So where's the solution to the 'Problem of Universals'?

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Fortunately for you, I saw your massive edit in time and didn't waste time pointing out the consequences of your remarks. I'm glad that you recognized the problem.

[ed: this is directed at "Ogg" and his last post, which was massively edited.]

That's actually mistaken. A percept is the product of perception, not the object perceived. For example, note what Rand says on p. 5: "A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality." Thus an actual apple is not a percept.

I didn't massively edit, I clicked the wrong button, added a small paragraph at the end, but it turned out all right. It became one post instead of the two that I wanted. The small paragraph at the end was to be posted separately. That small paragraph was the only edit made, and it wasn't supposed to be an edit at all but its own post.

You're right to correct him. Sensations are components of percepts. But I prefer his idea of 'percept' over Rand's. Now it is just a matter of correcting his idea about his interpretation - because it is not Randian, it is his own theory - and then convincing all of you that Rand's theory of percept-formation shouldn't be there at all, it serves no function, it only adds confusion, and her theory of concept-formation doesn't need the percept anyway. It couldn't function, however, without the implicit concept.

[DavidOdden]

I should add here that Rand's theory of concept-formation requires no percepts. Implicit concepts, yes, but not percepts.

Given (and in the context of this forum you must assume it) that a concept is an integration of two or more mental units, what do you think the "implicit concept" of a reindeer is, the first time a man sees a reindeer. What is the "implicit concept" underlying the Asian pear apple, for the man who sees one for the first time? Are you confusing "implicit concept" with "potential concept"? That is, if you see a white reindeer and then a yellow-brown one, have you seen two implicit concepts (there are two percepts)? Show me how the sense organs create "implicit concepts" (we have no innate concepts), and how integration of implicit concepts into actual concepts works. If you do that, I'm certain that we'll see that you have simply renamed "percept" and are using the expression "implicit concept" -- in a way that is different from how Rand used it.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

The post didn't turn out all right after all. I did massively edit - and mistakenly deleted my whole post, resending only a small edit I added at the end. So now I'll have to repost my response and hopefully you'll explain where the evil consequences are found in denying the mental entity 'percept' but not the faculty of perception. As I have stated, I see nothing but good consequences for Rand's theory; it is not only falsely asserted on the basis of unwarranted evidence, it adds nothing to the theory of concept-formation to follow.

She started with a theory of perception that has not been validated and is probably false, based on some alleged scientific theory which she neglected to bring forward, expecting her readers to take it for granted as true, and glossing it over with a veneer of scientific reputability.

In the absence of any evidence, even indirect, I cannot be expected to declare the concept of a 'percept' to be a valid one. Yes, it's in the dictionary, but so is "ghost." Yes, I looked at the world, and there wasn't a single percept in sight.

What elements of the concept do you have doubts about? For example, do you doubt that a living entity perceives? Do you dispute that there is some thing (other than an actual apple) in the mind of a being that perceives an apple? Do you contend that this mental object is constructed by reasoning, based on something else (what else)? For example, do you believe that a percept is constructed from a set of primitive measurements of light wavelength, amplitude, very complex light-and-dark measurements sewn together into some huge equation that represents a Jpeg of an apple? Your objection to "percept" smells exactly like the standard mechanicalist / physicalist objection to "mind", that you've never seen a mind separated from a brain. Surely you wouldn't engage in that fallacy.

As I said before, that is a lot of questions. I don't doubt that a living entity perceives, I doubt that it perceives on the basis of integrations of a chaos of sensations into percepts. It perceives by means of the faculty of perception, for purposes of survival, procreation, etc.

I believe there is something in the mind of a being that perceives, I believe there is conscious awareness.

I don't believe in a percept, in Rand's theory of it at least, so I don't believe one is constructed.

I believe that Rand's theory smells of some kind of mechanicalistic interpretation, although not yet an objection to 'mind.' That is the next step. Because of her constant analogies with data and information-processing, which is not exactly physical but definitely virtual (as in virtual space or virtual machine, i.e., software programming), the next step is for Objectivism to reduce all of the mind to something virtual, and then mechanical, just as a computer is basically a mechanical thing with virtual processes.

The analogies with virtual computer functions is not necessary. They were not necessary before computing machines were invented, and they are not necessary now. It is not my theory that smells mechanistic, it is Rand's. My theory has no need for it. A computer is what a computer is, the mind is what the mind is, I don't reduce it to anything except what it is, the mind.

p. 5: "A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality.

...

Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery".

If it is science, thus falsifiable, then it doesn't belong in a work of philosophy which supposedly deals with eternal and non-falsifiable principles, the necessary and "axiomatic" in reason.

I take it your answer is 'no.'

I take it you acknowledge that your question is meaningless or self evident. Percepts exist, and they are in the mind.

But percepts, as mental entities dependent upon the existence of physical entities, are not self-evident. Do they bring self-evidence? Perception does, I'll agree with that.

Therefore, I refuse to believe in percepts. I perceive, grasp and apprehend reality by means of perception, not by means of percepts, which are presumably mental entities requiring physical entities in order to exist. I have no use for it, perception (of entities) is good enough.

So you contend that there is an action of perceiving, but that this is a cause without an effect (the result of perceiving, which is a percept). How does the mind retain nothing? I wonder if next you plan to deny the existence of concepts?

A mind retains something: memories of prior perceptions. Where is the cause? - in the entities; where is the effect? - in the perception of entities which is awareness. Awareness is not possible without something to be aware of, but this doesn't require any notion of percepts. The rest, as Rand stated, should be left up to science, if there is any scientific hypothesis to be found in it. But what science cannot do is bridge the gap between the physical and the mental. Whatever awareness is, beyond some physical process, will not be routed out by science. That is the province of metaphysics. And it cannot be explained away in terms of mechanistic, computer IT "data-processing" analogies.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Given that clarification, I think you would agree that a universal is not a percept -- i.e. it is not something available to the senses. A universal is also not like radio waves or x-rays or atoms, something that actually exists in reality apart from man's mind that we can use special instrumentation to detect.

So, the question becomes: OK, so what is a universal? If it is not something that we perceive and it does not have an existence apart from man's mind, then what the heck is it?

Miss Rand's answer was that a universal is something the human mind does with the percepts (with that which is available via perception), and what the human mind does is omit the measurements and compact those observations into a concept.

