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I recently asked myself a (short series of related) question(s): (Q): Hank Rearden invented, manufactured, and sold steel. Of the vocations that Hank Rearden could have potentially entertained - industrial or otherwise - why did he find the steel industry so satisfying? Similarly, Ayn Rand apparently decided at a very young age that she wanted to write for a living. Was this decision to write - an important value judgement that would affect the course of her life - an arbitrary one? Was it tantamount to allowing a feeling to 'make' an important decision, as opposed to feelings supplementing reason? The question(s) itself, on the surface, is simplistic and not apparently problematic. I found, however, that I was not satisfied with my own response to it. It is my response that created problems: (A): Initial interest of this kind tends to be generated, where untouched by the edict of social conditioning (as an 'interest' in not going to the Christian hell after death), by 'raw' ability; that is, a man who through basic curiosity and/or happenstance discovers that he seems to have 'natural talent' for, let's say, sculpting - perhaps he has a high spatial intelligence - tends to develop an interest therein and, subsequently, an affinity for sculpting. Since the man could apply reason to satisfy his needs and achieve a productive happiness by taking the necessary steps to become a professional sculptor, I posited that the man's enjoyment of (his impetus to pursue) the specific task of sculpting is grounded in valuing success - success being both the product of biological ability (as lent to potential achievement) and of an intellectual adherence to rational practice (as lent to actual achievement). Therefore, it seems, the man's emotional interest is actually the summation of a process of rational deduction ("I can be a successful sculptor, given my talent") from an objective value (success). But then, I find that I can offer myself reproach in turn: In response to (A): If the contents of (A) are accurate; if the specificity of the job itself is not centrally relevant to a man's satisfaction therein; if the initial emotional reaction to sculpting or writing or steel-making is instead a derivative of recognizing one's own ability to succeed - then it should not ultimately matter what job the man does, so long as he is capable of succeeding at his task. But wouldn't that reasoning (A) extend such that a man could be dictated a job by some collectivist authority, and achieve a productive happiness in that job so long as he succeeds doing it? This is to specifically contradict Anthem, where Rand has the protagonist unsatisfied with his 'success' at street-sweeping, regardless of the fact that his physical needs are otherwise met by the act (conformance arguably being a requisite of being fed in that scenario). (A) must therefore be incomplete or false. If (A) is indeed false, then what drives the protagonist of Anthem, if not a desire to succeed 'doing something more interesting'; what is the desire to do something 'more interesting' if not arbitrary, as what is 'interesting' is subjective; how, therefore, is following this whim through rational means qualitatively different from following any other whim through rational means? More importantly, it is almost as if the necessity of the arbitrary - as if the objective value of the arbitrary as such - is posited here. This, it seems, undermines what I argue in (A) and goes on to offer some conflict with the idea that the arbitrary should be philosophically subordinate to reason. Is the arbitrary, given this example, essential to proper life on Earth? This response makes it seem like a necessary prerequisite of happiness, and of free action in the first place. Following these two, I have been likewise going around and around, through several similar points and counterpoints of varying strength and weakness. I am not really satisfied with any of them at the moment. I know no Objectivists with whom I might debate, in person, for the purpose of checking the argument on either side of my internal argument - hence this post.

I find, for the first time in my life, that the question is difficult for me to answer. This, what was previously one of the simplest questions that I could have been asked. Soon after I began to really integrate reason into my life on the fundamental level that studying Objectivist philosophy requires, which is only recently, my artistic interests started to change. Where I was previously stuck in a sort of dark little 'intellectual oubliette,' created by the manner in which my personal brand of Logical Positivism totally amputated metaphysics and ethics, and subsequently any real sense of purpose, meaning, justification, truth, value, and self-confidence (et cetera), my taste in music was overwhelmingly dystopian, cynical, and/or faux-militant-chic in nature. Most of the list is relatively obscure; I won't waste your time by rambling off the three hundred some-odd Industrial, Post-Industrial, Martial/Neoclassical, Post-Punk, Darkwave, Power-Electronics, Rhythmic Noise, Apocalyptic Folk and EBM bands that I enjoy less by the day, but perhaps the following short summary might give some of you a general idea. Joy Division Bauhaus Death in June Skinny Puppy Der Blutsharch Wumpscut Black Tape for a Blue Girl Brighter Death Now Control/Exsanguate Lyica Navicon Torture Technologies Laibach Unto Ashes Sedaye Marg Einsturzende Neubauten Wolfsheim Suicide Commando Nine Inch Nails Velvet Acid Christ Mephisto Walz ... The only thing that hasn't really changed is my appreciation of electronic (computer and synth-based) composition in and of itself, which stems, I believe, from my strong valuing and appreciation of new technology. I expect that I'll run across something that fits my new tastes eventually; as of the moment, there is nothing that I would call 'a favorite' amidst what I dislike or am increasingly indifferent to.

