human_murda

Altruism means you exist for the sake of others. There is no such thing as 'involuntary egoism' or 'involuntary altruism'. Egoism (and altruism) requires choice. In your scenario, Adam is the altruist. He believes that you (Bert) exist for his sake and that he has a right to take your possessions. From your own perspective, you are not being an altruist. You are only trying to mitigate the damages by giving him what he wants (but you don't believe you exist for his sake while doing so). To convince yourself of this, consider a mechanical robot attached to your body, controlling your legs and arms (and you are too weak to resist). Now suppose this robot picks up your possessions and gives it to everyone on the street. Just because your body is attached to the robot's and goes through the motions of picking up your possessions and giving it to others doesn't mean you are being the altruist here. You had no choice. The only altruist is the person who designed this robot. If this robot goes through a rampage executing hundreds of actions from different moral systems, you don't reflect that morality. It's not on you. You may not even understand it's actions or what moral system each action belongs to. Another case may be a thief stealing from your house while you're not there. The thief is obviously being an altruist here. But you're not an altruist. In fact, you're not even conscious that a theft is even taking place. Altruism doesn't mean giving things to others (by that definition, you would be the altruist and the thief would be the egoist: an obviously inverted relation). It means you don't have a right to exist without doing so (giving things to others is only a consequence of this belief). Morality doesn't exist when force is involved ("morality ends where a gun begins"). You giving him your possessions (from threat of force) has nothing to do with morality (and therefore, altruism). Essentially, there is only "voluntary egoism" (not necessarily trade) and "voluntary altruism". For the other two, you used the word "involuntary" as a concept pertaining to you (Bert) but also ascribed the concept "altruism" to Bert even though Adam is the one who believes in it. Morality does not apply to actions when you separate it from a valuer. You shouldn't view morality (even false ones) as simply "giving to others", which is a mere action separate from the agent. However such disembodied action (and talk of a morality of action, without mentioning the agent) is common in altruism. A transfer of money from you to somebody else is not altruism ("involuntary altruism"). A transfer of money from somebody else to you to somebody else is not selfishness (or "involuntary egoism"). Disembodied actions have no moral meaning: morality requires a mind. Morality is not a series of actions or duties. A penny falling from your hand and falling on your neighbor's doorstep is not altruism. Not exactly. Government makes morality (altruist or not) possible. People can act altruistically even under an Objectivist government. Government doesn't exist to prevent altruism. However, it would prevent the exercise of altruist doctrine through force. Altruism usually coexists with force: because of the belief in the impotency of individuals, the attempt (since individual impotence makes altruism necessary) to make individuals impotent by denying reason and finally through force (because of the lack of justification for altruism) but force is not essential. Force is usually used in cases where a moral system has no rational justification. This could be religion, altruism or any number of things. This is also the reason why religion should never be allowed to get into the the government. Since they have no justification for their morality, they will definitely use force. Altruism may be worse than this because, through complete denial of reason and acceptance of impotence of man, there is this undercurrent notion that it requires no justification since man, by nature, is impotent so that altruism is necessary. Also a government has no right to enforce selfishness (i.e., government doesn't exist to weed out altruism). But observe that no government has ever attempted to do so: because selfishness is justified.

Consider an example: You found 32 trees in a 2km*2km area. Then you may conclude there are 8 trees per unit area. The unit area is the entity. You are trying to find the expectancy for other unit areas. But possibilities refer to different throws of the dice. Possibilities don't refer to the same throws of the dice. It's a big mistake to say the entity of statistics refer to the single entity of populations. Suppose you throw a die 36 times and get side-6 5 times. Then you may conclude that the probability/expectancy for getting 6 is 5/36. But this is inaccurate. You may take larger and larger populations to get more accurate results. All this means is that populations aren't what you're concerned with. They are merely used to discover expectancy for different throws. You may use any population whatever to come to the same conclusions. You may observe one part of a forest. I may observe another. You may observe throws of the die in the morning. I may observe throws of a die in the afternoon. The populations are irrelevant, but they all refer to the same entity: a unit area of a forest or a throw of a die. You are concerned with expectancy for different throws of a die. Statistics as such don't refer to populations. Populations are used to study some other unit (measurement omission). You can use any population whatever to study the same unit, which means that the statistics don't talk about any specific population as an entity. The same statistics can refer to any population whatever. They don't refer to "single entities". Statistics aren't "attached" to any specific population. The concept of sampling itself derives from the fact that statistics don't refer to a specific population. There is no single sacrosanct entity known as population to which a statistic applies.

Actually, they do. With multiple experiments, you can "pluck" out hidden variables. But you can still talk about the ensemble as a whole. You know there are only six outcomes for a dice, that these are mutually exclusive etc. You know a lot about the population as a whole. But what if you "pluck" the hidden variable out of a single experiment? All you've got left is a dice which turned up 3 with no way of knowing how. Removing hidden variables are useless in a single exmeriment. Its only useful in the context of an ensemble.

