Questioner

I'm still working on my thoughts, but it seemed worth it to point out the wikipedia entry on Modal Logic as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Modal Logic. I think that this is context that he is using to frame his argument and it is from that context that we should be considering his position.

I just need more time to formulate my position.

You certainly have a point. I am in full agreement that Thesis B needs more citations/quotes from Rand/Objectivists in order for it to be a completely fair thing to say.

First, you said a lot of other stuff that I need time to process and I think you raise some good points. I just wanted to point out that in Thesis B he says that Objectivists seem to hold that the distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated. Then he says that: 5.4) The above objections simply do not succeed to dispense with the Modal distinction; they cannot replace it; and they cannot show that it is not conceptually prior to any distinction they propose. 5.5) And if the Modal-distinction is conceptually prior, more fundamental, and presupposed by the Randian distinction, then the scope of the Modal distinction is determined on its own grounds rather than dictated by the Randian distinction it is used to explicate. 6) Hence, Thesis B is false. I don't know that he's necessarily right. I just thought it was worth bringing those quotes into focus.

Here, you are referring to Thesis B. Thesis B says: Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated; for the sake of brevity I shall occasionally refer to the distinction between contingent (and possible) vs. necessary facts as the ‘Modal distinction.’ __________ Rand says: The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological error, as I have discussed, is an incorrect view of the nature of concepts. The metaphysical error is: the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts. Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 106). Plume. _________ So, here we can observe that, to the extent that Rand asserts that the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts is a metaphysical error, it can certainly be said that she is asserting that the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is, at the very least, conceptually incoherent. This of course assumes that we can agree that whatever is an error — at least in terms of thinking, is also, ultimately, conceptually incoherent.

Really, I need more time to formulate a coherent response. So, please don't take what I said there too seriously. I guess I should have explained myself better. I have seen Objectivist's use the phrase "necessary fact" to mean "metaphysical fact." I think that, in those instances, the Objectivists are applying their own meaning/usage to "necessary." It seems like that usage of the phrase "necessary fact" is different from non-Objectivist's usage of the phrase "necessary fact." At this point, I really want to emphasize that I need to do more research before I can adequately respond to your questions. I fully and readily admit that I may be completely mistaken with regard to my above distinction.

I think you make a good point. The purpose of the distinction does seem to serve the purpose that you assert and is certainly worth mentioning, as you suggest. However, it is unclear to me why you would say that the modal distinction does not provide some "wisdom" as to how to tell the difference between facts that can be judged and facts that cannot be judged. If we understand the modal distinction as there being necessary facts, which could not have been otherwise, and contingent facts, which could have been otherwise, then how is that all that different from what you are saying. The modal distinction, right or wrong, may not "purport" to actually provide any wisdom. However — analogically considering your description of the purpose of Rand's distinction, the modal distinction certainly allows for one to distinguish between facts that can properly be judged (i.e. — facts that could have been otherwise) and facts that cannot be properly judged (i.e. — facts that could not have been otherwise). Maybe you disagree, but I see very little difference between your position and the Modal position other than your assertion that Rand's distinction expressly purports to give some wisdom.

First, I am definitely not the author. I would have no problem saying that I was in the case that that was actually true. However, it is not true. I am not the author. With regard to Thesis B, I am not completely decided. Before making any definitive assertions with regard to Thesis B, I will have to locate sources and get a better grasp on what exactly the Objectivist position is with regard to contingent and necessary facts and then consider how that position lines up with what the author asserts is the Objectivist's position with regard to contingent and necessary facts. My very general and non-definitive perspective on the Objectivist's position with regard to contingent and necessary facts is that Objectivists reject the division of facts into contingent and necessary facts. Nonetheless, if I am not mistaken, I believe that Objectivist's do assert, in some sort of qualified way (that I am currently unaware of), that whatever is a necessary fact is also a metaphysical fact. I could be totally wrong on both counts. I have to do more research before I can say anything with confidence in that regard.

