Where does A is A come from?

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world

Imaginary conversation, with my imaginary son:

“Dad, what’s the definition of entity?”

“It’s self-evident!”

“Okay, but what is it?”

“An entity is a thing you perceive!”

“Like a galaxy?”

“No, you have to hold it in your hand!”

“What about a pile of acorns?”

“No, that’s more than one entity! You perceive each acorn, and your mind makes up the concept ‘pile!’”

“What if they’re glued together and I pick them up in one piece.”

'That’s a secondary entity - you perceived the acorn first, the pile is secondary, even if they’re glued!"

“What about a popcorn ball?”

“Caramel or marshmallow? - no, wait, … doesn’t matter - entity!”

“What about a forest, is that an entity?”

“That’s a secondary entity, because the trees aren’t all one thing!”

“But if I see it from a mile up, I can’t see the trees.”

“Okay, then it’s an entity!”

“What if I see it from half a mile up?”

“Then the trees are entities, and you make up the forest!”

“What if the guy next to me is short-sighted, and can’t see the trees, is it a forest to him, and trees to me?”

“No! There’s only one reality, and it’s not different for different people!”

“Well then, which is it?”

“You’re normal; he’s abnormal. Secondary!”

“What if it’s on TV?”

…

(etc.)

Yup, I’m still trying to figure out what an entity is…

Imaginary conversation, with my imaginary son:

<snip>

Yup, I’m still trying to figure out what an entity is…

I’ve been debating with myself as to whether or not I should even respond to this, since you are being a smart ass; but the hell of it is, even though you were being a smart ass, you almost got it right.

Returning to the topic of this thread, where does A is A come from; well, it comes from the observation of entities, and effectively says that an entity is what it is: A thing is itself. So, if you don’t grasp what an entity is, then you are not going to get “A is A”.

In other words, the side tracking of the discussions to entities was not irrelevant, but was very much germane to the topic of the thread.

A drinking glass is a drinking glass, it is not a puff of attributes hanging around together or constructed from our sensory manifold or constructed from our consciousness – it exists and it is one thing. If one drops it and it shatters, then each pieces – each little sliver of glass – becomes an entity, becomes many things. But the glass is not many things when it is all one thing, it is a drinking glass.

When you grasp that, then you will be on the road to recovery and can begin to take Objectivism seriously.

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world; and Robert is trying to figure out what consciousness is by looking at a medical scan. Both of you are starting at the wrong place – in mid-stream.

Having a working human brain is sufficient for knowing what consciousness is. I was looking for a mind in the scan. I did not find it.

Bob Kolker

I’ve been debating with myself as to whether or not I should even respond to this, since you are being a smart ass; but the hell of it is, even though you were being a smart ass, you almost got it right.

Sorry, I know I was being a smart-ass, but intended no disrespect. The point of the dialog was to illustrate that the concept “entity” evades attempts at specific exemplary definitions. (or maybe just examples of what they are not )

Even Peikoff falls into the trap when he states that air is not an entity*. That example leads us to an entity-less attribute (hot or humid), which contradicts Rand’s definition of ‘attribute.’ The contradiction forces us to challenge the premises:

1 - Air is not an entity.

2 - No attribute can exist without an entity.

3 - Air has attributes.

I assert that metaphysically, (3) is true. Therefore, either (1) or (2) must be false, because (1) and (3) disproves (2), while (2) and (3) disproves (1). So which is false? Choosing the principle over the example, I’m forced to accept that attributes belong to entities, and that air is therefore an entity.

This leads me to the next tough question: Does an entity exist without perception? If so, and I believe Rand’s answer is ‘yes,’ then the definition of entity as “what is given in sense perception” leads to another contradiction. If the illusions we spoke of earlier are not “entities” then how can they be “given in sense perception.” This leads us perhaps to a refinement of entity as “a thing existing in reality which is given in sense perception.” This leads us in turn to a new challenge, which is defining “existing in reality” in terms of our sensory perception. That is where the hard work of philosophy takes place, and at first glance I believe it has to do with a recognition of the non-contradictory nature of “real” percepts.