I retained all this as the core of your discussion of universals in that response, keeping your previous clarification in mind about what you consider a percept to be. And I am in agreement with it. I like your theory, but I do not like Rand's theory, in which sensations are components of mental entities called 'percepts,' and that is not at all equivalent to your definition of 'percept' which is not a mental entity. As far as I can tell, for you it is a concept pointing to the fact that something is perceivable, within the range of possible human perception, in distinction to that which is not (atomic particles and such). Sounds good to me.

But then, while implicitly rejecting Rand's idea of what a percept is, you use your own (highly valuable) idea of a percept in explaining a universal, claiming it to be part of Rand's answer. So I'll have to ignore your assertion that Rand had anything to do with your idea of 'percept.'

And your answer is, man takes what is available to the human mind, omits the measurements, and retains whatever is necessary to complete the concept by universalizing it -- it is true for all instantiations of that concept, and for all time. Otherwise, what does it mean to be a universal, if it is not true universally but also eternally? It is therefore a concept of metaphysics, because only metaphysics can grant such potency to a concept. The only question remains, where does metaphysics come from? Where do its concepts come from?

Is a universal a concept, as Rand claimed in the Foreword? If it is, it is no concept of entities, as you said: it is therefore either a concept of method or a concept of consciousness. Or please tell me, what kind of concept is a universal?

Edited February 24, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I should add here that Rand's theory of concept-formation requires no percepts. Implicit concepts, yes, but not percepts.

Given (and in the context of this forum you must assume it) that a concept is an integration of two or more mental units, what do you think the "implicit concept" of a reindeer is, the first time a man sees a reindeer. What is the "implicit concept" underlying the Asian pear apple, for the man who sees one for the first time? Are you confusing "implicit concept" with "potential concept"? That is, if you see a white reindeer and then a yellow-brown one, have you seen two implicit concepts (there are two percepts)? Show me how the sense organs create "implicit concepts" (we have no innate concepts), and how integration of implicit concepts into actual concepts works. If you do that, I'm certain that we'll see that you have simply renamed "percept" and are using the expression "implicit concept" -- in a way that is different from how Rand used it.

Notice, first of all, in the text itself (ITOE, p. 6), that Rand completely drops the notion of a 'percept,' then goes on to discuss the stages of development: entity, identity, unit. But what is the 'building-block' of all this, mentioned back on page 5? Is it the percept? No. It is the concept of an 'existent.'

Thus, Rand's theory of concept-formation, which begins on page 6, does not require the concept of a 'percept' found back on page 5.

Whatever way in which Rand used the term 'implicit concept,' I haven't actually discussed it here yet. So

I don't see how you can say that I used it in a way different from the way Rand used it. If Rand has renamed 'percept' to say 'implicit concept,' that is not my problem, and I see no mention in the text that they are synonymous expressions. I don't know if 'implicit concept' means 'potential concept,' I can't speak to any of that at present. I tend to stick with the text, not my interpretations of it or any jargonizing of it. The jargon that exists (e.g., entity, percept, implicit concept) should be sufficient to explain her meaning, which is plain and clear for all to see, like I said before, not at all obscure or Kantian.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Notice, first of all, in the text itself (ITOE, p. 6), that Rand completely drops the notion of a 'percept,' then goes on to discuss the stages of development: entity, identity, unit. But what is the 'building-block' of all this, mentioned back on page 5? Is it the percept? No. It is the concept of an 'existent.'

Thus, Rand's theory of concept-formation, which begins on page 6, does not require the concept of a 'percept' found back on page 5.

I've re-read the introduction and the first chapter to ITOE.

I think we need to step back a minute and realize what the human mind does by introspection. I think it is pretty obvious that our mind does not take actual apples, pears, and water melons and compact these together into the concept "fruit". If one compacts all these actual fruits together, one gets fruit juice, not a concept. The apples, pears, and water melons don't actually enter the mind at all; what happens is that we are aware of them via the senses which brings information to the mind. The human mind can then do things -- processes -- with that awareness.

I think the concept "percept" the way Miss Rand uses the term is meant along those lines. So, I stand corrected. We are aware of apples, pears, and water melons via direct perception, but our mind is not doing processes on these entities, but rather doing processes on the awareness of these entities in the mind that results in concepts. And that awareness of those entities is the percept.

The point she was making regarding an infant's level of awareness versus a young child versus an adult -- the level of sensations, the level of percepts, and the level of concepts -- is there simply to show the stages of man's cognitive abilities. I will grant you that asserting that infants are only aware on the level of sensations would be a scientific theory that would require validation before being accepted; and that this would be outside the province of philosophy; except insofar as one can make direct observations about infants, and realize that they do not mentally grasp the world in terms of entities. I haven't studied infants, nor read much about them, so I can't affirm or deny that observation.

On the young child level, it is certainly clear from my observations of them, that they mentally grasp entities -- that is they are aware of cups and glasses and books, etc. I've been around enough young children and have been one myself, and I remember having that ability. I don't remember the stage of being an infant, so I couldn't tell you from my own memories if as an infant I was only aware of sensations.

On the adult level, I am certainly aware of entities when I look out at the world, and that this does not require any volitional effort on my part. That is, it is not necessary for me to volitionally process the data of the senses in order to be aware of entities. I just open my eyes and I perceive entities. This ability is actually a part of the validation of the senses, which Miss Rand did not go into in ITOE. She basically says to take it for granted that the senses are valid -- i.e. give us true information about the world. Dr. Peikoff in OPAR goes into more details on this topic. In essence, because the process of being aware of existence via the senses is automatic and non-volitional, it is valid.

In short, it is necessary to distinguish the apple and our awareness of the apple. We do not mentally process the apple, but rather we mentally process our awareness of the apple; and thus are able to remember it and to conceptualize it (more than one apple).

So,when Miss Rand says that a percept is an automatic integration, it means that we are aware of entities (on the adult level), rather than being aware of sensations (of individual cellular inputs of data). Thus the percept -- our perceptual level awareness of entities -- can be (volitionally) processed into a concept, and that concept is "entity."

One's awareness of apples, pears, and water melons can then be compacted together using measurement omission into the concept "fruit."

But this process of forming a concept covers or subsumes all fruits everywhere for all time, thus making it universal. It is not as if the concept exists outside of man's mind, nor that it persists, say after death, as some sort of metaphysical entity. It is the result of a mental processing of information -- of compacting via measurement omission -- and does not have an existence outside of the human mind. One can say that a concept is something, that it is definitely an existent, but I don't know that I would call it an entity (unless one is very specific in calling it an entity of the human mind).

