hunterrose

Was Roark wrong for sleeping with Dominique pre-marriage, as pre-marriage she was definitely not Objectivist, not "ideal," and not "safe??" Didn't Dominique have a "reasonable" amount of time to realize her error?? If a woman proved god existed, or resolved the gaps in Objectivist esthetics, her philosophy wouldn't be Objectivist. Should such a woman be undesired as a mate to an Objectivist male? If a person determines that the theist isn't evading, likelihoods don't matter.

Okay. Let me use the blackjack example for a moment to illustrate my problem. Mr. Smith decides whether to hit or stand on a hand on the basis of a coin flip. How can he validate this principle? He could base it on probability or whether he gains money, but that doesn't validate the principle itself. What else can he use to validate his principle is objectively rational - other than whether his principle has any negative consequences? If there is another way to validate a principle as rational other than empiricism or negative consequences, I am unaware of it. That's where I ask "how is this action destructive to the perpetrator;" asking it is not lack of awareness of "living by principle." Accepting dependence on coin-flips lead to accepting injustice, dishonesty, etc? What is the basis for saying Mr. Smith will inevitably act in these other ways? I ignore for the moment that this seems to be passing the validation buck onto injustice and others... which themselves would have to be proven rational before dependence on coin-flipping could be thus validated. Not ignoring the theft argument, I just felt this could state my problem better. I can state it in terms of theft if necessary.

Conscious of the god's thoughts? I suppose the god would have to have some inherent ideas and/or values. Made from the god's thoughts and will? Thoughts are not "nothing." And "physical creation requires physical work" can't be accepted as irrefutable until "god can't create matter" is definitively derived from the axioms. The contradictory is false without a doubt; the arbitrary is not. I'm not meaning to come across as "prove that I am wrong." That's not my intention. I'm merely stating that I believe god is arbitrary, and not contradictory. If we agreed that god was arbitrary, but not contradictory, then I wouldn't have any argument to make. Because while you might not do it, many people have said that god contradicts the axioms. I'm not so sure of that, so I am in search of validation of this contradicting.

Nah, I'm saying that the god created even energy (in the e=mc^2 sense.) A scenario in which god (non-matter) was originally the only existent, and the god later created matter, space, gravity, light, and other forms of energy-matter. Why do you assume I speak of something else? It's granted that consciousness couldn't exist before existence( assuming we mean existence as everything that exists, not necessarily just the physical universe.) But how does primacy of existence make the case the god's consciousness couldn't have been the original existent? How does it make the case that even a god's consciousness can't create physical matter? Saying it violates primacy of existence (without explaining primacy's derivation) is one thing. Stating how these two things are validated by the axioms is a wholly different matter. Given enough time, I can write any number out onto pieces of paper. The fact that I could thus write any number doesn't imply that I can write out an infinite number. I feel it's quite likely that infinite strength would indeed violate identity, but infinite strength isn't a logical conclusion of this god's strength, any more than writing out infinite numbers is a logical conclusion to my ability. Agreed, and the fact that an assertion is arbitrary does not constitute a contradiction to a philosophic axiom.

I will agree that consciousness can't exist before existence; if a consciousness exists, then an existent (the consciousness) exists. However, that doesn't in and of itself say: - existence chronologically precedes consciousness (they could be concurrent?) - a "god" couldn't create physical existents from his consciousness I acknowledge that no consciousness can create existence in toto; that's not necessarily the same as saying a god couldn't create physical (matter) existence. I'm not sure of the basis of saying that consciousness can't create any physical existents. How do we come to that part of primacy of existence? If the Christian god or any other "greater god" could exist, I don't think "lesser gods" would be a stretch of possibility. We have shown that: - "god" creating existence (god can't create himself) is contradictory (to existence?) - ultimate omniscience (creating and lifting the unliftable) is contradictory to identity I don't think it has been shown that: - "god" couldn't have created physical existence - nigh-infinite power (ability to lift any quantifiable mass) is contradictory - every consciousness is bound by scientific laws Okay, I see where you're coming from. I didn't mean I accepted god's contradiction or had no counter-argument. I just meant that at that point I didn't want to argue too many points at one time. It seems that I was just delaying the inevitable, though I suppose I was somewhat unclear; the "acceptance" on my part was that "god" might not contradict one of the axioms (which was all I was thinking about at that point) but still be contradictory to one of the axioms' necessary derivatives. There seems to be multiple uses of "contradictory to identity" being used. a: "blatant contradiction" - being A and not-A - this is blatantly contradictory because something can't be two exclusively different things. I don't think anyone argues with this. b: nigh-infinite contradiction - e.g. "god" could lift any quantifiable mass, or all existent mass (but not something that's an unliftable [infinite] mass.) I don't see how this violates the law of identity. Having identity doesn't necessarily mean being totally delimited, does it? c: physical contradiction - e.g. moving faster than the speed of light, or perhaps being in more than one place. I question what way this contradicts identity too. a is granted. How is b and/or c contradictory? I don't deny many people define godhood as omniscience. Many also recognize "contradictory omniscience" (lifting and creating the unliftable) is impossible, but don't hold nigh-infinite powers or omniscience as a necessary quality of godhood anyway. Showing omniscience in the ultimate sense is contradictory thus doesn't really prove that "god" can't exist, in and of itself. If one can prove the conditions of godhood to be contradictory, then you've proven the god can't exist. Besides, you can't get mad if I don't give a definition, and mad if I do give a definition

Fair enough. It would have been more precise for me to have stated my objection something like: Why should I respect another person's property? Because violating another's property would be dishonest. Why is dishonesty qua theft immoral? Because I should respect another person's property. I could ask why shouldn't a man fake adhering to the rights of other men if he's not caught. The answer would seem to be that dishonesty - "faking reality" - is wrong. But then can you validate honesty with property rights? I don't think so. I'm not questioning the nature or need of my property rights; I'm saying that the only reason for me to respect the property of others is if disrespecting it would be (immoral) dishonesty. I have no problem with adhering to property rights in this sense - so long as dishonesty is validated on something other than property rights. But then how is the beehive honey - wallet analogy differentiated? Falling asleep I didn't reply to much, but I'm not forgetting; I'll post later tonight or in the morning.

The other mentioning of the unliftable boulder? It might be somewhere here. That is indeed a different topic, though that may not be the one I referred to either I read it in some God topic, I just don't remember which one! There's a bunch interesting dormant topics here A god is an entity which has at least one of the following characteristics: 1) creator of the (physical) universe from the god's consciousness (1) Places consciousness as primary over existence. Granted. If "primacy of existence" can indeed be taken as true, I will accept 1) as contradictory. My next question then would be how is "primacy of existence" necessarily derived from the axioms of existence/identity and consciousness? Unless someone else wishes to explain, I'll have to go through OPAR on this before I reply further. 2) powers limited only by non-contradiction (2) You have to define what these powers would be that are non-contradictory (X-ray vision or something)? Well here I mean non-contradiction in the sense that a god couldn't do things such as lift an unliftable boulder, or be here and not be here. Either a god couldn't create something he couldn't lift, or he couldn't lift something he made as unliftable. That's the only condition I'm placing on the god's power. While I agree that absolute (contradictory) omnipotence is itself contradictory, I'm not sure about 2). I don't mean non-contradiction as unable to violate physical laws... ...hmm, I suppose any being capable of 2) would also be capable of 3). I didn't realize that before Since 2) requires 3) to be non-contradictory, I'll restate the definition for all intents and purposes as: A god is an entity which has at least one of the following characteristics: 1) creator of the (physical) universe from the god's consciousness 3) cognitive being able to exist outside of the bounds/laws of a created (physical) universe. 3) cognitive being able to exist outside of the bounds/laws of a created (physical) universe. (3) is impossible. Something cannot exist if it is not possible to exist. I don't mean existing outside of the bounds of existence, which I wouldn't accept. I mean existing outside of the laws of physical existence. That is, not being affected by gravity, mass and weight constrictions, the speed limit of light, etc. We shall see :) True, I didn't include "gods" like the Greek/Egyptian/Norse gods, but if the ultimate type of god isn't contradictory, I assume the lesser gods would also be non-contradictory.

Questioning primacy of consciousness or the nature of property rights wasn't actually my intent. My question is still on the immorality of theft. It seems to me that theft is ultimately immoral based on empiricism ("you might be disadvantaged by theft") or man's/property rights ("theft of a wallet is wrong because it's theft of another man's wallet.") If the counter-argument is "you will inevitably be disadvantaged by theft" (i.e. non-empiricist,) is theft immoral because it fakes the reality of property rights? This is where I make the comparison of stealing a wallet to taking honey from a beehive. If the sole difference between the two is that man has property rights, and bees don't, then the sole reason taking a wallet is immoral would seem to be that man has property rights. There is nothing immoral about taking honey; what else could differentiate the two (i.e. make one honest, the other dishonest) other than the rights of other men? 1)"Taking a wallet is an act of irrationality, because I should respect another's man's rights to a wallet." The problem with saying such is that 2)"I should respect another man's rights to a wallet, because taking a wallet is an act of irrationality" would then be circular, wouldn't it? I'm not arguing against 2) - if taking a wallet is immoral, then I agree with 2). I'm arguing against 1), and the non-empiricist proof that taking a wallet is faking reality. 1) and 2) can't both be correct formulations, because then they would be circular. But if taking a wallet is not immoral from empiricist reasons, and it's not immoral from property rights reasons, then what reality is taking a wallet faking?

Does anyone think the definition for a god in #89 is serviceable? I accepted it? When? You proved it??? Where? Simply saying that "the ability to lift any quantifiable mass" is contradictory to identity is not a proof, or even an argument. If you're referring to the boulder example, that proves that omniscience must be limited by non-contradiction, and perhaps thus that omniscience can't exist. The boulder example doesn't show that "the ability to lift any quantifiable mass" or "powers limited by non-contradiction" can't exist. And I never believed or implied that absolute omniscience was a necessary condition of godhood, so I doubt that I've "accepted" your proof that "god" isn't possible.

The whole point of this topic is whether a god can exist, which I take to mean whether "god's" existence or non-existence is necessarily contradictory. If you were saying that "god" was contradictory, I merely asked how. I have no idea. I don't hold that a god has to or does create something out of nothing. Off-hand, I agree with you on this. I agree. I'm not sure if it was in this topic, or the original topic, but that example has been used. It still makes a good point, though. Someone said that such arguments are moot, as "omnipotent" means being able to do anything that's possible, which I take to mean any non-contradictory thing. Thus, an omnipotent god couldn't be here and not be here, or be able to lift anything and not lift a certain weight, and yet maintain his omnipotence. Ultimately whether a non-contradictory "omnipotence" is really omnipotence doesn't really concern me. I don't believe contradictory omnipotence is possible (largely because of arguments similar to Felix's,) but at the same time, IMO contradictory omniscience isn't a necessary condition of godhood. If everyone agrees I offer this as a definition of a god: A god is an entity which has at least one of the following characteristics: 1) creator of the (physical) universe from the god's consciousness 2) powers limited only by non-contradiction 3) cognitive being able to exist outside of the bounds/laws of a created (physical) universe. I'd hold that a being that possessed any one of those characteristics would be a god, though there is room to digress. I refer to "universe" as "all physical (matter) existents." In other words, creating the universe wouldn't necessarily be the same thing as creating existence. If you prove #1 to be contradictory, then "god as creator of existence" and "creation from nothing" are contradictory. If you prove #2 to be contradictory, then "god as omnipotent" is contradictory. If you prove #3 is contradictory, then "god as beyond existence" is contradictory. And IMO proving all three to be contradictory would prove the concept of god to be contradictory.

Even if matter couldn't be created out of non-matter, what would be the metaphysical basis for such a claim? Unless it is metaphysically contradictory, I don't think the definition needs to be modified. Sure. In addition to creator of physical universe, powers at the least limited by non-contradiction, and not necessarily omniscient, add spirt (non-physical) being. One possible weakness of that argument may be that God here seems to merely be a synonym for the universe (or existence.) I'm not sure if that is a correct assumption, but if it is, then "god" wouldn't have much meaning, and any godhood characteristics (creation, omni-potence/science, extradimensional, etc) would be just as equally consistent or contradictory as otherwise.

Marriage, for me, means a bond with a person who is representative of my highest values. The sexual partner relationship would be far less exacting, but would follow the same idea. I am somewhat at a loss as to precisely qualifying either, though. Some examples would be I'd want a marriage partner to enjoy physical activities like hiking and exercising. I wouldn't require that of a sexual partner, though it'd be a plus. I prefer redheads over blondes, but I think it would be absolutely silly to decline on marriage (or any relationship) to an otherwise "ideal" blonde just because she refused to dye her hair. I feel there are 1) some ideal qualities either relationship would require, 2) some that only marriage would require, and 3) some that are nice, but not required to either. I wouldn't regard this as a compromise, because in each instance I feel that I would be basing a relationship on what I deem desired qualities, though not perfection qualities. If Hank had been evading his errors, then I'd consider Dagny wrong. I don't believe a non-marriage relationship should necessarily have as exacting standards as a marriage relationship, and I do believe that Hank was representative of a good enough part of Dagny's most important values (though not enough for marriage) to approve of their relationship.

Granted, but if dishonesty doesn't fake any particular fact, then how do you know that dishonesty fakes any facts, assuming dishonesty isn't simply defined as "faking reality?" Let me stop there for a second. If the Artful Dodger steals a wallet and rationalizes this action as no different from taking honey from a beehive, what makes one action honest, and the other dishonest? Variants of property rights carry the spectre of circularity.

This all still seems a bit circular to me. What certain facts of reality does dishonesty fake, if not some variant of property rights? What is the basis for observing the property rights of another, if not some variant of rationality?

I think he means that the idea of people choosing collectivism (not necessarily the governmental forcing) would be a "good" thing. Like I said, that's the idea that really has to be fought.

I agree that a person should marry the "ideal" person. But ideal can be taken two ways: ideal as "having my consummate qualities for a mate," and ideal as "having the "important" qualities for a mate." I would rather marry someone who consistently pursued attainment of what was objectively and philosophically "right" but never attains "full integration" over someone who accepts Objectivism and proceeds to dogmatically ignore anything that questions that philosophy. Not implying that any Objectivist is such, just making a point. For me, the pursuit of "the right" is the consummate philosophical quality. Having a person of the same philosophical foundations is equivalent to having a grandmaster as a mate: it's nice, but not a necessary quality of "ideal." IMO similar foundations would be necessary, though what "similar" constitutes is in the eye of the beholder. As far as the Hank-Dagny question goes, Hank searched for his error, but it didn't "click" for a long while. Hank wasn't evading the truth, he just didn't immediately see it.

Hey, thanks for the Journals info! I wasn't aware Rand had any addressed this I'm glad you told me that, as it alleviates much of my concerns. Galt was possibly more intelligent than d'Anconia, but if he was, it wasn't by much IMO. Remember that Mr. "I can do it" independently discovered differential equations as a child. And did it as a sidenote to a child's pursuits. That's gotta be a 400 IQ!

The Declaration of Independence also stated something similar (though all people didn't have equal rights then,) and I don't recall if "citizen" was clearly denoted in his Objectivist DoI. Perhaps, but equality of rights is far different from equalizing of means. Equality of rights, with what the "rights" are being briefly explained, is something that is quite necessary.

I've read a portion of ASU and one Objectivism-criticism essay of his. I'd recommend both. ASU sought to develop a case why anarchism enevitably leads to and justifies minarchism. And then (if I remember correctly) why government exceeding minarchic standards is wrong. Like I said, not watertight, and not based off of Objectivist underpinnings, but neither removes its value. The essay I read ("Nozick on the Randian Argument") is definitely not Objectivist. It's not worthwhile for those who are offended at any attempt to disprove Objectivist ethics, but as with ASU, it has its merits. Its rebuttal by Den Uyl and Rasmussen is (I believe) "Den Uyl and Rasmussen on Nozick on the Randian Argument." Whether either is definitive is a personal matter, I suppose. I do know that both of these have been published in at least a book besides Socratic Puzzles (I've never found a copy of that,) though I don't remember the name of the book I read them in. ASU attempts to lead to the same minarchist solution as Objectivism (though on different grounds,) so I'd say it's somewhat consistent. "Nozick on the Randian Argument" is not at all consistent with Objectivism. Nozick's arguments are debatable and they aren't bulletproof, but I found them interesting.

From a personal perspective and in a general sense, I don't. But personal perspective isn't a strong reason to allow one over the other. I'm sure I can find some group of people that'd prefer dogmatic and slaveowning as mascot adjectives (Bob Jones U? ), and if their personal feelings were the necessary justification, what would be the rationale in opposing the Dogmatic Objectivists of X University? In general, fighting and marching are, at the least, more benign than dogmatic and slaveowning, but there are exceptions. Marching might be VERY justifiably offensive in regards to the Cherokee, as it has connotations of the Trail of Tears. The Fighting Nats is okay... unless Nats refers to Nat Turners, which might take some of the luster off of "Fighting." "Fighting" and "marching" aren't necessarily complimentary. Alternately, a group can find some aspect of "dogmatic" or "slaveowning" that they find "complimentary." It's quite a slippery slope to say that A is wrong in opposing this mascot, but B is right in opposing that mascot. If one is wrong, that at least justifies a person questioning whether another is wrong.

But surely being effiminate isn't a disability?

I haven't gotten Makai yet. I likely will, but money's tight If it's anything like Disgaea though, I'll definitely love it. FFX was a downer in many ways. Yuna was just ... bleh. Altruism is one thing, but suicidal altruism is definitely a turn-off... and anti-Objectivist, I suppose.

Well, to add a bit of perspective from the other side, "fighting" isn't necessarily a complement. Someone could mean these to be complimentary, too: Machiavellian Presidents Slaveowning Whites Fighting Nats Dogmatic Objectivists Marching Cherokee That certainly doesn't mean groups these mascots are derived from would or should approve of such "flattery," though.

Blarg, that sucks Okey-doke. Nope. Do you really want to suggest to your fiancee that she's not thinking things over in the first place?

I don't go into politics much, but I'll give my two cents: "Just compensation" could get quite tricky. Who'd decide what is "just?" Who would be capable of deciding the "just compensation" for, say, Galt's motor research? Just some ideas, but remember that a Declaration doesn't have to go into all the specifics, just the general idea. Incidentally, I'm not sure whether you've read it or not, but Anarchy, State, and Utopia (by Robert Nozick?) might be of interest to you, as it touches on a lot of these issues. I don't agree with all of his conclusions, but he does make a case. It's late (or early?) so bear that in mind with my responses One question toward this might be what about the poor and those unable to pay for whatever reason? Alternatively, if you can't use your land how you wish (i.e. must support gov't,) are property rights truly sovereign?