The characteristics involved in each throw of the die are different. The characteristics involved may be the angle with which the die hits various things, its linear and angular momentum etc. These are different for each throw. The "entity"/instance are these quantities. Different rolls of the dice corresponds to these quantities. Not the dice. Even though you use the same dice, the entities involved are different. The dice sets the premise though. Probabilities don't refer to single experiments. One throw can only give one output (stating probabilities don't help you predict this single output. Probabilities are irrelevant for single experiments. You have to use the above quantities).

Something more on the drake equation: is it basically A is non-A in that it assigns distribution to a single entity: extraterrestrial life. Now if you are a space voyager, and have travelled various galaxies and know the premises of existence of life in these galaxies, then saying it is possible that life exists on a new galaxy is merely an instance of your premise. However, saying extraterrestrial life itself is possible is a contradiction. You are applying a distribution to a single entity. Also, if you make the case that different people are the different instances in the case of Pascal's wager, that doesn't hold out. If one person can get to heaven by believing in God, another person can get it heaven by believing in God. You are talking about the same entity/characteristic even with different people. The same applies to gay people: there are several gay people. However, if you assume that if one person is born gay, then all are born gay, you are talking about the same characteristic in all these people. So, the distribution still talks about the same entity (which is not necessarily the person itself, but much more abstract). If the case of a rolling dice, if my dice shows up one, that doesn't mean yours should too. So probabilities for these don't talk about the same entity. Just because my building catches on fire doesn't mean yours should. These are actually different entities/instances.

I'm not sure about ideas influencing reality in Pascal's wager. I think it asks you to believe in things though sheer will, i.e., it asks you to trick yourself into belief while simultaneously realising that God need not exist. I think the argument is sound once you get past "possibility" of God existing. I still maintain that that is a contradiction. In the case of a rolling dice what is the probability distribution? The distribution arises from the fact that you can repeat the experiment many times. Now what is the probability distribution of you going to heaven/hell? None. Here the possibilities refer to the same entity: you. Thus, your assumption that God exists and doesn't exist applies to the exact same case. This is a direct, explicit, A is non-A contradiction. If you don't understand this: the case is exactly the same in Quantum Mechanics. In usual probability theory, what do probabilities refer to? It refers to an ensemble of particles. But quantum theory asserts that the entire probability distribution can be attributed to a single particle. Then they conclude that a single particle must travel through all possible paths so that the entire distribution can be dumped on one particle. The "all possible paths" involves A is non-A. The situation is exactly the same in Pascal's wager. It ascribes possibility to a single situation. Therefore if you can make any statement about wagers or expectations, which involves the entire probability distribution, then all these possibilities must be simultaneously true (the single situation is the entity, you. You don't have multiple lives). This is explicitly A is non-A, atleast as much as quantum mechanics is. So I think Pascal's wager is explicitly a contradiction: it assigns distributions to a single entity. In the case of saying "born-gay" and "choice-gay" being possible: it assigns both possibilities to the same entity (gay people). There aren't several instances of the same gay person. These are all explicit contradictions. They all make the mistake of assigning distributions to the same entity. As for the building fire: the entities are different. You say a fire is possible this time. Time and place are what makes the instances different. In the case of a dice, the different instances are the different rolls of a dice. These don't make the mistake of assigning distributions/possibilities to the same entity.

As to Eioul's assertion that possibilities refer to something you have yet to evaluate, I partly disagree. Possibilities only apply when you have evaluated the premises of a situation before, but not the specific incidence of that situation. In considering probabilities, such as in the case of a dice being rolled, you still talk of possibilities. But here, know exactly the premises of your game: there is one roll of the dice, the outcome ranges from 1-6 and the outcomes are mutually exclusive. You don't account for a seventh possibility where a truck runs over your dice and you don't see it coming. You already know and have evaluated the premises for your possibilities. Only under certain premises, which you have already evaluated, can you talk about possibility. Consider a fire in a building. If your colleague informed you about it, you would get the hell out. This is because you already know that things can catch on fire and that the fire can spread. Therefore it is possible that the building's on fire. Now if somebody said the water in the pool is on fire, you can dismiss him. Even the premise is not correct in this. This isn't what some "scientists" do. They are already talking about possibilities when they don't even know about the premises of what they are dealing with. Drake's equation ("possibility of alien life") is the worst example of this. The premise for the various ways life can originate hasn't been established. In the case of homosexuality (a psychological phenomenon) the premise is knowledge of psychology. "Born gay" or not, they make all their assumptions and evaluations without any reference to psychology or consciousness. They mostly talk about (epi)genetics/hormones or social conditioning. The same goes for "evolutionary psychology". You shouldn't attempt to evaluate possibilities while your premise takes a back seat or doesn't even enter the discussion. It is your basic premises that guide you about the possibilities.

