You confuse throwing out a bunch of unsupported assertions with an argument. You have not shown how competing police agencies could provide an objective restraint on the use of force. (Which is understandable, since they can’t.) You’ve just blurted out the absurd contention that somehow they can.
Well, you never asked me. Despite your somewhat uncivilized tone, we could’ve had a great point of exchange on polycentric legal systems if you were interested. It’s funny how Objectivists suddenly turn into a pure deductivists who resort to various arguments in the attempt to show how a free market legal order is somehow a priori impossible, but not once has any Objectivist scholar (that I know of anyway) has ever engaged the vast literature out there right now on examples of polycentric legal systems. Nope, then any such scholars or papers are persona non grata, they don’t even get mentioned. In fact, Dennis Hardin exclaims that his position is simply obvious and no sane person must dispute it, engaging with the empirical record is a “waste of time.” This is akin to Galileo’s inquisitors refusing to look into the telescope because they just knew, a priori, that the Ptolemaic theory must be true. It’s a waste of time! If our critics wish to challenge our interpretation of the historical evidence, they are free to do so; discussion and debate on that front would be most welcome. But once we have offered our historical evidence, it is essentially an admission of defeat for the other side to go on repeating their old deductivist arguments without responding to the evidence.
Here’s a good start for you:
Bruce Benson - The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State
Pacific Research Institute, 1990
Fred Foldvary - Public Goods and Private Communities:
The Market Provision of Social Services
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994
Robert C. Ellickson - Order Without Law : How Neighbors Settle Disputes
Harvard University Press, 1994
Bruce Benson - To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice
New York University Press, 1998
David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, Alexander Tabarrok (ed.) -
The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society
University of Michigan Press / Independent Institute, 2002
Hans Hermann-Hoppe (ed.) - The Myth of National Defense
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003
Gustave de Molinari - The Production of Security (pdf)
Journal des Economistes, 1849
Benjamin R. Tucker - The Bill for Justice: Who Should Pay It?
Liberty, Vol. 9, No. 49, Saturday, March 24, 1894, Whole No. 283
Murray Rothbard - Defense Services on the Free Market
in Power and Market, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1970
David Friedman - Police, Courts, and Laws-on the Market
in The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to A Radical Capitalism, Open Court, 1973 (1989 second edition)
John D. Sneed - Order without Law: Where will Anarchists Keep the Madmen ? (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977
Karl T. Fielding - The Role of Personal Justice in Anarcho-capitalism (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1978
T. L. Anderson & P.J. Hill - An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 3, no. 1, 1979
David Friedman - Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case
Journal of Legal Studies 8, 1979
Murray Rothbard - Pennsylvania’s Anarchist Experiment: 1681-1690
Barranco Galt - Libertarian Ireland
Alfred G. Cuzan - Do we ever really get out of Anarchy? (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1979
Karl T. Fielding - Nonexcludability and Government Financing of Public Goods (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1979
George H. Smith - Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1979
Charles J. King - A Rationale for Punishment (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1980
Murray Rothbard - Law, Property, Rights, and Air Pollution (pdf)
Cato Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 55-99. Also in: Murray Rothbard - The Logic of Action Volume Two (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 121-170.
