Do animals have volition II?

12 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

13 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

What is the goal of bacterial action? 

Could one say that it wants to survive? Or perhaps it acts like it wants to survive.

Biologists say there are four phases to a bacterium’s life cycle.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzAr4L1Sag4

Within each phase you might say it has a different “goal.” In the lag phase the “goal” is to grow. In log, it’s to multiply. In stationary, to cease growing and multiplying. And in death, to die. So all four phases amount to a bacterium acting toward its ultimate death. It grows so much and multiplies so rapidly that it consumes all the available nutrients, then the environment can no longer sustain its life. It acts like it “wants” to grow as much as possible and then die. Its short-term “goal” is growth, its long-term “goal” is death. If a bacterium “wanted” to live, it would remain small, wouldn’t multiply, and would thus maximize use of the available resources for its one, individual life.

Instead, it appears that the “goal” of bacteria is to consume material and excrete waste as quickly and as efficiently as possible. They’re part of the natural process of breaking down materials for the consumption of plant life, without which animals could not eat and poop.

12 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

How do you determine if a lion is aware? What is the difference with “that problem”?

Yell at it and see if it turns to face you. Basically test one of its sense organs. If it can’t see, hear, smell, taste, or feel you, then it’s probably unconscious, likely dead. We can easily test a lion’s extrospection, because we can provide stimuli to which it either responds or fails to respond. Testing its introspection is more challenging, because we are not inside the lion’s mind, and thus we cannot provide its own mental stimuli to which it responds or not.

13 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

Similarly, how do you determine if a bacteria is not aware?

It must be hard to do, because bacteria are microscopic in size, but I’ve read that they have some simple sensory abilities that you could probably test. 

13 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

If it is aware, did it choose it?

Bacteria don’t have brains, so I’d say no. Its lack of a brain might also exclude it from the realm of potentially conscious (aware) life forms, but I haven’t given that question much thought. It would depend on your definition of “consciousness.”

13 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

Can something be aware, but not able to make any choice?

I believe so. Being aware of a path on the right and a path on the left is different than being aware of a choice to turn right or left. A lion might see both paths but go right involuntarily, automatically responding to the sight or scent of a deer it’s hunting. The cause of it going right or left does not have to be volitional in nature. It might even be random if there is no compelling factor urging the lion one way or another. It needs to move, so it moves. 

13 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

If volition is “focusing”,  then just being aware indicates a defacto level of focus. From this perspective, awareness seems to be a concomitant of volition.

You certainly need to be aware in order to be volitional. But I don’t think you can be volitional without first being aware of a choice. That requires a certain level of introspection, where you are aware of your ability to choose between alternatives. Focusing comes before volition. It is a prerequisite of choice. First you must focus, which comes automatically in response to stimuli, then you can be aware of a choice to change your focus, narrowing or broadening it to this or that level of perception.

14 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

In other words, that which is aware, has chosen to be aware.

You don’t choose to be aware. Awareness is axiomatic. You choose to direct your awareness.

http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Jetton/Scope_of_Volition.shtml

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@merjet

From Scope of Volition, regarding free will as the choice that controls all the choices…

She gave no support for the assertion, nor is it supportable.  It is too narrow, contradictory, and the choice to think does not control or determine what or how one subsequently thinks.

This is extracted from page 161 of For The New Intellectual

Somewhere in the distant reaches of his childhood, when his own understanding of reality clashed with the assertions of others, with their arbitrary orders and contradictory demands, he gave in…

In the section regarding children from the Scope of Volition, it was stated that it is well past two before they become self-conscious.

Would it be a fair assessment that the birth of a mystic is the beginning of an abdication of the choice of remaining independent? How distant a reach into childhood might this have been?

 * * *

I recollect being tucked into bed one night by my mother when I was about four. The sermon at church had to have been about accepting Jesus into one’s heart to be saved, for that was the essence of my prayer that night. 