I agree that saying Zeus exists is impossible is setting yourself up for future contradictions. Here you may distinguish between the "not possible" and "impossible". The former is a human term while the latter is a "God term". The former refers to human knowledge while the latter refers to omnipotence. They aren't the same concepts. When you say "not possible", you know the limits of your error. The limits of your error come with the concept. In this context you might even say "impossibility" is an anti concept. In this thread it was used to wipe out the meaning of the term "possible" (and that is perhaps the only use of that anti concept).. So saying God exists and doesn't exist are possible (in the human sense of the term possible) under the same context (lack of evidence) is a contradiction (unless you introduce terms to wipe out the meaning of these terms)..

Pascal's wager says you should believe in God ("wager that He is"). It never concludes "therefore it is true that God exists". It isn't an appeal to consequences fallacy. It merely says you should believe in God regardless of whether or not it is true that God exists since both of these are possible.. Now that you've reminded me: appeals to consequences seems to be used a lot in the homosexuality debate (but not in Pascal's wager)..

By the way, Pascal's wager is a very good example of the use of A is non-A... So A is non-A has something to do with real world chit chat after all.. The contradiction is that it makes an argument, assuming that both existence and non-existence of God are possible..

So its possible you might explode then? NVM: I thought that was a reply to me

You shouldn't pit arguments against concepts: they're too closely tied. However, barring evidence for your conclusions, concepts are your ties to reality, not arguments.. Consider a statement: "With every right step of the foot you take, you have a .00001 chance of exploding". Based on the the lack of evidence, are you going to say that with every right step of your foot, it is possible that you may explode? Are you honestly going to live the rest of your life believing in the possibility that you might explode while walking? What's going to happen is, you're going to forget this assertion after 5 minutes because you don't actually believe it's possible. You have to have a reason before saying something is possible. So it is not possible that Zeus exists just as it is not possible that you might explode because of the right step of your foot. The same reasoning applies to reject Pascal's wager (are you going to say you believe in that too?) Impossibility requires omnipotence. It's not something you should care about..

Actually they are contradictions. Rejecting things based on the arbitrary is merely the method used to resolve the contradiction.

When I said translation, I merely wanted to highlight the differences in concepts used (i.e., there is some difference in the way you and he uses language). However, you shouldn't make it difficult for other people to understand your position. I usually make my arguments using examples and state things in such a way that it would be easy for others to state where they disagree with me. You have to make your arguments clear enough so that it is possible for them to identify the concepts you used. But you don't need to identify the concepts for them.

I was thinking more about the wrong way to do it: which is the consideration that all different "if"s are simultaneously possible. You shouldn't hold a contradiction for long. Consider what agnostics and desperate theists would say: Given the lack of evidence for God, existence and absence of God are both possible. They're clinging to a contradiction. For the right way to come up with a hypothesis: you need to look at the issue from all sorts of angles and form concepts. Then by the time you make a hypothesis, you're almost certain that it's true. Psychologically, the hypothesis should feel like an epiphany, uniting all the sundry reasons and logic you used previously. Most people are as clueless about the hypothesis they make as the person who has just heard about their hypothesis 5 minutes ago. They develop a belief that they can discover facts of reality without a process of integration. Then they cling onto this A is non-A assertion (that all of the alternatives are possible), once their inability to discover facts of reality become more and more obvious.

I assumed you understand what the other person was saying. When I said "otherwise", I meant: you understand their perspective but you don't evaluate things the way they understand it. That is, once you understand their perspective, you don't use their logic. You use your own concepts and logic. You don't have to translate the subsequent arguments to them (unless you are a psychologist, apparently, but that's their primary job anyway so that's not problem), using their concepts.

I know this is a year old thread but anyway: Human nature is selfish but not automatically or by birth. A human being is a human being by choice.

