The Childs-Peikoff Hypothesis

Trials by private agencies would only be possible with close governmental oversight, again, to insure procedural objectivity. Consider the frequency with which trial verdicts are overturned because of some seemingly trivial error on the part of the court—allowing the use of tainted evidence or questionable testimony, etc. Any hint of impartiality is sufficient cause to void a guilty verdict. The role of the government is to insure absolute adherence to due process—rules of evidence, jury selection. et. al. Without ironclad safeguards on due process, there would be no assurance that justice was served in a given case.

So, yes, in the absence of such oversight, the government can legitimately intervene to stop a trial conducted by a private agency in the name of protecting individual rights.

To consider the question of “monopoly,” I don’t think we are best served by a hypothetical of a poorly administered “private trial.” But imagine a private trial that does *everything* that government normally does in terms of due process, incorporating the same rules of evidence and jury selection and so on that you mention, and the same level of sensitivity to “any hint of impartiality.” A private trial that provides as much “assurance” that justice will be served as any trial run by the state (unless you believe that no such private entity could ever “assure” justice in the same way… but then I would have to ask why not).

Would the state – in the name of preserving its monopoly of the administration of justice alone – be justified in shutting down a trial that in all other respects was perfectly consonant with objective justice?

If there were no such oversight, what would stop alleged “victims” from paying private agencies to conduct “trials” for the purpose of prosecuting anyone they considered guilty of having harmed them? There would be nothing to insure the impartiality of the outcome.

The government would be justified in acting on principle to prevent the initiation of force by such agencies, even if, in a given instance, a particular agency acted properly (i.e., observed appropriate due process) without governmental oversight. That is the only way a government can guarantee the protection of individual rights in all cases.

When you say that “[t]he government would be justified in acting on principle to prevent the initiation of force by such agencies, even if, in a given instance, a particular agency acted properly,” I must observe that this may be begging the question. For after all, I’m not talking about an agency initiating the use of force, but responding to force with force, as is just, in the same manner that a government might do. Justice in this case remains an aspect of self-defense.

If, however, you’re saying that the government is justified in acting on principle to prevent the use of force in response to force – acting against those who have not initiated it (i.e. the agencies under discussion) – then aren’t we ultimately advocating the initiation of force on the part of the government?

Yeah Google does what they do(and Ebay) regardless of knowing they have a civil court system to protect their “internet” property, hey they must be anarcho-capitalists.

One can only argue from the standpoint of the conditions necessary for a market, you can not start with a market system. On the premise that traders must know in advance that their rights would be recognized and protected, by some entity or agency, prior to trading. If trading value for value were contingent on nothing other than force, who but those that can wield the most force would even think of entering any type of ‘market’ activity?

Exactly.

When you say that “[t]he government would be justified in acting on principle to prevent the initiation of force by such agencies, even if, in a given instance, a particular agency acted properly,” I must observe that this may be begging the question. For after all, I’m not talking about an agency initiating the use of force, but responding to force with force, as is just, in the same manner that a government might do. Justice in this case remains an aspect of self-defense.

If, however, you’re saying that the government is justified in acting on principle to prevent the use of force in response to force – acting against those who have not initiated it (i.e. the agencies under discussion) – then aren’t we ultimately advocating the initiation of force on the part of the government?

Exactly, what’s supposed to justify a monopoly agency is that it is necessary to impose a single code of objective procedures (forget the implications of one-world government for the moment), but suppose a competing agency is using the exact same procedures, then these grounds are no longer sufficient. Either the activity is permissible, or the activity isn’t permissible, in which case the government shouldn’t be engaging in it either.

One can only argue from the stand point of the conditions necessary for a market, you can not start with a market system. On the premise that traders must know in advance that their rights would be recognized and protected, by some entity or agency, prior to trading. If trading value for vlaue were contingent on nothing other than force, who but those that can wield the most force would even think of entering any type of ‘market’ activity. It seems to go against human nature to purposely put oneself in that position, the position of being at somones mercy that a trade will in fact occur.

This doesn’t seem to be coherent. Your second sentence is a sentence fragment, and if I can best interperet it, I am sure that you cannot mean by “traders must know in advance that their rights would be recognized and protected, by some entity or agency, prior to trading” that “traders must know in advance that their rights would be recognized and protected, by some entity or agency, [temporally] prior to trading” because if no trading could ever occur temporally prior to “some agency or entity” protecting their rights, then no agency or entity could exist. After all, agencies and entities require resources, and thus if no trading can temporally occur, then where are their resources coming from that they are using to become law-producing agencies to begin with? This, I submit, is the “rationalist nonsense” Hardin refers to, an attempt to prove polycentric legal systems a priori impossible, all the while refusing to look at the actual historical record (I even provided an abundance of papers one can research in this very thread.) Reminds one of Galileo’s inquisitors refusing to look through his telescope because, after all, they just know a priori that the Ptolemaic theory is deductively true.

But let me, once again, extend courtesy I have not received, and try to be as even-handed as I can with this type of objection. Again, it’s like talking to a wall because the argument seems to want to say, in summary, “Okay, look, functioning market requires a functioning legal order and stable rule of law, and can’t really exist otherwise.” Yes, certainly this is true. But as I have stated again and again, we are not saying “we are against stable rule of law,” we are saying that polycentric legal orders can produce stable rule of law. Critics say that it can’t, but if they are making that claim then they need to produce an argument for it, instead of simply re-asserting prior convictions as if they should be self-evident. Argument is not making ex cathedra pronouncements over and over while ignoring everything, or reciting passages from the Ayn Rand Lexicon as if that were sufficient refutation to just cite the appropriate cannon.