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Notice, first of all, in the text itself (ITOE, p. 6), that Rand completely drops the notion of a 'percept,' then goes on to discuss the stages of development: entity, identity, unit. But what is the 'building-block' of all this, mentioned back on page 5? Is it the percept? No. It is the concept of an 'existent.'

Thus, Rand's theory of concept-formation, which begins on page 6, does not require the concept of a 'percept' found back on page 5.

I've re-read the introduction and the first chapter to ITOE.

I think we need to step back a minute and realize what the human mind does by introspection.

Psychology again, not philosophy. But, moving along...

I think it is pretty obvious that our mind does not take actual apples, pears, and water melons and compact these together into the concept "fruit". If one compacts all these actual fruits together, one gets fruit juice, not a concept. The apples, pears, and water melons don't actually enter the mind at all; what happens is that we are aware of them via the senses which brings information to the mind. The human mind can then do things -- processes -- with that awareness.

I think the concept "percept" the way Miss Rand uses the term is meant along those lines. So, I stand corrected. We are aware of apples, pears, and water melons via direct perception, but our mind is not doing processes on these entities, but rather doing processes on the awareness of these entities in the mind that results in concepts. And that awareness of those entities is the percept.

I'm glad you see it that way. Let me just add this: the brain, which is what Rand talked about on page 5, might be "processing" "data" and "integrating" "information" or whatever IT terminology someone wants to use to explain it; however, none of that matters in the philosophical context. But you're discussing psychology, and it doesn't matter in that context either.

At the end there, I'm not sure if you're going back on your previous definition of what a 'percept' is, which I found quite nicely put.

The point she was making regarding an infant's level of awareness versus a young child versus an adult -- the level of sensations, the level of percepts, and the level of concepts -- is there simply to show the stages of man's cognitive abilities. I will grant you that asserting that infants are only aware on the level of sensations would be a scientific theory that would require validation before being accepted; and that this would be outside the province of philosophy; except insofar as one can make direct observations about infants, and realize that they do not mentally grasp the world in terms of entities. I haven't studied infants, nor read much about them, so I can't affirm or deny that observation.

On the young child level, it is certainly clear from my observations of them, that they mentally grasp entities -- that is they are aware of cups and glasses and books, etc. I've been around enough young children and have been one myself, and I remember having that ability. I don't remember the stage of being an infant, so I couldn't tell you from my own memories if as an infant I was only aware of sensations.

We're supposedly not aware of sensations in themselves at any stage, not in the absence of perception, at any rate. We can isolate individual sensations from acts of perception, but that is all. While psychology calls those 'sensations,' philosophy calls those 'qualia.' So we're obviously not pondering any philosophical issue here. But whenever I try to raise a philosophical issue, I get shot down for discussing philosophy -- on a philosophy forum.

On the adult level, I am certainly aware of entities when I look out at the world, and that this does not require any volitional effort on my part. That is, it is not necessary for me to volitionally process the data of the senses in order to be aware of entities. I just open my eyes and I perceive entities. This ability is actually a part of the validation of the senses, which Miss Rand did not go into in ITOE. She basically says to take it for granted that the senses are valid -- i.e. give us true information about the world. Dr. Peikoff in OPAR goes into more details on this topic. In essence, because the process of being aware of existence via the senses is automatic and non-volitional, it is valid.

I don't believe he goes into any more than detail, which is to say, he offers a more detailed version of Rand's stolen concept counterargument -- which is a negative, circular proof, not a positive one. Because the issue does not involve merely the validity of the senses, but the conceptual process by which we know they are valid, and this cannot be grounded by an appeal to the senses or by simply thumbing our noses at the opposition and saying "you can't prove it." It is, indeed, the opposition which is saying, "you can't prove it, either." And the problem is -- lacking any positive, logical, philosophical form of proof from the Objectivist side of the aisle, either in ITOE or in OPAR -- they are apparently right in their assertion. The skeptical crowd can't prove a negative anyway, but the other side can't even seem to prove a positive which I would think to be a far easier task than proving a negative. The skeptical crowd doesn't have to prove a negative, it only has to thumb its collective nose back at you and point out the fact that your side hasn't proven its own positive assertion about the validity of the senses.

In short, it is necessary to distinguish the apple and our awareness of the apple. We do not mentally process the apple, but rather we mentally process our awareness of the apple; and thus are able to remember it and to conceptualize it (more than one apple).

So,when Miss Rand says that a percept is an automatic integration, it means that we are aware of entities (on the adult level), rather than being aware of sensations (of individual cellular inputs of data). Thus the percept -- our perceptual level awareness of entities -- can be (volitionally) processed into a concept, and that concept is "entity."

One's awareness of apples, pears, and water melons can then be compacted together using measurement omission into the concept "fruit."

But this process of forming a concept covers or subsumes all fruits everywhere for all time, thus making it universal. It is not as if the concept exists outside of man's mind, nor that it persists, say after death, as some sort of metaphysical entity. It is the result of a mental processing of information -- of compacting via measurement omission -- and does not have an existence outside of the human mind. One can say that a concept is something, that it is definitely an existent, but I don't know that I would call it an entity (unless one is very specific in calling it an entity of the human mind).

ITOE, p. 156 - AR: Concepts 'are mental concretes. You are now discussing an integration of mental entities. "Concept" refers to mental entities.'