(Moderator, since this discussion is off-topic, would it be worthwhile to split it off into “what is an entity?”)

*:

“An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities.”

  • Leonard Peikoff, “The Philosophy of Objectivism” lecture series (1976), Lecture 3.

Does an entity exist without perception? If so, and I believe Rand’s answer is ‘yes,’ then the definition of entity as “what is given in sense perception” leads to another contradiction. If the illusions we spoke of earlier are not “entities” then how can they be “given in sense perception.” This leads us perhaps to a refinement of entity as “a thing existing in reality which is given in sense perception.” This leads us in turn to a new challenge, which is defining “existing in reality” in terms of our sensory perception. That is where the hard work of philosophy takes place, and at first glance I believe it has to do with a recognition of the non-contradictory nature of “real” percepts.

I stress once again, that the term “entity” is defined ostensibly – by pointing to things that exist; i.e. a drinking glass, a baseball, a cigarette, a small rock, an acorn, etc. The fact that it is given ostensibly is why there really is no formal definition of the term “entity”. And once again I will stress that entities are not created via perception; so, sure, there are entities out there that we do not perceive directly – i.e. dust mites, bacteria, atoms, etc.

However, the reason we don’ t consider air (or other fluids) to be an entity is that it is not one thing and doesn’t act as one thing. One can get eddies and currents in fluids, which you don’t get in entities – i.e. if one spins a glass and stops it, it stops; whereas if one stirs a glass of tea, and then stops stirring, all kinds of eddies and currents begin to form, so it is not acting as one thing.

You might consider this to be some sort of philosophic problem, but it isn’t; the problem is in your grasp of existence, and the fact that you refuse to start at the perceptually self-evident.

To answer Robert, the existence of the mind is also self-evident and does not require any knowledge of the brain in order to be confirmed. One day, we will better know the relationship between the brain and the mind; and with modern medicine for easing or curing of mental disorders are one such connection. In other words, due to research, it can be shown that a chemical imbalance or a brain disorder can lead to improper thinking, or at least make proper thinking difficult. If the hardware isn’t functioning properly, then the workings of the mind are not functioning properly either. Nonetheless, one does not start in understanding this relationship at the level of the brain, but rather at the level of introspection such that one is aware that one is aware – i.e. that one has a consciousness. Otherwise, the existence of the brain and its functionality is unrecognized. Introspection is what leads us to realize that we have a mind; a combination of introspection and extrospection leads us to realize there is a connection between mind and brain. But without introspection and the ready knowledge that we are aware that we are aware, then knowledge of the brain has no purpose. In other words, without the realization that we have introspection, the benefits of certain medications would be unknown to both the researcher and the patient. People take certain medications because they realize that by taking these medications they can think more clearly – i.e. they realize the medication is working, not by looking at a brain chart, but by their direct experience, as is confirmed by asking them.

I stress once again, that the term “entity” is defined ostensibly – by pointing to things that exist; i.e. a drinking glass, a baseball, a cigarette, a small rock, an acorn, etc. The fact that it is given ostensibly is why there really is no formal definition of the term “entity”. And once again I will stress that entities are not created via perception; so, sure, there are entities out there that we do not perceive directly – i.e. dust mites, bacteria, atoms, etc.

However, the reason we don’ t consider air (or other fluids) to be an entity is that it is not one thing and doesn’t act as one thing. One can get eddies and currents in fluids, which you don’t get in entities – i.e. if one spins a glass and stops it, it stops; whereas if one stirs a glass of tea, and then stops stirring, all kinds of eddies and currents begin to form, so it is not acting as one thing.

You might consider this to be some sort of philosophic problem, but it isn’t; the problem is in your grasp of existence, and the fact that you refuse to start at the perceptually self-evident.

If air is not an entity, but air has attributes, then the attributes of air are entity-less attributes.

If I’m wrong, where is my error?

But Rand asserts:

“Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities”

  • Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 18.

How is this not a contradiction?

(This is not an attempt at a trap, but a serious question. I do take Objectivism seriously, which is why I question any premise which leads to a logical contradiction.)

Thanks,

~A

If air is not an entity, but air has attributes, then the attributes of air are entity-less attributes.

