So here is a problem I have been having in thinking about the concept man
We don’t distinguish measurements to consider something as existing within a concept, we go by basic characteristics.
What puts someone into the concept man is their rational faculty, or the fact that they are a being with the ability to act rationally
Those units within the concept man have a basic identity that they share: in order to exist as man, in order to use their rational faculty, they must be left alone, free from force
This gives them rights – rights mean to respect that basic identity of the concept
There are units within the concept that, while possessing the characteristics of the other units (which is why they are in that concept) possess those characteristics to such a diminished degree as to almost make those characteristics unnoticeable
Consider a severely mentally retarded person. He possesses the characteristics, but doesn’t actually undertake any of the same actions as the other units do; ie he cant make choices using his rational faculty and act on them to sustain his life, which is why the other units have rights.
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Why would such a person not simply be considered as a different concept that does not merit rights?
I understand that he still shares a basic identity with other units so that he can be grouped under the concept man, but as far as considering the purposes for conceptualizing man, which could be said to be, at least in one instance, “in order to know how to interact with such a unit when we encounter it,” a mentally retarded person simply doesn’t fit the mould.
I’ll actually give this one a shot, after thinking about it for a few minutes, and tell me whether or not it makes sense.
What are we talking about when we talk about man having rights? We are talking about beings with a rational faculty. All men have one, but not all men use it, and all men who do use it, use it to varying degrees. It is primarily the rational faculty that merits one designation under the concept man, but if we were to go and evaluate each man’s rational faculty abilities in order to grant rights – something that applies to the concept as a whole–, we would have to evaluate each man on a case-by-case basis – we would have to destroy the wider concept of man, and face the problem of concretizing, regarding each man as his own concrete, since we disregarded the basic characteristic that connects all men. But to do so would take away our ability to abstract, to conceptualize – concretizing is what animals do. It is epistemological suicide.
Although the need for rights arises out of the fact that men need freedom to act on their rational judgement, rights must be applied to all men regardless of whether or not they have the ability to exercise them. If you were to do away with rights for the mentally handicapped (or mentally incapacitated temporarily) what would stop evil men from exploiting them? Furthermore, just because one’s capacity for reasoning may be severely limited that does not mean that it is eliminated which, granting the basic premise, means that there is no basis for depriving their rights. Within his severely limited abilities, he must be free to decide his own path. In cases where his mind is inadequate, there is a third party (usually a relative or charitable organization) to act on his behalf. However such cases are the exception and cannot be made the basis for any principle.