It's just like I said before here, experience (including everything in it, such as concepts) is given as a continuity, otherwise it would not be experience. And this continuity is even granted while asleep or unconscious. The continuity of experience is logically equivalent to the continuity of existence. 'It is only conceptual awareness that can grasp and hold the total of its experience—extrospectively, the continuity of existence; introspectively, the continuity of consciousness—and thus enable its possessor to project his course long-range. It is by means of axiomatic concepts that man grasps and holds this continuity, bringing it into his conscious awareness and knowledge.' (ITOE, p. 57) Rand does not place those two ideas about continuity into any kind of primary-secondary relationship. I take it that they are logically equivalent, although one may presuppose the other in its conceptual development. Metaphysical primacy, however, is another matter. Metaphysical primacy is given over to existence; epistemological primacy is given to conscious experience, without which no knowledge of any of this primacy would even be possible.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I don't believe he goes into any more than detail, which is to say, he offers a more detailed version of Rand's stolen concept counterargument -- which is a negative, circular proof, not a positive one. Because the issue does not involve merely the validity of the senses, but the conceptual process by which we know they are valid, and this cannot be grounded by an appeal to the senses or by simply thumbing our noses at the opposition and saying "you can't prove it." It is, indeed, the opposition which is saying, "you can't prove it, either." And the problem is -- lacking any positive, logical, philosophical form of proof from the Objectivist side of the aisle, either in ITOE or in OPAR -- they are apparently right in their assertion. The skeptical crowd can't prove a negative anyway, but the other side can't even seem to prove a positive which I would think to be a far easier task than proving a negative. The skeptical crowd doesn't have to prove a negative, it only has to thumb its collective nose back at you and point out the fact that your side hasn't proven its own positive assertion about the validity of the senses.

Let me add to this, before someone else says it: no skeptic has to use the validity of the senses to deny them, all he has to do is point to your lack of positive proof, shrug his shoulders and ask, "If they are valid, then why can't you prove it?"

[agrippa1]

Thus, Rand's theory of concept-formation, which begins on page 6, does not require the concept of a 'percept' found back on page 5.

I think you're missing a step in the process if you drop the percept.

Introspectively, it is clear to me that there is a step taken to go from the canvas of vision, that is, fields of varying brightness, hue and intensity, to the perception of entities of reality.

The process is one of isolating an entity from its visual context into what I believe Rand refers to as a "percept." I don't think you can get around this step prior to concept-formation because the actual entity, which exists external to the mind, must be "grasped through" perception and held in the mind as a mental entity. The isolation from visual context is done via visual cues which include visual demarcation lines, focal length disparities (fuzzing of context in front of and behind an entity), and the fore- and back-ground disparities resulting from unaligned stereo vision.

I believe the process of going from a purely sensual experience of reality, to a perceptual experience, involves the mental creation of a model of reality, on which the directly perceived sensation of vision is continuously superimposed in a continuing process of validation, refinement and correction. How we make that model, and the percepts which compose it is a mystery to me, but I know that I think in terms of a three-dimensional reality which "exists" in my mind and correlates to perceptual inputs, even when direct visual sensation is absent or incomplete.

The percept is the first point at which we understand that "something" exists "out there." From that percept, and from all percepts, we proceed to the conceptual experience of reality. The entity does not exist as an "entity" in our visual canvas (even though it does exist in reality), but as a set of fields of color and light. It is through our mental reconstruction of the entity using learned or programmed cues that we perceive the entity as a percept. We do not directly grasp the entity into our minds.

I'm not clear as to how we go from the sensual to the perceptive, if it is learned as we differentiate and integrate the undifferentiated chaos, or if man has evolved automatic tools which convert stereoscopic, focal, electromagnetic sensation into percepts of entities. (or if it is some of both)

As a question to you, though, which I believe demonstrates the validity of the percept: How does your theory explain the perception of "false" entities, such as objects represented in a painting or on the screen of a TV? Mentally, we perceive from these images, entities of reality, but metaphysically we know them to be just artificial representations of entities. How do you explain the mental equivalence of an object and its mere image, without the intermediating percept?

Edited February 24, 2008 by agrippa1

[DavidOdden]

Let me add to this, before someone else says it: no skeptic has to use the validity of the senses to deny them, all he has to do is point to your lack of positive proof, shrug his shoulders and ask, "If they are valid, then why can't you prove it?"

After the shoulder shrug, he has crossed the concept-stealing line. If you simply deny the claim that the senses are valid -- best delivered in 6 year old bratty brother tones saying "Nuh-uhh!" -- then you have the skeptics position in its best form. Once you start talking of "proof" or "validity", then you presuppose certain things such as "knowledge" and "fact". A "proof" implies some kind of a relationship between a mind, a statement, and aspects of existence. You can dispose of brats by reminding them that they have no proof that you did not give a proof.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Thus, Rand's theory of concept-formation, which begins on page 6, does not require the concept of a 'percept' found back on page 5.

I think you're missing a step in the process if you drop the percept.

Introspectively, it is clear to me that there is a step taken to go from the canvas of vision, that is, fields of varying brightness, hue and intensity, to the perception of entities of reality.

The process is one of isolating an entity from its visual context into what I believe Rand refers to as a "percept." I don't think you can get around this step prior to concept-formation because the actual entity, which exists external to the mind, must be "grasped through" perception and held in the mind as a mental entity. The isolation from visual context is done via visual cues which include visual demarcation lines, focal length disparities (fuzzing of context in front of and behind an entity), and the fore- and back-ground disparities resulting from unaligned stereo vision.

I believe the process of going from a purely sensual experience of reality, to a perceptual experience, involves the mental creation of a model of reality, on which the directly perceived sensation of vision is continuously superimposed in a continuing process of validation, refinement and correction. How we make that model, and the percepts which compose it is a mystery to me, but I know that I think in terms of a three-dimensional reality which "exists" in my mind and correlates to perceptual inputs, even when direct visual sensation is absent or incomplete.

The percept is the first point at which we understand that "something" exists "out there." From that percept, and from all percepts, we proceed to the conceptual experience of reality. The entity does not exist as an "entity" in our visual canvas (even though it does exist in reality), but as a set of fields of color and light. It is our mental reconstruction of the entity using learned or programmed cues that we perceive the entity as a percept. We do not directly grasp the entity into our minds.

I'm not clear as to how we go from the sensual to the perceptive, if it is learned as we differentiate and integrate the undifferentiated chaos, or if man has evolved automatic tools which convert stereoscopic, focal, electromagnetic sensation into percepts of entities. (or if it is some of both)

As a question to you, though, which I believe demonstrates the validity of the percept: How does your theory explain the perception of "false" entities, such as objects represented in a painting or on the screen of a TV? Mentally, we perceive from these images, entities of reality, but metaphysically we know them to be just artificial representations of entities. How do you explain the mental equivalence of an object and its mere image, without the intermediating percept?

The first thing I noticed about all this is that you referred to a mental entity, called it a 'percept,' but you gave me no concrete example, that I can visually see, to help me understand exactly what this mental entity is. Rand has her own idea of 'mental entity,' but that is always with reference to concepts, not percepts. Granted I can't see concepts, but I know what they are because they take the form of thoughts, words, propositions, language. Percepts, however, as entities, seem to take no form at all, there is nothing that I can go by to describe them. Once I use a word it becomes a concept, such as 'entity.' So if you say I have percepts of entities, I will just say: I have the concept 'entity,' I perceive entities, but percepts in this Randian sense are nowhere to be found.