If I’m wrong, where is my error?

The problem is that you are being rationalistic in order to try to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities. But, there are no floating attributes.

Air can certainly be considered an entity in the secondary sense – and it is in this sense that it can have attributes – i.e. the air in my room is 70 degrees, or this patch of air near the thermometer is 32 degrees. Something like temperature does not exist without there being something there that can be hot or cold. This is true even for radiation, like infrared radiation, which is not an entity in the primary sense but can be spoken of as if it is an entity (entity in the secondary sense).

But if you are not going to start with the perceptually self-evident, you are just not going to get it.

Sometimes I wonder why people are that way – why they want to reject Objectivism or aspects of Objectivism. I don’t think the answer is always that they are being evasive, but rather that they have accepted ideas that divert them from perceiving existence first-hand. Somewhere, you have accepted the idea that the sensory manifold or consciousness creates entities. Or that it is by integrating attributes by a conscious effort that you get entities. You need to check those premises.

The problem is that you are being rationalistic in order to try to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities. But, there are no floating attributes.

I’m not sure what is meant here by “rationalistic,” but it appears to be a substitution of an imprecisely chosen word* with negative connotations for the more applicable word: “rational.”

The method used by the rational mind to perceive, identify and integrate the material provided by the senses is: logic. Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification.

So let me restate using the correct term: “The problem is that you are being rational in order to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities.”

Yes, I believe I’m being rational, but no, the conclusion is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?).

Peikoff’s exclusion of fluids from entities leads to contradictions which are resolved only through the fudging of terms. To allow contradictions to exist under the cover of an undefined modifier, “secondary,” is a violation of logic and an abrogation of reason. Without a precise definition, “secondary” is a floating abstraction, which apparently means: “any entity which does not meet my definition of entity.” A kind of circular anti-reasoning. I’ve searched for a definition of “secondary,” and the closest I’ve found is “an entity composed of other entities,” referring, in two cases, to “society” and “culture.” These are abstractions which can only be recognized by the rational integration of perceived entities. I suspect that was the original intent of “secondary,” and it is indeed a useful and discriminatory term. Air does not meet this definition of “secondary,” because I can see it (in the presence of suspensions of solid or liquid particulates) and I can feel it, not only its radiated heat, but haptically and kinesthetically, when it blows against me. Water, another apparently excluded entity, most certainly can be touched and seen.

This observation is not a rejection of Objectivism; it is meant to explore and resolve an apparent contradiction in a specific interpretation. (which contradiction I don’t believe existed in Rand’s writing)

* This assumes that we have the same concept in mind when using the term “rationalistic”: “The doctrine that reason alone is a source of knowledge and is independent of experience.”

Peikoff’s exclusion of fluids from entities leads to contradictions which are resolved only through the fudging of terms. To allow contradictions to exist under the cover of an undefined modifier, “secondary,” is a violation of logic and an abrogation of reason. Without a precise definition, “secondary” is a floating abstraction, which apparently means: “any entity which does not meet my definition of entity.” A kind of circular anti-reasoning. I’ve searched for a definition of “secondary,” and the closest I’ve found is “an entity composed of other entities,” referring, in two cases, to “society” and “culture.” These are abstractions which can only be recognized by the rational integration of perceived entities. I suspect that was the original intent of “secondary,” and it is indeed a useful and discriminatory term. Air does not meet this definition of “secondary,” because I can see it (in the presence of suspensions of solid or liquid particulates) and I can feel it, not only its radiated heat, but haptically and kinesthetically, when it blows against me. Water, another apparently excluded entity, most certainly can be touched and seen.

I am surprised by this. While I am no L.P. fan, I find it amazing that L.P. would deny that fluids are entities. Fluids turn out to be ensembles of simpler entities (molecules) but as an ensemble, fluids have very specific attributes and characteristics (density and viscosity). Any little child who has splashed the water in his bathtub or watched as the soapy stuff circles the drain knows that water, the fluid, is -something-. Some of the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers identified water (not water qua H20, but water as instantiation of fluidity) as the basic Stuff of the world. Earth is just water with an infinite viscosity, so to speak and air is water with low density etc etc.. So the early Greek thinkers used fluids and fluidity to comprehend the sensible stuff of existence. Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

Could you provide a reference for the presumed defect in what L.P. is teaching?

