dan_edge

A wealth of philosophical literature has been devoted to discussion of the supposed mind-body split, and why no such dichotomy exists. But the specific way in which mind and body are integrated has been neglected to a significant degree. This essay will explore the connection between these components of self and applications for self-training. I intend this to be a foundational paper for future articles on gastronomy, self-motivation, sexuality, and romantic love. I assume that the reader has a working knowledge of psycho-epistemology, specifically the way in which concepts and physical motions are automatized in the subconscious. A summary of these ideas can be found in the introduction to my Psycho-Epistemology of Acting article. The process by which ideas and physical motions are automatized is asymmetrical reciprocal, with one's volitional consciousness performing the weighted side of the process. One must initially focus on an idea or set of actions in order to automatize it, but after it is automatized the subconscious makes this information immediately available. Similarly, in the mind-body relationship, the mind is the weighted side of the equation. But the mind does not store automatized physical motions as entirely separate from ideas. The two are very much interrelated. I propose that automatized ideas, sensations, and physical motions are stored together, as integrated units, in the subconscious. I shall designate these composites as psycho-physical units. The teleology of the subconscious must now be considered. Man is able to deal with vast quantities of information because his subconscious provides him information related to whatever his mind is focused on at any particular time. If one's mind is well organized in a hierarchical fashion, then the subconscious will provide information stored close by within the hierarchy. Conceptual units may be interrelated and cross-classified in a variety of ways, and the subconscious aims to provide the focal awareness with related information. For instance, if one is thinking about snakes, his subconscious will send him units related to snakes, like reptile, or animal, or some memory of an encounter with a snake, or some emotion related to snakes (like fear), etc. The information provided depends both on the organization of one's mind and the context in which the idea arises in the focal awareness. If components of mind and body are integrated and stored together, then one would expect that his mind will provide automatized physical motions when considering an idea related to those motions, and vice versa. Using the "snake" example, if one fears snakes, then he may cringe when the topic of snakes comes up in conversation. Note that he does not necessarily choose to cringe in the moment, it is simply an automatic reaction, one which he would experience to a greater degree if he actually saw a snake nearby. To use another example, if an accomplished typist closes his eyes and imagines words he wants to type, then he can allow his subconscious to take over and his fingers move as if he were actually typing. Conversely, willfully performing automatized physical motions related to mental units will trigger the subconscious to provide related conceptual information. For instance, if one empties his mind and goes though the motions of riding a bike, then his mind will send him information related to bike-riding. If he allows his mind to wander, this activity may trigger memories of bike-riding, ideas about fitness, or any other thoughts related to bicycles. These psycho-physical units are very much interrelated and can be attuned and organized in a the same way as conceptual units. Sensory-perceptual experiences are also integrated into psycho-physical units. If one detects the pleasantly familiar scent of honey wafting in the air, he may begin to lick his lips, even before he conceptually identifies the smell. Also, his subconscious may send him memories or pictures of pleasant gastronomical experiences. All this before he even identifies the fact that yummy honey is in the immediate vicinity. Alternatively, thoughts of a pleasant food can give rise to the automatized sense-memory of that food. One can imagine that he is smelling or tasting something that is not in fact present. The human mind is incredibly powerful, and can integrate all these elements of conceptual, physical, and sensory units together with ease. One's physical state can also affect his mood in a variety of ways. For years, motivational speakers have argued that sitting up straight, breathing deeply, and smiling can improve one's emotional state almost immediately. Similarly, if one forces an angry facial expression and posture, and breathes sharply, his mind will tend toward negative feelings and memories. Actors have long used this method to incite an appropriate emotional state in the moment on stage. The evidence for this phenomenon must be gathered introspectively, and as it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, I encourage those who are interested in exploring these ideas to experiment with this. Emotional experiences are a special case, because they represent a psycho-physical experience in and of themselves. Emotions are a response to automatized value-judgments (conceptual information), yet are experienced physically. Emotions can be identified and classified in part by the way they affect one's body. Feelings of anxiety may cause one to frown, raise his blood-pressure, increase his heart rate, tighten his stomach, or (most often) a combination of these. Feelings of happiness may cause one to smile, laugh, dance, etc. It is important to note that the physical manifestation of an emotional experience is automatic. One does not need to focus on the actions associated with an emotion, he performs them automatically. (However, he can forcibly re-automatize these physical reactions if they are incommensurate with his value-system. I will offer a more complete discussion of re-automatizing the physical components of emotions in another essay). I propose that emotional experiences are also integrated into psycho-physical units, and are treated by the subconscious as information related to ideas and physical actions. If one ponders a happy memory, he may experience a shadow of the happiness he felt at that time, along with the physical manifestation of that happiness. If he feels happy in the moment, his mind may naturally wander to memories of happy occasions. This phenomenon is very much the same as the snake-reptile example. Again, the function of the subconscious is to provide related information to one's focal awareness, and I argue that all these elements of self are integrated in one's mind. With a proper understanding of the way in which his mind and body are integrated, an individual can train himself to automatize mental, physical, sensual, and emotional experiences in a more optimal way. It is important to train not only one's mind, but also one's body and spirit. The man who has fully integrated his mind and body feels more comfortable in his own skin, and is more attuned to experiences of sexuality and sensuality. He can achieve this state of being by paying closer attention to the interrelationship between the different elements of self. He studies dance, or martial arts, or sports, etc., in an effort to explore the physical elements of his existence and automatize physical expressions of masculine (or feminine) power. He can become more acutely aware of the physical manifestations of his emotions, and learn to control and re-automatize these physical reactions to more appropriately reflect his value-system. The applications of these principles are endless, and I hope to explore them in depth in future papers. I welcome any questions or comments. Thank you for reading. --Dan Edge