Again, I would recommend that interested parties read the supplementary essay, "Volition and Modality." It definitely helps clarify some of the points that the author is attempting to make — right or wrong.

It is not entirely clear to me that Rand is asserting a metaphysical dichotomy between classes of "facts." She is however, definitely asserting a division of of facts — in general. One "class" is metaphysical and one "class" is "man-made/volitional." As far as dividing the natural world in two, what you mean here is not clear to me either. If it is the case that the natural universe is that which is the metaphysically given (i.e. — non-man-made), then I don't think that Rand has driven wedge into the natural world. She is expressly not dividing metaphysically given facts into two types. If you mean to say that the natural universe includes both metaphysically given and man-made/volitional facts, then Rand has definitely driven a wedge into the natural universe with regard to facts — in the sense that she asserts that some facts are metaphysically given and some are man-made.

I totally agree that specific quotes from Rand would have been immensely helpful, especially with regard to Thesis B.

It is unclear to me why you would say that Objectivists don't hold Thesis A. Could you please elaborate on why or how you think that? I am just confused because, if you just take a brief perusal of the Ayn Rand Lexicon entry on Metaphysical vs. Man-Made, there are several instances where she distinguishes between two types of facts — metaphysical facts and volitional or man-made facts. What is it about that statement that you disagree with? What am I missing?

I agree that references on his part would have been helpful, especially with regard to his "Thesis B." Thesis A seems like a reasonable enough assertion. I can accept that one without specific citations. Its pretty non-controversial from an Objectivist perspective. Thanks for the link. I have already read it, as well as mentioned it and provided a link for it in my opening statement. It definitely doesn't hurt to highlight it. There is a good bit of relevant discussion and other links in that thread. Thanks.