Of course I've read Popper's Logik der Forschung. Being a Falsificationist, however, no more makes one a "Popperian" than being an Objectivist makes one a Randroid, or being a fan of modern highways and their gently curving off-ramps makes one an Adolf Hitlerite. What you're doing amounts to nothing better than artificially broadening Falsification into "Popperianism" in order to launch offal at the simple concept from outside of its bounds. And now, instead of attempting to defend your indefensable comments, you instead evade the issue entirely. So then, in further response to your matrix-like evasion, my take on Falsification, as articulated above, certainly isn't something that I simply came up with. This is the orthodox scientific employ of Falsification whenever and wherever I have encountered it used as a division between scientific and nonscientific theory (which is everywhere that scientists make such a distinction). Besides Popper, if you're actually interested in scouring the dry tombs of original impetuses (not that such has bearing on the context of this discussion), you will also find Ernest Gellner, and still others.

How, exactly, does Falsifiability do any harm to the "conduct of scientific research?" I don't know about "Popperianism" (we're only talking about Falsifiability here - it isn't some cult of personality), but Falsifiability is not anywhere close to Nihilism. Regarding it as such would be a gross and irresponsible misnomer, one which illogically extends well beyond the contemporary scientific function of Falsifiability. As applied to your post, it also serves as a straw man and is therefore doubly fallacious. No, no, and again no. Even a true theory can quite plainly be Falsifiable, which, as has already been mentioned several times, doesn't have anything to do with actually showing that theory to be false (and does not make it any 'less true' either); Falsifiability is a skeletal component - a property of the empirical structure of a theory - totally without regard to the topical specificity thereof. True or False are irrelevant here: Falsifiability regards the theory in principle and that is as far as it goes. This so-called "flaw" is sophistry. "Unfalsified" is not synonymous with "unfalsifiable," which is the matter at hand. Whether a theory is "unfalsified" or not is absolutely immaterial to the subject. Be sure to let me know when you next see one of these mysterious "Popperians." Until then, I'll be scanning the thread for on-topic debate specifically concerning Falsifiability.

What is the official policy on graphics within the signature line (specifically, user-created signature images displayed by way of linking)? I didn't notice anything about it in the Forum Rules, but I assume that they would be either disallowed or regulated given the nature of the other rules. Most well-run boards seem to prohibit them altogether or have a specific set of criteria - pixel maximums and minimums (universally fixed dimensions), filesize maximums, file type restrictions (generally animated signatures do not go over well), and so on. I apologise for being redundant if this has in fact been discussed somewhere.

Not really. Here is an excerpt from the wiki link that I posted earlier: "A patient regarded by his psychoanalyst as "in denial" about his sexual orientation may be viewed as confirming he is homosexual simply by denying that he is; and if he has sex with women, he may be accused of trying to buttress his denials. In other words, there is no way the patient could convincingly demonstrate his heterosexuality to his analyst. This is an example of what Popper called a "closed circle". The proposition that the patient is homosexual is not falsifiable." You can replace the word "possible" with "potentially" or "in principle" if you find it especially problematic. Otherwise, I am really at a loss. But it's not an insistence on disproof - its an insistence on potential disproof. And, unrelated to that, how is 'proving the opposite' not an example of specifically proving a negative in a question of true/false? One could uncover information that goes so far as to prove that a related theory is false, without simultaneously proving a countertheory (or "opposite"), which makes the only "opposite" involved a question of the truth or falsity of the original theory. That asked, the terminology I used in the quoted post was purposely identical to the individual that I in turn quoted, for the sake of a more simple comparison. To be more specific, and to reiterate what I've said earlier, it is only a question of the ability of a theory to be disproved in principle. The opposite of Falsifiability - to potentially disprove - is Verifiability - to potentially prove. They aren't lumped together as you seem inclined to think, and Falsifiability really has nothing to do with the ability of a theory to be "proved." Many scientific theories are posited that cannot yet be completely proved because we still lack information. What they all have in common is Falsifiability - the distinction between scientific and nonscientific theory.

One does not mean "prove or disprove" - one only means "disprove," hence "Falsifiability". As for online references, try this. At a glance, it is far more complete.

I agree - not that I have ever posited a reconciliation of Nihilism and Objectivism in the first place. As I mentioned in my very first post, Nihilism is something that I've recently discarded. No. I said nothing about any necessary falsehood. "All scientific knowledge" being rendered false does not follow from the falsifiability of scientific theory. Falsifiability is a potential. Scientific theory is perpetually incomplete. A theory that is unfalsifiable can never be disproved or decisively challenged; it is posited such that it is intrinsically immune to reproach or expansion by way of the scientific method, and it is therefore unscientific. It looks like you are confusing theory based upon fact with naked facts themselves (but correct me if I am in error). Considering the fact that I nowhere said anything about "scientific fact" or "non scientific fact," instead specifically mentioning scientific and nonscientific theory, I think that the answer to this question is self evident. Right - and it is a method that depends upon theories that are falsifiable. Ergo, a theory that is not falsifiable is not part of the contemporary scientific method and should not be referred to as if it was. No. I was asked if I considered a theory to be necessarily invalid simply because it is unscientific. Saying that I do not does not mean that I "accept some means other than reason of understanding the world." I am genuinely sorry for all of the confusion that this post seems to have caused. That aside - I don't need to "chuck" any of the "junk" that I have "accumulated" simply to understand Objectivism. Comprehension is a simple process, and in this case it entails nothing but entertaining a neutral perspective while learning - allowing that perspective to be swayed by the new information. I do not find it even remotely challenging to temporarily or permanently disregard ideo-philosophical biases at will, in order to entertain what might be a diametrically opposing perspective for the sake of argument, or the analysis thereof, or the practice thereof. Correct. It is all important to note the massive, pulsating difference between "unfalsified" (or "false" for that matter) and "unfalsifiable".

In order for .999... to equal anything other than one, there would have to be a number - even an infinitely small number - between .999... and one. And yet, were we to start at the number one and move backwards towards .999..., we would immediately find there to be no number between the two - which means that they are the same number. And besides that: IF 1/9 = .111... 8/9 = .888... AND IF .111... + .888... = .999... AND ALSO 1/9 + 8/9 = 9/9 = 1. THEN .999... = 1. This series of repeating decimals is just a semantic limitation of decimal notation, is it not?

Thanks. As I said, it is a fledgling interest; of Rand, I've only yet read Atlas Shrugged.

An unfalsifiable theory. It could be any number of things in addition to that - it just isn't scientific. To use a common example, a Falsificationist might argue that Psychoanalysis is an ideology, as opposed to a scientific theory, because it cannot be falsified. You could probably regard Falsifiability a principle of exclusion in that it excludes theories from science, but does not subsequently categorize those theories further. The purpose is to distinguish between science and pseudoscience that potentially retards the scientific method by erroneously claiming to be science. Personally, my interest in the classification of theory also tends to terminate there. I don't think that a theory is necessarily invalid because it is unscientific, no. I do, however, strongly value scientific theory above nonscientific theory. Well, it is possible that I am not seeing the issue clearly. I don't think it likely, but I won't rule it out. I'm not. Any value judgements that I might make upon a philosophy in this case are not simply based upon the politics that it encourages. Actually, it would be the other way around; I would agree or disagree with a given political climate based upon my alignment with a background philosophy. In the case at hand, my lack of ethical direction when it comes to socio-political assertion (or non-assertion) is the impetus behind my search for a philosophy that underlies with such things. See below for further elaboration. I completely lack such a system of ethics. I basically just restrict my behaviour to what is stipulated by the laws under which I live, and I only do this because I am forced to do so. I do not immediately see right or wrong in any action; beyond not doing what I am not allowed to do, I have been functioning largely on whim. Yeah. The interplay between the two is transparent.

(Note: This was split from this thread (link) in the Introductions sub-forum - softwareNerd). Sure. A Falsificationist is simply an individual who subscribes to the general principle of Falsification, which, broadly, states that any theory intrinsically impossible to be found false can not be considered a scientific theory. It is a mainstay of contemporary Western scientific thought. What I mean is some kind of rational philosophical basis that I might appeal to whenever I must make socially significant decisions, such as voting one way or the other during an election. Do I work to maximize the freedom of the individual? Do I put my interests first, or do I submit to a group for my own ultimate betterment? Et cetera. I need a general ideal upon which to orient socially significant right and wrong. Coming from a long history of nihilism, I have little grounding in this regard.

Hello. I don't particularly enjoy going on about myself, so forgive me if the following comes off a bit impassionate or sparse. I'm a 23 year old college student, living in the United States. After five years of non-academic, "real world" living, I was able to finally extract myself from the cold dregs of an especially bitter, longstanding nihilism - first manifesting in excess of eleven years ago (which, from my nascent perspective, is an eternity). I am, and have always been, an unmitigated Agnostic and Logical Positivist/Falsificationist. Still, I seek a rational social platform of some kind - and thus my fledgling interest in Objectivism. Well. There it is.