David, I was thinking this morning about what you wrote, and I'm starting to understand how important it is to mantain context in one's own thoughts and in communication with others. You're right that it is "entirely irrational to speak in such a way that no contextual assumption would be made." If one repeated the implicit context of a statement every time, then he would have no economy of thinking whatsoever. There's a lot to write about here regarding economy of thinking and communication, hopefully I will be able to come back to thta and expand this essay soon. Thanks, --Dan Edge

Wow Mike, What an incredible editorial. So completely dead-on. Thanks for posting it. --Dan Edge

I posted this hoping to get some good criticism. I am an amatuer writer and would like to improve, so let the fire rain down! You're right, a definition of the term "correspondence" is in order, and should have been included in my paper. Correspondence would seem to denote a very exact similarity, in this case between the concepts of a conceptual consciousness and the identity of some characteristic(s) of an entity. When referring to the relationship between concepts and entites, I would say that "correspondence" is "the conceptual representation of the identity of some aspect of an entity." I'm not very happy with that definition, but it's a start. I think the term 'statement' is used to clarify that one is dealing a collection of concepts, without reference to any particular language. Maybe it's just a question of focus: sentetence mean statement qua grammatical unit. I think the two terms can be used pretty much interchagably in this discussion. I'm not sure if I agree with you that the context-dropping issue is more significant, I'll have to think about it some more. The omniscience issue comes up more often in conversation, in my experiece. You're right, I need to elaborate a lot more on communication of ideas, I just couln't squeeze it in to the page limitation of the paper. Thanks for the comments, I may respond more fully when I have the time. --Dan Edge

Objectivist Singles! groups.msn.com/objectivistsingles Not as big as the Atlasphere, and not as active since the Atlasphere appeard on the scene, but it's free and there's close to 1000 members. I've moderated it off and on for 4+ years. --Dan Edge

Hey Folks, I'm moving up the the NYC area in three weeks, and once I get settled in I'll be looking for Objectivist contacts. Hopeully, I'll meet some onf you soon! --Dan Edge

