What would a ‘private court’ be?
This question runs deep, in my opinion, so get comfortable. We might be here for a while.
Let me first try to describe a “private court” in the context of this conversation. The idea of the modern state is a government with a monopoly on the use of legitimate force (primarily, though with more or less allowance for personal self-defense) in a given territory. One of the services such a government is expected to provide is a justice system, typically incorporating courts. A “private court” would be an entity within that state which also provides justice, though not-affiliated with the government which claims “monopoly.”
Now, I believe that the question before us is this. Imagine for a moment that we took seriously the idea that it is wrong to initiate force, and that we wished to govern ourselves by that idea. That “government” means that we commit our force, individually and collectively, only in response to its initiation – via self-defense and retributive justice. If we did such a thing, and enshrined our idea in a Constitution so that our land were governed by the principle of the non-initiation of force, and some entity within our land set up a “private court” as described above, would we take action against that court for the purpose of preserving our monopoly?
And to that question, my answer (thus far) is: we should only take action against that court if that court, itself, were initiating the use of force by acting contrary to the principles of justice. If, however, that “private court” were equally committed to the principle of the non-initiation of force, and acting only to provide objective justice, then we would have no call to take action against it. Indeed, to act against such a court would be an initiation of the use of force on our part. But then, if we allow the establishment of such a court… what has become of our “monopoly”?
For after all, the idea of a “private court” is ultimately a self-contradiction, is it not? Insofar as the word “private” is meant to mean apart from governance, and that role which government is meant to play in effecting justice within a society, there can be no “private court”; every court is government of its nature. Equally suspect is the term “anarchy,” thrown around in this thread and elsewhere. To suggest that the creation of an additional court which provides objective justice means to have no government whatever is flawed on its face, when we’re actually talking about a net increase in… uh… archy.
So if we take “anarchy” to mean “without government,” then the idea of a “private court” is not a blow for anarchy at all, and rather its opposite. It does, however, take aim at one feature of the modern state that is typically assumed to be part and parcel with governance itself (in, perhaps, a bit of a “package deal”): that a particular government (meaning here: certain specific individuals and established institutions) must have a monopoly on the functions of governance. But as we’ve seen, insofar as other individuals within a state or a society administer objective justice apart from the previously recognized “monopoly government,” then to take action against those individuals for the purpose of maintaining one’s monopoly would be an initiation of the use of force.
Thus, I find that the establishment of a “monopoly government” is incompatible with the principle of the non-initiation of force. And after all, we may imagine whether a John Galt, say, would feel a call to take action against some portion of Galt’s Gulch who decided to administer government themselves, so long as they continued to do so according to the principles of objective justice. I’d imagine that his response would be something like, “so long as they don’t initiate force against another man, they can do what they’d like.”
And how would the existence of such a system of justice not be operational only by the principle of might makes right, as opposed to the idea of a government of laws and not men?
If I’m right about all of this (and, full disclosure: most of these ideas are very very new to me; and I’ve certainly not tried to articulate them before)…
…then I believe that what I’m discussing is actually the full flower of “a government of laws and not men.” Or not even “laws,” per se, but enshrining the principle of the non-initiation of force at the very peak of governance.
After all, what gives a “monopoly government” its legitimacy? How does one man, or group of men, decide that they are capable and authorized to enact justice, and no other? Is it the first to claim that “he is the government”? Is it that act which grants him moral leave to initiate force against any other man who would make a similar claim? I suspect that historically this is so, in combination with the size of his rock or club – the very “might makes right” which perhaps (hopefully) you would decry.
But if might does not make right – if only right makes right – and if we take “right,” politically, to mean the observance of man’s rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force, then I think that we also must not initiate force against another man or group of men who are equally committed to protecting man’s rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force… even if that means that there is no such thing as a legitimate “monopoly” on these activities.
In one sense – viewing “government” as a particular set of defined institutions and individuals which have a monopoly on the administration of justice – this will seem like “anarchy,” despite what we’ve discussed above. In another sense, however, it can be understood that these “private courts” would actually be operating within one government – but it would be a government aligned around the principle of the non-initiation of force (which would have the only monopoly remaining: a philosophical monopoly), as opposed to being aligned around specific men and specific institutions. It would be a full recognition of the objectivity of justice, which does not derive its legitimacy from the “official” nature of those who enact it, but from the nature of the act itself – what is just is just, and what is not is not.