ammonius

I'm probably wrong but doesn't the life=ultimate value (please correct me, are absolute, greatest, highest, etc. acceptable qualifiers of value?) resemble just a wee bit the second formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative, namely that paraphrasing, "One should always treat human beings as an end, never as a means". Seems to me that they share some agreement on at least one significant issue. Also, of course Ayn Rand does address this... the life=greatest value presumably solves the "is=ought" question, (which indecently is part of what Kant was up to in his Categorical Imperative. Rand writes, "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the relation between 'is' and 'ought'." (VS, 18). She doesn't really explain "why" it resolves the "is=ought" problem (accentuated by Hume), she more or less just demands a tautology. Furthermore, does her "is=ought" solution solve all "is=ought" situations (that is, is it really a solution?), if she is saying that "is=ought" always than where is there any possibility for actual change, innovation, or revolution in her philosophy? That's saying nothing of the equivocation between life and value; it seems to me that in order for Rand to be consistent (with her axiom of identity) she would have to accept that the "is" of life "is"(=) the highest value than they are Identical or the Same. That's also saying nothing of the discourses of "bare life", such as that experienced in concentration camps, that are currently proliferating in some philosophical circles, around the work of Agamben.

I'd be interested... where is this text available. Parmenidies begins with the axiom existence exists; or A=A, and his paradoxes are firmly rooted in the logical conclusions of this premise; following meticulously the law of non-contradiction. I'd like to look at the precise point in the argument where the two (Parmenidies and Rand) differ, and for what reasons; this should be possible with just comparing syllogisms.

The relationship of science to philosophy is a question through the ages. Certainly philosophers and scientists often explore each other's territory. Furthermore, being a scientist doesn't mean one blinds oneself to philosophical questions, and the reverse. Often ideas in science and philosophy are thought simultaneously. Deleuze and Guattari's volume "What is Philosophy?" explicitly examines philosophy's relationship to science and art. Evolution is certainly such a notion that has been explored by philosophers and of course scientists; and the question of species certainly is. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/ Furthermore, contemporary philosophers still publish books addressing the issue of species, here's a review of one: http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread...s/morphogenetic But, I digress... good discussion to watch regardless.

You say "entities precede attributes", and then clarify that you mean "man perceives"... are you making a metaphysical AND epistemological claim here? As far as I've read on this great thread, this has been a more or less epistemological discussion. Regardless, I'm not sure that it is untenable that perception of attributes precedes perception of objects. Especially if the object being perceived is unfamiliar or strange to the perceiver (that is unidentifyable by recognition or repetition of the similar). Furthermore, I don't think it's philosophically nutty to hold that objects are constituted by the arrangement of their components (attributes/organs/parts) rather than determined by identity. I don't think that you need to drag Descartes into this, or indirect perception. I am thinking that what one has is only direct perception of components; and that one never has direct perception of the whole. Like I said, I don't think your philosophically "right", you might have a perfect Objectivist understanding of identity; but there has been a long history of the problem of the relationship of parts to wholes in philosophy; and it is tied to very old discourses of A=A, (Parmenides as opposed to Hericlitus for example; and all the way to contemporary Complexity Theory). Admittedly I haven't looked at Huemer's work; I don't think you need to bring Descartes or (representationalism) into it; and I would be more inclined to read references on cognitive scientific work in this area. I certainly don't think it is outside of philosophical debate, though I think there are at least two questions here, what constitutes an "A" and how do we recognize (perceive) an A?