I see the relevance of A is A in considering possibilities: you could construct a chain of "if this then that", but at some point, you have to sit back and decide on the validity of the "if". Otherwise, you just end up having unintegrated contradictory "knowledge". A lot people fall back on this "knowledge" and decide not to check the validity of the "if" since it requires volitional thought. They would rather wait for reality to contradict them (this trend is becoming more common in modern physics: for eg., in string theory, they have constructed large models resulting from various "if"s. Now they are waiting for reality to contradict them). Now if reality contradicted them, they would have confirmation that their original "if" was wrong. Most people use it as a substitute for concept formation. With concept formation, you would be able to check your premises much earlier in the logic. Otherwise you are just left with perceptual level contradictions (i.e., contradictions between percepts and concepts). What you actually need is contradictions between concepts and other concepts (which is the realm of ideas). Most people would rather not deal with the realm of ideas and look for perceptual level faults/disproof. The consequence is primarily arrested thinking (since there are no ideas in their heads). You end up with theories which are "not even wrong" (until they are perceptually disproved). This trend is also common in psychology: for eg., in evolutionary psychology, they say if man lived in such and such environments and if certain specific aspects of your psychology were genetically heritable, then these many people in the present having "in-born" traits is explained. Now, they are waiting for perceptual level contradictions. They aren't going back to check their "if"s. Another is claiming that if homosexuality is inborn, then it must be genetic. Unable to find the genes, they posit that it must be epigenetic. What they offer as proof that it is epigenetic is the original "if". They say that if homosexuality is inborn it must be epigenetic. Hence it is proved that it is epigenetic. The subsequent "explanations" are merely assertions that "it could still be true". Feynman's views on String theory may put things in context: Now all this is just among scientists. Things are worse amongst other people. Most people don't check their ideas. Instead of thinking, they conclude things based on "if"s and wait for reality to contradict them. The A is non-A thing is everywhere..

These things you suggest aren't actually straw man arguments. Of course, if you are intent on pointing out the problems with somebody else's beliefs, you have to evaluate things the way they understand it. Otherwise, you just take what they said, convert them into your own language (i.e., use your own concepts, which only exist in your head) and then close the argument. Their failure to understand the results you have come up with does not make it a straw man argument. If they have to understand your argument, they have to form concepts which only exist in their head and they have to do this volitionally. You can't think for them. You could try to make them understand your concepts but that isn't primarily your job. (By concepts only in your head, I mean the references, not the referents..)

Well, I personally believe that everyone's psychology (objectivist or not) is a consequence of their philosophical discoveries. So I do think you need to know some things about philosophy before evaluating a person's psychology. Correcting your psychological faults requires a knowledge of the correct, reality-based philosophy. But to merely know the psychology of a person, you needn't know the correct philosophy, just merely what they believe in (or assume to be true in every one of their beliefs)...

I think I can call myself a determinist as well (I have not zeroed in on it because of QM considerations, which I have to study more thoroughly before coming to conclusions). The way I think of it, you cannot change what happens in the future. However, you still have a choice in what you can do in the present. Choice does not violate the fact that the future cannot be changed. Choice is the nature/ the identity that determines the future. All determinism means is that you do not have a choice whether your choices (i.e., your identity) will affect the future. I.e., you do not have a choice to change your nature. Determinism still requires that you were the agent that resulted in your action (i.e., it was your unchangeable nature that resulted in an unchangeable future), and being the agent, you are responsible for your actions. In other words, you could have done anything as per your nature requires, but your nature itself is unchangable (i.e., you would always have chosen the same). The role of choice is to determine the future, not change it. Even though you cannot change your future, it is still your choice that determined your future. Choice determines the actual future out of the various conceivable futures.

I'm not very familiar with what you are talking about, but if you mean to say that somewhere in the probability distribution there is something that can cause the Universe, then that is merely an assertion of the existence of a cause without specifying what the cause is. QM is different: in addition to not specifying what the cause of a particular outcome is, it does not even assert/propose the existence of such a cause. Besides, asserting the existence of a cause is equivalent to saying something like: "one of the three things in {C,D,E} must cause F". This does not mean that a "sense of cause" is applicable to all of C,D and E. Just because you don't specify what the cause is does not mean causality can be applied to the entire distribution: it is only applicable to specific member(s), whether you know which ones they are or not. You cannot regard the entire distribution as having some "potential" to act as a cause just because you don't know which part of the distribution acts as the cause. What meaning of the word 'cause' are you using anyway? When I say A causes B, I mean that, within a particular context, all happenings of A imply the occurence of B. But when you say there are also some instances of A (within the same context) that does not imply B, then A cannot be a cause, a contradiction.

You shouldn't assign any "sense of causality" to QM. It doesn't describe the world in terms of cause and effect but in terms of exact probabilities. Formally, QM is an acausal theory. Trying to assign a "sense of cause" to probabilistic theories gives rise to the conclusion that the world itself violates causality. Is that a "We know it works and we are going to laugh at you with our genious in-joke till you understand" stance I see? You do realise that it is only an intimidatory tactic with no argumentative value?

From my experience, I would say that the exertion of free will is the primary determinant of a person's intelligence (at least the logical part of cognition anyways) and this is probably true for all neurotypical adults. I also think that keeping your mind active influences the "automatic", subconscious functions of the brain. I don't know what can happen during mental retardation. Obviously a lot of underlying physical things necessary for cognition don't function as they should. Even assuming your capability for free will is unaffected by the damage, your subconscious processes, which are supposed to "record" and extend the functioning of your free will over time, are disrupted. So of course you can expect yourself to be less rational for the same amount of effort you put in through your free will.

Probably