, once the factors present to make it free, are all in the past.  This freedom shrinks (if one could assign a magnitude) as one approaches the choice, and simultaneously becomes 0 as it is made.

That does not mean one can not make another choice, quickly countermanding the previous… but that is a further choice, not an extension of the first, nor an illustration that the first choice was or was not free.

There may be a “deciding one has chosen” factor which shuts the freedom down, at least for that choice, or for some temporary period afterward… to avoid endless dithering in the mind.

 

I do like your softening of classical determinism, and your reflections about genuine contingency, with processes which (like QM) exhibit multiple outcome causality.  I think it is a sort of multiple outcome causality which for any particular starting identity of the universe and itself, would exhibit a probability function (if it were possible to repeat reality) in the Hilbert space of all choices and actions, which would typify free will.  It has enough identity (the probability function is specific… maybe you’ll choose Italian Food over Thai 80% of the time) so that it is not purely random, but it also is not wholly determined.

 

Here’s an aside:

Of course if we shrink free will, or the free aspect thereof, i.e. if we restrict it ONLY_ to the choice to focus_… well we have a different story.

Once you make the choice to focus or not everything else would be determined… and so then alternative futures are all about the randomness with which you choose to focus. 

IF you so happen to be such that you choose to focus 100 percent of the time you’d be deterministic. 

If you so happened to be such that you choose to focus 0 percent of the time you’d be deterministic. 

If you so happened to be such that in each and every particular context you always made the same decision to be focused or not, say 100% whenever you are in a car and 0% whenever you are on a boat, you would be deterministic.

There has to be some appreciable number of contexts, realities in the moment, at which point you could choose to be focused or you could also choose not to be in focus, that alternative futures are even possible.

 

If follows, that in accordance with Objectivism, your ability to choose to go out of focus is crucial to your having fee will.

[As you can likely see I am not of the view that free will must be so restricted]

1 Like

Strictly Logical,

If I understand correctly, you are saying that, in at least some cases where a person makes a free-will choice, probabilities can be assigned to the different alternatives the person is choosing among.  Is this what you are saying?  If so, why do you think this?

1 hour ago, Doug Morris said:

Strictly Logical,

If I understand correctly, you are saying that, in at least some cases where a person makes a free-will choice, probabilities can be assigned to the different alternatives the person is choosing among.  Is this what you are saying?  If so, why do you think this?

Free will requires that you could have chosen otherwise, absolutely everything about the context the same… the exact same universe, the exact same you (identity).

Probability, in the context of “you could have chosen otherwise” means you are more likely to choose certain things than other things.  IF we could rewind the universe to when you started making a choice and let you choose again it might be different… but if we could rewind the universe and let you choose again… and rewind it again and let you choose again… and do it over and over… as we approach infinity, there will emerge certain patterns which have certain probabilities, which reflect your identity.  Your preferences, tastes, thoughts, memories, all might be involved in the decision making process and because you are you and not someone else, you will tend to do some things in that situation and tend not to do other things.

I posit probability, because positing certainty of any one choice, would deny free will entirely.

 

I am not saying that your faculty of choice is a alternative choosing machine governed by some numbers stored in you as probabilities, your choice works the way it works, period, we only understand and analyse your choices according to statistics (this is pretty well true for anything “statistical”… no coin looks up a spreadsheet stored in itself and says… last time I landed “heads” so to make things work out next time I should land “tails”). 

Since you are unique, the outcomes of a repeated (hypothetical) choice will (must) exhibit a pattern of probability according to who you are, but always you do what you do according to who you are not according to statistics.

 

 

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I posit probability, because positing certainty of any one choice, would deny free will entirely.

A probability distribution in this context means that the person choosing doesn’t even know why they choose - it’s just a certain chance that they will do what they chose to do. If in this exact context I choose to reply to your post, why would I do anything different if nothing about the context changes if it’s repeated?

11 hours ago, Eiuol said:

A probability distribution in this context means that the person choosing doesn’t even know why they choose - it’s just a certain chance that they will do what they chose to do.

No.

You clearly do not understand or are not trying to understand what I posted.  Read it again.  Try using abstractions when thinking.

 

11 hours ago, Eiuol said:

If in this exact context I choose to reply to your post, why would I do anything different if nothing about the context changes if it’s repeated?

Some of us here believe in free will, if you want to propose a determinist theory of human action, you can but I am not going to argue that with you. 

That pleasure I leave to someone else.

 

 

Please stop misconstruing what I am saying.. if you do not or cannot understand, the polite thing to do is first ask what I mean.  The impolite approach you are using is to prop up something unintelligible resulting from your erroneously twisting of what I have said, then to claim I said it, and then to proclaim “aha” that does not make sense.

If you cannot do the polite thing, then we have a problem.