You have hit a point that most undergrads recognize as problematic in the Categorical Imperative, namely how one goes about formulating a maxims. Though, I don't think that Kant is talking about eating peanuts, or self-appointed divinity. He's talking about things like murder or theft. Particularly, if you steal something from someone then you must be able to will that everyone could steal from everyone else (including yourself) all the time. The same goes for murder. As far as your Maxim of willing everyone to treat you as God, well that's sort of Kant's point in the formulation of treating everyone as an end rather than a means. Though in your formulation you would be willing everyone treated you as God in the same way as you treat yourself as God, which may or may not have contradictory consequences. Well, willing and wishing have very distinct meanings and uses in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche after all didn't write "the Wish to Power". conflating the two doesn't solidify your point, besides if you had a will to fly I suppose you would act on that by taking piloting lessons, rather than hurling yourself out a window. That is will is generally a desire that one may act upon, while wishing is merely action-less desire. And I wouldn't grant your distinction between soft-core reality and hard-core reality; that seems an entirely fruitless distinction. Will is real in so far as it is will, a wish is a wish in so far as it is a wish, just like a rock is a rock in so far as it is a rock; and they all reside within the same universe; or are you positing a qualitative distinction, like mind/body, inside/outside, or other such dualism? Again, I don't think ends and goals are the same thing. An end in itself is that which one can not go beyond, while a goal is a marker. One can have many goals in life, but the end of ones life is, in Kant's world, your own subjectivity. That is, and this is where I think Kant is rather close to Objectivism; one shouldn't treat Julie(A) as a good Lay (-B-) (A=-B-), but rather Julie(A) should be treated as Julie (A) (A=A) as her own end. As far as the "nature of the hammer", I have no idea what this is getting at. Perhaps you mean something like 18th century natural philosophy, or the search for a unified "human nature". Kant very well may be thinking of sort of thing, in fact he might mean that when you shouldn't treat another being as anything but an end, that is their own Nature. Here is a point where I certainly can't but into Kant. Nature seems to me to be one of those metaphysical claims about objects that is entirely based on the subjective apprehension of said object. Kant thinks the Imperative is given by reason, which he holds as supreme, even though he goes into a lengthy critique of "Pure Reason". Kant's reason is very close to Aristotle's, he holds the law of non contradiction, for example, and lays out just a few things which reason can not make sense of (his antinomies). Kant, I suppose, like other Natural philosophers certainly thought that Reason was universal and not subjective, and he would've pointed to natural laws, such as those expressed in Newtonian Physics as evidence that the universe has reason running throughout. But let me ask a question, if there is no reason without humanity; did humans simply make it up? If not, why do other creatures not appear to have faculties of reason? I think that Kant saw the universe as bound by specific natural laws which were understandable; that the universe itself was reasonable. For Kant then reason was the faculty that we can know the world through, including the faculty of making moral choices. That is, for Kant there was no need to look to God for any kind of moral knowledge, rather one could simply look to reason. Now, I certainly am no Kantian; and I don't know anyone who really is. I have a good friend who is a Kant scholar, he certainly isn't a Kantian. Most of the philosophers who wrote after Kant weren't Kantian, most especially Hegel, Nietzsche, etc. I don't know were they myth that philosophers were plagued by a consistent Kantianism comes from, most of the canonical philosophers after Kant explicitly disagreed with him, they certainly didn't put him up on a pedestal. Furthermore, contemporary philosophy (at least the philosophy I was taught in) is nearly an utter rejection of Kant, though they tend not to straw-man him. My point in posting on this forum in particular was that Rand really wasn't all that novel in her philosophy, and I agree that she discounts most of academic philosophy out right; but I don't think it is a "return of the favor" that contemporary philosopher don't address her as such; you'll find few philosophers who read the rather neo-platonic philosophy of Aldous Huxley. It is rather because Rand, like Huxley didn't deal with problems of her time but rather re-articulated apologetics from the past. If Objectivist philosophers want to be taken as philosophically significant they should address concerns and problems of the contemporary world, not the boggy men of an imagined enemy. For example, Rand's greatest enemy seems to be Marx, but she never explicitly examines Marx, she doesn't do a systematic reading of Marx, which one could easily do, rather she write polemic against Marx and Marxists. I was always disappointed in reading Rand's philosophy, as I imagine others who read philosophy outside of Rand are, given the adoration her readers celebrate. For example, at the time that Rand was writing her work centered on the Individual; the whole notion of the Individual was being torn apart in general philosophical discourse; Rand might have addressed this openly, head on, but rather she chose to ignore it and repeat, more or less, the philosophical notions (Aristotelian) that those philosophers were tearing apart. Those philosophers weren't Kantians, the Kantians were all long dead; so were the Hegelians by the way. Some of them were Marxists, but they had their own critiques of Marx. Rand, like Huxley, doesn't address any of that, and instead does philosophy in a vacuum, against boogy men that don't exist; and creates a discourse addressing a philosophy that is long over. I personally would like to see her students, today's Objectivists, take up that discussion that she never bothered to, rather than simply retreat into the teachings of a master. note: the -B- above was to keep a smiley from coming up it should be read as B and: I am in no way trying to disparage Rand or Objectivists, in fact I think Objectivist would do quite well to throw their hat into various (Analytic or Continental) philosophical discourses; in particular, I think Prof. Odden could produce significant work in the areas of linguistic philosophy/ philosophy of language, again in addressing Analytic or in Post-Structuralist philosophies. There are, after all, as many philosophical publications and conferences professionally as there are in any other discipline; and perhaps more than quite a few. I think the APA in particular would be generally welcoming, especially given the interest in Rand amongst the undergraduate student population (at least at the schools I have been at). Quite a few important contemporary philosophers don't have PhDs explicitly in philosophy, and many don't hold positions in Philosophy departments, it's quite an interdisciplinary field, not nearly as walled of as many have suggested in this discussion.