When I got done, my mother had begun to cry and left the room calling for my father. I remember deciding there was something that needed to be understood about that moment that did not come until years later. At that time, I associated tears with being hurt. It wasn’t until much later I recollected that incident and connected it to her being so overjoyed that she cried. At the time my decision served as a mental defense not realized until well into my twenties.

The following is from a presentation of the Rand/Branden model of free will, by Onkar Ghate in the Blackwell A Companion to Ayn Rand.

“Rand rejects any theory of volition that roots free will in a choice between particular items of mental content: whether to walk or ride the bus to work (selection between envisioned physical actions); whether to order the vanilla cheesecake because one is hungry or the bowl of mixed berries because one is on a diet (selection between desires or motives that will govern one’s physical actions); whether to admire Mother Teresa or Bill Gates (selection of values); whether to accept the psychological theories of Freud or of cognitive psychologists (selection of ideas). For Rand, all such matters are secondary and derivative: at root, free will is the power to activate one’s conceptual faculty and direct its processing or not. ‘All life entails and exhibits self-regulated action’, writes Branden in presenting Rand’s theory.”

Quote

but in man the principle of self-regulation reaches its highest expression: man has the power to regulate the action of his own consciousness. Man has the power to exercise his rational faculty—or to suspend it. It is this choice that is a causal primary. (“The Objectivist Concept of Free Will versus the Traditional Concepts” TON 3(1), 3)

“An individual becomes both capable and aware of his power of conscious self-regulation as his mind develops. ‘It must be stressed’, Branden writes, ‘that volition pertains, specifically, to the conceptual level of awareness. A child encounters the need of cognitive self-regulation when and as he begins to think, . . . to reason explicitly. . . .” (“The Objectivist Theory of Volition” TO 5(1), 23)

Rand and Aristotle remarked that higher animals are able to perceive more in sensory perception and to remember more than are lower animals. In modern psychology, the development of perceptual and memorial competencies in childhood has been greatly illuminated. I’d add to the Rand/Branden idea that the human conscious self-regulation emergences with the onset of conceptual abilities in children, add that: self-regulation of memory is also critical for the distinctly human abilities. “Remember this” we say to ourselves. Since the invention of sticky pads, I riddle my books with little strips of them.

“The choice to ‘think or not’ is not man’s only choice, according to Rand: it is his primary choice. This choice sets a mind’s regulating goal. Sub-choices then arise to the extent that there is such a goal, and are the means of implementing it.”

Quote

The primary choice to focus, to set one’s mind to the purpose of cognitive integration . . . is the highest regulator in the mental system; it is subject to man’s direct, volitional control. In relation to it, all other choices and decisions are sub-regulators. (TO 5(2), 23)

 

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This but unironically

 

 

 

 

 

had to look it up. Can you elaborate?

Aquinas and the Ladder of Being

Copied from: Aquinas and the Ladder of Being – Discourses on Minerva - <https://minervawisdom.com/2019/04/16/aquinas-and-the-ladder-of-being/>

9 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

It might even be random if there is no compelling factor urging the lion one way or another. It needs to move, so it moves. 

One thing that we can be sure of is that nothing acts randomly. You can say randomly as if you have no idea, but no animal or anything in existence acts truly randomly. Turning right is not involuntary, the whole point about locomotion is that it requires control. You can actually cut the spine of a cat in a specific surgical way and it’s legs can move automatically without being even connected to the brain. This has been done before, the cat could walk on a treadmill. That would be involuntary and automatic in the truest sense. Yet this ability is not at all adaptive. You can’t simply set the muscles in motion and everything is okay or partially functional. It can’t turn left or right. 

An animal needs to move because something compels it to move. Food, water, attention, things like that. It’s easy to observe. Vertebrates have pretty complex movements. Those complex movements are not really possible without some voluntary control. Some kind of selection about ways to move and seek out things in the world. The more you observe of animals, the easier it is to see. So when you put the 2 together, volition is the kind of attribute that explains complex movement while also explaining that awareness has a function for at least vertebrates. Jellyfish and things like that are at the borderline, so I’m leaving that out of the discussion.