 

17 hours ago, Doug Morris said:

Strictly Logical,

If I understand correctly, you are saying that, in at least some cases where a person makes a free-will choice, probabilities can be assigned to the different alternatives the person is choosing among.  Is this what you are saying?  If so, why do you think this?

Thank you for the question by the way.  Does my answer clear things up for you?

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Read it again.  Try using abstractions when thinking.

For a second there, I forgot that I’m not a Neanderthal.

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Some of us here believe in free will, if you want to propose a determinist theory of human action

Is there anything I said that leads you to believe that I don’t believe in free will?

3 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

The impolite approach you are using is to prop up something unintelligible resulting from your erroneously twisting of what I have said, then to claim I said it, and then to proclaim “aha” that does not make sense.

Which part was unintelligible?

What was mistaken about a probability distribution implying that not even the person making the choice would know why they chose it?

The question I asked was another way of asking what you mean. It gives you a chance to clarify what I think is a problem or contradiction. “Erroneously twisting” is me pointing out the contradiction - contradictions do indeed twist what you mean. It’s not because I’m trying to distort your words.

Think of it this way. If the context I’m making a choice in gives me the reason for the choice I make, and I make the choices I do because of the way I think, why would identical context and my identical way of thinking ever lead me to make a different choice? If you are hungry, food is available, and you want to survive, you’re going to choose to eat. You wouldn’t then say that if the context repeated forever into infinity, some portion of the time you would not choose to eat. This isn’t a denial of free will, but a fact of behavior to explain. Making the same choice is still a choice.

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Is there anything I said that leads you to believe that I don’t believe in free will?

This:

15 hours ago, Eiuol said:

If in this exact context I choose to reply to your post, why would I do anything different if nothing about the context changes if it’s repeated?

and this:

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

 why would identical context and my identical way of thinking ever lead me to make a different choice?

Because if it never lead to a different choice you would be deterministic.  Free will requires that you could have chosen otherwise, without that aspect, you do not have free will.  I am open to the idea that some choices, especially important ones core to who you are, will almost certainly always be the same.

 

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Which part was unintelligible?

This part:

15 hours ago, Eiuol said:

A probability distribution in this context means that the person choosing doesn’t even know why they choose

It does not.  Choosing includes everything we are and think and feel etc. when we choose, it is what it is, and generally includes knowing why, in that choice, we make that choice.

The part which I think most relevant for reread is this:

SL wrote:

"I am not saying that your faculty of choice is a alternative choosing machine governed by some numbers stored in you as probabilities, your choice works the way it works, period , we only understand and analyse your choices according to statistics (this is pretty well true for anything “statistical”… no coin looks up a spreadsheet stored in itself and says… last time I landed “heads” so to make things work out next time I should land “tails”). 

Since you are unique, the outcomes of a repeated (hypothetical) choice will (must) exhibit a pattern of probability according to who you are, but always you do what you do according to who you are not according to statistics."

 

38 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Think of it this way. If the context I’m making a choice in gives me the reason for the choice I make, and I make the choices I do because of the way I think, why would identical context and my identical way of thinking ever lead me to make a different choice? If you are hungry, food is available, and you want to survive, you’re going to choose to eat. You wouldn’t then say that if the context repeated forever into infinity, some portion of the time you would not choose to eat. This isn’t a denial of free will, but a fact of behavior to explain. Making the same choice is still a choice.

There are some choices which you are almost certain to make… and perhaps for some (its hard to know) you are absolutely going to make that choice every time. In such a case the probability would be unity, but for most choices, certainly almost all of the little or not so important ones, the probabilities of outcome for the alternatives will be less than one, but all add up to 1.

 

Back to this:

I said this:

“Deterministic thinking machines will be able to fool us into thinking they have free will only in the sense that it will mimic it.  We will know it does not have free will because we will know exactly how it works, and know that it is deterministic.”

Think of this, all replacements are in bold:

" Hydraulic driven watches will be able to fool us ( as watch onlookers ) into thinking they have  gear driven internals  only in the sense that it (the Hydraulic watch) will mimic (fake, look as though it were - as seen from the outside) it ( standard gear driven watches ).  We (as watchmakers) will know it does not have gear driven internals  because we will know exactly how it works, i.e.  know that it is Hydraulically driven."

 

This IS exactly, by analogy, what I meant.

 

 

 

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

The part which I think most relevant for reread is this:

Why don’t you tell me what I should notice rather than saying it louder? Or try explaining it a different way? Clearly it didn’t work the first time, why would it work the second time? It’s not because I didn’t read it. Pasting it again didn’t change anything for me.

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Because if it never lead to a different choice you would be deterministic.

So if my way of thinking is to be rational, and I evaluate the context in such a way that I figure out the rational action I want to take, then always making that choice would be deterministic? Do you see the problem here? Making a deterministic choice. That’s a contradiction. 