So, in the foregoing, my most charitable interpretation, if we make some minor changes, is this: “traders must know in advance that their rights would be generally recognized and protected, by some entity or agency, in order to have a stable, functioning market.” Certainly, once again, we have no issue with this, but it is unclear how this tells against market anarchism, e_xcept_ insofar as to infer the necessity of a coercive monopoly from this is a non sequitur, as to have rights recognized and protected by some entity or agency does not logically necessitate that be one monopolistic agency or entity. It is erroneous to reason from “there must be some agency or entity that recognizes and protects traders’ rights” to “there must be one single agency or entity that recognizes and protects traders’ rights.” That would be an example of the fallacy of composition, wherein one infers from, e.g., “Everyone likes at least one TV show” to “There’s at least one TV show that everyone likes.”

Would the state – in the name of preserving its monopoly of the administration of justice alone – be justified in shutting down a trial that in all other respects was perfectly consonant with objective justice?

Thanks again for your comments, Don.

My question to you would be: How is the government supposed to protect individual rights if it does not have oversight over the use of force? I don’t know about you, but I seriously doubt if the honor system is going to work.

If, however, you’re saying that the government is justified in acting on principle to prevent the use of force in response to force – acting against those who have not initiated it (i.e. the agencies under discussion) – then aren’t we ultimately advocating the initiation of force on the part of the government?

This brings us back to the moral issue—i.e., the moral legitimacy of the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It is the government’s responsibility to protect the rights of the citizens within its jurisdiction—i.e., to prevent the initiation of force. It cannot do so unless it has control over the use of force. That’s simple causality. If the government does not control the use of force, it cannot protect individual rights.

Any agency that tried to usurp the government’s authority by using force on its own, independently of the government or governmental oversight, would be acting to prevent the government from doing its job. Such action by an independent agency would constitute a de facto threat to the rights of all the citizens within the government’s jurisdiction. So I argue that, in such cases, the government’s action is retaliatory and not an initiation of force.

In reality, the government has to be able to do its job of protecting rights. To say that it cannot, in a technical sense, “initiate force” against those who obstruct its proper function of protecting individual rights is sheer rationalism—i.e., focusing on concepts severed from reality.

And further, the government’s action against private parties who use force is exactly equivalent to what any private agency would have to do when confronted with another agency with a conflicting interpretation of the law. So to say that it’s okay for private agencies to do it but not a government “monopoly” is to endorse a contradiction. That’s the inherent nature of force—one party prevails. And to say that there would not necessarily be any such conflicting interpretations is to live in a dream world.

And further, the government’s action against private parties who use force is exactly equivalent to what any private agency would have to do when confronted with another agency with a conflicting interpretation of the law. So to say that it’s okay for private agencies to do it but not a government “monopoly” is to endorse a contradiction. That’s the inherent nature of force—one party prevails. And to say that there would not necessarily be any such conflicting interpretations is to live in a dream world.

Well let’s pass over the fact that you totally didn’t answer Don Athos’ question again, for the second time (hope you have more patience than me, Don), and passing over again that you have misrepresented our position (we have not said there wouldn’t be conflicting interpretations of justice, we have said the exact opposite, and you even acknowledged it earlier! Anyone reading this can see that), but let us question why would any private agency have to use force against another agency with a conflicting interpretation of the law? Really? They have to? Say’s who/what? Again, I already argued why since conflicting interpretations of justice is an all-pervasive fact of human nature, what happens when members of the government have conflicting interpretations of justice? They have to use force? I’m just gonna start copying and pasting until someone actually responds to my arguments: here from #18.

The “people have conflicting interpretations of justice” argument goes like this: If you don’t have a single monopoly government, then everyone is just sort of free to going around and impose their own interpretations of justice, and things won’t be equally applied, and this requirement of objectivity is breached. People, after all, do have different interpretations of justice, people disagree about what crimes should be, and also the proper response to all sorts of crimes. People have different interpretations of the natural law, says Locke, or different interpretations of what is permissible to do. Even when people can sort of grasp intuitively the general principles, like murder is a crime, theft is a crime, beating someone over the head is wrong and should be punished, etc. or even when people do have a rational understanding of the natural law, people still disagree about how to apply them. After all, just look at this forum. People here may agree on general principles, but don’t ever seem to agree on how to apply them. So therefore, this is a problem with a market-based legal order, which having a single monopoly legislature is designed to fix.

So the worry is that competing providers of legal services in a market legal order will have conflicting interpretations of justice. Do we have to deny this in our response? No, no doubt they will. In fact, we agree with Locke that this is a pervasive feature of the human condition. Thus, how is this different from a single monopoly government? Having differing opinions of the requirements of justice is part and parcel of human nature, as Locke himself demonstrated in his Letters Concerning Toleration, since the answers to these things aren’t self-evident, or given to us by a pure rational intuition from the noumenal self, or what have you. That’s going to be true of a market-based legal system, and it’s also going to be true under a single monopoly government. Ordinarily, the people in government, the people administering the monopoly system, will disagree with each other about the interpretations of justice. It seems pretty clear that not everyone in the US government is unanimous on interpretations of justice. But also amongst the American people, they all still have differing interpretations of justice. Even in a limited government, even in an Objectivist society, where there is agreement along fairly broad principles, there would still be differing interpretations of justice. So how exactly is this any different? As Locke explains the whole point of having a constitutionally limited government, with checks and balances, is that the agents who administer the system will have conflicting interpretations of justice. There would be no point whatsoever in having distinct branches of government limiting each other, or having the people limit the government through the franchise, if unanimity on questions of justice could be expected. So it’s not as though there cease to be differing interpretations of justice under a single monopoly government.