So then you ask me a question, and all I can really say in response is: Is it possible for me to respond to your question without granting positive, albeit mental, reality to the word 'percept'? Indeed it is. I don't perceive the mental equivalence of an object, I perceive an object. There is no Indirect Realism involved here. Rand claims that this percept brings direct awareness, but of what? Of the percept? But the problem you give me has to do with illusions of entities in the forms of external images on TV or in a painting. In that case, I perceive the image in accordance with a mental interpretation of the image, not the interpretation of an image or illusion brought to me in the form of a percept, but the interpretation of an image or illusion given in my perceptual field.

The given in awareness, as you may amply see by now, is not the percept, but the entity being perceived, or better yet, its perception in the mind. Anything else, regarding mental entities that aren't concepts, would involve images from perceptual memory. So in that case I would take care not to confuse the memory image with the real entity of perception. For example, in many cases throughout ITOE we are not given any real example to work with, only images of reality taken from memory, so that it is not necessary to look at an actual table, I only have to call up an image of one from memory, or an imaginary one that doesn't exist in reality, or whatever image works for the example.

Let me add to this, before someone else says it: no skeptic has to use the validity of the senses to deny them, all he has to do is point to your lack of positive proof, shrug his shoulders and ask, "If they are valid, then why can't you prove it?"

After the shoulder shrug, he has crossed the concept-stealing line. If you simply deny the claim that the senses are valid -- best delivered in 6 year old bratty brother tones saying "Nuh-uhh!" -- then you have the skeptics position in its best form. Once you start talking of "proof" or "validity", then you presuppose certain things such as "knowledge" and "fact". A "proof" implies some kind of a relationship between a mind, a statement, and aspects of existence. You can dispose of brats by reminding them that they have no proof that you did not give a proof.

That is proof by negatives: you are requiring that the skeptic prove a negative, to prove that a proof doesn't exist.

But he is simply asking you to produce the proof, he is not stealing anything.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

After the shoulder shrug, he has crossed the concept-stealing line. If you simply deny the claim that the senses are valid -- best delivered in 6 year old bratty brother tones saying "Nuh-uhh!" -- then you have the skeptics position in its best form. Once you start talking of "proof" or "validity", then you presuppose certain things such as "knowledge" and "fact". A "proof" implies some kind of a relationship between a mind, a statement, and aspects of existence. You can dispose of brats by reminding them that they have no proof that you did not give a proof.

I pressed reply to this post, but it added the reply to the bottom of another post that I had already sent. At least that's how it appears in my browser. Just thought I'd give you a heads up.

[agrippa1]

I pressed reply to this post, but it added the reply to the bottom of another post that I had already sent. At least that's how it appears in my browser. Just thought I'd give you a heads up.

That's what happens when you post in quick succession.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Psychology again, not philosophy. But, moving along...

I'm glad you see it that way. Let me just add this: the brain, which is what Rand talked about on page 5, might be "processing" "data" and "integrating" "information" or whatever IT terminology someone wants to use to explain it; however, none of that matters in the philosophical context. But you're discussing psychology, and it doesn't matter in that context either.

I've come across this before, the claim that most of what Miss Rand wrote, such as in ITOE, is psychology and not philosophy. According to you, what is philosophy and what is psychology? I'm just trying to understand where you are coming from. Are you trying to say that any conclusions one reaches that involves introspection, such as concept formation, is psychology because it involves introspection?

At the end there, I'm not sure if you're going back on your previous definition of what a 'percept' is, which I found quite nicely put.

Yes, I'm taking it back, in context. In one sense, according to my dictionary, a percept is the object of awareness; which I took to mean actual apples and oranges, and cars, etc. Miss Rand does seem to be using the term differently, and even defines it differently, and by her definition and usage, it is more the awareness of entities, not the entities themselves. As I have pointed out, one does not do anything mentally with actual apples and pears to form the concept "fruit", but rather it is our awareness of apples and pears that is transformed into the concept "fruit."

[agrippa1]

The first thing I noticed about all this is that you referred to a mental entity, called it a 'percept,' but you gave me no concrete example, that I can visually see, to help me understand exactly what this mental entity is.

Okay, the handle on that coffee cup on your desk in your office. "Reality" is the totality of the swash of light which your eyes capture, focus on your retina and convert to electrical signals into your brain. The handle of the coffee cup, which is isolated from the context of your visual canvas, is grasped as a mental entity, and represents an entity of reality, is a "percept." The areas of color and light which are EM energy reflected from the entity in reality and absorbed by your retinas, continuously reinforce the percept in your mind, allowing you to observe the attributes of that entity.

Without the "percept" how do you isolate the entity from the rest of reality? How do you justify, metaphysically, the separation of the handle from the coffee cup from the table, from the study, from the house, from the land it sits on, except through the perception of something called an "entity" which you define as a perceptually separable piece of reality? The "entity," that is, the separable piece of reality, is separable by virtue of what metaphysical criteria? I contend: none. The perceived entity is an analog, in reality, of the percept, and may or may not be metaphysically justifiable as a separable entity.

The percept provides the implicit criteria of separation and allows you to grasp the "thing" as an "entity" of reality. Introspection and scientific inquiry can lead us to some good guesses as to the perceptual criteria that create the perception of an "entity" but they are reconstructions of what the mind actually does in separating and isolating any particular entity as a mental percept.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The process is one of isolating an entity from its visual context into what I believe Rand refers to as a "percept." I don't think you can get around this step prior to concept-formation because the actual entity, which exists external to the mind, must be "grasped through" perception and held in the mind as a mental entity.

I don't think Miss Rand held that a percept is a mental entity, but rather it is the awareness of the entity mentally. Introspectively, I am aware of entities that are available via perception -- that is I am aware of cars, apples, drinking glasses, etc. -- it's like an awareness of awareness. I look and I see cars and apples and such, then I am aware mentally that I am aware of these entities.

And while it is necessary for some aspect of the mind to isolate out entities from the background, this is part of what the senses do automatically. I look at my wall, for example, and I see a framed picture hanging there. I don't have to put forth any conceptual volitional effort into the differentiation of the picture frame from the wall; it just happens. This is what Miss Rand means by the perceptual level.

