DonAthos quoted Rand
The individual does possess the right of self-defense and that is the right which he delegates to the government, for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.
The right of self defense is delegated to the government, was Rand being ambiguous?
No. Rand wasn’t being ambiguous, yet this quote may not mean exactly what you want it to mean. Let’s try to unpack this, as best we can, and see what we find.
I take this quote as being a description of the nature of governmental power, and also an explanation as to why government exists in the first place – why men should want such a thing, and choose it. In sum, it explains the origin of governance, sourcing it in the individual’s right of self-defense, and appealing to man’s reason that he should adopt government according to the blessings that it can confer; the better defense of his rights. And let us remember that this is consonant with the idea that all “group rights” are ultimately nothing more than the application of the rights of those individuals which comprise that group; a “government” would have no power to make a court of law if the individuals within that government did not have that selfsame power.
However, you seem to take this quote as meaning that there is no choice for an individual to make – that in some attenuated (and I would argue meaningless) sense, he has a “right of self-defense,” but this right is metaphysically stripped from him (presumably before birth) to be vested in this other preexisting, eternal entity called “government,” regardless of the shape or form of the body currently calling itself government, and regardless of the individual’s will. That this is a singular, automatic transaction, taking place outside of space and time (rather like Christ’s self-sacrifice, sucking up the sins of the world), and it is irrevocable.
I disagree with what I view as your interpretation.
What does it mean to have a “right”? And what does it mean to “delegate” that right? Let us say that, everything else being equal, I have a “right” to go to the market and buy groceries. (Strictly I have the right to do anything that does not initiate the use of force against another man; so if the grocery store doesn’t want to have me, then I can’t go there, but bear with me for this example.) How can I “delegate” my right in this case? Surely, I could empower another person to be my purchasing agent – provide them with the funds, or etc., to buy the groceries that I desire.
Yet we will observe in this case that, in “delegating my right,” I have not lost any part of it. In empowering my purchasing agent to act on my behalf, I have not given up my own ability to go to the store myself. Neither is this some permanent arrangement existing outside of spacetime. It is a real world transaction that has all of the ordinary limits that we recognize of a general right of contract, or of association. Neither have I foreclosed from myself the option of further delegation.
An individual cannot be divested of his rights, however else we believe that such a “delegation” occurs; that is what it means to have a right in the first place. They are “inalienable.”
From “Textbook of Americanism”:
When we say that we hold individual rights to be inalienable, we must mean just that. Inalienable means that which we may not take away, suspend, infringe, restrict or violate—not ever, not at any time, not for any purpose whatsoever.
You cannot say that “man has inalienable rights except in cold weather and on every second Tuesday,” just as you cannot say that “man has inalienable rights except in an emergency,” or “man’s rights cannot be violated except for a good purpose.”
Either man’s rights are inalienable, or they are not. You cannot say a thing such as “semi-inalienable” and consider yourself either honest or sane.
So, what does that mean for us? It means that every individual has his full right of self-defense , and even those parts of it he has “delegated” to some other individual or group of individuals (as even a “government” is no more than this – it is just people) “for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.” Furthermore, whatever is involved in this “delegation,” it is fully reversible. A group of men may form a government on Tuesday and dissolve that same government on Wednesday; there is no supernatural power thereafter binding them together in perpetuity, because someone spoke the arcane word “government.” Men only work together in this – or any other fashion – according to their rational self-interest, and without physical force if we are to consider it just.
Remember:
If men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement.
This applies as much to the formation or maintenance of an official “state” as anything else. And if you mean to take from men their right to self-defense, or even “delegate” it, against their will, and leave them (literally) defenseless against such a government as you would proclaim legitimate, then you have initiated the use of force against them, and contravened the Objectivist Ethics entirely.
Now, let’s briefly consider a couple of examples to try to better understand what we’re talking about.
Suppose a man on an island, alone. We will call him Gilligan. Is Gilligan in full possession of his rights? Does he have his full right of self-defense? Or does he belong to some nebulous “government” (that simply has the misfortune of not actually existing yet) and thereby has he already “delegated” (and, per your view, lost) some portion of it, or the entirety?
But no. There is no government here, except for the man himself, insofar as he acts in self-defense and we recognize those actions as having the character of “governance.” Of course, in a political sense, there can be no “self-defense” without another person, and neither can there be politics!
So let us put somebody else on the island – the Skipper.