The way that I have always understood this is, that one should act in a way that one could will one's action to be enacted by everyone everywhere all the time (that is "universal"). Thou I'm not sure what you mean by "hard core reality"; is there a "soft core reality"? I'm generally of the view that there is but one reality, that is "this" reality, which of course includes individual/particular will as well as the particular who wills. I don't see "goal" anywhere in Kant's statement, rather he is saying that each individual is an end in themselves, and that they shouldn't be used as a means to another end. That is, you shouldn't "use" other people. The third formulation is the closest to the "golden rule", which basically says treat others as you wish to be treated, Kant is saying, I think, that one should act "as if" you are the legislator of all humanity. Kant thinks all three formulations are getting at the same thing, the Categorical Imperative. I'm not sure what you mean by "floating imperative", Kant thinks his moral principle is fully rooted in reason and is thus universal, or categorical. For Kant reason is not "out there" (is it for Objectivists?), though it is Transcendental (Universal), without being Transcendent (God), he makes that distinction. The imperative is Categorical (Universal) because it is rational, and reason for Kant is universal. Kant most certainly replaced God with Reason, but for him it wasn't "out there" but rather always everywhere. What Kant would call Universally valid. Kant is simply claiming that in order for an act to be moral it must be Universal (Rational); to behave otherwise is immoral (irrational). Personally, I don't think the Categorical Imperative is accurate; but for entirely different reasons from Objectivists, though after your post, I'm not entirely sure.

That's a bit questionable. Epicurus made moral arguments "based on the requirements of man's nature". Arendt and Agamben have shown that life, (Grk zoe & bios) have been central to philosophy since the begining, not to mention Nietzsche, who writes at length on the affirmation of life. And the favorite whipping boy of Objectivists, Kant, explicitly has a moral philosophy grounded in an individual's life; the Categorical Imperative. First formulation: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals p.30) Second formulation: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (ibid, p36) Third formulation: "Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends." (ibid, p43) Is the Categorical Imperative (ignoring the rest of Kant for the time being) antithetical to Objectivist values? As to why Rand get's no respect, I wouldn't take it too hard, there are a lot of philosophers, some taken to be more or less important in the history of philosophy, and contemporary philosophy departments. Major philosophers are forgotten all the time, some just waiting for a student to reflect on how important or original their thought was. How about in literature departments, is Rand regularly taught? It seems to me that's where one should ask first given the success of her fiction.

Thanks! Are you saying that the Objectivist Law of Identity is the "same"(identical with) the Law of Conservation? Or, what does it mean for an A to be an A? (f.ex. it's quanta of matter/energy? What about when that changes, which is to say alway it is always changing?) That is, if the Law of Identity is the fundamental axiom of Objectivist Metaphysics shouldn't it apply in all ways in the Universe (even trivial and superficial identities, Quantum to Cosmic)?

QM other contemporary sciences (genetics, evolutionary biology, etc) and philosophy (some at least) are, for the most part wary of the notion of axioms (including identity); at least the scientist I know. I think one can look at the development of (Leibniz's) Calculus to see the mathematical origins of probability models over axiomatic certainty. As far as probability goes, it isn't "random chance" (dice throw); probability takes as it's starting position a specific population or set of circumstances and posits probable outcomes. It's rather the opposite of axiomatics, in that probabilistic models look at particular populations for information in forming probabilistic knowledge about an event; while axiomatics (I'm not sure if I speak to Objectivism) appeals to a universal law, rule and applies it to any situation. In many circumstances it sounds like a simple semantic shift, statements appear in percentages, likelihoods, etc, rather than in yes or no. Certainty, in these sciences, becomes "degree(s) of certainty or uncertainty" rather than absolute knowing. But I think Objectivists are right to recognize that there is a (fundamental) philosophical difference. Stephen Hawking has a lecture: "Does God Play Dice?" where he addresses Einstein's remark in the article.