I believe the process of going from a purely sensual experience of reality, to a perceptual experience, involves the mental creation of a model of reality, on which the directly perceived sensation of vision is continuously superimposed in a continuing process of validation, refinement and correction. How we make that model, and the percepts which compose it is a mystery to me, but I know that I think in terms of a three-dimensional reality which "exists" in my mind and correlates to perceptual inputs, even when direct visual sensation is absent or incomplete.

To go from the level of sensations to the level of percepts is automatic, and does not require a prior model of existence to work. If you want to use an analogy, our eye is like a camera lens, and the image falls on the retina and is automatically processed by the visual cortex into our awareness of entities. On the camera film, there is no need to isolate out the boundaries, that happens automatically as the light falls onto the film. Similarly, the light falling onto the retina and being processed by the visual cortex is automatically registered as light and dark patches, or different colored patches, that is then automatically integrated together into our awareness of entities. In other words, that part of being aware is done by the nervous system, which is automatic, and not by the mind per se -- or at least not done by the conscious volitional mind. All one has to do is to look and one perceives entities.

As to the modeling of existence, such as me being able to think about my place of work (including details) even when I am not there, I think that is taken care of by memory. I guess one could call it modeling in a sense, but I don't think they are mental entities. They are rather recalling and being able to manipulate our past awareness or future projected awareness. That is, I'm not sure Miss Rand ever referred to percepts as mental entities in the sense you are trying to say. We are aware of entities, and we can remember them, and we can manipulate them (our awareness of them) in our mind's eye so to speak. It's an interesting line of thought, but it goes back to: What is a percept? Is Miss Rand using it in the sense of a mental entity, or our awareness of entities? I think she means our awareness of entities.

By the way, this has been an enjoyable long weekend for me. Though I do participate in these discussions even during work days, I've had four days to do what I wanted to do. A few chores and a few errands, but mostly I was able to focus on Objectivism, which is enjoyable to me. Aside from the things that I just had to do, I thought about Objectivism and watched TV as a break. It was frustrating at times, but mostly enjoyable

Now, if only I can figure out some way to get paid to do this

[DavidOdden]

That is proof by negatives: you are requiring that the skeptic prove a negative, to prove that a proof doesn't exist.

Oh dear, I thought you were above that canard about "proving a negative". A skeptic can't, consistenly, prove anything, because for a skeptic, there is no such thing as a proof, so for him to refer to a proof is inconsistent (not that that means anything to a skeptic)

But he is simply asking you to produce the proof, he is not stealing anything.

Sorry, that's a term of art in Objectivism. It doesn't refer to larceny, it refers to petitio principii. The concept "proof" cannot be defined without assuming that the senses are valid.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Thanks to agrippa for pointing out the reason for the posting problem I had. I never had any posting issues at kevinswatch.com, so I'm not used to dealing with all kinds of error messages ('number of quote tags don't match') and bugs. And sorry, you won't be able to find any of my illustrious posts on kevinswatch. But test out their posting software (where you press a 'quote' button instead of 'reply') and you'll see a vast difference. Here all quotes have to be done manually. So why don't I just stay there? Because nobody there knows any philosophy, and besides, the philosophy of The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant would consist of nothing more than Platonism and moral intrincisim, which isn't very interesting to me.

Psychology again, not philosophy. But, moving along...

I'm glad you see it that way. Let me just add this: the brain, which is what Rand talked about on page 5, might be "processing" "data" and "integrating" "information" or whatever IT terminology someone wants to use to explain it; however, none of that matters in the philosophical context. But you're discussing psychology, and it doesn't matter in that context either.

I've come across this before, the claim that most of what Miss Rand wrote, such as in ITOE, is psychology and not philosophy. According to you, what is philosophy and what is psychology? I'm just trying to understand where you are coming from. Are you trying to say that any conclusions one reaches that involves introspection, such as concept formation, is psychology because it involves introspection?

There are places where Rand says this is metaphysical and that is epistemological. There are also many, many references to the words 'psychology' or 'psychological.' Just as a rule of thumb, I'd say that unless otherwise specified in the book, it's about psychology, the result of a half-hour's effort on Rand's part of introspection on her own process of concept-formation.

And yes, introspection brings nothing more than psychological content, or let's say, it is the cognition of some psychological content, recognizing it empirically as a psychological entity, and then cognizing it under some psychological categories or other so that it becomes known to awareness as "a thought, "an impression," "a memory," or even that concrete, mental entity Rand called "a concept."

At the end there, I'm not sure if you're going back on your previous definition of what a 'percept' is, which I found quite nicely put.

Yes, I'm taking it back, in context. In one sense, according to my dictionary, a percept is the object of awareness; which I took to mean actual apples and oranges, and cars, etc. Miss Rand does seem to be using the term differently, and even defines it differently, and by her definition and usage, it is more the awareness of entities, not the entities themselves. As I have pointed out, one does not do anything mentally with actual apples and pears to form the concept "fruit", but rather it is our awareness of apples and pears that is transformed into the concept "fruit."

It is more than the awareness of entities, a percept is the result of the brain's processing of sensations. It's right there on page 5.

How is a mental entity the result of physical processing? Even if there is some science involved in studying sensations and neurology in studying the brain, it is at this mental-physical gap where the science ends, because it is no longer in the realm of the physically measurable.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

That is proof by negatives: you are requiring that the skeptic prove a negative, to prove that a proof doesn't exist.

Oh dear, I thought you were above that canard about "proving a negative". A skeptic can't, consistenly, prove anything, because for a skeptic, there is no such thing as a proof, so for him to refer to a proof is inconsistent (not that that means anything to a skeptic)

Well no, I'm not above the 'proof by negatives' canard because I'm not above the laws of logic. And I don't classify a skeptic as a different kind of human who needs to be dealt with through some other kind of logic. He wants proof, so give him the proof. If he responds with some post-modernist trash in which he shows no openness to logical proof (which you probably knew anyway), then you can go your separate ways. But at least the proof would be out there, and someday, when academia eventually comes around, maybe it will gain some positive appreciation. But academia won't come around by sitting on your thumbs and doing nothing, offering nothing. And right now, with regard to the validity of the senses, Objectivism has nothing to offer academia on this point when it finally comes back around to respecting logic again.

