The difference is one of consent and legitimacy. Yes, in the grand sense, someone somewhere must have the guns to enforce your rights, but when a government exists, the group with the guns (properly) is an organization which has the consent of its citizens and the assured firepower to back it up. That is not the same as having the consent of of one’s paying customers and the hope that your gang is more powerful than the other gang.
If we both agree that all government exists by the consent of the governed, then it’s difficult to see the force of this argument, since the criticisms apply equally to limited government, monarchy, dictatorship, tribal rule, and anything else. The bit about “hoping” is the same, since under limited government one would equally have to “hope” one’s Objectivist gang is more powerful (I’m assuming “more powerful” means “having more popular support”) than say, communists, or that in a monarchy, one would have to hope liberal forces had more support than, say, theocratic ones, etc. Since we agree that government rests on the consent of the governed, and since there is no such thing as a “self-enforcing rule,” then there is no system on God’s green earth that can get around the problem of “guaranteeing” everyone will follow the law. The best system is not one that eliminates such a problem, since no system can eliminate it, but one that does the best job of providing its constituent agents with an incentive to resolve their disputes 1) peacefully, and 2) in a manner consistent with individual rights, then differentiating between the best incentive structure, markets or governments. And again I think a perfectly reasonable case that markets would have a better constitutional structure for securing those two things, can be made.
I am sure you are aware of Rand’s argument for voluntary taxation. As long as the state isn’t initating coercion, the population is not “captive.”
Of course I am familiar with Rand’s position that her type of limited government would not necessarily have to rely on taxation. I have written before that I do not regard her case as necessarily one that I agree with, but I think it can be modified in such a way that we can picture a minarchic regime that does not tax. Whether this type of regime would work or not, it has nothing to do with whether or not the customer base is captive.
First, insofar as the government is a coercive monopoly, it compels everyone to come to it for justice, and it is in this manner that the customer base is “captive,” since it faces no competition.
But secondly, I suggest that not even the “no taxation necessary” argument works out because a minarchic state would still have to engage in activities that are the moral and economic equivalent of taxation. The US. Postal Service likes to brag that it is not funded by taxes, and this is true, but it remains a coercive monopoly, since competition in the field of first-class mail delivery is illegal. Because of the knowledge and incentive problems notoriously associated with monopolies, the Postal Service inevitably costs its customers more both in actual fees and in quality-related opportunity costs than would a free market in mail delivery. This differential cost may not technically be a direct tax (a “seen,”) but the respects in which it differs from a tax seem neither morally nor economically significant. We may call it a de facto tax (an “unseen.”) A monopolistic legal system will necessarily be engaged in de facto taxation for precisely the same reasons. Hence the taxation-based objection to minarchy essentially stands.
The only reason an individual would not want to be a part of a proper state is if he desired to be injust, in which case, coercion of such an individual would be proper.
This has to be one of the most… just plain silly arguments Objectivists ever offer up against a free market legal system. This reminds me of one of the anecdotes about anarchist Roy Childs debating Objectivist Jeffrey St. John [emphasis mine]:
At a libertarian conference held in New York in early 1971, Roy [Childs] debated Jeffrey St. John on free-market anarchism (or as it was called then, “anarcho-capitalism”) vs. limited government. SIL, one of the sponsors of the conference, recorded the debate and made the tape available the following September. When Kephart purchased SIL’s book service, he acquired rights to the tape and included it as part of his Audio Forum enterprise.
St. John was known in Objectivist circles from a couple of articles he had published in The Objectivist, an honor not many outside Rand’s immediate circle ever enjoyed. Limited-state libertarians had good reason to expect much from him and to hope that he would refute the noxious arguments of anarchism. They were to be greatly disappointed.
St. John evinced a familiarity with [the writings of Childs] but never once in the debate did he actually address Roy’s arguments. I do not mean that in my opinion he failed to refute them; I mean literally that he did not address them. When, during the question period, he was called on to attempt to refute the logic of Roy’s argument, he could assert only that under a Randian limited government there would be no cause for anyone to become dissatisfied with the defense services of the government, and therefore there would be no need for competing defense agencies even to exist; hence no competing agency would come to the attention of the government; hence government would never have to make the choice that Roy had argued would make it a violator of rights.
Why, there could just be no reason for anyone to be disatisfied with the government’s service and want to purchase from someone else. Anyone who wants that is clearly an evildoer with malign intentions!
I’m sorry, but this argument is rather unconvincing. Apart from being just a glaring non sequitur, there is the “seen” and “unseen” point about costs and opportunity costs made above. The production of security and law is not, as Gustave de Molinari pointed out in the 19th century, somehow magically exempt from the laws of economics. “Either this is logical and true, or else the principles on which economic science are based are invalid.” Security is not one “lump,” but can be produced in marginal units at varying efficiency. There are as many reasons to both compete with and purchase from someone other than the single monopolist government as there are for competing with and purchasing from anyone else in any other enterprise.
I agree with much of what you say in that Objectivists often sell an-caps short. However, right here is a perfect example of anarchist rationalization. Every argument against the gang warfare scenario is just smoke and mirrors which pushes the the conclusion behind a series of excuses. First, who’s to say that “private security firms” won’t just form their own de facto monopolies in given areas and coercively tax their own citizens (ie. a force a protection racket).
Again, I’ve already answered this type of objection over and over. There is nothing to say that can’t happen. There is nothing to say a government can’t coercively tax their own citizens. There is nothing to say a private defense firm won’t suddenly declare being a redhead to be punishable by death. There is nothing to say that a government won’t declare being a Jew punishable by death. Any such criticism applies equally, if not moreso, to governments.
There is this idea of a government as “self-enforcing” rules that are imposed on society from without. But in fact the law exists only insofar as they are continually maintained in existence by human agents acting in certain systematic ways. A law is not some impersonal, miraculously self-enforcing robot. It’s an ongoing pattern of behavior, and it persists only so long as human agents continue to conform to that pattern in their actions. Therefore no one and nothing can “guarantee” anything like the above will or won’t happen, we can only point to a political structure that provides the best incentives for it not to happen, and I think again, that having a single coercive monopoly makes it easier and more likely that a statist conception of justice can be enforced, since costs can be externalized and insulated from competition.