Max O’Connor - Private Police and the Free Rider Problem (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Political Notes, 17, 1983
Bruce L. Benson - Guns for Protection, and Other Private Sector Responses to the Government’s Failure to Control Crime (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 8, Num. 1, 1986
Stephen Davies - The Private Supply of `Public Goods’ in Nineteenth Century Britain (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Historical Notes, 03, 1988
Matthew O’Keeffe - Retribution versus Restitution (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 05, 1988
Bruce L. Benson - Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive
Societies: Law without Government (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 9, Num. 1, 1989
Hans-Hermann Hoppe - Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 9, Num. 1, 1989
David Osterfeld - Anarchism and the Public Goods Issue: Law, Courts, and the Police (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 9, Num. 1, 1989
Chris R. Tame - On the Side of the Angels: A View of Private Policing (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Political Notes, 40, 1989
Nick Roberts - In Praise of Jackals: Assassination and Moral Defence Policy (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Foreign Policy Perspectives, 15, 1989
David Friedman - Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case
Liberty 2, no. 6,July, 1989, pp. 37-40
Bruce L. Benson - Customary Law With Private Means of Resolving Disputes and Dispensing Justice: A Description Of a Modern System of Law and Order Without State Coercion (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 9 Num. 2, 1990
Birgir T. Runolfsson Solvason - Ordered Anarchy, State, and Rent-Seeking: The Icelandic Commonwealth
Dissertation in Economics, George Mason University, 1991
Bruce L. Benson - Reciprocal Exchange as the Basis for Recognition Of Law: Examples from American History (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 10, Num. 1, 1991
Tom W. Bell - Privately Produced Law (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 16, 1991
Albert Loan - Institutional Bases of the Spontaneous Order: Surety and Assurance
Humane Studies Review, Volume 7, Number 1 Winter 1991/92
Tom W. Bell - Polycentric Law
Humane Studies Review, Volume 7, Number 1 Winter 1991/92
Birgir T. Runolfsson Solvason - Ordered Anarchy: Evolution of the Decentralized Legal Order in the Icelandic Commonwealth
Icelandic Economic Papers 17, 1992
Tom W. Bell - The Jurisprudence Of Polycentric Law
Unpublished Manuscript, Chicago, Illinois, August, 1992
Birgir T. Runolfsson Solvason - Institutional Evolution in the Icelandic Commonwealth (pdf)
Constitutional Political Economy 4, No. 1, pp. 97-125.
Gary Greenberg - Legal Systems Under Anarcho-Capitalism (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 18, 1993
Adam Chacksfield - Polycentric Law Versus the Minimal State: The Case of Air Pollution (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Political Notes, 76, 1993
Roderick T. Long - The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland
Formulations 1, No. 3, Spring, 1994
Barry Macleod-Cullinane - Lon L. Fuller and the Enterprise of Law (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 22, 1995
Stephan N. Kinsella - Rationalism, Legislation, and Law(pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 11, Num. 2, 1995
Stefan Blankertz - Courts, Judges, And The Law In The Free City
European Libertarian Convention, Amsterdam, 1996
Christian Michel - Should Criminals be Punished ?
Edited and annotated transcript of a talk delivered at a conference in Katowice, Poland, November 1996
David Friedman - Anarchy and Efficient Law
For and Against the State (ed. John T. Sanders and Jan Narveson),Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, p. 235-253
Stephan N. Kinsella - Punishment and Proportionality: the Estoppel Approach (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 12, Num. 1, 1996
Bruce L. Benson - Restitution in Theory and Practice (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1996
Bryan Caplan - The Economics of Non-State Legal Systems (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 26, 1997
Gareth Williams - Free Market Defence: Anarchist Insurance Will Work Best (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Economic Notes, 77, 1997
Tom W. Bell - Polycentric Law in the New Millennium
Essay submitted to the Mont Pelerin Society, 1998
Hans-Hermann Hoppe - The Private Production of Defence (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1998-1999
Edward Stringham - Market Chosen Law (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, Num. 1, 1998-1999
Stephan N. Kinsella - Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, Num. 1, 1998-1999
Patrick Tinsley - Private Police: A Note (pdf)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 14, Num. 1, 1998-1999
Kai Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas - The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State
Center for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2173, 1999
Frank van Dun - Kritarchy
July 18, 1999 (last revised May 2003)
Michael van Notten - From Nation-State To Stateless Nation, The Somali Experience
Michael van Notten, April 24, 2000
Joseph R. Stromberg - Gustave de Molinari on States and Defense
Antiwar.com, July 25, 2000
Christian Michel - Restitution: Justice in a Stateless Society (pdf)
Libertarian Alliance, Legal Notes, 33, 2000
Stefan Blankertz - Has the State Always Been There? How Tribal Anarchy Works
Paper presented ISIL Conference, London, Ontario, July 2000
Allen Wilhite - Seeking Protection and the Origin of the State (pdf)
Society for Computational Economics, 2001
Bruno S. Frey - A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly (pdf)
The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Volume 6, Number 1, Summer 2001
Richard A. Garner - If Hobbes is Right, Then he is Wrong: Why Social Order Can Arise Without a State Amongst Hobbesian People
Against Politics, April, 2002
Roderick T. Long - Privatization, Viking Style: Model or Misfortune?