Now we have an island with two people. It is a small “society,” but it is a society. Do we have government yet? Has one of them somehow delegated his right of self-defense to the other? Or do they both automatically delegate their rights to a mystical abstraction of the two-acting-together – again, somehow? If one attacks the other – the Skipper always did resort to violence against poor Gilligan, after all – does the victim not have the right to defend himself (for his “government” cannot reach quorum to resolve the matter one way or the other)? I believe it would be nonsensical for Gilligan to do anything other than defend himself, according to his right of self-defense. He has not lost a wit of his rights, simply because someone else has appeared on the island.
Now suppose that the Howells show up and build a resort. And the Globetrotters are there, and suddenly a hundred, a thousand, a million other people move to this (apparently rather big) island. What now? Has Gilligan… somehow lost some part of his “semi-inalienable” rights? If that Million Others decides that they should get together and form a government – but they do not invite Gilligan to the meeting – is he automatically included in it anyways? Has he lost his rights to them at that point, on their say-so? Or suppose they divide the island in half and form two distinct governments… Gilligan’s hut lies right on the border, both governments eager that the other should take him and unable to reach consensus. Are we to say that Gilligan must give up his rights to someone, but now he gets a “choice” (of exactly two options)? Or does he yet have the right to withhold such a delegation altogether?
Per Rand and Objectivism, we would not force Gilligan to “contribute” to any government via tax. Per Rand and Objectivism, we would not force him to act in concert with any other man except “by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement.” Per Rand and Objectivism, Gilligan – as any other individual – has the right of self-defense. Remember the first portion of the quote that sent us down this rabbit-hole: “[Gilligan] does possess the right of self-defense…” and we know that this right, as they all are, is inalienable.
So what gives anyone else the “right” to draw a border around Gilligan’s hut and say that he has – against his will, and possibly even without his knowledge – delegated his individual rights, to them?
And beyond all of this, let us recognize that there is not – and never will be – any justice in initiating the use of force against Gilligan. However it gets sorted between the Professor, the Howells, Ginger and the rest in drawing up this new, political map of the island, they can take no legitimate action against Gilligan unless he initiates the use of force against another man.
If Gilligan were to declare himself his own government, that would not be an initiation of the use of force on his part. If he were to defend himself, according to his rights as an individual, that would not be an initiation of the use of force. If he were to establish a court and administer justice in as objective a fashion as anyone else on the island could manage, that would not be an initiation of the use of force. And that – his establishment of such a court – would provide the controversy around which this entire conversation turns in the first place. So please note: the two governments – Skipper’s Ship, and Howell Valley – would neither have any more justification for breaking up Gilligan’s court as he would for breaking up the ones that they establish.
But let’s leave Gilligan’s isle for a moment.
Suppose a person lives in Nazi Germany, and suppose that person has the temerity to consider himself an individual with rights and all that, despite his poor condition. Does that individual have a choice as to whether to “delegate” his right of self-defense to Adolf Hitler, Fuhrer and Chancellor for life, or whatever it was he was supposed to be? If he gets such a choice, should he do it? Would you?
The justification Rand gives for governance – as we turn to the second portion of the quote – is “for the purpose of an orderly, legally defined enforcement.”
Let us say that order is a “good” in an abstract fashion, where governance is concerned, as is “legally defined enforcement.” And perhaps we can “give the devil his due,” and admit that Nazi Germany was both orderly, and its law was characterized by “legal definition.” (Now, if we were to look closely at the historical record, I’m sure we could find arguments on either side – as with any actual government – but again, please bear with.) If you were Jewish, let us say, your life might be legally defined as forfeit, and you would be taken by train to the place of your execution in as orderly a fashion as you could wish.
So what then? In the name of government, and because you believe yourself to have already (somehow!) “delegated” your rights of self-defense to the tender mercies of Hitler and Co., would you willingly obey their commands – recognizing them as the legitimate rulers of your land, and yourself?
I should hope not! I should hope that you would fight like a wildcat! (Or fight in whatever manner was most effective, at least; perhaps, at times, more like a mosquito.) And in what name should you fight? Upon what justification? Why, in your own name, and justified by your own rights as an individual, which – as it turns out – you never actually lost, whatever you were supposed to have “delegated.” (Because: inalienable.)
