The Possible, Impossible & Supernatural

Metaphysics and Epistemology
1

Before discovering Objectivism, I used possible to mean “something that has not been demonstrated to be contradictory with known truths” and impossible to mean “something that has been demonstrated to be contradictory with known truths”. Objectivism, however, holds that some evidence is required for something to be deemed possible. For example, I would have said that gremlins are theoretically possible (although arbitrary), but Objectivism does not. It regards the two as mutually exclusive.

Recently I was having a discussion with a friend about God. She agreed with me that God is arbitrary and that many conceptions of God are metaphysically impossible. However, she holds that the conceptions of God which are not metaphysically impossible (e.g., a creator that abides by the laws of reality) are still possible. And so it seems that she used possible in the way that I had before. How would one demonstrate that this usage is wrong and the Objectivist usage is correct?

Lastly, I have a related question about the supernatural. Searching the forums, it seems that Objectivists have defined the supernatural as “apart from/above reality”, i.e., conflicting with reality. But witches and goblins, which are often classified as supernatural, aren’t impossible, just arbitrary. So why is the supernatural defined as such? Are there two different concepts of “supernatural”, one being more philosophical?

2

It’s not so much that Objectivism requires evidence for the possible to be possible. For example, it is possible that there are animals on this planet that humans have never seen (something that happens quite regularly).

Objectivism makes the distinction between possible, impossible, and arbitrary. The arbitrary might exist, but without any evidence to support it, it’s simply dismissed.

Goblins and Witches, in their common uses, are both arbitrary AND impossible. They possess magic, magic is impossible, and so they are too. A similar argument applies to God. God is arbitrary and impossible.

3

It’s not so much that Objectivism requires evidence for the possible to be possible. For example, it is possible that there are animals on this planet that humans have never seen (something that happens quite regularly).

In OPAR, Dr. Peikoff says, “A conclusion is ‘possible’ if there is some, but not much, evidence in favor of it, and nothing known that contradicts it. … For an idea to qualify as ‘possible,’ there must be a certain amount of evidence that actually supports it. If there is no such evidence, the idea falls under a different concept: not ‘possible,’ but ‘arbitrary.’” So, according to that passage, some evidence is required.

Regarding the idea that there are undiscovered animals on this planet, there is evidence for this claim. a.) The fact that the planet is a tremendously vast place which has not been thoroughly explored, b.) there have been many animals discovered in all sorts of places around the world, and c.) we discover animals still today, all qualifies as evidence. So I don’t think this is an example of something that is arbitrary and possible.

Objectivism makes the distinction between possible, impossible, and arbitrary. The arbitrary might exist, but without any evidence to support it, it’s simply dismissed.

In the quote from OPAR, it seems that Dr. Peikoff regards possible and arbitrary mutually exclusive categories because “possible” requires some evidence whereas “arbitrary” indicates the lack of it. So according to the quote, the statement that “The arbitrary might exist,” is false because it’s just another way of saying, “The arbitrary is possible,” i.e., there is some evidence for it, which by definition there isn’t.

Granted that the Objectivist usage of “possible” requires evidence, how can one demonstrate it to be correct, as opposed to the usage presented in my first post?

Goblins and Witches, in their common uses, are both arbitrary AND impossible. They possess magic, magic is impossible, and so they are too. A similar argument applies to God. God is arbitrary and impossible.

Given that magic itself is arbitrary, I don’t know if we can say it’s impossible because we don’t know what its nature would be. I probably would not consider magic and all of its manifestations to be impossible. For example, it’s conceivable that magic powers utilize some unknown source of energy, which is by no means impossible, but most definitely arbitrary. If such was the nature of magic, would witches, etc. no longer be considered supernatural?

4

Granted that the Objectivist usage of “possible” requires evidence, how can one demonstrate it to be correct, as opposed to the usage presented in my first post?

Take the point seriously i.e. treat it as it is. dictionary.com defines arbitrary in several ways, but the most relevant here would be:

“4. capricious; unreasonable; unsupported: an arbitrary demand for payment.”