But he is simply asking you to produce the proof, he is not stealing anything.

Sorry, that's a term of art in Objectivism. It doesn't refer to larceny, it refers to petitio principii. The concept "proof" cannot be defined without assuming that the senses are valid.

I don't see any Objectivist art term in what I wrote. But you know what a good example of petitio principii is? Claiming that the senses are valid on the basis that they can't be disproven without using them. This assumes that Objectivists have used the senses while proving them, which is exactly as you called it: petitio principii. And that is a problem for Objectivism, not for the skeptic.

And now you are in the quandary, not the skeptic. And that quandary involves a rule set by Objectivism itself, as you said, "proof" cannot be defined without assuming the senses are valid. And now your quandary is of your own devising, because the rule you just set means your proof of the validity of the senses themselves must involve begging the question. And that is the fault of your rule, not a fault of the miserable skeptics who point it out to you. They may be miserable, but they're right. So you either have to change the rule, or live with the fact that the very basis for all Objectivist proof, as based in the senses, is the petitio principii.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

The first thing I noticed about all this is that you referred to a mental entity, called it a 'percept,' but you gave me no concrete example, that I can visually see, to help me understand exactly what this mental entity is.

Okay, the handle on that coffee cup on your desk in your office. "Reality" is the totality of the swash of light which your eyes capture, focus on your retina and convert to electrical signals into your brain. The handle of the coffee cup, which is isolated from the context of your visual canvas, is grasped as a mental entity, and represents an entity of reality, is a "percept." The areas of color and light which are EM energy reflected from the entity in reality and absorbed by your retinas, continuously reinforce the percept in your mind, allowing you to observe the attributes of that entity.

Without the "percept" how do you isolate the entity from the rest of reality? How do you justify, metaphysically, the separation of the handle from the coffee cup from the table, from the study, from the house, from the land it sits on, except through the perception of something called an "entity" which you define as a perceptually separable piece of reality? The "entity," that is, the separable piece of reality, is separable by virtue of what metaphysical criteria? I contend: none. The perceived entity is an analog, in reality, of the percept, and may or may not be metaphysically justifiable as a separable entity.

The percept provides the implicit criteria of separation and allows you to grasp the "thing" as an "entity" of reality. Introspection and scientific inquiry can lead us to some good guesses as to the perceptual criteria that create the perception of an "entity" but they are reconstructions of what the mind actually does in separating and isolating any particular entity as a mental percept.

You've got to read what Miovas says on all this first. Because I see no reason, based on your explanation, to distinguish the concepts 'entity' from 'percept.' But what Miovas gives us is a reason to single out a concept of a 'percept' -- as distinguished from that which is not a percept but which is in the same genre as the entity -- so simple. And that which is not a percept is not a possible percept, because it is not found within the range which the human senses are capable of handling, for example, sub-atomic particles, or ultraviolet light. A percept is an entity that is perceivable; other entities, I don't know what they would be called: noumena?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Thanks to agrippa for pointing out the reason for the posting problem I had. I never had any posting issues at kevinswatch.com, so I'm not used to dealing with all kinds of error messages ('number of quote tags don't match') and bugs.

Well, most people who participate on oo.net don't do the type of quoting that you do; they simply quote the passage they want to reply to. You quote yourself, and then quote someone else, and then write your reply. That does take a lot more work. We are used to keeping the context of the thread and do not need each separate essay to stand alone.

There are places where Rand says this is metaphysical and that is epistemological. There are also many, many references to the words 'psychology' or 'psychological.' Just as a rule of thumb, I'd say that unless otherwise specified in the book, it's about psychology, the result of a half-hour's effort on Rand's part of introspection on her own process of concept-formation.

It require reading more than ITOE to understand the layout of Objectivism. We recognize five main branches of philosophy: Metaphysics (the basic nature of reality); Epistemology (how man's mind works); Ethics (how ought man to live); Politics (how ought man to live in a social context); and Esthetics (the role of art). All of this is philosophy, and psychology is not a branch of philosophy. ITOE is all epistemology.

Though confirming ITOE requires introspection, it is not psychology. Psychology is a special science that deals with the subconscious. It would deal with automatized habits, and not just psychological problems.

How is a mental entity the result of physical processing? Even if there is some science involved in studying sensations and neurology in studying the brain, it is at this mental-physical gap where the science ends, because it is no longer in the realm of the physically measurable.

I think eventually it can all be mapped out using the special science of neurology combined with observations on the limits of perception. That is, one could set up a screen and project images onto it and measure at what point of manipulating the images that entities are no longer discernible, for example. Which would give the lower limits of percepts (awareness of entities). Coupled with neurology, one can then ascertain how and when certain neurons fire.

How all of this works together leading to a man having a mind and having free will is not an issue of philosophy, except to say that a man is what he is and he has those capabilities.

Objectivism does not recognize the mind / body dichotomy. In other words, we need all of that wetware upstairs in order to perceive existence and to be aware of our awareness; and we need all of that wetware to form concepts. Over time, by studying neuro-damage we might be able to say that this or that part of the brain actually does that processing, say if someone looses that ability due to brain damage. But the mind is not something separable from the body. The mind does not exist as some sort of entity that interacts with the body giving us perception and concepts. The whole entity that is a man, including his sensory equipment and his brain, makes that possible.

But, it would require specialized sciences to understand these processes totally; it is not the province of philosophy to speculate about how it all works, except to say that the wetware is necessary for a man to be aware of existence and to be aware of his own mind. The details have to be worked out via some special science.

While consciousness is an axiom, there is nothing in that conception that says that the mind is some separable entity; just as identity is an axiom, without implying that identity is a separable entity.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

A percept is an entity that is perceivable; other entities, I don't know what they would be called: noumena?

Actually, I changed my mind about that given the way Miss Rand uses the term "percept." But regardless, I don't know that we need a concept for those entities or existents that we cannot perceive, such as atoms, magnetic fields, and such. Besides, the term noumena has already been taken by Kant, and he gave no evidence whatsoever, let alone proof of any kind, that the noumenal world exists.

Speaking of which, what David Odden was getting at regarding proof is that one has to have evidence and consider it logically (in a non-contradictory identification manner) before one can talk about proof. And if the skeptics are not going to take as evidence what is right before their eyes, then what is going to convince them? They are in denial for the most part. They sometimes bring up issues that need to be considered, such as your skepticism about "percepts" (without calling you a skeptic), but one must be careful in understanding if they are raising a good issue or merely putting a question mark at the end of a series of words.