But we might imagine the response being, well sure, there’s conflicting interpreations of justice under government now, and there would be under limited government, but there’s a way of dealing with them under a single monopoly government system. Under our system, we have a series of constitutional restraints, you have various checks and balances and so forth. Certainly. But why do you assume that’s not the case under a market-based legal order? Under a market-based legal order there are constitutional restraints, and various checks and balances too, that is, there are various institutions and incentives for people to do things. The point of constitutional design is that the government is supposed to be structured in such a way that people have an incentive to work together and reach some reasonable solution rather than fighting it out when they have differing interpretations of justice. So there are also incentives in a market-based legal order for people to work together peacefully rather than fighting it out. In fact, you could argue that they have more incentive, because with defense services being provided on the free market, it’s harder for anyone to externalize their costs, thus people are less likely to choose violent conflict instead of coming to a consensus. It’s the incentive structure that matters in terms of how likely it is anyone will attempt to solve conflicting interpretations of justice with violence versus a consensus.

Now there is also another objection to consider against the “people disagree” argument. So let’s go back to the original complaint. People are all patronizing different defense agencies on the market, the problem is that people have different views. Like you mention, some people believe in the death penalty, some people think abortion is murder, some people think that if you violate certain religious laws you should get your hand chopped off, etc. So you’ve got all these defense agencies trying to enforce incompatible codes of law. Now perhaps you find the argument above persuasive, and grant that yes, okay there are economic and legal incentives not to just be fighting it out constantly, that as a matter of prudence people would not necessarily just resort to shooting each other all the time. But there would be no stable rule of law, it would be an arbitrary environment then. And there would just be various groups, maybe not attacking each other, but this still wouldn’t be a nice world to live in. Instead, let’s form a limited government where we all agree that, yes we have these differing views of what justice and a just society looks like, but where we have these periodic elections, and we all agree that as long as the democratic process is fair, and basic liberties are secured, that we will abide by the results and try to build a consensus. And if people don’t like it, they can try to elect somebody else the next cycle. Sounds fair, right? We’re just going to not use violence to solve our problems, but we’re going to just form this single institution and work things out by letting people at separate geographic locations vote, and have this federated legal structure, and so forth, and that’s why we should form a limited constitutional government of the sort we currently have, or at least were intended to have.

Well what’s wrong with this then? What I’m going to counter-argue then, is that if you have a society that is capable of doing that (even though let’s be clear that no government ever emerged in that kind of nice, peaceful and voluntary fashion, but that’s a side-point), but if they are capable of doing that, then why are the same people in a market-based legal order going to patronizing such defense agencies that will just be shooting it out constantly? After all, the defense services on the free market just respond to consumer demand. So if you’re willing to say: Okay yes, we have different views from each other, you may think abortion is murder, I may think prohibitions on abortion amount to legalized rape, but I’m not going to physically attack you and hire people to shoot you down, so let’s just be reasonable and settle this at the ballot box. If you’re that reasonable of a person, then it’s unclear why resort to a single monopoly government is necessary. A society that can settle things peacefully through the ballot box, even though there may be disagreements on some issues, why couldn’t they also do the same thing through the market, where there’s also not all the other problems that comes along with democracy? If the vast majority of individuals can agree that they should settle these issues not through arbitrary uses of force, but rather through various generally agreed-upon sets of orderly procedures (such as is provided by periodic elections), if this does indeed describe a particular population, why would we expect such people, as consumers, to patronize defense agencies that routinely used arbitrary force? Why wouldn’t the vast bulk of reasonable customers patronize defense agencies that subjected their disputes to various generally agreed-upon sets of orderly procedures, such as interlocking arbitration agreements? Why wouldn’t the market-based constitutional framework function as an orderly mechanism to settle matters of different views of justice, whereas having one single state that decides for everybody would? Doesn’t seem to make sense on its own grounds.

This brings us back to the moral issue—i.e., the moral legitimacy of the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It is the government’s responsibility to protect the rights of the citizens within its jurisdiction—i.e., to prevent the initiation of force. It cannot do so unless it has control over the use of force. That’s simple causality. If the government does not control the use of force, it cannot protect individual rights.

But I don’t believe that anyone (yourself included) argues that government ought to control the use of force entirely – imagine the application of such an argument to gun control, for instance. If a government’s goal is to prevent the initiation of force – this and nothing more – then we can agree that such a government is just. But to argue that such a government must be the only agency that may respond to force, or act to protect individual rights, or enact justice, is something else altogether. More to the point, that’s precisely the question under examination.

In positing a private trial/court, we are examining an entity that does not initiate force, but responds to it in the same manner that we ordinarily ascribe to the government. If this private court observes justice in the same manner as a just government would, then our private court would not harm individual rights anymore than the just government – would it? If you believe that this private court would damage individual rights (by, say, convicting a murderer in the same fashion that a government court would), then I’ll ask you, again, to please demonstrate how. Would the private court be initiating the use of force against the murderer in proclaiming him a murderer or punishing him for it, in as objective a fashion as we may ask of any government?

I do not believe that punishing a murderer for his crimes is an initiation of force. It seems to me that justice is a question of making sure that the murderer pays for his crimes – and proper procedure is required to do this correctly. But apart from that, I don’t see how it matters who dispenses the justice in question, so long as it is done correctly.

Any agency that tried to usurp the government’s authority by using force on its own, independently of the government or governmental oversight, would be acting to prevent the government from doing its job.

If the government’s “job” is to prevent the initiation of the use of force within its jurisdiction, then I do not believe it follows that the example of the private court is acting to prevent the government from doing its job; I do not prevent the street sweeper from cleaning the streets by finding a candy bar wrapper on the ground and throwing it in the trash.

Such action by an independent agency would constitute a de facto threat to the rights of all the citizens within the government’s jurisdiction.

In what way? How would an independent agency that metes justice – and does so according to whatever procedures you would demand of a just government – act as a threat to the rights of any man?

So I argue that, in such cases, the government’s action is retaliatory and not an initiation of force.

And thus far I believe I must disagree with this. The government (as with any group) does not have any additional or special rights; it only has the rights of the individuals which defer to that government. If government does not harm individual rights, as such, in administering justice – if that is not an initiation of force – then I would think that individuals could administer justice outside of a particular government (i.e in what we’re calling a “private court”) in the same fashion: with the character of retaliatory/just force and not as an initiation of force.