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

perhaps for some (its hard to know) you are absolutely going to make that choice every time.

You flatly called this deterministic. If you’re always going to make the choice every time, then the context and your way of thinking will never lead to a different choice.

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

It does not.  Choosing includes everything we are and think and feel etc. when we choose, it is what it is, and generally includes knowing why, in that choice, we make that choice.

Then you would succeed in making the same choice every time.

I mostly wrote this next part for myself because I thought it was useful. For other reasons as well. Let’s try this:

 

choosing to eat = p(e) = 0.9
not choosing to eat = p(s) = 0.1
p(e + s) = 1

For any choice, we know that there are factors involved, reasons why you make a particular choice. Choices are made in order to acquire or move toward something. We know this simply by observing any animal. If there is an apple, then this is a factor (reason why) you choose to eat. This factor is external. It exists outside the animal. Broadly speaking, we can also say that there are internal factors. One such factor is hunger. Internal and external factors make up the context. 

c = (EX, IN)

In this case

c = (apple, hunger)

So c is context. Whatever your context is, that’s the material for making choices. So let’s call volition v, assuming whatever you want goes into that process itself. Whatever method you want. For precision, let’s call it a deliberation process. It is determinate with choice involved, that is, there is no uncertainty about each step along the way (determinate as in knowable). I am hungry, and there is an apple, therefore I will eat. Moreover, you are aware that you were hungry. You know exactly why you chose to eat. The input to the function is c. The output, the behavior, the mental choice, is b. 

v(c) = b

In this case,

v(c) = (choosing to eat)

Presumably, if nothing ever changes about a context, nothing about the process of volition will change, so the resulting choice would not change. If the choice did change, then there is something about the process of volition that is indeterminate, or the context is indeterminate. Indeterminate context, truly indeterminate, would apply to someone who doesn’t trust the senses, which doesn’t apply here.

I would think that p(v(c)) = 1

But somehow v(c) = e OR s

In another thread, a selection of critters is offered to observe free will. 

The concept of rolling can certainly be formed from observing a ball, tire, a stone or even a log roll along a stretch of surface.

In the case of animals, hunger develops, the quest for food ensues (in the case of humans, this presumes he has learned to identify hunger by some unspecified means.) “Choosing” to look for food does not strike me as what Rand is referring to when she penned:

that which you call ‘free will’ is your mind’s freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character.

Is this the same freedom found in jellyfish, honeybees, alligators, elephants, as is found in man?

It seems to fall short in the realm of “the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections.”

Digressing to positing an explanation of determinism, why wouldn’t there be agreement on all matters, were mechanistic determinism a valid (pesky free-will laden) choice to select from? After all, are not all residing in the context of existence? 

To paraphrase another writer, Steven Covey, is the effort here to understand, or simply to be understood?

1 hour ago, dream_weaver said:

“Choosing” to look for food does not strike me as what Rand is referring to when she penned:

But it is still a choice. I mean, it doesn’t happen by accident. That’s why I used the example. It doesn’t require more than awareness of hunger, and sight. 

The last line of my thing isn’t as clear as I thought, it means that the choice is 2 distinct outcomes of the same process. Not the potentialities before the process (which definitely would be a probability distribution), but the actualities after.

I don’t generally like to formalize like that but I thought it was interesting and maybe someone else would also like it.

On 5/14/2021 at 1:14 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

" Hydraulic driven watches will be able to fool us ( as watch onlookers ) into thinking they have  gear driven internals  only in the sense that it (the Hydraulic watch) will mimic (fake, look as though it were - as seen from the outside) it ( standard gear driven watches ).  We (as watchmakers) will know it does not have gear driven internals  because we will know exactly how it works, i.e.  know that it is Hydraulically driven."

This example was reminiscent of this quip by Albert Einstein, without the hearing of the ticking, or the hope of ever understanding exactly how it works:

In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way to open the case.

1 Like

On 5/14/2021 at 10:14 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

I am open to the idea that some choices, especially important ones core to who you are, will almost certainly always be the same.

Yes, I think if it affects a major value, and only one option is beneficial, you’ll most likely always choose that option, because you see that only one choice leads to what you want or need. But I can imagine a scenario where the value is so trivial that I could easily choose differently given the same exact situation and knowledge and history, etc. Let’s say it were possible to duplicate me right now and both of us faced the option of finishing this sentence before posting, or stopping mid-sent 

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

Yes, I think if it affects a major value, and only one option is beneficial, you’ll most likely always choose that option, because you see that only one choice leads to what you want or need. But I can imagine a scenario where the value is so trivial that I could easily choose differently given the same exact situation and knowledge and history, etc. Let’s say it were possible to duplicate me right now and both of us faced the option of finishing this sentence before posting, or stopping mid-sent 

haha!  Au contraire, your example is not a good one, since from the moment you started to set that joke up, you knew you were very well  “determined” to follow through…   well done though!