Hello all, I came across this argument on the Maverick Philosopher's blog and found it interesting and very well written. Even so, I am having a hard time determining what a rigorous Objectivist response to it would be. The original essay, with comments, can be found here. There is also a supplementary essay called, "Volition and Modality," which goes into greater detail in a bid to further buttress the arguments in the first essay. There is also a thread here on the forum that is a response to the original essay and appears to have been roughly contemporaneous with the ensuing related content on the Maverick Philosopher's blog. That topic thread can found here, "One Problem with Objectivism." Unfortunately, there is no point by point Objectivist rebuttal of the essay and, as far as I can tell, the thread mainly tracks what is happening in the comments section of the original essay. There are also a fair number of interesting and related side conversations on that thread as well. It is worth noting that John Donohue, who rigorously debated in the comments section of the original essay, is very active in this thread and it is interesting to get his perspective. At any rate, I was wondering if there were any point by point Objectivist rebuttals of this essay and its addendum (i.e. — "Volition and Modality"). Thanks. Happy thinking. P.S. — Should it be of interest to you and should you have the time, it might be very much worth it to read "Volition and Modality" as a supplement to the main essay. One Fallacy of Objectivism The following comment is by Peter Lupu. It deserves to be brought up from the nether reaches of the ComBox to the top of the page. Minor editing and highlighting in red by BV. One Fallacy of Objectivism 1) Objectivists seem to hold two theses: Thesis A: There is a fundamental conceptual distinction everyone does or ought to accept between “metaphysical facts” vs. “volitional or man-made facts”; for the sake of brevity of exposition I shall occasionally refer to this distinction as the ‘Randian distinction’. Thesis B: The content of the traditional philosophical distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts is either reducible to the Randian distinction or to the extent it is not so reducible it is conceptually incoherent, superfluous, or cannot be clearly demarcated; for the sake of brevity I shall occasionally refer to the distinction between contingent (and possible) vs. necessary facts as the ‘Modal distinction’. 2) I shall argue here that the Randian distinction, to the extent it is a cogent distinction at all, far from being the fundamental distinction in fact conceptually presupposes the Modal distinction. If my argument is successful, then Thesis B maintained by Objectivists is false. Thesis A is untouched by my argument because I shall not dispute the fundamental cogency of this distinction except insofar as I find the terminology used by Objectivists to mark this distinction lacking in clarity. 3) Examination of the Randian distinction. 3.1) Objectivists maintain that there is a distinction between so-called “metaphysical facts” and “man-made or volitional facts”. What types of facts belong to the class of facts labeled by Objectivists as “metaphysical”? Well, examples of such facts are the following: (i) There are three trees in my backyard; (ii) The earth is round and orbits the sun; (iii) There are exactly 32,728 leaves right now on the closest tree to my house; (iv) It is raining here and now. 3.2) These sort of facts are claimed by Objectivists to have the common property of being “necessary”. But, what do Objectivists mean by the term “necessary”? Well, one possible meaning that they might give to this term is that facts of the sort (i)-(iv) “could not have been otherwise”. Let us grant for the moment that the sense of necessary here intended is that facts of the sort described by the above examples indeed could not have been otherwise. Let us also grant for the moment that these facts are indeed necessary in this sense of the term. 3.3) Now, these metaphysical facts that are necessary in the sense that they could not have been otherwise are contrasted with another class of facts, namely, those facts that are “man-made” or the product of “volition”. And what sort of facts are these? Well, I suppose that examples of man-made or volitional facts can be easily given (or so it would seem): (v) I kicked the ball; (vi) John divorced Merry because she insulted him; (vii) Bill wrote a paper on existence in order to prove his thesis; (viii) George stole billions of dollars in an investment scam. 3.4) In what way do the facts described in examples (v)-(viii) contrast with the facts described by examples (i)-(iv)? Objectivists maintain that the former are man-made whereas the later are not. But this way of marking the distinction is inadequate. What do we mean here by “man-made”? Causally produced by a human being? Surely that will not do, for a burp is produced by a human being, but it is not voluntarily produced. So we must add here that in the examples (v)-(viii) a certain action was undertaken by a human being voluntarily or freely. But, now, what do we mean by saying that an action was performed “voluntarily” or “freely”? It will certainly not do here to keep re-describing the problem by introducing additional terms such as ‘free-will’, ‘choice’, ‘intention’ etc., because all of these additional terms belong to the very same family of terms we have already used to describe the situation in the first place. What is wanted is some kind of a property that belongs to all events that are the products of human beings and that belong to a category that can be clearly contrasted with the category of cases exemplified by examples (i)-(iv). 3.5) But clearly we already have access to such a property, for we have already characterized the class of cases (i)-(iv) as necessary in the sense that all of these facts could not have been otherwise. So why not characterize the contrast in these very terms: namely, say that in all of the cases (v)-(viii) we have a circumstance where the person who did such-and-such could have done otherwise instead. But, what do we mean here when we say that the given person *could have done otherwise*? We have to be very careful how we answer this last question. It would be tempting to answer that the sense in which a person could have done otherwise is that this person could have *chosen* to do something different than what in fact he has done. But there is danger lurking here. It is false that the person could have chosen to do just anything they please as long it is different than what they have actually done. While I could have refrained from kicking the ball for sure, it is not the case that I could have made myself into a ball instead. It is not within my power to do such a thing: it is not *possible* for me to turn myself into a ball. And because it is not possible for me to turn myself into a ball, I simply do not consider it as one of the alternatives available to me instead of kicking the ball. So clearly, then, when I do something freely I first must recognize that there are alternative courses of action I could have chosen, alternatives that I must also simultaneously recognize to be within my *power* to do: i.e., that are *possible* for me to do. 3.6) But, now, what exactly are these possible alternatives which I must recognize as within my *power* to do: that are possible for me to prefer? Well, I suppose that it is possible for me to kick the ball, given certain facts etc. By contrast, it is not possible for me to turn myself into a ball or a bullet or fly without any mechanical devices like birds can. And so I could not have done any of these things instead of kicking the ball. By contrast, since it is possible for me to kick the ball or for Bill to write a paper or for John to get divorced and since each of us recognizes that these things are possible, we can exercise a certain faculty of choosing freely and opt to do just these things. But, notice, that the *possibility* of a certain course of action is conceptually prior to any of the other cognitive tasks (or conscious tasks) of recognizing these as alternatives among which I can exercise my free choice and select one of them. 4) What did just happen here? Well, what happened is that we have succeeded in clarifying the Randian-distinction; i.e., the distinction obscurely labeled by Objectivists in terms of the distinction between “metaphysical” vs. “man-made” facts, in terms of the Modal distinction between things that “could have been otherwise” vs. things that “could not have been otherwise”. Now, it is indeed true that in order to fully flesh out the category of “volitional” or “freely chosen” facts we will have to eventually introduced some faculty that enables persons to opt to do one thing instead of another among the things they recognize as being possible for them to do. And it might be that in order to introduce such a faculty properly, consciousness is going to play a central role. But it is imperative to see that we simply cannot demarcate a category of volitional or freely chosen acts unless we presuppose that certain facts could have been otherwise whereas others could not have been otherwise. And when we presuppose this distinction we in fact presuppose a Modal distinction which Objectivists maintain in Thesis B is either reducible to the Randian distinction or dispensable or irremediably unclear. 4.1) The first disjunct in this claim [Thesis B] turns things the other way around, as we have seen above. 4.2) The second disjunct (i.e., that the Modal distinction is dispensable) cannot be maintained since, as we have seen above, this distinction is required in order to make sense of the Randian-distinction: so just on this ground alone the Modal distinction is indispensable, if the Randian distinction is to be maintained in any cogent form. 4.3) And the third disjunct (i.e., that the Modal distinction is irremediably unclear), if true, will have the result that so is the Randian distinction. 5) Now, someone might object. Someone might argue that it is possible to define the notion of necessity involved in the Objectivists claim that the category of “metaphysical” facts are necessary without appeal to the modal notion of “could not have been otherwise”. For, one might argue, so it would seem, that these so-called “metaphysical” facts are necessary in the sense that they are made *inevitable* by the physical laws and initial conditions, perhaps going back all the way to….forever? 5.1) But in what sense are these facts *inevitable* and how do the physical laws together with the initial conditions *make* them so? We have to be careful here of not anthropomorphizing physical laws and turn them into intentional agents that make things happen. Well, we can perhaps say that these facts are "made" inevitable in the sense that given the laws and the initial conditions, they *must* occur. But, what is meant by the claim that these facts *must occur*? That the world *could not have but* contained these facts given these laws and these initial conditions? This, of course, introduces once again the Modal concept of “could not have been otherwise”, except this time it is introduced in order to explicate the additional loop of inevitability. 5.2) Someone might retort as follows: a certain fact is made inevitable by the laws together with the initial conditions in the sense that its truth is guaranteed by the laws and the initial conditions. Of course, this will not do. First, propositions are true, not facts. Second, what do we mean when we say that the occurrence of a fact is *guaranteed* by the laws and initial conditions? This account suffers from the same problems as the “inevitability-account” we have encountered previously featured and a few more to boot. 5.3) Someone might finally argue that what is meant here is that a given fact is necessary in the sense that the truth of the proposition describing this fact follows from statements of the laws and initial conditions. But “follows” in what sense? I presume the only adequate answer here is that it “logically follows”. Good! But, now, why can we explicate the notion that a given fact is necessary in terms of logical entailment; i.e., in terms of a proposition describing this fact being logically entailed by the laws and initial conditions? The answer is this: because if the proposition in question is logically entailed by the laws and initial conditions and the later are true, then the proposition describing this fact *must* be true as well. That is, under such circumstances this proposition *could not be false*. But, now, once again we encounter a version of the Modal concept of *could not be otherwise (false)*. 5.4) The above objections simply do not succeed to dispense with the Modal distinction; they cannot replace it; and they cannot show that it is not conceptually prior to any distinction they propose. 5.5) And if the Modal-distinction is conceptually prior, more fundamental, and presupposed by the Randian distinction, then the scope of the Modal distinction is determined on its own grounds rather than dictated by the Randian distinction it is used to explicate. 6) Hence, Thesis B is false.

Further wrinkles... First, my above mentioned Point #2: In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a material/physical/non-mental existent that is a visible, audible, and/or tangible word). Here, I would like to add another confusion. Are we to understand from this that the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. In other words, should we understand that the enormous sum integrated by a concept, but NOT the concept itself, has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. In this case, the enormous integrated sum takes the form of a perceptual concrete and then, later, the concept itself is denoted by a word. Strange indeed. Second, my above mentioned Point #1 & #4: Point #1 says: the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity. Point #4 says: words transform concepts into (mental) entities. Again, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity. Once more, in this first instance, we have a non-mental entity that "contains" a mental entity. Is this equivalent to saying that a mental nothing contains a mental something? Or, should we understand that some unspecified material entity — material entities being non-mental entities, contains a mental entity? Stranger yet, should we go so far as to understand that some unspecified non-entity/non-existent — non-entities/non-existents being in fact non-mental entities, contains a mental entity? Nothing contains something? What are we to make of this shambolic account of concepts and words?

I realize that surely this is a dead horse by now; nonetheless, my own compulsiveness requires that I mention this. Apparently due to my lack of diligence and thorough reading, I missed this passage from the ITOE which I would now like to present: The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required). _________In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. (Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities in a conceptual method of cognition. Observe that even proper names, in advanced civilizations, follow the definitional principles of genus and differentia: e.g., John Smith, with “Smith” serving as genus and “John” as differentia— or New York, U.S.A.) Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. (Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate sounds.) Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 10-11). Plume. Obviously, this passage clearly refutes my earlier position — implied or otherwise, that Rand never formally and explicitly mentions that concepts and words have a specific type of relationship until page 19 of the ITOE. It is worth noting that the above passage still retains a lack of clarity with regard to concepts and words. It is only after page 19 (additionally supplemented by conversations in the appendix) that things become somewhat clearer (i.e. — concepts do not exist in the mind of an individual until there is a word associated with/that denotes that concept in the mind of that individual). From this passage, we may gather the following: The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought... In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a material/physical/non-mental existent that is a visible, audible, and/or tangible word) Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes Words transform concepts into (mental) entities This passage, for me, really exemplifies some of Rand's confusing writing style. If we just look at what she actually says, it is not at all clear what she is actually trying to say. I suppose that this is why this forum is so helpful — it helps clarify one's own thinking, as well as Rand's actual meaning. From point #1, we can understand that the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity. From point #2, we can understand that, generally, a concept can only be used as a single unit if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. More specifically, we can understand that the enormous sum integrated by a concept can only be used as a single unit if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. Let's pause here for a moment. For the sake of simplicity, let's use what I am designating as the general point #2 (i.e. — a concept can only be used as a single unit if...) in order to elucidate what is being said. Here, we can extract more clarity from the above statement if we substitute the definition of unit for the word unit, so that the statement reads: We can understand that, generally, a concept can only be used as a single existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members if it is given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete (i.e. — a visible, audible, and/or tangible word). Why is this significant? It is because if, generally, a concept is NOT given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, then it CANNOT be used as a single unit. In such a case, this merely means that a concept CANNOT be used as a single existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. Thus, we can understand that as long as a concept is not regarded as an unique member of a kind/group, then there is no need for it to be given the form of a perceptual concrete. From this position, it is indeed possible for there to be any number of primary/first level concepts that utterly and completely lack the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete. This is because these primary/first level concepts are not mental integrations of two or more concept-units... Instead, they are mental integrations of two or more material-existent-units. A similar case may be made with regard to specific point #2 (i.e. — the enormous sum integrated by a concept can only be used as a single unit if...). I will leave it up to the reader to formulate that argument on their own — they should be careful to follow the same argument form as the one outlined above. From point #3, we can understand that language converts concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Her use of the word, “converts,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental equivalents of concretes until such a time that a word converts that concept into the mental equivalent of a concrete. There is the explicit intimation that concepts exist prior to being denoted by a word and independently of whether or not they are actually denoted by a word. From point #4, we can understand that words transform concepts into (mental) entities. Again, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity. There is, once more, the explicit intimation that concepts exist prior to being denoted by a word and independently of whether or not they are actually denoted by a word. I would like to take this moment to pause again and draw our attention to what was said in point #1 and then, here, in point #4. Point #1 says: the integration involved in a concept blends units into a single, new mental entity. Point #4 says: words transform concepts into (mental) entities. For me, this is a confusing quasi-repetition. Thus, we have a case where a concept "contains" a single mental entity (i.e. — the blended units), and yet is not itself a mental entity until a word transforms it into one. In this first case, we have a non-mental entity that "contains" a mental entity. Subsequently, at the point when a concept is transformed into a mental entity, it also becomes partially constituted by and/or "contains" another mental entity. Thus, in this second case, we have one mental entity that "contains" another mental entity — perhaps this, in itself, is not actually so bizarre. What seems most bizarre for me is that the integration involved in a concept can blend units into a mental entity while the concept itself remains, at that time, a non-mental entity. It all feels a little arbitrary and/or confused on the part of Rand and can be somewhat confusing, to say the least, to try to untangle. In closing, I would like to add that there is certainly a charitable way to understand the above passage from Rand — a way that I did not attempt, as I was more focused on the specific meaning of what Rand was actually saying. I also want to emphasize that I am not against there being a charitable presentation of her ideas and would, in fact, prefer to understand the most charitable interpretations of Rand. Thus, more than likely and without giving it too much thought, I would probably defer to Plasmatic's interpretation which demarcates the pre-conceptual from the conceptual. Nonetheless, it concerns me that Rand's presentation of her own ideas seem to be so lacking in clarity themselves.