But isn't that what an existent is? That is a portion cut out of the process of the universe? Or, how does Objectivism distinguish an existent from process (isn't the identity of existence that it is process or change), or when does the Cosmos stop? Without getting into too much, how is the process of consciousness distinct from the "contents of consciousness"? Is the distinction between consciousness and body a process of epistemology or a metaphysical reality (or an epistemological determination), or something else? (Are metaphysics and epistemology distinguished epistemologically or metaphysically)? Where is this identity? Is it the body, what happens when it rots away, is burned, etc? Or does identity have nothing to do with where a particular object is located (in time-space)? If it is epistemologically, in other's brains, what about when they're no more, is A=A? Even when the specific time of the particular identity becomes "was", that is past? A was A rather than A is A, when the particular is no longer present, when it becomes (forgotten=no longer present in body or memory) history. Not of course to mention history; is George Washington qua history book (c.2006) the same as (identical to) George Washington (1732-1799), or is it enough that they refer to the same person in the mind of the observer and shared audience, is it contradictory to believe they are the same or not to acknowledge they are different?

Well if you want a "for example" story, see the one above, it's pretty good. Or, we could also talk about a hypothetical city on a coast that is hit by a devastating hurricane, leaving people without food (or shelter) starving outside of locked (flooded) stores without clerks, free people in the modern world. What about not acting on the positive right to life? That's the issue here, what if acting to sustain one's (self-interested) right to life violates another's (self-interest) right to property? Also, just in case I misunderstand you, if rights are universal (for everyone, everywhere, all the time) then how do you justify them without recourse to a notion of universal reason (romanticized Nature, God, Mind, Absolute Knowing, etc.)? It sounds a lot like a very slight modification of Kant's Categorical Imperative. It wrong to steal because if everyone did it all the time humanity would destroy itself in contradiction (for the same reason that it is wrong to lie or kill, etc). That's good, and thanks for the link. Though I don't understand how "man qua man" necessarily has anything to do with value, or if it means something like Man by way of rationality (after all Man, not woman or child, is the Rational Animal for Aristotle) is what constitutes value in Man. Since we have defined Man as the Rational Animal (distinguished from the rest of the Animal kingdom by rationality), the best Man is the most Rational (unlike the other Animals). Is that what that means? As far as recognition of cause and effect, I like that, but is there one recognition of cause and effect, or many? It seems to me that not only do many causes result in particular effects, but that folks have different ways that they express causal relations. We inherit and change these communal notions of cause and effect over time as desire for new effects emerges. But that is about desire or is that what reason is? That seems to me to be what people in the real world act out of, that is desire what they want to do, reason is an after thought and varies from person to person according to their own (self-interested) desire. As for potential thief and the property holder, if stealing results in the starving man being fed he has fulfilled his own self interest by staying alive; while denying another his right to property (but they still have their life). Would it be moral for the starving to ignore their own self interest and deny themselves their right to life, or should they act in their own self-interest and steal, and stay alive?

It seems to me that it very well may be in the self-interest for someone to steal. Especially if you are in a situation where you only other choice is death, particularly starvation. I can certainly imagine a person behaving quite rationally (in self-interest), given the choice between death and theft, choosing the latter to continue to exist. To state that 'it is never rational to steal' is to posit, I think, a universal morality in a very Kantian sense. That is, an action is moral if and only if it is rational for everyone to do it all of the time. I think that's one of the reasons Kant's thought is flawed, though in line with of the overall universalization of the rational that is indicicative of much of the Enlightenment. This is one of the reasons Nietzsche throws out the notion of morality ("Beyond Good and Evil") all together and revives (and modifies) the Spinozistic distinction between morality and ethics. Briefly, for Nietzsche ethics is the practice of living in the world, while morality is understood as the distinction between 'good' and 'bad', that is a matter of taste (or abstract idealism). The rejection of this (universal) morality is Nietzsche's amoralism, which he thinks is necessary for an living ethical life (which is always particular). It may be distasteful to steal given the particular laws, moral or norms, religion, etc. of a community, however it may be ethical to steal in a situation that threatens ones existence in the world, that is for life. My question is how can one state there it is never ethical to steal without appealing some sort of transendental (or abstract) universal (universal reason, God, etc)?