Introduction This essay is a discussion of the Correspondence Theory of Truth (CTOT) and how the theory fits into the philosophy of Objectivism. I will argue that properly understood, the CTOT is compatible with Objectivist epistemology. I will also discuss pitfalls that must be avoided to keep the door closed to skepticism. Readers should note that I am writing here for two distinct audiences. The first is the Objectivist community at large, those who are already familiar with the philosophy. I am also presenting this essay to my Senior Seminar in Philosophy class at the University of South Carolina for peer review. To the Objectivist community: Some have expressed dissatisfaction with an unqualified acceptance of the Correspondence Theory, and with good reason, as I hope to demonstrate. A proper understanding of the Correspondence Theory is necessary to defend against Juggernaut of skepticism that has been sweeping the academic community for the past century. To my classmates: This paper is based on information contained in my in-class presentation of Objectivist Epistemology, and it assumes the truth of Objectivism. I will glaze over some technical aspects of Objectivist principles. I encourage any of you to approach me with questions about these principles as you are working through the text. ---------------- The Correspondence Theory of Truth The first formal expression of the Correspondence Theory of Truth (CTOT) can be traced back to Aristotle, who wrote: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Metaphysics 1011b25), though Plato wrote very similar formulations (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b). Kant considers the issue so obvious that it doesn't even deserve arguement, writing "“The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 82). The Correspondence Theory has endured over the centuries, in part because it is seemingly so axiomatic, so elegant in its simplicity. According to the CTOT, a statement is true iff (if and only if) it corresponds to reality. If I make the statement "Dr. Donougho is the Professor of my Philosophy class," this statement is true iff Dr. Donougho is, in fact, the Professor. If anyone else is the Professor (or if I don't have a Professor), then my statement is false. According to most interpretations of the CTOT, my statement would be false even if I have every reason to believe that Dr. Donougho is the professor, but he is not in fact because some impostor has taken his place. One's context of knowledge is irrelevant. Please keep this in mind, as we will have reason to return to it in a moment. The Correspondence Theory of Truth is an alluring philosophical principle on many levels. At root, it is an epistemological expression of axiomatic metaphysical principles. Two such axiomatic principles in Objectivism are the Law of Identity and the Primacy of Existence. The Law of Identity states that "A is A," or "a thing is what it is." The Primacy of Existence states that "existence has primacy over consciousness," implying that consciousness has no effect on the identity of entities. If one accepts these metaphysical principles, then the task of man becomes to discover the identity of the world around him. His consciousness does not have the capacity to create, only to identify reality. The Standard of Omniscience The biggest problem with the common interpretation of the CTOT is that it sets a standard of omniscience for truth, making certainty impossible. If we accept that certainty is impossible, then we leave the discipline of philosophy open to skeptics (who will gleefully agree that reality is unknowable) and mystics (who offer a supernatural source for certainty). As mentioned earlier, one's context of knowledge is deemed irrelevant when determining the truth value of his statements. If I say that "Dr. Donougho is my Professor," then my statement is false even if I have every reason to believe that it is true. These kinds of situations are not uncommon. The history of man is marked by an ever-expanding degree of knowledge about the nature of reality. In the realm of science, when new data is discovered that contradicts old theories, then the old theories are discarded, and new ones devised. Does this mean that the old theories were always false? How can we ever be certain that our theories will not be contradicted by new evidence at some point in the future? This creates a problem. If truth is determined without regard to context, then one's context must be all-encompassing (i.e., omniscient) to make a claim of certainty. An omniscient standard of truth is incompatible with Objectivism. Knowledge As Contextual Objectivist epistemology lays the foundation for a bridge between subject and object, and the reconciliation between the CTOT and certainty. Objectivism states that absolute certainty is possible within a specified context of knowledge. Any statement made by a human being necessarily implies the preamble "within my context of knowledge." This preamble is necessarily implied because man, by his nature, is a being of limited consciousness. He is not omniscient. For example, Newton's Laws of Motion are true, and will always be true, given Newton's context of knowledge at the time. Einstein has access to better technology and higher levels of mathematics, and was able to expand man's understanding of Physics. He discovered new data that could not be explained by Newton's Laws, and he was able to construct a new theory which did account for the data. It would be false for Einstein to state that Newton's Laws will always always be true regardless of context, but Einstein could agree that, give Newton's context of knowledge at the time, his theories are still true. The contextual nature of knowledge allows man to continually expand his understanding of the world around him, while at the same time avoid being paralyzed by uncertainty. The rational man forms principles on the basis of evidence, and treats them as absolute unless and until he discovers new evidence that would require him to restructure those principles. This methodology can be applied to ethics, politics, and esthetics, as well as science. The Implied Conditional of Absolute Principles Another helpful way of viewing absolute principles is in the form of a logical conditional. One can assert "If there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play, then