Lew Rockwell.com, June 6, 2002
Thomas Whiston - Medieval Iceland and the Absence of Government
Ludwig von Mises Institute, Daily Articles, December 25, 2002
Llewellyn H. Rockwell - The National Defense Myth
Lew Rockwell.com, October 23, 2003
Hans-Hermann Hoppe - The Myth of National Defense (Introduction)
Ludwig von Mises Institute, October 24, 2003
Peter J. Boettke - Anarchism as a Progressive Research Program in Political Economy (pdf)
George Mason University, Working Papers in Economics, 2004
Per Bylund - Competition in Private Justice
Strike-the-Root, March 5, 2004
Roderick T. Long - Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections
Lew Rockwell.com, August 19, 2004
Silas Barta - Public Goods: Not a Problem. A Study of an Extreme Case
Anti-State.com, February 21, 2005
I await your next JARS article, which I’m sure will be filled with references to some of these papers.
And you have not shown how their conflicting interpretations of the law would not lead to chaos and bloodshed. Your answer to the issue of conflicting interpretations of the law was no “answer” at all. You offered this “solution”: “ If it is possible (and of course we are in agreement that it is) to verify objectively that one interpretation of justice is valid whereas another one is not, then it does not matter who employs the procedures in question.”
Well let me, in the spirit of treating you better than you have treated me, try to, as charitably as possible, reconstruct your argument here, and show you how response proceeds.
The “people have conflicting interpretations of justice” argument goes like this: If you don’t have a single monopoly government, then everyone is just sort of free to going around and impose their own interpretations of justice, and things won’t be equally applied, and this requirement of objectivity is breached. People, after all, do have different interpretations of justice, people disagree about what crimes should be, and also the proper response to all sorts of crimes. People have different interpretations of the natural law, says Locke, or different interpretations of what is permissible to do. Even when people can sort of grasp intuitively the general principles, like murder is a crime, theft is a crime, beating someone over the head is wrong and should be punished, etc. or even when people do have a rational understanding of the natural law, people still disagree about how to apply them. After all, just look at this forum. People here may agree on general principles, but don’t ever seem to agree on how to apply them. So therefore, this is a problem with a market-based legal order, which having a single monopoly legislature is designed to fix.
So the worry is that competing providers of legal services in a market legal order will have conflicting interpretations of justice. Do we have to deny this in our response? No, no doubt they will. In fact, we agree with Locke that this is a pervasive feature of the human condition. Thus, how is this different from a single monopoly government? Having differing opinions of the requirements of justice is part and parcel of human nature, as Locke himself demonstrated in his Letters Concerning Toleration, since the answers to these things aren’t self-evident, or given to us by a pure rational intuition from the noumenal self, or what have you. That’s going to be true of a market-based legal system, and it’s also going to be true under a single monopoly government. Ordinarily, the people in government, the people administering the monopoly system, will disagree with each other about the interpretations of justice. It seems pretty clear that not everyone in the US government is unanimous on interpretations of justice. But also amongst the American people, they all still have differing interpretations of justice. Even in a limited government, even in an Objectivist society, where there is agreement along fairly broad principles, there would still be differing interpretations of justice. So how exactly is this any different? As Locke explains the whole point of having a constitutionally limited government, with checks and balances, is that the agents who administer the system will have conflicting interpretations of justice. There would be no point whatsoever in having distinct branches of government limiting each other, or having the people limit the government through the franchise, if unanimity on questions of justice could be expected. So it’s not as though there cease to be differing interpretations of justice under a single monopoly government.
