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  1. I'm still working on my thoughts, but it seemed worth it to point out the wikipedia entry on Modal Logic as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Modal Logic. I think that this is context that he is using to frame his argument and it is from that context that we should be considering his position.
  2. You certainly have a point. I am in full agreement that Thesis B needs more citations/quotes from Rand/Objectivists in order for it to be a completely fair thing to say.
  3. First, you said a lot of other stuff that I need time to process and I think you raise some good points. I just wanted to point out that in Thesis B he says that Objectivists seem to hold that the distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated. Then he says that: 5.4) The above objections simply do not succeed to dispense with the Modal distinction; they cannot replace it; and they cannot show that it is not conceptua
  4. Here, you are referring to Thesis B. Thesis B says: Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated; for the sake of brevity I shall occasionally refer to the distinction between contingent (and possible) vs. necessary facts as the ‘Modal distinction.’ __________ Rand says: The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one
  5. Really, I need more time to formulate a coherent response. So, please don't take what I said there too seriously. I guess I should have explained myself better. I have seen Objectivist's use the phrase "necessary fact" to mean "metaphysical fact." I think that, in those instances, the Objectivists are applying their own meaning/usage to "necessary." It seems like that usage of the phrase "necessary fact" is different from non-Objectivist's usage of the phrase "necessary fact." At this point, I really want to emphasize that I need to do more research before I can adequately respond to
  6. I think you make a good point. The purpose of the distinction does seem to serve the purpose that you assert and is certainly worth mentioning, as you suggest. However, it is unclear to me why you would say that the modal distinction does not provide some "wisdom" as to how to tell the difference between facts that can be judged and facts that cannot be judged. If we understand the modal distinction as there being necessary facts, which could not have been otherwise, and contingent facts, which could have been otherwise, then how is that all that different from what you are saying. The
  7. First, I am definitely not the author. I would have no problem saying that I was in the case that that was actually true. However, it is not true. I am not the author. With regard to Thesis B, I am not completely decided. Before making any definitive assertions with regard to Thesis B, I will have to locate sources and get a better grasp on what exactly the Objectivist position is with regard to contingent and necessary facts and then consider how that position lines up with what the author asserts is the Objectivist's position with regard to contingent and necessary facts. My very gen
  8. Again, I would recommend that interested parties read the supplementary essay, "Volition and Modality." It definitely helps clarify some of the points that the author is attempting to make — right or wrong.
  9. It is not entirely clear to me that Rand is asserting a metaphysical dichotomy between classes of "facts." She is however, definitely asserting a division of of facts — in general. One "class" is metaphysical and one "class" is "man-made/volitional." As far as dividing the natural world in two, what you mean here is not clear to me either. If it is the case that the natural universe is that which is the metaphysically given (i.e. — non-man-made), then I don't think that Rand has driven wedge into the natural world. She is expressly not dividing metaphysically given facts into two types.
  10. I totally agree that specific quotes from Rand would have been immensely helpful, especially with regard to Thesis B.
  11. It is unclear to me why you would say that Objectivists don't hold Thesis A. Could you please elaborate on why or how you think that? I am just confused because, if you just take a brief perusal of the Ayn Rand Lexicon entry on Metaphysical vs. Man-Made, there are several instances where she distinguishes between two types of facts — metaphysical facts and volitional or man-made facts. What is it about that statement that you disagree with? What am I missing?
  12. I agree that references on his part would have been helpful, especially with regard to his "Thesis B." Thesis A seems like a reasonable enough assertion. I can accept that one without specific citations. Its pretty non-controversial from an Objectivist perspective. Thanks for the link. I have already read it, as well as mentioned it and provided a link for it in my opening statement. It definitely doesn't hurt to highlight it. There is a good bit of relevant discussion and other links in that thread. Thanks.
  13. Hello all, I came across this argument on the Maverick Philosopher's blog and found it interesting and very well written. Even so, I am having a hard time determining what a rigorous Objectivist response to it would be. The original essay, with comments, can be found here. There is also a supplementary essay called, "Volition and Modality," which goes into greater detail in a bid to further buttress the arguments in the first essay. There is also a thread here on the forum that is a response to the original essay and appears to have been roughly contemporaneous with the ensuing related con
  14. Further wrinkles... First, my above mentioned Point #2: In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a material/physical/non-mental existent that is a visible, audible, and/or tangible word). Here, I would like to add another confusion. Are we to understand from this that the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. In other words, should we understand that the enormous sum integrated by a concept, but NO
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