principle X will always hold true." If one has properly formed his principle, and integrated it with all of the evidence available to him, then this statement will always be true, forever and ever. One can view this logical conditional the same as any other, in terms of truth value. We can represent the statement as: p-->q Where p = there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play And q = principle X will always hold true Note that the truth value of this statement follows the same format of any other conditional statement. If 'p' is true, then 'q' must be true. If 'q' is false, then 'p' must also be false. And if 'p' is false, then the truth value of 'q' is indeterminable. Let's return to Newton to demonstrate this method in action. Newton makes the claim that "if there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play, then The Laws of Motion will always hold true." If Newton acquires evidence that his Law of Motion does not apply to a particular case (for example, when entities approach the speed of light), then he knows that an element outside his context of knowledge has come into play. Now, he is challenged to integrate the new data with his old principle, modify it, or discard it favor of a new one. Note that, while 'p' and 'q' in the above example can have varying truth values, the logical statement p-->q is itself an absolute principle. A New Perspective on CTOT I have argued that theories and principles can be held with absolute certainty within a specified context. How then can one marry this with the CTOT? When one formulates a theory based on evidence he has gathered, and integrates it without contradiction into the whole of his knowledge, then his theory does indeed correspond with reality. He has properly identified a relationship between his consciousness and some specified aspect of reality. It is important to keep in mind that a conceptual consciousness is an entity in reality, and an understanding of that consciousness is an instance of correspondence. One's integration of data into concepts and principles corresponds to the reality of his conceptual consciousness, and the contents therein. One will never be able to step outside of his consciousness and make propositions based on information unavailable to him, but that does not mean that his limited theories do not correspond to the aspects of reality within his contextual range. It is unfair, and indeed irrational, to demand that man define "truth" in terms of the metaphysically impossible, i.e., omniscience. The Importance of Semantics An understanding of epistemological concepts is critical to maintain the integrity of philosophy as a discipline. In academic circles, classrooms, journals, online discussion forums, and even private philosophical conversations, the defenders of rationality must insist on the precise use of epistemological terms like "truth" and "certainty." The reason why there is so much misunderstanding about the proper application of the CTOT is that many just assume that the CTOT requires a standard of omniscience. This misunderstanding must be identified, clarified, called out, and rooted out of existence. When engaged in discussion with an intellectual opponent, especially on issues of epistemology, take care that your opponent is not demanding that you step outside your context of knowledge in order to make a claim of certainty. A flaccid refrain of rationalistic "what ifs" does not take the place principled, logical, evidenced-based discussion. In the of spirit of Socrates, define your terms, and challenge your opponent to define his. Communication I must anticipate a challenge to my argument with respect to communication. If all knowledge is contextual, and each individual is working from his own context, then how can one defend against the charge of relativism? Is it reasonable to assume that one can effectively communicate with other individuals, and that the ideas being communicated are understood in the proper context? My answer to this last question is 'yes!', given that one goes to the effort of defining his terms. This is why the precise definition of philosophical terms within one's own mind is so important. Individuals may define concepts in subtly different ways, so when a misunderstanding arises, the first step is to make sure that participants in a discussion understand each others' context of knowledge with respect to the issues being discussed. Misunderstandings are always possible, but can be limited through proper discourse of ideas. Also, while individuals may have different contexts of knowledge at any given time, as men we all have access to perceptual concretes. Another method of clarifying interpersonal communication is to logically reduce ideas as close as possible to the perceptual level. Looking Forward: A Complete Theory of Induction There are many challenges in the field of epistemology that must still be overcome. The most important of these, in my view, is a more complete theory of induction. Logical induction is man's method of forming rational principles based on evidence of the world around him. Ayn Rand presented a powerful theory of induction with respect to concepts in her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, but some questions remained unanswered. First, what degree of evidence is required to form a (contextually) absolute principle? In Objectivism - The The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff discusses degrees of certainty with respect to principles (p67). He classifies theories on a graduate scale, from "possible," to "probable," to "certain." But what delineates these degrees of probability? More importantly, at what point can one settle on any given principle as "certain?" One clue offered by Peikoff is that in order to settle on a principle, "all evidence points in one direction, there is no evidence in any other direction, and no contradictory evidence." This idea is helpful, but insufficient. If philosophers can agree on the CTOT and proper standards of rational discourse, then I believe these questions are answerable within our lifetimes. The only way to defeat the specter of skepticism in the academic community is through our consistent and determined effort to define our terms in philosophy with the most rigorous logical integrity. --Dan Edge