5 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

In the section regarding children from the Scope of Volition, it was stated that it is well past two before they become self-conscious.

It’s not really true. I mean, many people used to think that. But now plenty of scientists really believe that toddlers and babies are aware of themselves to some extent and capable of deliberately seeking goals that they want. Self-conscious it almost impossible to measure, using mirrors is not enough. It’s not enough to ask their name. You have to watch what they do. Children explore in such a way that they are figuring things out not simply responding to stimuli. Of course there is complex analysis that scientists do, about how capable they really are, or to what extent they need language to develop further. If you tie the foot of a one-year-old up to a mobile above their bed, the baby will learn that kicking their foot will make the mobile move. I don’t off hand remember the details of the experiment (there was a control group), the point is that the baby would kick without needing an external reward and made a causal connection between foot and mobile. 

 

2 hours ago, 2046 said:

This but unironically

For those needing a bit more context, this may help:

Three Scales Of Intellect Connecting Earth With The Abode Of God.

Ramon Llull (1232-1316)

23 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

[P]lenty of scientists really believe that toddlers and babies are aware of themselves to some extent and capable of deliberately seeking goals that they want. Self-conscious it almost impossible to measure, using mirrors is not enough. It’s not enough to ask their name. You have to watch what they do. Children explore in such a way that they are figuring things out not simply responding to stimuli.

I was essentially content with:

The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has—and this is his birth as a human being.

If anything, I would be curious at what age might the implicit self-conscious described become explicit in conceptual form.

11 hours ago, Eiuol said:

One thing that we can be sure of is that nothing acts randomly. You can say randomly as if you have no idea, but no animal or anything in existence acts truly randomly.

Random in the sense that the lion might have gone left or right. The path he took was not determined by the factors compelling him to move. Let’s say he was thirsty after waiting out a storm under some rock. He leaves in search of a puddle and comes to the junction. It’s a new area, so he doesn’t know where the puddles might be. He happens to be stepping toward the path on the right when he reaches the junction, so he continues in that direction. Now he’s on the path to the right, but he didn’t choose that path over the other one. It was where his roaming for water took him. 

15 hours ago, dream_weaver said:

I was essentially content with:

The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has—and this is his birth as a human being.

If anything, I would be curious at what age might the implicit self-conscious described become explicit in conceptual form.

That line from Galt’s Speech is within a paragraph sketching human cognitive development from infancy.

“The birth of [a baby’s] mind is the day when he grasps that the streak that keeps flickering past him is his mother and the whirl beyond her is the curtain, that the two are solid entities and neither can turn into the other, that they are what they are, that they exist. The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has—and this is his birth as a human being. . . . The [later] day when he grasps . . . [that] his mind must discover the nature, the causes, the full context of his sensory material, his mind must identify the things that he perceives—that is the the day of his birth as a thinker and scientist.” (1957, 1041)

Rand wrote further: “The pre-conceptual level of consciousness is nonvolitional; volition begins with the first syllogism” (1961, 15). At times Rand seems to have used syllogism in a super-broad, rather emblematic way to mean simply any logical inference, deductive or inductive. (The first definition of syllogism in my American Heritage Dictionary is as in any elementary logic text. The second definition is: “Reasoning from the general to the specific; deduction.” The definitions are very like these in my Webster’s Unabridged. Pellegrin points out that at 92a28 of Post An. “the term syllogism is taken in a broad and non-technical sense” (2010, 131n15).) I rather think volitional thinking, with action- and image-schemata, is in the repertoire before attaining first uttered word (at about one year), which word is co-referential and incorporated into schemata (and later into sentences).

As for the 1957 statement, I’d say that coming a day of realizing that matter has no volition and that oneself does have volition is not distinctively human; rather, it is shared with higher animals. By the time I realized my teddy bear was not volitional and that me and my puppy were, my puppy also had realized that, pretty sure.