But we might imagine the response being, well sure, there’s conflicting interpreations of justice under government now, and there would be under limited government, but there’s a way of dealing with them under a single monopoly government system. Under our system, we have a series of constitutional restraints, you have various checks and balances and so forth. Certainly. But why do you assume that’s not the case under a market-based legal order? Under a market-based legal order there are constitutional restraints, and various checks and balances too, that is, there are various institutions and incentives for people to do things. The point of constitutional design is that the government is supposed to be structured in such a way that people have an incentive to work together and reach some reasonable solution rather than fighting it out when they have differing interpretations of justice. So there are also incentives in a market-based legal order for people to work together peacefully rather than fighting it out. In fact, you could argue that they have more incentive, because with defense services being provided on the free market, it’s harder for anyone to externalize their costs, thus people are less likely to choose violent conflict instead of coming to a consensus. It’s the incentive structure that matters in terms of how likely it is anyone will attempt to solve conflicting interpretations of justice with violence versus a consensus.
Now there is also another objection to consider against the “people disagree” argument. So let’s go back to the original complaint. People are all patronizing different defense agencies on the market, the problem is that people have different views. Like you mention, some people believe in the death penalty, some people think abortion is murder, some people think that if you violate certain religious laws you should get your hand chopped off, etc. So you’ve got all these defense agencies trying to enforce incompatible codes of law. Now perhaps you find the argument above persuasive, and grant that yes, okay there are economic and legal incentives not to just be fighting it out constantly, that as a matter of prudence people would not necessarily just resort to shooting each other all the time. But there would be no stable rule of law, it would be an arbitrary environment then. And there would just be various groups, maybe not attacking each other, but this still wouldn’t be a nice world to live in. Instead, let’s form a limited government where we all agree that, yes we have these differing views of what justice and a just society looks like, but where we have these periodic elections, and we all agree that as long as the democratic process is fair, and basic liberties are secured, that we will abide by the results and try to build a consensus. And if people don’t like it, they can try to elect somebody else the next cycle. Sounds fair, right? We’re just going to not use violence to solve our problems, but we’re going to just form this single institution and work things out by letting people at separate geographic locations vote, and have this federated legal structure, and so forth, and that’s why we should form a limited constitutional government of the sort we currently have, or at least were intended to have.
Well what’s wrong with this then? What I’m going to counter-argue then, is that if you have a society that is capable of doing that (even though let’s be clear that no government ever emerged in that kind of nice, peaceful and voluntary fashion, but that’s a side-point), but if they are capable of doing that, then why are the same people in a market-based legal order going to patronizing such defense agencies that will just be shooting it out constantly? After all, the defense services on the free market just respond to consumer demand. So if you’re willing to say: Okay yes, we have different views from each other, you may think abortion is murder, I may think prohibitions on abortion amount to legalized rape, but I’m not going to physically attack you and hire people to shoot you down, so let’s just be reasonable and settle this at the ballot box. If you’re that reasonable of a person, then it’s unclear why resort to a single monopoly government is necessary. A society that can settle things peacefully through the ballot box, even though there may be disagreements on some issues, why couldn’t they also do the same thing through the market, where there’s also not all the other problems that comes along with democracy? If the vast majority of individuals can agree that they should settle these issues not through arbitrary uses of force, but rather through various generally agreed-upon sets of orderly procedures (such as is provided by periodic elections), if this does indeed describe a particular population, why would we expect such people, as consumers, to patronize defense agencies that routinely used arbitrary force? Why wouldn’t the vast bulk of reasonable customers patronize defense agencies that subjected their disputes to various generally agreed-upon sets of orderly procedures, such as interlocking arbitration agreements? Why wouldn’t the market-based constitutional framework function as an orderly mechanism to settle matters of different views of justice, whereas having one single state that decides for everybody would? Doesn’t seem to make sense on its own grounds.
When I explained that this is typically anarchist, rationalist crap, you came back with: “Of, I didn’t really mean that there is one interpretation that’s verifiable, I only meant basic principles, blah-blah.-blah.”
That’s not my understanding. My understanding was that you took exception to the fact that I claimed since justice is a province of human knowledge, it is possible to verify one interpretation objectively, and you wanted to interpret this claim in too narrow a fashion, whereas I explained it need not be, because the interpretation you took was indeed itself an interpretation of justice open to verification.
I consider your long-winded, ambiguous posts to be nothing more than a poor effort at obfuscation, and I will continue to repeat the essential points as long as you continue to try to bury them in needless complexity and confusion.
Why do that? Why not consider them for what they are at face value: disagreement with your position.