There’s a straight, down-the-line difference between arbitrary and possible. “Arbitrary” refers to the unsupported, and there’s no known indication that the claim would be supportable. “Possible” refers to something that could be substantiated. Again, philosophy is for living as a human here in this world. We constantly depend on evidence. In fact, we often do it to the point of taking the circumstances completely for granted.

For example, a person can have their respective daily routine so thoroughly automatized that he may forget how he got from a given point A to a point B. That person might literally forget how he arrived at a location. If someone said, “Well, gremlins got you here.” _That_ is an arbitrary claim; it is by no means the only possible arbitrary claim that could be made in this regard. If someone else said that, “You must have had your mind on something else which you consider much more important.” That is a possibility. People have behaved that way before. Also, you’ve likely had that experience and recognized it for what it is if you were following a well-worn routine. That is, there’s some sort of a real-world indication that the premise can be supported.

Dr. Peikoff makes a good point here: http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/certainty.html

"You cannot challenge a claim to certainty by means of an arbitrary declaration of a counter-possibility, … you cannot manufacture possibilities without evidence …

All the main attacks on certainty depend on evading its contextual character …"

5

Some people get confused because they assume “not possible” and “impossible” are the same thing. Most people literally don’t have a conceptual niche for assertions which should be regarded as cognitively meaningless. Usually the conversation goes something like this:

Theist: “Until you prove there is no God, you should regard it as possible.”

Objectivist: “Not until you give me some reason to think it’s possible.”

Theist: “On what grounds do you say it’s impossible?”

Objectivist: “I don’t. I say it’s arbitrary.”

Theist: “Well, it’s either possible or it’s not, and you’re saying it’s not possible, so you have to prove it’s impossible.”

Objectivist: “Let me tell you why there can’t be any actual infinities.”

See the problem? That’s two different conversations with a very bad segue. For what it’s worth, I’ve found it useful, as soon as I realize I’m about to have this sort of conversation, to explicitly define the two stages of argument. First, that there is no cognitive merit to the claims made by the theist. This doesn’t disprove their claims, it just shows that there’s no reason to take them seriously. The second stage is to humor them and point out the logical inconsistencies in their notion of God. I’ve usually found that, if you point out the difference between those two, you never actually have to get to the second part - by the time you’ve finished explaining why you can’t grant a “maybe” to something without evidence, the second part is pretty obviously superfluous. They may not agree with you, since almost no one changes their mind in the middle of an argument, but they will at least be more likely to understand where you’re coming from.

The most important part is to cut off their avenue of rationalization. Many theists are very good at modifying their notion of God on the spot. I actually worked one guy down to “maybe God is just an alien with really good technology” once… after many excruciating hours of mutually inept back-and-forth. Now I entirely refuse to make even *one* point against the logic of God until I’ve entirely established the rules of evidence. Saves time.

–SpiralTheorist–

6

Recently I was having a discussion with a friend about God. She agreed with me that God is arbitrary and that many conceptions of God are metaphysically impossible. However, she holds that the conceptions of God which are not metaphysically impossible (e.g., a creator that abides by the laws of reality) are still possible. And so it seems that she used possible in the way that I had before. How would one demonstrate that this usage is wrong and the Objectivist usage is correct?

First, you have to specify what you/she means by “create”; what is being created and by what means?

Even in your friends’ case, she’s misused the concept of “possible.” She still has no evidence to support her claim that such a being exists. When a person declares that something is “possible,” it isn’t enough for them to have “some evidence in favor” of their claim–they must also explain what a complete proof would consist of:

…To determine whether a fact is ‘evidence,’ therefore, one must first define what proof of a given claim would consist of. Then one must demonstrate that the fact, although inconclusive, contributes to such proof, i.e., strengthens the claim logically and thus moves the matter closer to a cognitive resolution. If one has no idea what the proof of a conclusion would consist of–or if one holds that a proof of it is impossible–one has no means of deciding whether a given piece of information ‘tends to prove’ it. If the terminus of a journey is undefined or unknowable, there is no way to judge whether one is moving toward it.