In that 1957 sentence, I doubt Rand was thinking of that dawning of volition as the volition at hand in free will. With development of the Rand/Branden formulation of the Objectivist conception of free will in the early 1960s, as we have seen, the crucial ability is self-regulation of one’s explicit conceptual consciousness, including setting the general aim of attaining truth. Surely that ability arises before ability to make inferences. I wonder if it might be developing as one is learning explicit rules of grammar—for speaking and writing—expressly learning to follow them. That is an extensive self-regulation closely related, I imagine, to self-regulation of conceptual consciousness. On the learning and teaching of grammar from ages 5 to 7, there is this.

_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _

Lennox, J. G., and R. Bolton, editors, 2010. Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle – Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf. Cambridge.

Pellegrin, P. 2010. Definition in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. In Lennox and Bolton 2010.

Rand, A. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House.

——. 1961. For the New Intellectual. Signet.

1 minute ago, Boydstun said:

As for the 1957 statement, I’d say that coming a day of realizing that matter has no volition and that oneself does have volition is not distinctively human; rather, it is shared with higher animals. By the time I realized my teddy bear was not volitional and that me and my puppy were, my puppy also had realized that, pretty sure.

Coming to conceptually realize that you have the capacity of volition was not a condition of your being able to exhibit volition.  Many higher animals exhibit it without knowing anything about it conceptually speaking.

4 hours ago, Boydstun said:

. . .

As for the 1957 statement, I’d say that coming a day of realizing that matter has no volition and that oneself does have volition is not distinctively human; rather, it is shared with higher animals. By the time I realized my teddy bear was not volitional and that me and my puppy were, my puppy also had realized that, pretty sure.

In that 1957 sentence, I doubt Rand was thinking of that dawning of volition as the volition at hand in free will. . . .

 

4 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Coming to conceptually realize that you have the capacity of volition was not a condition of your being able to exhibit volition.  Many higher animals exhibit it without knowing anything about it conceptually speaking.

SL, yes. However, in Rand’s 1957 paragraph shown in the preceding post, she was presenting things in chronological order of human development. The sentence “The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he realizes that he has—and this is the day of his birth as a human being” is at an early stage of development. It is not about mere exercise, but realization, recognition. And it is not plausibly, in context, about volition as free will. It is about a more primitive sort of volition and recognition of it, as when I recognize that my live puppy has volition and my teddy bear does not. It is a necessary step along the way of developing free volition and recognition of free volition later on. Rand was simply getting unnecessarily crossed up by wording of this sentence as it is located in the unfolding of development in the unfolding of the paragraph. It’s fine to speak of “volition” sometimes while not meaning “free volition” or “free will”. But in this sentence, in it’s paragraph sequence, she is speaking of a more primitive volition and recognition of that volition that I and my puppy shared at that stage, and she should not have got in a hurry and telescoped the eventual distinctively human volition (free volition) and its recognition into toddlerhood by taking the toddler recognition as distinctively human.

Objectivist model of free will got more consistent and further developed when Rand and Branden thought on it further and wrote about it in their non-fiction of the early 1960’s.

 

8 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

Now he’s on the path to the right, but he didn’t choose that path over the other one. It was where his roaming for water took him. 

That would be incidentally or accidentally. But if there really are two paths, there is some kind of selection in order to achieve drinking water. If the lion is trying to get to the lake and goes along the left path because that happens to be on the way to the lake, he is still looking at the environment and making some kind of choice. Even more importantly, we know he would change course as the circumstances change. Incidental or accidental would be more like a lion stepping on a dry leaf. 

On 5/10/2021 at 4:42 PM, Boydstun said:

 

SL, yes. However, in Rand’s 1957 paragraph shown in the preceding post, she was presenting things in chronological order of human development. The sentence “The day when he grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he realizes that he has—and this is the day of his birth as a human being” is at an early stage of development. It is not about mere exercise, but realization, recognition. And it is not plausibly, in context, about volition as free will. It is about a more primitive sort of volition and recognition of it, as when I recognize that my live puppy has volition and my teddy bear does not. It is a necessary step along the way of developing free volition and recognition of free volition later on. Rand was simply getting unnecessarily crossed up by wording of this sentence as it is located in the unfolding of development in the unfolding of the paragraph. It’s fine to speak of “volition” sometimes while not meaning “free volition” or “free will”. But in this sentence, in it’s paragraph sequence, she is speaking of a more primitive volition and recognition of that volition that I and my puppy shared at that stage, and she should not have got in a hurry and telescoped the eventual distinctively human volition (free volition) and its recognition into toddlerhood by taking the toddler recognition as distinctively human.