Thank you.

Bob Kolker

I’m not sure what is meant here by “rationalistic,” but it appears to be a substitution of an imprecisely chosen word* with negative connotations for the more applicable word: “rational.”

You continue to be rationalistic; and, no, by that I do not mean rational. There are no floating attributes. Period. End of story.

You’ve got this notion in your mind that you can have attributes without entities, when all you have to do is look at the world and perceive that there is no such thing. That’s why it is rationalism – or the idea that one’s ideas are superior to existence. And then you try to make arguments based on a misunderstanding of a key aspect of Objectivism, leading to further rationalism.

Stop thinking about how attributes fit together, and start looking at the world.

Once again, a Coke can is not a set of attributes that somehow cling to one another. It is an entity. And one cannot grasp the attributes of an entity without first grasping the entity qua entity. Concepts of attributes are abstractions from abstractions. One conceptualizes the entity, and then one can move on to conceptualizing its attributes.

One aspect of being rationalistic is to overlook the obvious; like someone trying to deduce that we don’t have free will because we are made of matter, when free will is as clear as you being aware of your own mind. Similarly, it is a clear as day that there are entities, but you would rather come up with an argument for their existence, instead of simply perceiving them.

Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities – at least not in the primary sense.

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities – at least not in the primary sense.

Did you bother to see that I was asking the prior poster to document his claims?

Bob Kolker

Did you bother to see that I was asking the prior poster to document his claims?

I’m not questioning the source. I’m saying I agree that a fluid is not an entity.

If one has a block of solid ice, that is an entity. If it melts and runs all over the place, it is no longer an entity. If the block of ice sublimates, it is no longer an entity. Neither the puddle of water nor the water gases are acting as one thing. In a secondary sense, one can say that the puddle is an entity, in the sense that one can mentally isolate it from the dry areas of the floor, but it is not one thing. Likewise,if the gases tend to stay in one certain area, say near the floor if it is cold, then one can mentally isolate the fog from the clear air, but the fog is not an entity, except in the secondary sense of the term “entity.”

Both the water and the fog are something, as opposed to being nothing, but neither is an entity.

I am surprised by this. While I am no L.P. fan, I find it amazing that L.P. would deny that fluids are entities. Fluids turn out to be ensembles of simpler entities (molecules) but as an ensemble, fluids have very specific attributes and characteristics (density and viscosity). Any little child who has splashed the water in his bathtub or watched as the soapy stuff circles the drain knows that water, the fluid, is -something-. Some of the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers identified water (not water qua H20, but water as instantiation of fluidity) as the basic Stuff of the world. Earth is just water with an infinite viscosity, so to speak and air is water with low density etc etc.. So the early Greek thinkers used fluids and fluidity to comprehend the sensible stuff of existence. Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

Could you provide a reference for the presumed defect in what L.P. is teaching?

Thank you.

Bob Kolker

“An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities.”

  • Leonard Peikoff “The Philosophy of Objectivism” lecture series (1976), Lecture 3.

I want to stress that this is not an argument against Objectivism, only against a specific interpretation by one individual.

You continue to be rationalistic; and, no, by that I do not mean rational. There are no floating attributes. Period. End of story.

I know that you do not mean “rational” when you write “rationalistic.” I think I made the distinction perfectly clear. Could you please provide a definition of “rationalistic?”

You’ve got this notion in your mind that you can have attributes without entities (etc.)

Nothing could be further from the truth.

I’ll quote myself from my post:

“Yes, I believe I’m being rational, but no, the conclusion [that you can have attributes without entities] is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?).”

Where in that do you find me claiming that attributes exist with entities?

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities – at least not in the primary sense.

Could you please provide a definition of “primary” and “secondary” in this context?

I’m not real good with floating abstractions.

Thanks,

~A

I’m not questioning the source. I’m saying I agree that a fluid is not an entity.