Sometimes it’s nice to remember Free will is simply awesome.

1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

you’ll most likely always choose that option, because you see that only one choice leads to what you want or need.

Of course I agree that there are a wide variety of potentials, but why, given your desires and state of mind and context, would you make a different decision? Like anything in reality, there are many potentials, ways that things could be otherwise. But in actuality only one thing happens, only one thing is actualized. Like an acorn that is planted in the appropriate setting, it will grow into a tree. In general, it could fail to grow and die - it could be otherwise. But given the specific context, and if the context is repeated forever in the future, the acorn becomes a tree, and will always become a tree in the identical context. It’s not that the tree is deterministic, where a series of parts move according to billiard ball causality. It’s that the tree has a nature as does the acorn.

Volition, as a process, has different standards, different ways of occurring, different methods are employed for thinking with determinate outcomes. If I think rationally, I get rational results. If I don’t think rationally, I don’t get rational results. If I think rationally, I will never not be thinking rationally at that time. We can say there are many more potentials given volition, but I don’t see why more than one actuality could occur. 

What I want to know is where the decision-making process breaks down where context no longer is what you use to determine the course of action you choose take. Because the way I understand this, you would need to free yourself from all context completely for this to be possible - no one ever makes decisions in a vacuum without a context. What else is there to consider besides thinking methods employed and context? 

 

 

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

Volition, as a process, has different standards {read contexts} , different ways of occurring {read contexts} , different methods {read contexts} are employed for thinking with determinate outcomes.

If volition, as a process,  employs different contexts, . . . :

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

What I want to know is where the decision-making process breaks down where context no longer is what you use to determine the course of action you choose take. Because the way I understand this, you would need to free yourself from all context completely for this to be possible - no one ever makes decisions in a vacuum without a context. What else is there to consider besides thinking methods employed and context?

Why are different standards, different ways of occurring, different methods . . .  not considered as a different contexts?

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

What I want to know is where the decision-making process breaks down where context no longer is what you use to determine the course of action you choose take. Because the way I understand this, you would need to free yourself from all context completely for this to be possible - no one ever makes decisions in a vacuum without a context.

Am I missing something here? Under what context would a prosecuting attorney disregard the rules of evidence while submitting his claim?

. . . what am I missing here?

8 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Why are different standards, different ways of occurring, different methods . . .  not considered as a different contexts?

Different standards of analyzing how something acts according to its nature. Volition is different than acorns. I think you misunderstood me, perhaps thinking that I was talking about how you can employ different standards using volition. I just meant this is a different existent, that’s all. The analysis of potential versus actuality is the same.

10 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Why are different standards, different ways of occurring, different methods . . .  not considered as a different contexts?

The thought experiment was about repeating the same context. You are correct, if a different method was employed, that would be a different context. That’s what I’m trying to get at. As soon as I introduce something that would lead you to make a different choice, I have changed the context. In fact, the very first choice you ever make is itself a method with determinate outcomes - the choice to focus. Each choice after that is another method you choose to employ with determinate outcomes. 

17 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

Am I missing something here? Under what context would a prosecuting attorney disregard the rules of evidence while submitting his claim?

This is a good concretization. If context includes internal and external, and the attorney is applying all the standards they should use, hypothetically repeating this situation infinitely into the future would not lead to different considerations of evidence. The only way it could change is if there was a different context, or some portion of the time the attorney would spontaneously disregard the rules of evidence. 

 

On 5/14/2021 at 8:19 AM, StrictlyLogical said:

Thank you for the question by the way.  Does my answer clear things up for you?

It helps me understand what you’re saying a little better.

On 5/14/2021 at 9:14 PM, dream_weaver said:

“Choosing” to look for food does not strike me as what Rand is referring to when she penned:

that which you call ‘free will’ is your mind’s freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character.

I think we need to pay better attention to this.

31 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

On 5/14/2021 at 7:14 PM, dream_weaver said:

“Choosing” to look for food does not strike me as what Rand is referring to when she penned:

that which you call ‘free will’ is your mind’s freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character.

I think we need to pay better attention to this.

But this is an argument against an aspect of Determinism.

It does not argue against the idea that “choice” is an illusion.

It successfully agues against the aspect of determinism that implies that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

But before any moral aspects are considered, Determinism is an attack on “choice”. The idea that any choice is an illusion.

Determinism also implies that “the capability to choose to think” has antecedents. So it is an attack on “will”, i.e. Everything is an event, nothing is willed.

In a sense it is an attack on “alternatives”. That there are no alternatives, everything is determined.

That all events are a result of antecedent-causes (including “will”). As in, will is determined.