In reality, the government has to be able to do its job of protecting rights. To say that it cannot, in a technical sense, “initiate force” against those who obstruct its proper function of protecting individual rights is sheer rationalism—i.e., focusing on concepts severed from reality.

What we haven’t yet shown is that the government’s “job of protecting rights” is necessarily frustrated or hampered or otherwise “obstructed” by another institution that also protects rights.

But besides this, I’m afraid that I do believe that government must be restricted from initiating force (in even a “technical sense”) for me to consider it just. Some may argue (as I’ve seen before elsewhere) that government must be able to tax people against their will, because such taxation is necessary for government to survive and do its good work of protecting rights, and so on. That the ends justify the means. And yet I do not believe in compulsory taxation either, because that is an initiation of force, both technically and truly.

If we propose a government that survives on voluntary contribution, and never initiates force (even in a “technical sense”) but only responds to the initiation of force, and only acts with justice, then I’m all for it. But I’m not willing to accept compromises in that regard.

I appreciate it of course, but I don’t want to run afoul of the forum rules, so I don’t open a new thread. However, I trust responding to or analyzing various arguments presented falls under the category of “honest questions about such subjects.” I think the links in #18 are definitely worth reading in regards how a free market legal order could work, and historical examples are discussed. A good starting point for understanding how law without a state is possible is books like Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, Edward P. Stringham (Editor), Anarchy and the Law, Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State.

I didn’t read, nor do I think I shall ,any of the source material you posted. The reason I won’t is contained in your statement “..a good starting point for understanding how law without a state is possible..” , if the materail suggested are sources to find justifications for this and like assertions are ridiculous on face.

As to why should we have a free market legal order, the foundations are the same as the argument for a laissez-faire capitalist society. The question of what kind of constitutional structure we should have goes along with the question of what our goals are. So you have articulated philosophical principles on the one hand, and the question of political structure on the other hand. We get conclusions like, we should have a society that respects the non-initiation of force principle, we should have restraints on the use of retalitatory force, so we should have objective law, etc. So then what kind of system will produce objective law and will have the best incentive structure for maintaining respect for individual rights. So what is objective law? What are its requirements? Can a state satisfy these requirements, or does objective law require a free market? I mean, you could imagine a dictator that only wanted objective law, but that kind of system would have a terrible incentive structure, so you wouldn’t want it. You would want a constitutional structure incorporating checks and balances, separation of powers, etc. So where Rand stopped short and supported representative democracy, I think if we analyze her arguments, you will find defficiencies, and I think that the incentive structure of the free market provides the best constitution for a free society.

If the foundations of a free market legal are the same as a LFC society, how do they not incorporate a monolopy of the use of just force vested in the state?(ignoring any grammatical errors they may lead to differing interpretations of meaning)

So the question boils down to what kind of constitution should a free nation have? In trying to answer that question we immediately think in terms of a Bill of Rights, restrictions on governmental power, and so forth. And any constitution worth having would certainly include those things. Usually Objectivists answer “well we should have a written constitution,” and that would solve a lot of the structural problems. But mere paper constitutions are neither necessary (look at Britain) nor sufficient (look at Soviet Russia) for actually operative restraints. What matters is a nation’s constitution in the original sense of the actual institutions, practices, and incentive structures that are in place.

In the context of a discussion on politics from a philosophic perspective, who believes a constitution is but the mere words(text) printed on paper? What do you mean here?

So a constitution has no existence independent of the actual behaviour and interactions of actual human beings.Things like “separations and divisions of powers, and checks and balances,” are not structures that exist as external limitations on society, as if they are being imposed from without. But in fact those structures exist only insofar as they are continually maintained in existence by human agents acting in certain systematic ways. A constitution is not some impersonal, miraculously self-enforcing robot. It’s an ongoing pattern of behaviour, and it persists only so long as human agents continue to conform to that pattern in their actions.

What? Are you saying that concepts like legality, rights , justice and capitalism only exist in the actions of concrete indiviual humans and that unless they act in manners consistent with those concepts , the very idea of such things would be impossible?

So if a constitution is to be more than a wish list, it must also specify the political structure necessary to ensure that people have an incentive to keep acting in a manner consistent with the articulated philosophical principles that you’re attempted to put in place. And so the incentive structure you put in place must encourage people to act in a manner consistent with individual rights, to produce objective law, to encouraging social cooperation, persuasion instead of force, and peace. So in discussing whether a government or the market is the best for this, you have to look at the incentives of each strucutres, and I think there are problems with coerced monopoly, and I think the opponent of competition has some considerations to surmount before they can prove their case.

Perhaps just a semantic difference(though I doubt it), but in organizing the proper structure for a civilized society incorporating rational principles into the idea of a state and its mechanics is not the same as trying to put in place philosophic principles. Rational principles are what they are , there is no choice or competition between principles as to their respective rationality.

In positing a private trial/court, we are examining an entity that does not initiate force, but responds to it in the same manner that we ordinarily ascribe to the government. If this private court observes justice in the same manner as a just government would, then our private court would not harm individual rights anymore than the just government – would it? If you believe that this private court would damage individual rights (by, say, convicting a murderer in the same fashion that a government court would), then I’ll ask you, again, to please demonstrate how. Would the private court be initiating the use of force against the murderer in proclaiming him a murderer or punishing him for it, in as objective a fashion as we may ask of any government?

I do not believe that punishing a murderer for his crimes is an initiation of force. It seems to me that justice is a question of making sure that the murderer pays for his crimes – and proper procedure is required to do this correctly. But apart from that, I don’t see how it matters who dispenses the justice in question, so long as it is done correctly.

How would an independent agency that metes justice – and does so according to whatever procedures you would demand of a just government – act as a threat to the rights of any man?

Again, we are back to looking at the real world as opposed to a fantasy world.