Objectivist model of free will got more consistent and further developed when Rand and Branden thought on it further and wrote about it in their non-fiction of the early 1960’s.

 

On a related subject, what are your thoughts on this question:

/t/26153

 

A worthwhile set of schematics to think with, I’d say, SL, at least to get started. I notice that internally, there are random processes that affect a human life in a deterministic way, such as the appearance of a cell mutation (truly random at first cell alteration) we call cancer. It could deterministically become, say, non-Hodgkins lymphoma. In the particular case of person having it, though in advance of therapies, we might say it’s a matter of chance whether the therapy will be effective in this case; that is just our ignorance, and when the particular outcome eventuates—say death from the cancer—we sensibly say that this outcome was a matter of objective, determined fact from the time the therapy had begun. With the same stage of cancer and the same age of life when the therapy would begin, different patients would make different yes-no choices over whether to undertake the therapy. Each patient could weigh all sorts of common and uncommon factors in coming to a decision. It might become clear enough to a patient which way she should go, or she might end very unsure and decide to let a coin-flip decide which way. But I’d say each person of mature sound mind freely comes to their decision.

One thing that seems key in my current thinking about this is that alternatives as alternatives on what to do are not something merely out in the world without their being an agent confronting the world. The thinking agent is able to generate alternatives, and though they are drafted over what all is in the world, the more powerful at generation, the more free is the agent in the sense of having organized outputs more distant from, more deliberately organized than, immediate-emergency fight or flight response (I’ll pose the latter for William O’s deterministic case). And so long as the thinking agent’s conscious, purposive control system has been in the overall control, greater freedom seems also to go with greater distance from random acts, or anyway acts without large purpose, such as acts of someone who has lost their mind (which I’ll pose for William O’s randomness case).

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19 minutes ago, Boydstun said:

A worthwhile set of schematics to think with, I’d say, SL, at least to get started. I notice that internally, there are random processes that affect a human life in a deterministic way, such as the appearance of a cell mutation (truly random at first cell alteration) we call cancer. It could deterministically become, say, non-Hodgkins lymphoma. In the particular case of person having it, though in advance of therapies, we might say it’s a matter of chance whether the therapy will be effective in this case; that is just our ignorance, and when the particular outcome eventuates—say death from the cancer—we sensibly say that this outcome was a matter of objective, determined fact from the time the therapy had begun. With the same stage of cancer and the same age of life when the therapy would begin, different patients would make different yes-no choices over whether to undertake the therapy. Each patient could weigh all sorts of common and uncommon factors in coming to a decision. It might become clear enough to a patient which way she should go, or she might end very unsure and decide to let a coin-flip decide which way. But I’d say each person of mature sound mind freely comes to their decision.

One thing that seems key in my current thinking about this is that alternatives as alternatives on what to do are not something merely out in the world without their being an agent confronting the world. The thinking agent is able to generate alternatives, and though they are drafted over what all is in the world, the more powerful at generation, the more free is the agent in the sense of having organized outputs more distant from, more deliberately organized than, immediate-emergency fight or flight response (I’ll pose the latter for William O’s deterministic case). And so long as the thinking agent’s conscious, purposive control system has been in the overall control, greater freedom seems also to go with greater distance from random acts, or anyway acts without large purpose, such as acts of someone who has lost their mind (which I’ll pose for William O’s randomness case).

The division between internal and external may be illusory, but with respect to the discussion about free will they are primarily meant as providing some locus to encourage some focusing on what one would defines as free will (structure and process). 