Megan, I was using the "green" example to point out the nature of ostensive definions, and how these kinds of definitions might apply to proper names. I think you are right to distinguish between "definition" and "description," and therein lies the nature of my misunderstanding. The referent of a proper name is not defined (as I am wont to do), but described ostensively. That settles the issue in my eyes. In a different forum, someone criticized my approach to this issue, saying I focus too much on "semantics." I think semantics are very important here. How am I supposed to move forward in my study of philosophy if I haven't defined my terms precisely? Thanks for the comments, everyone. --Dan Edge

Just registered for Universe 3. Home planet = Edge, Nickname = Dan Edge. I hope the game works, I'm using a Mac. --Dan Edge

Hal, Let's consider other terms that are defined ostensively, like the concept "green." Green can only be defined by pointing to its referents in reality. Now, imagine that you are trasported to a place where there are no green enitites. Does that mean that you can no longer grasp the concept green? Even if your children grew up in the same place, with no green entities anywhere, history could record the former existence of the color and they could study it, with the understanding that the term was originally defined ostensively. I think that your "Nero" example falls within the same category. You can only study Nero with the implicit understanding that, originally, the referent of the proper name Nero existed as *this particular guy*. Please let me know if this is not clear, I'm still thinking it through. --Dan Edge

I was discussing this issue in your chat room this evening, and I believe I've come up with a resolution that satisfies me. 1. Objectivism *is* a proper name, and proper names *are* defined ostensively, i.e., by pointing to their referents. To say that Objectivism is "the philosophy of Ayn Rand" is merely an offhand way of pointing to the referents. 2. Based on this, I would say that the conecept "abstract particular" is a valid one, and can be defined as "a specific set of ideas or abstractions refered to by a proper name." Thanks to Noah, EC, Metaphysical, and Neptune, who helped me tease this out in the chatroom this evening. --Dan Edge

Thanks bud! Good to know who the admins are. --Dan Edge

Hello All, I would like to hone my understanding of the epistemological status of proper names. Rand mentions proper names briefly in the ITOE, but does not discuss them at much length. I am in the process of going over the "Objectivism as Open vs Closed system" debate again, and would like to better understand "Objectivism" qua proper name. I am assuming at this point that Objectivism is a proper name, designating the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Some questions: 1. Do proper names qualify as concepts? Concepts are integrations of two or more units; this description would not seem to fit proper names. However, we customarily use proper names in the form of genus and species, which is the same format we use to define concepts. A related question: 2. Do proper names require a formal definition? I have often thought that "Objectivism" can be defined as "the philosophy of Ayn Rand." This description has been challenged of late (via online discussion) on the basis that "Objectivism" is not a concept and as such cannot be defined in this way. 3. Are proper names defined ostensively? Is the only appropriate "defintion" of a proper name to point to its referent (i.e., John Smith is that guy *pointing*)? A simple ostensive definition of "Objectivism" is dissatisfying to me, but I can't figure out why, exactly. 4. Is there a concept designating proper names of abstract particulars, such as "Objectivism" or "Newtonian Mechanics?" Diana Hsieh onced used the term "abstract particular" to describe Objectivism, and I have considered incorporating this term into my vocabulary, if I can properly define it. Tentatively, I would define abstract particular as "a proper name designating a specific set of abstractions." This seems too broad, but I can't think of anything better at the moment. Thanks for any response. --Dan Edge Sorry for the post duplication... --Dan Edge