Emily, thanks for the sources, I read the article as well. If you didn't know I am not an Objectivist, though lots of my friends are (I recently moved), and have found them to be great conversationalists. This is a point of agreement between myself and Rand, at least insofar as I don't think "society" is a useful concept. However, I don't think "society" is useful because it is a generality that is not accounted for in the actual particulars which would constitute society in general. That is, not that there aren't actual existing social entities, (clubs, unions, nations, associations, etc), but rather there is no such thing as "society in general", each social arrangement is particular. However, I am wondering if there is a contradiction in the Axiom of Identity and the notion of growth, change, development. That is, an acorn is not the same thing as an oak tree, though the acorn is a necessary condition for the oak tree (as well as minerals, sunlight, water, soil, etc), it isn't a sufficient condition for the oak. So we make a distinction between an acorn and an oak, one certainly wouldn't say acorn=oak. Perhaps I am missing the point of the Axiom of Identity, but it seems difficult for me to say America = America (if one is speaking of 1776 and/or 2006). If there is a difference between America at one date and America at another, on what grounds does one call America, America; and can one continue to call America=America if there is a change in that which constitutes America (f.ex. the individuals that make up America). In this way, that an oak is not an acorn, day is not night, there is a change in X that results in X+/-n. Or to put it another way, if there were a society of Objectivists, how would the society decide to do anything as a society? Is there any way the rational self interest of one individual could conflict with another? If there isn't any conflict between the rational self-interests of the individuals in the society, would that not itself mean that the rational self-interest of all individuals is the same as that of all others (collective interest)? Would that properly be then individual self-interest? Would it not be precisely society's interest, with the interest of the individual trumped by society? I guess on a more metaphysical level, I am having a hard time understanding how the Axiom of Identity allows for any given Identity to have a relationship with any other Identity without at the same time changing that Identity or producing a new Identity (like the acorn interacting with the water, soil, light, etc to become oak). Thus I am curious as how Objectivists account for this? In physics atomic particles come into contact with other atomic particles, some repel, others attract. Some particles join together with others based on their internal properties creating different atoms, do those atomic particles retain their identity in becoming molecular?

Hello all, like Lee I am new to the board. Lee's got me thinking about what an Objectivist philosophy of society would look like. That is, what is the Objectivist concept of "society" (or institution)? Metaphysically, would a society be an individual (self identical), in the sense of an active subject with its own self-interest? If it is, would it have a self-interest? And how would the individuals that make up the society square that with their own rational self-interest? Furthermore, as individuals join or depart from a society (or the society expands geographically) would the society itself change (say from generation to generation), and what does that mean for it's self identity (i.e, would the individual American Society=American Society regardless of if it's 1776 or 2006)? Classically, doesn't the very concept of society mean that there is a certain amount of the relinquishing of self-interest for the interest of the whole (social contract)? Is there an Objectivist sociology?

This is my first post on this board, its been really informative so far. I have one foot in the Academic philosophy world, and in my experience it isn't true that Rand has been completely ignored in Philosophy courses. I remember one prof who had his students read the Virtue of Selfishness in his "Human Nature" course. The professor was himself a "classical" Marxist, that is, a Marxist from a reading of Marx and his intellectual predecessors. I also think there is something to the Analytic/Continental divide in philosophy (not to mention the innumerable divisions within the major divisions). Most of my work has been in classical philosophy and in Continental thought. However, I have never met a Kantian (I know some Kant scholars but they aren't themselves Kantians). I think that there have been developments in some corners of the Continental/Analytic divide where the two have come together, especially in the Philosophy of Science, and to some degree in Political Philosophy (post Marxists such as the latter Frankfurt School). Rand simply isn't addressing issues that these thinkers find interesting, that is, she seems to be trying to be in discourse with Kant and previous philosophers, that is, her concerns are dated. For example, as far as I know the Continental/Analytic divide goes back to Fichte/Hegel, with Analytic philosophy rooted in Fichte and moving from there, while most contemporary Continental philosophy is anti-Hegelian. For both schools Kant is a historical figure, pre-Fichte/Hegel. He retains importance, but only bits and pieces for philosophers, and for understanding what latter post-Kantian philosophers (Hegel/Nietzsche) where writing against. So in this respect, the attack on Kant, could be seen as beating a long dead horse. I'm also not sure that there is anything that is "properly" Rand's thought, that is, thought that is not attributable to Aristotle for example. Quite a few contemporary philosophers, many Continental, wouldn't accept Rand's Axioms, f.ex. Deleuze's whole philosophy is founded in an Ontology of Difference rather than a Metaphysics of Identity. However, the whole issue of Axiomatics has been reinvigorated in French thought, but not for Rand, rather the Mathematician-Philosopher Alain Badiou; though I doubt he would have much in common with Rand (he's rather left). Again, all this is from my Continental background, I am a bit out of the loop on the Analytic end (though a good friend of mine is a respected Analytic philosopher).