Interesting. I’d like to take a look at your work. What are some of your publications?
Sure. But since you appear to be incapable of understanding a simple post on a message board, I don’t expect that you’ll be able to understand a higher level article (and one with so many pages!) in an anthology of articles on grammar and linguistics. Besides, I hate to see you spend your hard-earned money on yet another book that you won’t read.
I see, so does that mean that when you said “from the standpoint of propositional logic, it makes no difference how we phrase something grammatically”, you were lying, you hadn’t thought about what you wrote, you made an error – or have we learned that ‘no difference’ means ‘some difference’? Just curious.
No. It just means that when writing for twits, I normally don’t see the need to dot all the I’s and cross all the T’s. Obviously, you’re a high-functioning, fastidious twit, so I shall certainly keep that in mind.
Yup, those are other examples – sorry that I mistook you for a foreigner.
Quite all right. I pegged you for a native-speaking Objectivist right away.
It’s not unusual for high-functioning non-native speakers of English to be mistaken about the kinds of complementizers a verb takes, and since prove, clarify etc do take that-complements, it’s not an unusual form of rationalism for them to make the error of analogizing disprove, obscure and think that then take that-clauses rather than NP-that clauses.
Well, lookie that! You talk the talk! Almost as if you’re an academic linguist! Unfortunately for you and your non-argument, grammatical is as grammatical does. Since people in fact use “that complements” with both “prove” and “disprove” (as well as with “like” and “dislike”) that, by definition, makes the construction grammatical. Never heard “obscure” used that way, though. Would you source that for me? Thanks!
Perhaps, but ungrammatical is ungrammatical.
True. And legalistic is legalistic. Now that you’ve established yet again that A is A, and I’ve established yet again that no solecism has occurred, what, pray tell, is your point, and what, except your arbitrary whim, establishes that a solecism has occurred?
Legally speaking, it is also wrong.
I knew there was an assertion somewhere in your argument!
You grant that supposed god is everywhere all at once (ominipresent, ubiquitous)
So far, so good.
but then deny that this means “without limit”.
Splendid.
Your argument is based on the trivial straw argument that “everywhere” doesn’t mean “without limit”.
I admire your question-begging; please count me as one of your warmest detractors. Whether or not the undisputed FACT that “everywhere” does not mean “without limit” is trivial is what’s at issue. Since you admit that “everywhere” does not mean “without limit”, I think any intellectually honest person would find that to be relevant – especially since Seeker’s claim of self-contradiction turns on it.
That would be relevant if he had claimed that everywhere means without limit, but I don’t find that claim anywhere except in your argument.
(Ahem)
“By contrast, the JudeoChristian god is supposedly omniscient, omnipotent, and everywhere all at once, i.e. is without limit …” [posted by Seeker]
Try reading the post.
Being everywhere means being everywhere without limit. That is what everywhere means – no limits on the where.
Not so. It means no limits on the “every.” I suggest you do the unthinkable: get a dictionary and look the word up. There’s no mention of “without limit.”
Your next argument also falls apart but might be resurrected by a bit of leglism on your part – “Gravity is ubiquitous and has an identity”. Gravity depends on entities,
Gravity depends on space. Whether or not gravity exists apart from matter has yet to be proven. Gravity waves have been detected and String Theory makes use of gravity quanta.
since it is a relationship between two things. Gravity is not an independent entity.
This is true only in Objectivist textbooks on physics (and we all know what bestsellers they are). I don’t know of any working, publishing physicist who has made that claim. You don’t mind sourcing that, do you? Thanks!
Outside of the imaginary bounding box that encloses all entities in the universe,
I’m glad that lack of factual knowledge doesn’t restrain you from making breezy generalizations. I’m fascinated with your certainty about things for which you have zero evidence. An “imaginary” bounding box? Do tell us how you know it’s imaginary?
there are no entities (that should be self-evident), and therefore no gravitational force. Thus the extent of the gravitational forms is finite and limited
(Applause! Encore! Bravo! Bis! Bis!) This reminds me of arguments from knee-jerk Darwinian evolutionists about the putative “proto-life” forms that “surely must have existed” in some “warm little pond” billions of years ago. Whether billions of years ago on Earth, or billions of light-years away from Earth, I guess anything goes – any “just so” story will do – if one isn’t constrained by facts and is merely interested in ways to prop up a philosophy.
In case you were wondering, I enjoyed your little story very much.
Your claim that modern physics dismisses sensory evidence as either irrelevant or at best misleading is false, unsupported, irrelevant and at best misleading. It is well known that physicists depend each day on sensory evidence to support their conjectures about the universe. Modern physics does not, as you wrongly assert, intentionally construct models at variance with sensory evidence, in fact that is a scientifically meaningless claim – a scientific model can’t be at variance with a fact.
Then you have a quaint naïve-realist view of scientific models. Nothing wrong with that except that such a view was dropped in the 19th century and we are now in the 21st. As I’ve already explained in an earlier post, scientific models are constructed all the time at variance with observed fact. In fact, that’s the essence of most scientific models (the interesting ones, at any rate).
It is not true that a Karl Popper wrote that science proceeds by proving that certain phenomena that the current hypothesis lead you to expect to occur cannot occur.
He says so, both in Logic of Scientific Discovery and Conjectures and Refutations. You haven’t read enough Popper. (You’ve probably only read some sort of summary of his ideas written by various Objectivists – no wonder you’re wrong.)
In fact, you might read it again and see that this is close to the opposite of what he claims.
Sure. I have his books right in front of me. Why don’t you tell me which book, specifically, to “read again.” (Chapter titles would be helpful, too, since you appear extremely well acquainted with his work.)
His position is that one can only proved a specific instantiation to be false, so if your model predicts a certain particle at a certain time and place, and the particle is not observed, then the prediction is false. Popperian epistemology hold that one can only know that a singular statement is true or false, and it would be forbidden metaphysics to conclude that a phenomenon cannot occur. Of course he is wrong, but that’s another matter.
Alas, that isn’t what he says, and he rarely mentions metaphysics. He makes the perfectly legitimate claim that we can never prove that “All X is Y” from individual experiments. There is, in fact, no such thing as inductive logic; only deductive. (Older logicians, such as Richard Whately, viewed induction as a species of argument-from-analogy and properly placed it in the field of rhetoric, not logic. I have Whately’s treatises on logic and rhetoric, too, so you are certainly welcome to tell me which chapter to “read again” to prove that I’m wrong.) Popper claims that we can hypothesize that “All X is Y” because – as you have already shown us in your arguments above – there’s no limit to what we can imagine and fantasize about; and we can then test this hypothesis by means of experiments that attempt to refute it. We only need to find a single instance in which X is not Y to question, amend, or discard the hypothesis. Furthermore, he claims that knowledge progresses when new models not only make predictions of phenomena otherwise unknown to the earlier model, but also when they demonstrate that certain phenomena predicted by the older model (predicted but not yet observed) will NOT occur.
Falsification is thus the gravamen of demarcation, dividing “scientific truths” from “non-scientific truths.” This in no way invalidates those other truths; it means simply that they are not derived scientifically (in contradistinction to Popper’s early colleagues from the Vienna Circle who believed that truths were either scientific or they simply were not truths at all).
Of course, Popper is correct, but that’s another matter for another forum.