If one has a block of solid ice, that is an entity. If it melts and runs all over the place, it is no longer an entity. If the block of ice sublimates, it is no longer an entity. Neither the puddle of water nor the water gases are acting as one thing. In a secondary sense, one can say that the puddle is an entity, in the sense that one can mentally isolate it from the dry areas of the floor, but it is not one thing. Likewise,if the gases tend to stay in one certain area, say near the floor if it is cold, then one can mentally isolate the fog from the clear air, but the fog is not an entity, except in the secondary sense of the term “entity.”

Both the water and the fog are something, as opposed to being nothing, but neither is an entity.

Okay, so what about glass? What about caramel? What about honey? What about maple syrup? Where, in the spectrum of viscosity, do you draw the line between entities and “secondary” entities (whatever that might mean). I assert that the distinction based on “fluidity” is arbitrary and evades the principle of what an entity truly is.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

I’ll quote myself from my post:

Where in that do you find me claiming that attributes exist with entities?

Could you please provide a definition of “primary” and “secondary” in this context?

I’m not real good with floating abstractions.

Thanks,

~A

Could you please provide a definition of “primary” and “secondary” in this context?

I’m not real good with floating abstractions.

Thanks,

~A

See Aristotle 2b 6-7. A primary substance is something that cannot be said of another substance. Which is to say that it is not a genus. It is a particular in itself. In the Greek a this (meaning -this- thing in itself and not dependent in being or meaning on another thing). An ontologically or logically prior object (sometimes Aristotle conflates ontology with semantics or semiotics). He elaborates on this matter in -Physics- and -Metaphysics-. Aristotle does a lot of heavy lifting concerning these matters in Book VII (Zeta) of his Metaphysics. Be prepared to sweat a bit.

Bob Kolker

Yes, I believe I’m being rational, but no, the conclusion is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?).

<snip>

* This assumes that we have the same concept in mind when using the term “rationalistic”: " The doctrine that reason alone is a source of knowledge and is independent of experience."

Perhaps I misunderstood you, but the two bolded entries above are saying the same thing.

The following is an example of rationalism:

Things made of matter do not have free will

Man is made of matter

Therefore man does not have free will

Even though this is “logical” in the sense of not being internally contradictory, going by the facts (example and experience) man most definitely has free will.

You are starting at a mid-level conceptualization when you say that an entity is something that has attributes, and therefore if something has attributes therefore it is an entity. Starting at the perceptually self-evident level, one perceives entities and then must abstract out the attributes; not the other way around. Entities are given in perception – a cup, a glass, a candle,etc. – getting to the mental isolation of its attributes is a level higher than perception.

I find it funny that this thread has continued to grow.

Agrippa: you have managed to get Thomas to argue with you about the specific nature of entities when you haven’t even acknowledged that entities exist!!! As attested to here:

I see you’re holding on tenaciously to the entity as the irreducible primitive of perception, although I see some cracks.

By declaring the primacy of entity is self-evident, you are eschewing any need to prove your point of view. I accept that, logically, but I remain skeptical of the asserted principle.

In order to make any sense of the questions you’re asking we would first need to know what your fundamental view of reality is.

Is it: Primacy of existence or Primacy of consciousness;

do you think that existence exists, that there is one reality and that it exists independent of consciousness, that consciousness perceives what actually exists?

OR

do you think that reality only exists in the mind, that the mind constructs the reality that we see, that there is no one objective reality, that reality is different for each person?

If you need perceptual proof, just open your eyes; if you need conceptual proof, just try to frame an argument or say a sentence without accepting that existence exists.

If this question seems pedantic to you, your answer is not so obvious to me, because of what you say below (with emphasis added):

I believe Rand, in her hatred of Kant, may have overshot the mark when attacking his philosophy, and in doing so rejected his premises and any possibility of a causal (and thus vulnerable) processing chain between reality and perception , when in fact she only needed to recognize the weak links in his logic to reject his conclusions.

Are you leaving open the possibility of some sort of feedback loop in which one’s consciousness can alter reality?

Also, I think you should be careful about challenging the logic of Ayn Rand’s position when you have admitted that you don’t know her position.