As long as the private court did everything the government court would do, everything would be lovely. The problem, of course, is that it is very likely that the private court might not follow all of the procedural safeguards that a government court is required to follow. And in that event, someone’s rights have been violated. If the private court is operating separately from the government’s oversight, the government cannot do its job of protecting individual rights.

If the government’s “job” is to prevent the initiation of the use of force within its jurisdiction, then I do not believe it follows that the example of the private court is acting to prevent the government from doing its job; I do not prevent the street sweeper from cleaning the streets by finding a candy bar wrapper on the ground and throwing it in the trash.

The difference between a private company performing a specific service and the government is that the government’s responsibility is to make sure that something does not happen–that force is not used improperly. That’s why it requires jurisdiction over any agencies that may use force in any way.

Again, we are back to looking at the real world as opposed to a fantasy world.

Are you quite certain this distinguishes our viewpoints? I’ll come back to this in a moment, but for now let me observe that this is something I’ve often heard in opposition to any number of Objectivist principles, arguments or conclusions. That it’s all too “fantastical” or “idealistic.” That, after all, in the “real world,” men make compromises to their principles in order to “get things done.”

As long as the private court did everything the government court would do, everything would be lovely.

And in such a case, it would not be just for the government to initiate force against that private court. Both because of how lovely it would be, and also because it is wrong to initiate the use of force – it is a violation of rights – even when the government does it.

The problem, of course, is that it is very likely that the private court might not follow all of the procedural safeguards that a government court is required to follow. And in that event, someone’s rights have been violated.

And so long as gun owners use their guns with justice (i.e. in self-defense, or for other things that do not violate others’ rights), everything is lovely. The problem, of course, is that it is very likely that some gun owners will not use their guns justly. And in that event, someone’s rights have been violated.

Violations of rights are intolerable, of course. But as with gun owners, I think it’s necessary to distinguish between those that actually do violate other peoples’ rights, and those who do not. I think that such a distinction is, itself, an application of “justice.”

Those courts which pursue objective justice, which here means all of the procedural safeguards you mention along with whatever you think a government should properly do, do not violate rights, and thus a just government would not take action against them – would not initiate force. But those courts which do not pursue objective justice, and violate rights, should have action taken against them, just as anyone who violates rights should.

Before leaving off, I want to return to your observation that “it is very likely that the private court might [violate rights.]” I wonder how you come to this conclusion? Do you think that the government, generally, performs tasks more efficiently and with less corruption and immorality than similar tasks undertaken by the “private sector”?

Since you’ve mentioned my “dream worlds” and “fantasy worlds,” against which you’re offering the sober perspective of “the real world,” perhaps it is worth reintroducing the context of the actual world in which you and I currently live, in which there is not a single government which has ever, ever existed, except through a mass and continual violation of human rights.

If your argument is that we must not have private courts, but only government courts, because – heaven forfend – a private entity could never be relied upon to act justly, as opposed to that stalwart bulwark of human rights known as the government, then I must say that you are very far from “the real world” yourself, in which perhaps the best government on record in the history of the planet, the United States, has laws which stand in perpetual violation against every conceivable human right, survives through a system of continual compulsory taxation, nationalizes the property of its citizenry, drafts its men to war, and so on.

Given a private court today comprised of men of justice who subscribe to an objective code of justice, as against the government court of the United States, I should certainly prefer that private court as being the better protector of my actual rights.

However we regard the idea of a private court – hopelessly idealistic, a “dream world,” or whatever other way you might think to slight it – I think it stands at least as far from the reality of our situation as the remaking of the United States or any other actual government into a paragon of morality and protector of man’s rights. If I am correct in my arguments that private courts would be allowed in a just government, then I’m no closer or further away from “reality” than you, but I would have the advantage of advocating a more consistent system of justice.

Again, we are back to looking at the real world as opposed to a fantasy world.

As long as the private court did everything the government court would do, everything would be lovely. The problem, of course, is that it is very likely that the private court might not follow all of the procedural safeguards that a government court is required to follow. And in that event, someone’s rights have been violated. If the private court is operating separately from the government’s oversight, the government cannot do its job of protecting individual rights.

The difference between a private company performing a specific service and the government is that the government’s responsibility is to make sure that something does not happen–that force is not used improperly. That’s why it requires jurisdiction over any agencies that may use force in any way.

Sure, it would be “lovely.” So then, since justice is a province of human reason, the correct prodecures can be differentiated from incorrect ones, and therefore bandit (or rights-violating) courts differentiated from free market (or rights-respecting courts), which by your own admission no other agency has a right to intervene in, then you implicitly endorse market anarchism. The argument that okay but one agency is needed to “provide oversight” is debunked in #23:

Well this is interestingly similar to the theist’s cosmological argument. A “first cause” is needed to explain the existence of the universe, but then a first cause is needed to explain the supposed “first cause,” and so on, until you have an infinite regress. So the government is overseeing, in Nozickian fashion, that the correct procedures are being followed. But then if these other agencies require a “super-agency” to oversee the correct procedures are being used, who is to oversee the super-agency to ensure it is following the correct procedures? Does being a member of the super-agency somehow endow you with the ability to be objective, whereas being a member of any of the other agencies does not?

But moreover, we have this picture of the government as a “licensing agency,” so to speak, granting licenses to act within a certain set of legal rules, and being the “overseer” as Hardin wants it, of these other agencies. First of all, what exactly this means can have varying interpretations (I’ll skip listing all of them for now), but suppose that means something like the state confines itself to doing what Hardin wants it to do, ie,. to oversee that all other agencies are adhering to the correct procedures of justice. If one believes, as we both do, in such a single, uniform standard, then what possible objection could you have to this?