I love my life. And I don't just mean life in general, but my life in particular. I love my name, the particulars of my body, my voice, I love the fact that I'm a man, my taste in music, my hometown, my local football team, pretty much everything that makes me distinctly who I am. I would not want to trade my face with anyone, even someone better looking than me. I love my consciousness, and my body's particular physical manifestation in reality. All of these distinguishing characteristics are morally neutral. It is no more ethical to be male or female, to root for the Panthers or the Redskins, to have green eyes or brown eyes, to be from Greenville, SC or somewhere else. One may ask: On what basis can one value his particular distinguishing characteristics more highly than any other possible combination? There are no absolute standards of judgment in this morally optional realm. My simple answer: Self-love is a prime mover. I don't need a reason to highly value the distinguishing characteristics that make me an individual. To value life is to value the particular manifestation of one's life in the world. One exists as a unity of mind and body, and one's body exists in a particular form. It is appropriate to highly value your distinguishing physical characteristics, for no other reason than that is who you are. The experience of sexuality is an expression of this fundamental form of self-love. I love the fact that I am a man, and I would never in a million years want to be a woman. This is not because I think that men are morally superior to women. I love being a man because that is what I am. Man-ness is a central characteristic of my physical existence qua living being. My experience of masculinity is intimately tied up with my experience of living in reality. It is rational and appropriate for me to highly value the physical reality of my gender. [sexuality and the experience of masculinity or femininity as an expression of self-love is a closely related issue, one which I will discuss at length in a future essay.] I contend that one may choose to highly value other distinguishing aspects of his existence qua rational animal that are non-volitional, such as his birthplace. I love the fact that I am from Greenville, SC, and I would not want to be from anywhere else. I pull for southern sports teams, allow my southern drawl to manifest itself in my speech, and identify myself as a "redneck" or "southern gentleman" as a form of introduction. This does not mean that I withhold judgment on negative aspects of southern culture, I simply focus on the positive. The southern gentleman is educated, kind, polite, romantic, distinguished, witty, and intelligent. The redneck is hard-working, spontaneous, excitable, tough, and brutally violent when he needs to be. I take pride in identifying these positive aspects of my personality, and unifying them under a moniker that represents my place of birth. [individualizing oneself though the unification of personality traits into easily perceptible "types" (like redneck) is one powerful method of self-identification and expression. This, too, deserves its own essay at some point in the future. See Peikoff's lecture Integration as the Essence of Personal Identity for background.] I get great pleasure out of rooting for the Carolina Panthers, and I will be a fan for the rest of my life. Anyone who has seen me hoot and hollar at the television on a Monday Night during the fall months can attest to my passion for the sport. I chose the Panthers because they are the closest NFL team to Greenville, SC (thought one could chose a favorite team for a myriad of other reasons). The point is that, though my choice of team is morally optional, I highly value the choice that I have made, and I need no other moral justification beyond my love of self. This short essay represents a brainstorm of issues I have been thinking about for some time, especially as it relates to Mind-Body integration and sexuality. I welcome any comments that would help me clarify these issues. --Dan Edge

Howdy Folks, My mug should be under my name on the left, if the Avatar is working properly. A larger picture should be on my profile. Nice to meet all of you. --Dan Edge