The locus of the process is meant to distill how fundamentally that process works, and although determinism (classical) and random (quantum) processes were specifically shown, real systems and hence real processes can be combinations of these processes.  The upshot, is that a combined process can involve randomness, unlike a deterministic process. Free will was presented as a separate process for consideration.

So the circle is not the body, but a line circumscribing what is internal versus external to the process, and being, of a free will (wherever and however manifest). The deterministic effects on the body, therefore are external factors (and knowledge of it are inputs) to the locus of free will as a process of some natural structure (ie the relevant subset thereof).  The circle although arbitrary, does help because there is no need to quibble about what really is inside versus outside, only that if such a faculty exists it has identity, if we include too much into that identity, i.e. that which has no relevant causative effect, then it can lie there ineffectual.

In your cancer example, you conclude with “freely comes to a decision”.  For argument’s sake, I’d note that the defining aspect of that “freedom” is the ability to have chosen otherwise, not merely that the complex system came to an independent decision  in a certain way based on certain abilities to construct alternatives.

With respect to your discussion about alternatives, I am sympathetic to your identification of the sophistication of the choice giving rise to what we see as wider possibilities or possibilities more nuanced or effective… this goes IMHO to the quality of the choice, to the productive capacity of the will, and not specifically to its being free or not. 

One could imagine a complex and sufficiently effective Watson or other system, making “purposive” decisions and creating by trial and error or by some neural network, possible outcomes and scenarios and testing them… all in a deterministic manner (including so called random number generation determined from something like ambient temperature).  Such would generate and determine choices… eventually, a single choice, but without any freedom at all.  In fact the wider the system, the greater its capacity and the more information it houses or has access to, perhaps the more determined the single “maximal” or optimal choice becomes… ignorance might have lead to more unique choices…

In systems in which a free will IS operating, I agree that the cognitive apparatus supporting that locus has an effect on the sophistication and creativity in the final choice made, and can and do take it in a different direction from what a primitive cognitive system might choose… and yes a simple system or a complex one in fight or flight contexts (which adapt to become a simple one…) probably do drive the free will process towards a simple random process.

 

In the end I find the “free” in free will to be more interesting and glossed over, than the “will” in free will, and trying to determine just what we mean is incredibly important.

 

I have heard many arguments purportedly proving free will exists, and others purportedly proving free will does not exist, all the while without enough of an explanation of what the person MEANS by free will.  Saying one does not understand how or why free will exists, is not the same as and in no way is a valid excuse for, not knowing what one means by “free will” when one apparently has all the confidence in the world to claim proofs about it.

Until a philosopher can distill just what would qualify, at a high level, as a process with some amount of free will he has no means of determining whether anything, human or artificial, exhibits it. 

I have tried to circumscribe the minimum abstract physical requirements I have for free will (sophisticated or not), not necessarily the ultimate requirements for it.  So far, I do not see any reason why it could not be composed of a combination of deterministic (classical) and random (quantum) processes, however, I do not believe it possible to be composed entirely of deterministic processes.

 

SL,

Pages 107-12 of Onkar Ghate’s chapter “A Being of Self-Made Soul” sets out really well the Objectivist concept of free will, if you should ever like to get hold of the Blackwell book A Companion to Ayn Rand (2016) containing this contribution. The Objectivists take free will to be “the power to select among alternatives, with no particular selection necessitated by antecedent factors. Rand’s theory of free will, therefore, is a version of self-determination.” The geological earth is not a self-determining system. A forest fire or candle flame are not self-determining systems. Life and perhaps certain non-living machines invented by intelligent life can be self-determining systems, that is, systems organized with needs and powers for active self-maintenance of the system it is. Then, with that understanding as the proper context of application, we could define free will as a self-determination in which there is power to select among alternatives, with no particular selection necessitated by antecedent factors.

Antecedent factors, internal antecedent factors, at what time before the instant of choice? If the event that is choice itself occurs over a tenth of a second, for example, it could remain an empirical question, it seems to me, how much contingency (159-62), thence continuing possible freedom in the choice there remains at half a second before the choice, three seconds before the choice, and so forth.