If we delegate our right of self-defense to the government, even in the limited sense that I’m talking about, then we do so because (per rational self-interest) we judge it to promote our life. But we cannot delegate ourselves to “government, as such.” There exists no “government, as such,” but only actual governments with actual laws and actual people enforcing them. And whatever good may come of “order” and “legal definition,” they are only good when in the service of the principle of the non-initiation of force. Order and legal definition, when in the service of the initiation of force, just gets the train on time to Auschwitz.
And so we find that it is in an individual’s interest to delegate his right of self-defense to an agency committed to the non-initiation of force… but not otherwise. And even once he has “delegated” this right, it is still his. If and when he is attacked, by any individual or group and including the agency to which he has delegated his right, he retains the power and the moral legitimacy to fight back. In every event, this “delegation” does not authorize a given government to initiate the use of force against anybody – and to bring it all back home, this applies equally to the construction of a new court of objective justice.
I don’t mean to suggest that because Rand said such and such makes it true, but I’m not using quotes to prove my point.
Neither am I “using quotes to prove my point,” but I am making arguments and sourcing them in other arguments which – given the nature of this board – I expect you will find familiar, and with which you have some basic form of agreement.
But that may be a mistake. After all, it could be that you don’t really believe in the non-initiation of force (as it ultimately appears was true of other participants here). But I’m not here to argue for the non-initiation of force, per se. That justification would require its own thread/discussion, just as it would if you were suddenly to argue against what I’m saying by appealing to some general skepticism or mysticism or something (i.e. “God told me that a monopoly government is the way to go!”) I am taking it for granted that you agree with me on matters of Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics – since these form the foundation of political argument – and my use of quotes is meant to remind you of that upon which we are presumed to agree.
But again, if you have God on your side, then I’m not going to convince you of anything here. I need you to already be open to reason.
My over all point is that courts are an instrument of government, that can not exist apart from that function. I think the idea of a private court is a floating abstraction, and no arguments here have dissuaded me of that view.
That is just as well. None of my arguments are meant to convince you of the term “private court,” which I long ago (in this thread, and directly in response to you no less) said was a contradiction in terms:
For after all, the idea of a “private court” is ultimately a self-contradiction, is it not? Insofar as the word “private” is meant to mean apart from governance, and that role which government is meant to play in effecting justice within a society, there can be no “private court”; every court is government of its nature. Equally suspect is the term “anarchy,” thrown around in this thread and elsewhere. To suggest that the creation of an additional court which provides objective justice means to have no government whatever is flawed on its face, when we’re actually talking about a net increase in… uh… archy.
Do you see? I agree with you that “courts are an instrument of government.” And I agree that a court “can not exist apart from that function.”
There are many ways of looking at this concept of a “private court.” Once such way is to view it as the creation of a “new, separate government” from the original “monopoly government.” And another way to view it – and my preferred way, because I believe it to be apt – is that it is not actually a separate government at all, but merely a new legal institution within the one proper monopoly government, where the political monopoly consists of the principle of the non-initiation of force, and its implementation throughout society:
In one sense – viewing “government” as a particular set of defined institutions and individuals which have a monopoly on the administration of justice – this will seem like “anarchy,” despite what we’ve discussed above. In another sense, however, it can be understood that these “private courts” would actually be operating within one government – but it would be a government aligned around the principle of the non-initiation of force (which would have the only monopoly remaining: a philosophical monopoly), as opposed to being aligned around specific men and specific institutions. It would be a full recognition of the objectivity of justice, which does not derive its legitimacy from the “official” nature of those who enact it, but from the nature of the act itself – what is just is just, and what is not is not.
Again, I ask: do you see? If we were to establish a country, bound by the political ideal (as set forth by Ayn Rand) of the non-initiation of force, we would need some mechanism by which to enforce this. That any citizen, acting in the capacity of “government,” could administrate justice – so long as he did so in an objective fashion – would be one such mechanism. As it turns out, and as I’m arguing, it would be the only mechanism fully consonant with the non-initiation of force. That is to say, it is the only ethical system of government available.
From the modern point of view, where government is presumed to rest in a predefined set of institutions, and individual citizens have no right of self-defense (except what government allows them), that would look like utter anarchy. (Just as, I’d assume, someone who believed in the Divine Right of an Absolute Monarch would find the United States with its checks and balances and overlapping jurisdictions and state assemblies and democratic institutions like propositions and judicial oversight and etc., utterly anarchic.) But really? It’s not anarchy at all. It is objective government, yet radical to our current way of thinking, and easily misunderstood.