To validate the evidence of the sense, one has to take their nature into account, but it would be a validation and not a proof, since proof requires evidence and without the senses what evidence can one possibly have?

In Objectivism, the senses are considered valid because it comes about due to an automatic process that is not learned. As far as we know, we don't have to learn to perceive entities; it is just something that we do automatically. It is a strictly causal interaction between the world and ourselves; and since volition or choice is not involved, it is valid.

Edited February 25, 2008 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[DavidOdden]

Anyhow, we're getting into that time of week, so if Mr. Ogg would care to distill out the essence of his points regarding percepts and concepts, especially w.r.t. the Objectivist epistemology, that might allow me to respond to his claims. As I understand it, he wishes to eliminate "percept", which means "the product of perceiving", from chain between the external object and concept. At some point, he seemed to be claiming that a percept is an implicit concept or else that the act of perceiving automatically results in an implicit, but that's clearly false. The sensory organs present something to the brain, which receives that neural input in its perceptual centers and holds it in a tenable form, namely a percept. Certain percepts can, at least in man, be organised into abstractions via conceptualization, and this is really the level how man's knowledge is dealt with. It's unsurprising that Rand mentions the foundation, percept, only minimally and just at the beginning (this is a characteristic of her writing).

It is clear that "universals" and "classes" play no role in Objectivist epistemology, and that relating sense organs to knowledge via percepts and concepts does. So it is good to be focusing on the right stuff. If there is a story whereby concepts can be created directly without any perception, I'd be amused to learn about it. I haven't had the time to research the day's ever-changing output, and I now need to decide about whether certain people live or die, which sux for them.

[cilphex]

I think this is a very interesting discussion. I have not read it entirely yet, so I don't know if this has been posted, but I would just like to jump in and post this because I think maybe it will help (I hope!) with what you're discussing:

The higher organisms possess a much more potent form of consciousness: they possess the faculty of retaining sensations, which is the faculty of perception. A "perception" is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism, which gives it the ability to be aware, not of single stimuli, but of entities, of things. An animal is guided, not merely by immediate sensations, but by percepts. Its actions are not single, discrete responses to single, separate stimuli, but are directed by an integrated awareness of the perceptual reality confronting it. It is able to grasp the perceptual concretes immediately present and it is able to form automatic perceptual associations, but it can go no further.

http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/perception.html

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Thanks to agrippa for pointing out the reason for the posting problem I had. I never had any posting issues at kevinswatch.com, so I'm not used to dealing with all kinds of error messages ('number of quote tags don't match') and bugs.

Well, most people who participate on oo.net don't do the type of quoting that you do; they simply quote the passage they want to reply to. You quote yourself, and then quote someone else, and then write your reply. That does take a lot more work. We are used to keeping the context of the thread and do not need each separate essay to stand alone.

Well you know, once you're used to it being done a certain way for a long time, then it becomes the 'right' way. So what I'm aiming for is to emulate the 'right' way, even if it's more difficult and time-consuming.

There are places where Rand says this is metaphysical and that is epistemological. There are also many, many references to the words 'psychology' or 'psychological.' Just as a rule of thumb, I'd say that unless otherwise specified in the book, it's about psychology, the result of a half-hour's effort on Rand's part of introspection on her own process of concept-formation.

It require reading more than ITOE to understand the layout of Objectivism. We recognize five main branches of philosophy: Metaphysics (the basic nature of reality); Epistemology (how man's mind works); Ethics (how ought man to live); Politics (how ought man to live in a social context); and Esthetics (the role of art). All of this is philosophy, and psychology is not a branch of philosophy. ITOE is all epistemology.

I know, she wrote an intro. to epistemology, and then wrote a relatively easy piece on concept-formation which in some ways reflects the work on the same problem done by Abelard centuries ago.

I see you responded with "the official line." You know the drill well. However, this is now becoming personal, so all I can do is ask one more time for a single non-personal answer to a non-personal question fundamental to epistemology allegedly found in ITOE: "How do you know x?" Fill in the blank, I like to substitute "similarity" for "x."

Though confirming ITOE requires introspection, it is not psychology. Psychology is a special science that deals with the subconscious. It would deal with automatized habits, and not just psychological problems.

How is a mental entity the result of physical processing? Even if there is some science involved in studying sensations and neurology in studying the brain, it is at this mental-physical gap where the science ends, because it is no longer in the realm of the physically measurable.

I think eventually it can all be mapped out using the special science of neurology combined with observations on the limits of perception. That is, one could set up a screen and project images onto it and measure at what point of manipulating the images that entities are no longer discernible, for example. Which would give the lower limits of percepts (awareness of entities). Coupled with neurology, one can then ascertain how and when certain neurons fire.

How all of this works together leading to a man having a mind and having free will is not an issue of philosophy, except to say that a man is what he is and he has those capabilities.

Which answers nothing. So you have given us science, which gives all kinds of answers, and philosophy, which does nothing. And do you wonder why academia is in its present anti-intellectual state?

Objectivism does not recognize the mind / body dichotomy. In other words, we need all of that wetware upstairs in order to perceive existence and to be aware of our awareness; and we need all of that wetware to form concepts. Over time, by studying neuro-damage we might be able to say that this or that part of the brain actually does that processing, say if someone looses that ability due to brain damage. But the mind is not something separable from the body. The mind does not exist as some sort of entity that interacts with the body giving us perception and concepts. The whole entity that is a man, including his sensory equipment and his brain, makes that possible.

But, it would require specialized sciences to understand these processes totally; it is not the province of philosophy to speculate about how it all works, except to say that the wetware is necessary for a man to be aware of existence and to be aware of his own mind. The details have to be worked out via some special science.

While consciousness is an axiom, there is nothing in that conception that says that the mind is some separable entity; just as identity is an axiom, without implying that identity is a separable entity.

However, there is something none of that wetware can give you: certitude in your judgments, for instance, your certainty that the mind is not some kind of separable entity. Your wetware is a product of the laws of nature, not their intellectual master but a slave to the laws of determinism.

That is why I reject all the materialism present in your post. The so-called evil moderns don't have to say a word: you have just uttered philosophy's death-knell, and handed all of knowledge, every bit of it, over to materialistic science.