You see, saying “well yes, if they use the correct procedures, then it’s okay, as long as one agency oversees the correct procedures” doesn’t escape Don Athos’ question. Let’s think what this would look like for a second. We’re supposed to have a variety of competing agencies on the free market, and one organization takes upon itself the job of forcing all the other agencies to conform to the single, uniform standard of objective justice. But it’s the only organization doing this, so then suppose another organization enters that field and competes in the job of being the “licensing agency” certifying in accordance with the same exact principles of justice. Does it then prohibit competition in that field? Even if the other agencies are “overseeing” in accordance with the exact same principles, as per Don Athos’ question? If so, then it is an unjust aggressor on its own grounds, for if the coercive imposition of these objective principles of justice is permissible, then it is permissible for anybody. Secondly, it is also undesirable on incentive grounds (the same reasons we don’t want licensing laws, e.g. in consumer protection or for the medical industry), since all coercive monopolies (and licensing laws) lack the very checks and balances that make us want competition in the first place, and so this type of argument completely fails on its own grounds.

But apart from that point, you state “it is likely” that a private court would violate the correct prodecures. I must concur with Don Athos in asking how you made such a determination. If we analyze the actual incentive structures of monopoly versus competition, I think we can find powerful reasons why a monopoly, with a captive customer base and insulated from competition, also facing calculational and informational problems (due to familiar Misesian/Hayekian reasons) and the ability to externalize costs onto other parties, faces an inferior incentive structure for the “likelihood” of solving problems aggressively as compared with market institutions.

What would a ‘private court’ be?

And how would the existence of such a system of justice not be operational only by the principle of might makes right, as opposed to the idea of a government of laws and not men?

And why to be mora,l do free men need incentives?(begs the question of incentives provided by…?)

Alot of the reasoning behind the defense of the idea of a free market of legalism, at least coming from 2046, seems to be predicated on the idea of ‘incentives’,is this like the choice betrween the carrot and the stick? If so, who in reality gets to wield them? What is the rational way to determine who ‘gets to’ hold that power?

What would a ‘private court’ be?

This question runs deep, in my opinion, so get comfortable. We might be here for a while.

Let me first try to describe a “private court” in the context of this conversation. The idea of the modern state is a government with a monopoly on the use of legitimate force (primarily, though with more or less allowance for personal self-defense) in a given territory. One of the services such a government is expected to provide is a justice system, typically incorporating courts. A “private court” would be an entity within that state which also provides justice, though not-affiliated with the government which claims “monopoly.”

Now, I believe that the question before us is this. Imagine for a moment that we took seriously the idea that it is wrong to initiate force, and that we wished to govern ourselves by that idea. That “government” means that we commit our force, individually and collectively, only in response to its initiation – via self-defense and retributive justice. If we did such a thing, and enshrined our idea in a Constitution so that our land were governed by the principle of the non-initiation of force, and some entity within our land set up a “private court” as described above, would we take action against that court for the purpose of preserving our monopoly?

And to that question, my answer (thus far) is: we should only take action against that court if that court, itself, were initiating the use of force by acting contrary to the principles of justice. If, however, that “private court” were equally committed to the principle of the non-initiation of force, and acting only to provide objective justice, then we would have no call to take action against it. Indeed, to act against such a court would be an initiation of the use of force on our part. But then, if we allow the establishment of such a court… what has become of our “monopoly”?

For after all, the idea of a “private court” is ultimately a self-contradiction, is it not? Insofar as the word “private” is meant to mean apart from governance, and that role which government is meant to play in effecting justice within a society, there can be no “private court”; every court is government of its nature. Equally suspect is the term “anarchy,” thrown around in this thread and elsewhere. To suggest that the creation of an additional court which provides objective justice means to have no government whatever is flawed on its face, when we’re actually talking about a net increase in… uh… archy.

So if we take “anarchy” to mean “without government,” then the idea of a “private court” is not a blow for anarchy at all, and rather its opposite. It does, however, take aim at one feature of the modern state that is typically assumed to be part and parcel with governance itself (in, perhaps, a bit of a “package deal”): that a particular government (meaning here: certain specific individuals and established institutions) must have a monopoly on the functions of governance. But as we’ve seen, insofar as other individuals within a state or a society administer objective justice apart from the previously recognized “monopoly government,” then to take action against those individuals for the purpose of maintaining one’s monopoly would be an initiation of the use of force.

Thus, I find that the establishment of a “monopoly government” is incompatible with the principle of the non-initiation of force. And after all, we may imagine whether a John Galt, say, would feel a call to take action against some portion of Galt’s Gulch who decided to administer government themselves, so long as they continued to do so according to the principles of objective justice. I’d imagine that his response would be something like, “so long as they don’t initiate force against another man, they can do what they’d like.”

And how would the existence of such a system of justice not be operational only by the principle of might makes right, as opposed to the idea of a government of laws and not men?

If I’m right about all of this (and, full disclosure: most of these ideas are very very new to me; and I’ve certainly not tried to articulate them before)…

…then I believe that what I’m discussing is actually the full flower of “a government of laws and not men.” Or not even “laws,” per se, but enshrining the principle of the non-initiation of force at the very peak of governance.

After all, what gives a “monopoly government” its legitimacy? How does one man, or group of men, decide that they are capable and authorized to enact justice, and no other? Is it the first to claim that “he is the government”? Is it that act which grants him moral leave to initiate force against any other man who would make a similar claim? I suspect that historically this is so, in combination with the size of his rock or club – the very “might makes right” which perhaps (hopefully) you would decry.

But if might does not make right – if only right makes right – and if we take “right,” politically, to mean the observance of man’s rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force, then I think that we also must not initiate force against another man or group of men who are equally committed to protecting man’s rights through the principle of the non-initiation of force… even if that means that there is no such thing as a legitimate “monopoly” on these activities.