To demonstrate that the Objectivist usage is correct, you would have to understand that all knowledge is contextual, and that every item of knowledge stands or falls with its context, with its relations with other cognitive elements which condition it. But this may be too large of a topic to discuss at 4:37 in the morning.

Lastly, I have a related question about the supernatural. Searching the forums, it seems that Objectivists have defined the supernatural as “apart from/above reality”, i.e., conflicting with reality. But witches and goblins, which are often classified as supernatural, aren’t impossible, just arbitrary. So why is the supernatural defined as such? Are there two different concepts of “supernatural”, one being more philosophical?

I like Chops’ answer regarding this. In the context of human knowledge up to this point, there’s no evidence whatsoever for “magic” or “magical creatures,” and magic as it used as a concept would contradict known facts.

7

I understand that the Objectivist use of “possible” requires some evidence. What I don’t understand clearly is why the definitions I presented are wrong – not just how they conflict with the Objectivist view – but what in reality necessitates them to be defined differently.

When forming or validating a definition, one must look at its referents. The referents for the concept of “possible,” I think, are the statements themselves which are deemed possible. My friend (and many people like her) refer to different statements as possible than an Objectivist would. But I don’t think she’s breaking any epistemological rules. She understands that arbitrary statements should not be considered until or unless evidence is discovered for them. Though, she may regard arbitrary statements as possible, too, because evidence for them may be discovered in the future, and that’s all she means by it.

To demonstrate that the Objectivist usage is correct, you would have to understand that all knowledge is contextual, and that every item of knowledge stands or falls with its context, with its relations with other cognitive elements which condition it.

I’m not exactly sure what you mean. I understand that knowledge is contextual, but can you elaborate as to why that necessitates the Objectivist definition of “possible”? Thanks!

8

I understand that the Objectivist use of “possible” requires some evidence. What I don’t understand clearly is why the definitions I presented are wrong – not just how they conflict with the Objectivist view – but what in reality necessitates them to be defined differently.

I was arguing with an Agnostic once about God and “possibility,” and then I brought up “Rand’s Question”: What facts of reality give rise to the concept? (see Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, ch. 5 on definitions). Here’s what I said:

Think about it for a second: What facts of reality give rise to the concept of “possible”? The fact that man does not automatically go from ignorance to knowledge, and the fact that certain complicated, high-level conclusions take a certain amount of evidence in order to be validated. Can anything that is claimed by man to exist be “possible”? No. What then makes a claim not “possible,” but “arbitrary”? Whenever a claim is made that is deliberately detached from facts, in which no evidence is given which supports/proves it. How is a man supposed to make an actual claim to something’s “possibility”? By stating what a proof of something’s existence would be, and then showing logically how a certain amount of evidence leads slightly, but not mostly (probable) or entirely (certainty), to such a proof. Isn’t the above description a type of “objectivity”? Yes, establishing the current evidential status of a certain amount of evidence in relation to what would be considered a complete validation of a claim is a type of “objective judgment.” Do we need a concept that designates a certain amount of evidence which leads slightly towards a proof of a given claim, but not substantially or completely towards such a proof? Yes, the concept we need is "possible.

To put it another way, “possible” is not an isolated item of knowledge, from which any statement can be made and deemed “possible.” To know if something is “possible” is to already know in advance what would make that thing “probable” and even “certain.” The concepts “probable” and “certain” are a part of the context which validates the concept “possible.” Indeed, “possible” has no meaning apart from its relationship to “probable” and “certain.”

This is why I think the definitions you gave is wrong. If “possible” means “something that has not been demonstrated to be contradictory with known truths,” then whatever could “probable” mean? “Something that really hasn’t been demonstrated to be contradictory with known truths”? That definition, and the definition of possible you gave, are nonsensical.

I’m not exactly sure what you mean. I understand that knowledge is contextual, but can you elaborate as to why that necessitates the Objectivist definition of “possible”? Thanks!

I hope my statements above have answered your question. I’ll try to clarify if you don’t grasp it.

9

Thanks, Acount Overdrawn, your walkthrough of the concept helped. :frowning: