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Seeker

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Everything posted by Seeker

  1. There is no reason why a free market couldn't handle these issues. The dirty little secret here is that folks move onto thier little residential plots of land counting on unearned value, namely, something pertaining to how the guy next door or down the street is going to use his plot in the future. To secure that value, they should all have to pay by purchasing from the appropriate landowners the specific right-to-develop in question, stipulating the permitted uses. What needs to stop is their transforming the enjoyment of the unearned into a right by which they can make unjust demands on others. There is no right to direct sunlight, for example, free from the neighbors unless they pay for it, and if they haven't, a just legal system would make them sit in the dark, or leave (this will be my heartless-seeming-but-really-benevolent post for today).
  2. I daresay that if the authors of textbooks on Discrete Mathematics would just admit this outright, instead of hiding behind the notion of vacuous proofs as their justification, then this entire conversation would have been unnecessary.
  3. Individuals do not have the absolute right to choose which government they wish to be governed by. By your reasoning, my next-door neighbor could (by a 100% supermajority of himself) "secede" at any time, exercising his own force-monopoly within his house and yard. If he happened to murder a visitor, the town authorities could not prosecute him (because they would lack jurisdiction, because there can be only one force-monopoly in a given territory). Extending this principle would result in a patchwork of "governments" competing for individuals allegiances (like the Crips and Bloods). In short, this idea is nuts. You seem to have made a common mistake regarding the concept of "the consent of the governed" by conflating necessary and sufficient conditions. One may say that consent (as may be inferred from various legal means, at present commonly relying upon electoral majorities or, for certain constitutional changes, supermajorities) is necessary. But is it sufficient? The answer is no, it is not sufficient. Also necessary (and more fundamentally so) is that the government to which the majority consents be proper, i.e. rights-respecting; also necessary is that the monopoly-on-force principle be implementable, which means that there are stable borders, i.e. no freestanding right of secession vis-a-vis established territorial boundaries. To put it succinctly, there can be no government when anyone on a whim gets to redraw the borders as they please. Now, there may be a qualified right of secession implemented within the body of a nation's constitution, ensuring that the alteration of borders be orderly and preserving of individual rights (an example would be the provision of the U.S. Constitution whereby new states can be created from existing states with the consent of the affected legislatures and of Congress), but this is not the same as an absolute right of secession. What is needed is an application of objective political and legal philosophy to this specific area to delineate the proper requirements of adjustments to a government's territorial boundaries. Saying, in effect, that "anything goes" so long as some majority somewhere feels like it, isn't it.
  4. There is no freestanding right of secession, so my offhand answer is no, but if you want to build an argument that somehow incorporates an objectively provable relationship to Russia contra Georgia, something along the lines of "this is what makes a nation-state possible, it's a prerequisite, etc." -- a common language, for example, might be an objective criterion -- that steers clear of subjective whims and preferences, that might be an interesting argument. Of course it cannot be agnostic to the question of which government is more just and rights-respecting, so I am for the moment assuming that Russia and Georgia are about equally mixed up in that regard. My point is that you can't just use overwhelming majorities in a given self-selected territory rejecting a particular "rule" and seceding by whim, otherwise the monopoly-of-force principle would be meaningless as individual towns "secede" followed by neighborhood and houses therein.
  5. If I have anything valuable to add, then you have discovered the mathematical root of humor. Ha-ha. My Artificial Intelligence textbook suggests that "P=>Q" makes sense (i.e. relates to reality) if you think of it as saying, "if P is true then I am claiming that Q is true. Otherwise I am making no claim." Thus, since there are no seven-legged alligators, I am making no claim about them all being pink. And, since no element belongs to an empty set, I am making no claim about all of its elements belonging to every set. Yet, that is what my Discrete Mathematics textbook (like yours) essentially does. So in the end I agree, but perhaps this is a matter best left to the mathematicians.
  6. Then they ought to be satisfied with representatives who maximize the return of expropriated money to their own district, since that is what they are voting for. You have yet to establish that "voters are deeply dissatisfied with their so-called choice".
  7. Congress' approval rating does not indicate that voters in a given district are deeply dissatisfied with their choice, it indicates that they are dissatisfied with the institution of Congress. Given a reelection rate of 94%, this indicates that they are very satisfied with their own representatives, it's those other guys' representatives they can't stand. Money spent in their own district is a worthy expenditure that provides jobs, money spent in others' districts is pork. Across the board what you see reflected is the overwhelming preference for statism. Has anyone ever lost a seat in Congress because they brought too much pork back to the district? That's the sea change that needs to happen and we are nowhere near there.
  8. There is also the ultimate power of the people to make and break governments which entails the right to arms, which is arguably even more fundamental than all the others since they ultimately depend upon it.
  9. If you write a topic that says "existence does not exist, let us discuss the ways...", and others point out to you how existence is self-evident, and you continue to deny this then the topic is going to be your denial of the self-evident no matter how much you insist otherwise. Similarly, if you write a topic that denies that free will is self-evident in order to discuss a cultural determinism thesis, and others point out to you how volition is self-evident, and you continue to deny this then the topic is going to be your denial of the self-evident no matter how much you insist otherwise. As you tried to change the subject by invoking forum rules, I chose to point out that such invocation is unreasonable, and why. If you deny that free will is self-evident, then you are denying free will or you don't know what free will is. I would suggest the latter, and that the proper course of action would be to ask typical, non-debate questions along of lines of "here is what I think free will is, in what ways am I wrong?" so that the good people of this forum can get on with the business of providing you answers to the benefit of your understanding rather than dallying around a non-discussable topic.
  10. Still? I explained to you that the topic as given presupposes the denial that free will is axiomatic, contrary to Objectivism. Indeed, you yourself acknowledge this point, which is why this in the debate forum and why the conversation will invariably return to getting you to revisit your incorrect premise rather than proceeding with the topic as you have tried to frame it. This is especially true because one must deny an axiom in order to engage the topic as given. No rational conversation could possibly proceed on that basis. Agreed. I think that you were right the first time and wrong the second, but let's examine these aforementioned reasons just to make sure: "First, you may find out about the nature of your free will" This, I contend, is not correct. The whole conversation is predicated on denying the self-evident fact of free will, which (as you acknowledge) is one of my starting points. A conversation cannot serve to illuminate the nature of that which it denies at the outset. At best, your argument could only try to show that the nature of man's will is that it is unfree; this, of course, it cannot do. "... second, you may find out that the free will thesis is internally inconsistent, and need to revise either your beliefs about free will or the argument which purports to show that it's inconsistent." As I pointed out, you have not shown that it is internally inconsistent; your response was: "I have not tried." Well, if you aren't going to try, then it is disingenuous to assert that "you may find out that the free will thesis is internally inconsistent." In fact, as you admit, it would be futile to try, because free will is axiomatic. As to revising the argument that purports to show that it's inconsistent, this too would be a fool's errand, because free will is axiomatic. I agree that we have nothing more to say on the topic as you have tried to frame it. However, since you refuse to accept that the actual topic is your refusal to accept self-evident facts, I am choosing to reiterate why your statement that "I am expecting a conversation on the topic I have brought up, and not another, yes" is not reasonable.
  11. How do you know when someone's voliton is impaired such that they are not responsible for their actions? I have in mind the example of an adult who throws a fit when verbally provoked, who is known to be on medication to treat depression and is getting psychological counseling, and is known to be sensitive and prone to violent emotional outbursts. In general, they have low self-esteem, their social skills seem to be at the level of a child, they tend towards pessimism and negativity, are generally difficult to deal with, and have a world view that entails not holding weak people responsible for their actions (for example they support socialism). In other words, their mind is a mess of negative premises and diagnosed disorders and it is not clear, in chicken-and-egg fashion, which is causing which. Compounding the problem, they don't care for themselves physically, don't sleep and exercise properly, and abuse alcohol. Not being privy to their full psychological diagnosis, we still must choose whether to apply moral judgment to their outbursts and other behavior. Complicating the matter is that holding them to account is precisely the sort of thing that provokes them to outburst. In searching this forum, the answer I found is that such determinations are within the domain of psychology, a special science. But this is unsatisfactory. We are still responsible, as laypersons, for pronouncing moral judgment, but figuring out when someone should be held to account can be hard if we attempt our own psychologizing. My initial answer is that they are responsible for their actions barring a wholesale declaration of insanity, i.e. the sort that would entail institutionalization. There is no getting off the hook. By choosing to participate in society, they consent to moral judgment, notwithstanding any psychological peculiarity or apparent weaknesses. But is this right? Thoughts?
  12. Seeker

    Psychological Harm

    I agree that this is important, even essential. An important concept that has barely been touched-upon here is that of consent. I think that consent, especially given expectations in a particular social context, should make a difference regarding liability. There should be no liability if consent for the otherwise-wrongful act was given. I think that this has enormous implications in the area of psychological harm and actually obviates the eggshell skull problem significantly. If it can be shown that the victim should have expected the act that resulted in harm given the social context and chose to participate anyway (thereby granting consent), the other party should not be held liable even if they knew of the victim's weakened condition.
  13. Seeker

    Psychological Harm

    As I read the order (also not being a lawyer), the show itself will eventually become part of the record. At this stage of the proceedings (this is where it gets tricky) the Defendants tried to introduce the show as evidence, though the Plaintiffs had not, which would have changed the issue from the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings to a summary judgment. Later stages will include discovery, motions for summary judgment, trial and so on. Most certainly these will include the contents of the show. See, e.g. note 8 ("While there is no doubt that the broadcast of the “Nancy Grace” show will be a crucial piece of evidence going forward in this case..."). Unfortunately, these cases seem to move at a snail's pace so it will be months before we have something more to chew on.
  14. Seeker

    Psychological Harm

    For those who are really interested, I downloaded the judge's opinion refusing to dismiss the case from PACER and posted it to my blog. Enjoy! Duckett vs. CNN
  15. Seeker

    Psychological Harm

    On a related note - Lawsuit against Nancy Grace, CNN moves ahead
  16. Seeker

    Psychological Harm

    As I understand it, the tort of "intentional infliction of emotional distress" is actually disfavored in the law, precisely because it is so hard to objectively prove. Furthermore it is difficult to see how the victim in such cases (excluding children) is not in a certain key respect directly responsible for the harm to themselves by failing to responsibly process the allegedly hurtful cognitive inputs. For example, the proper reaction to the wax sculptures would not be distress but contempt. This is how a confident, upright, rational person deals with irrationalities of all sorts. "Letting it get to you", to use the vernacular phrase, is a choice, and in this respect the harm is essentially self-inflicted; it is the proximate cause of harm. Since the person could have chosen to process the cognitive inputs responsibly and correctly, the concept of the tort as such is, it seems to me, quite invalid as applied to normal, functioning adults.
  17. It is indeed the end of our conversation on the topic, but beyond that it ought to be the end of the conversation with any Objectivist. You admit this, which leaves you in the position of proposing a discussion among non-Objectivists only. Since you can have this anywhere else on the Internet, I am left wondering why you chose to bring it here to the debate forum, and the only answer I can think of is that you wish to enjoy the value of Objectivists' intellectual labors while simultaneously denying their validity. That's the real insult, and none of us here should stand for it.
  18. Now that's a laugh-out-loud. Suppose you wanted to discuss an infinite god, and noted that you do not accept the axiom of identity at the beginning "in order to obviate that issue and focus the conservation on the topic I posted". Sorry, it doesn't work that way. You cannot have a discussion that entails cutting off the means of discussion at its root. The only proper thing left for a rational participant to do is point out your egregious error. Others may "discuss" the infinite god with you, but it will not be a rational discussion.
  19. I'll grant that reproduction is what caused sex to exist in all animals along with its secondary characteristics like size, strength etc. I'm not sure how that helps the argument that homosexuality is contrary to man's nature inasmuch as man chooses his values including sexual values. To say male and female are complimentary either means "fit well together" and/or "fit better together than same sex". If this is some sort of appeal to natural/evident functions of various body parts then the argument fails, because homosexual sex is a natural/evident function of the parts used in that case. In other words, it is natural that man can use his body for sex in whatever way enhances his happiness -- there are entire books on the subject -- and just because heterosexual sex is rooted in reproduction does not mean that it is the only rational choice.
  20. Before concluding that a political campaign can be educational (which I am sympathetic to) let's look at the way in which the quoted statement is valid. The ultimate goal of an educational campaign is to inform. The ultimate goal of a political campaign is to win an election. In a rational society, these goals may coincide. In an irrational society, they will conflict. One way to interpret the statement is that one cannot run a rational campaign and an irrational campaign simultaneously. With this we should agree. This leads to more questions. What are the realistic chances of a rational political campaign winning in today's society? Would the goal of education be served best by running a campaign with those chances? What unintended consequences might there be?
  21. I think that politicians so rarely set out to educate the public that it's hardly any wonder the two would be seen as mutually exclusive. The fact remains however that politicians possess a rather unique platform for addressing the public through policy speeches, debates, and addresses, all of which can be used to teach. I can foresee a rational politician conducting something of an educational campaign on rational principles one day. Indeed, Ayn Rand herself exemplified that education is not confined to the four walls of a classroom, as illustrated by her novels and newsletters. Galt's and Roark's speeches also stand out as vivid examples of "extracurricular" teaching. That said, Objectivism is a philosophy, not a political party. It would be wise -- as we have done here -- to look critically at any organized party calling itself Objectivist, and reject pretenders. But this should not dissuade individuals interested in implementing rational principles in the cultural and political spheres. Personally I think that intellectual and political activism for freedom and reason is always timely, regardless of the name it goes by.
  22. The answer is: free will does not violate causality but is an instance of it wherein you are the cause, you determine the outcome, and do so by choosing, wherein your choice did not have to be what it was, i.e. it could have been otherwise. Which is to say that it was not wholly necessitated by antecedent conditions, a proposition that you can validate for yourself in the applicable context. And thus: you could help it and you did cause it. No catch-22 here.
  23. Since you use the phrase "outside evidence" here to refer to others' perceptions of reality vis-a-vis your own, the answer is: of course you rely on your own perceptions of reality without others' perceptions all the time. You don't need others' perceptions of your own existence to know that you exist and possess consciousness, do you? Of course not ("generally unreliable"?! You cannot be serious, unless you generally see things that aren't there, like ghosts). Free will is an attribute of your own consciousness. You definitely do not need others' perceptions to validate the concept, only your own introspective evidence. There are various specific techniques for validating free will, but they are all characteristically simple. For one example, see the technique I offer here in Post #11. For another example, see Dr. Peikoff's on OPAR p. 70 ("You the reader can perceive every potentiality I have been discussing simply by observing your own consciousness. ...").
  24. It should be stressed however that observing others' behavior is not the means of validating free will. The validation of free will is by introspection. I would say that others' behavior reflects, rather than implies, free will. The concept is valid regardless of that. At the same time, I would not expect others to accept the concept without properly validating it for themselves, which is why introspective validation is the critical element in this discussion. There are indeed quite interesting ideas to discuss about cultural influences around the world, but aleph_0 has tied this discussion to the validity of free will which necessarily makes proper validation of that axiomatic concept the only issue properly before us. Cultural influences, though interesting in their own right, are an improper point of focus when the validity of free will has been questioned. [As a side note, I mistakenly transposed parts of a sentence earlier, when I should have said: "It makes no more sense to entertain the notion of cultural determinism given the self-evident fact of volition than to entertain fanciful ideas of an infinite god given the axiom of identity." Whew, now that's been dealt with!]
  25. Nevertheless, the central topic of this thread is your unwillingness to accept free will by performing your own act of introspective validation; the rest is just window dressing that serves to obfuscate by pretending that there is anything else to discuss once the validation has been completed. Validate free will and your cultural determinism thesis becomes as irrelevant as the argument by neuroscience does, which is why I chose to focus on validation and its consequences. It makes no more sense to entertain fanciful ideas of an infinite god given the axiom of identity than to entertain the notion of cultural determinism given the self-evident fact of volition.
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