In one sense – viewing “government” as a particular set of defined institutions and individuals which have a monopoly on the administration of justice – this will seem like “anarchy,” despite what we’ve discussed above. In another sense, however, it can be understood that these “private courts” would actually be operating within one government – but it would be a government aligned around the principle of the non-initiation of force (which would have the only monopoly remaining: a philosophical monopoly), as opposed to being aligned around specific men and specific institutions. It would be a full recognition of the objectivity of justice, which does not derive its legitimacy from the “official” nature of those who enact it, but from the nature of the act itself – what is just is just, and what is not is not.

One wonders at how many people would read Ayn Rand’s novels if such a criteria as “well that seems rediculous on its face” were applied. And how do you expect to argue against a position if you won’t even investigate what that position is saying? It is one thing to display lack of comprehension of some point and strive to understand it, and maybe never succeeding, but it is quite another to say “I refuse to even look through Sr Galileo’s telescope, off to the index librorum prohibitorum with you!”

What would a ‘private court’ be?

And how would the existence of such a system of justice not be operational only by the principle of might makes right, as opposed to the idea of a government of laws and not men?

And why to be mora,l do free men need incentives?(begs the question of incentives provided by…?)

Alot of the reasoning behind the defense of the idea of a free market of legalism, at least coming from 2046, seems to be predicated on the idea of ‘incentives’,is this like the choice betrween the carrot and the stick? If so, who in reality gets to wield them? What is the rational way to determine who ‘gets to’ hold that power?

Every political system has a corresponding incentive structure. Monarchy has one structure of incentives, democracy another one, dictatorship another, communism, corporatism, whatever. Imagine if we got the idea that we wanted objective law, so we task Joe Jones with writing and enforcing all laws, which we trust he will do objectively. Now this kind of system would face certain incentives, for example, Joe Jones might find himself with all sorts of long-lost cousins, and people who suddenly want to be his best friend. That’s one type of incentive structure.

Now suppose we say that this a bad system because it does not provide its constituent agents an incentive to resolve disputes according to objective law, but rather incentivizes arbitrariness, cronyism, favoritism, bribery, etc. Would we feel much better if we then said, well we still want the Jones family to have a coercive monopoly, but instead we will have a better incentive structure if we decentralize the legal system with checks and balances and separation of powers. We’ll have Joe’s brother Jim exclusively writing all the laws, Joe will be restricted to just enforcing the laws that Jim writes, and good old Aunt Nene Jones will be the “final arbiter” of interpreting the laws that brother Jim writes. Well… okay this is probably better than Joe Jones doing all of these things, but it’s still a bad incentive structure for objectivity. It is in this way that limited government, through the principle of checks and balances and separation of powers, perhaps unbeknownst to its supporters tries to actually imitate the features of the market, but falls short at actually satisfying. And this helps to explain why limiting government in the long run has proven futile, and would probably not work, or at least, work as well as a fully decentralized free market legal order.

DonAthos said

After all, what gives a “monopoly government” its legitimacy? How does one man, or group of men, decide that they are capable and authorized to enact justice, and no other? Is it the first to claim that “he is the government”? Is it that act which grants him moral leave to initiate force against any other man who would make a similar claim? I suspect that historically this is so, in combination with the size of his rock or club – the very “might makes right” which perhaps (hopefully) you would decry.

Though the constitution of the United States is not a ‘perfect’ document, it is the closest mankind has gotten to founding a government of laws and not men. That the current society/culture has allowed those principles to be at the least corrupted or even blatantly ignored does not then mean that the idea of a constitutional republic vested with the monopoly use of justified force, that which is needed to protect all individuals within a society, is essentially flawed. By needed , I mean the idea that all are equal before the law means that those who break the law are accountable to the “law”, which would be the government( aside from the ideas of seperating specific jurisdictions eg states , federal, local municipalites, which should all ultimately comform to the principles of a constitutional republic, so in that sense it can be described as a ‘monopoly’ government).

Though the constitution of the United States is not a ‘perfect’ document, it is the closest mankind has gotten to founding a government of laws and not men.

This may be so. Where it falls short of “perfection,” it allows for (or even demands) the initiation of force against the people for whom government is supposed to be a protection against such force.

That the current society/culture has allowed those principles to be at the least corrupted or even blatantly ignored does not then mean that the idea of a constitutional republic vested with the monopoly use of justified force, that which is needed to protect all individuals within a society, is essentially flawed.

I have demonstrated the “essential flaw” of a “monopoly” on justified force in the arguments I have laid out, and which you have not addressed. That the preservation of a monopoly would require the initiation of force against those who would assert their own governance, even if they were not themselves initiating force, and even if they were acting in full concord with objective justice.

You are furthermore not even addressing that portion of my post(s) which you have quoted. Can you describe the process by which a “monopoly government” initially gains its legitimacy?

Since you have upheld the U.S. Constitution (and one assumes, by extension, the U.S. Government) as being “the closest mankind has gotten,” would you say that its inception was legitimate, despite, upon inception, upholding various features such as, to name one, slavery? Does that count as a legitimate government with respect to a philosophy which holds the non-initiation of force as its guiding political principle?

This may be so. Where it falls short of “perfection,” it allows for (or even demands) the initiation of force against the people for whom government is supposed to be a protection against such force.

I have demonstrated the “essential flaw” of a “monopoly” on justified force in the arguments I have laid out, and which you have not addressed. That the preservation of a monopoly would require the initiation of force against those who would assert their own governance, even if they were not themselves initiating force, and even if they were acting in full concord with objective justice.

You are furthermore not even addressing that portion of my post(s) which you have quoted. Can you describe the process by which a “monopoly government” initially gains its legitimacy?

Since you have upheld the U.S. Constitution (and one assumes, by extension, the U.S. Government) as being “the closest mankind has gotten,” would you say that its inception was legitimate, despite, upon inception, upholding various features such as, to name one, slavery? Does that count as a legitimate government with respect to a philosophy which holds the non-initiation of force as its guiding political principle?

Yes its inception was legitimate, it was written by men in the 18th century they had differing views on peoplehood. I am not sure how to answer you question , do mean that a government could only be legitimate if its guiding politcal principle were the non-initiation of force? I would say that the guiding principle should be the recognition and protection of individual rights. I do understand that the only way to actually violate rights is the use or threat of force, so perhaps basing guiding principles on force is more fundamental, but I am not sure.

Yes its inception was legitimate, it was written by men in the 18th century they had differing views on peoplehood.

They had “differing views”? All right. They had differing views – what of that? I’m interested in finding the objective criteria as to what makes a government legitimate, and I do not believe it depends on the subjective views that a group might have, per their time, their culture, etc. Folks in the Soviet Union, and etc., may have had “differing views on peoplehood.” I do not take it that, as a result, we must uphold that government as being “legitimate.” (Unless all government is somehow “legitimate.”) Do you take seriously the idea that man has rights of his nature? And that government’s purpose is to uphold and defend those rights? If that is true now, then it was equally true then… unless man’s fundamental nature has changed over the years.

So you say it was “legitimate,” and now I want you to describe what makes it so, in your view. Obviously it’s not respecting rights, or setting “might” on the side of “right,” because that didn’t happen then and has not happened subsequently. Unless I’m mistaken, coercive taxation was there from the beginning, and slavery as we’ve discussed, and if I were to investigate early American government, I suspect I could find all manner of other things that we would account rights violations. Do you disagree?

Now, what I mean by “rights violations” is 1) turning the very purpose of objective governance on its head, by setting the government against the citizens it is supposed to protect, and 2) an abridgement of an individual’s life, liberty, property, etc. So… should the individual whose rights are abridged – whose life, liberty, property is attacked by the government – regard that government as being “legitimate”? Should a man pronounced a slave by governance in the 18th century have respected that judgment, because after all, the legitimate monopoly government said that it was so, and people just didn’t know enough back then to be expected to do anything different?

What fealty does an individual owe to a government that does not respect rights – as no government on earth ever has – and what is the precise source of that obligation?

And further, how does an individual – or a group of individuals – become a legitimate government in the first place? Is it just a matter of getting a gun, pointing it at a group of heads and then proclaiming “I am the government now”? Does that carry moral force in impelling those targeted to bend their knee and obey my commands, because they must obey someone? Where does that moral force – the “legitimacy” of a government – come from?

(And btw, tadmjones, I’m not asking you these questions either because I think you must have the answers, or to pick on you, but because these are the questions I’m currently asking myself.)

I am not sure how to answer you question , do mean that a government could only be legitimate if its guiding politcal principle were the non-initiation of force?

Yes. I think so. I think that no individual should accept anything less.

Where a government is not guided by the non-initiation of force in its actions, it is initiating force. It is curtailing rights. Hurting the people it is meant to protect. To accept that morally (to grant it “legitimacy”), I think, is to concede that “some sacrifices must be made” where the “sacrifice” might be you, me, your father, my son, etc.

Yes its inception was legitimate, it was written by men in the 18th century they had differing views on peoplehood. I am not sure how to answer you question , do mean that a government could only be legitimate if its guiding politcal principle were the non-initiation of force? I would say that the guiding principle should be the recognition and protection of individual rights. I do understand that the only way to actually violate rights is the use or threat of force, so perhaps basing guiding principles on force is more fundamental, but I am not sure.

The relationship between force and rights is a very important one. At the beginning of his thread, I suggested that defenders of anarcho-capitalism read Understanding Objectivism. One of the key points covered in that book is the connection between the evil of force and individual rights.

The following is a brief summary of my own notes on this topic as taken from the book.

From the perspective of the hierarchy of Objectivism, the principle of the evil of the initiation of force is more fundamental than individual rights. However, this does not mean that you can move from the evil of force directly to politics and government (as anarchists typically do). Another step is necessary, and that step is the clarification of the nature of rights.

The nature of individual rights is the base of politics. When discussing rights—or any other issue related to politics—we must hold the context of everything that precedes politics, including all of ethics. The evil of the initiation of force is part of ethics. But one cannot proceed from “force is evil” to “government should ban it.” Government does not exist for the purpose of upholding morality. It cannot outlaw dishonesty or sexual promiscuity or pornography.

The principle relating ethics to politics is: What is moral in ethics must be possible in politics. Society must institutionalize the conditions which enable man to live morally. That’s why Rand defines rights as “conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival.”

“If a man has a right to his own life, then he has the right to take all those actions that are necessary, by his nature as a rational being, to sustain and protect it. In order to prove that a certain action is in fact a right, you have to prove that it is required by man’s nature.”

Ayn Rand, Objectively Speaking (p. 47)

Consider the implications of this for another ‘hot button’ issue with anarchists: copyright laws and patents. Objectivism says that, in accordance with the requirements of human life, a man should be able to profit from the efforts of his own mind. Therefore, he has the right to control who profits from his artistic creations and inventions. But the anarchist says that, because this will require “initiating” force to stop others from duplicating his work without permission, the artist and inventor has no such right.

The reason such anarchists cannot find any such “right” is that they have never grasped that the issue of the evil of the initiation of force is not a primary. Just that principle alone is not sufficient to build a political theory. It is necessary to understand why it is evil. It is not an axiom.

Paraphrasing Peikoff: If you start with the non-initiation of force as your axiom, there is no way to know how to interpret or apply that principle. That error alone–an error which reflects the epistemology of rationalism–underlies most of the massive folly called anarcho-capitalism.

I have no illusions that anarcho-capitalists will grasp this and suddenly “see the light.” The implications of this are obvious, but I am not about to waste my breath repeating myself while certain posters keep telling me that I have not ‘addressed’ this or that issue when I have addressed it over and over and over again. I have better things to do than to try convince anarchist “true believers.” My primary purpose in posting this is for the education of other readers on this thread.

For more clarification on this, please read Peikoff’s Understanding Objectivism.