Personally, I don't read it exactly in that way. She has already suggested that there is a wordless process immediately prior to and immediately following that quote. As for when she says, "if the process were identified in words," I read the "if" statement as a conditional statement where the if-clause indicates that there is a condition that is, in theory, possible to fulfill. The fact that it suggests possible fulfillment in theory does not entail that its fulfillment is necessary. I understand the quote as being there merely to serve as an example to illustrate and somewhat clarify the meaning of the wordless process. Remember, in the text, she has so far said nothing in a formal way to indicate that a concept's existence is dependent upon being denoted by a word or that that is what we should understand from that quote. I could certainly be wrong in my reading of this passage, but this is how I understand it. Also, look at the line just before the one that you quoted: "In order to form the concept 'length,' the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following..." Again, that line suggests that the child’s mind retains the attribute [common to multiple existents] and omits [the] particular measurements [of those multiple existents] in order to form the concept "length." In other words, it is not entirely clear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. Now, as for when you say: "'I shall identify as 'length,'" indicates an explicit identification, which would be a word." I think that you might be right. Maybe, in this case, "length" refers to the word and not just the attribute. Thank you for catching that and pointing it out, I definitely overlooked it. I will need more time to really think about it. Thanks again — it is an excellent point!

Plasmatic, I think you must be right. Being charitable with Rand, I would tend to agree that what is being described is, as you say, the "'pre-conceptual' stage of the 'implicit concept.'" However, this reading is itself still problematic, as we have to recognize that she is explicitly discussing the process of concept formation and referencing “concepts” specifically. Moreover, if we take into account her overall epistemological project, then we are forced to accept that an “implicit concept” is not in any way, nor can it ever be a “concept.” An “implicit concept,” epistemologically, is not a subtype of “concept.” Rather, it is in a separate category altogether from that of a “concept” — whatever is one is necessarily not the other. Eioul, for me, the quote I provided is enough context. In the ITOE, she doesn't mention anything else especially pertinent related to that particular quote. I guess I just don't know how much context you want/need — the whole chapter, the whole book, her whole oeuvre, etc. Also, if it is not enough, please feel free to quote other passages from the ITOE that better help to contextualize the passage that I quoted. It is always possible that I may have overlooked something. Thanks. Moreover, while I agree with Plasmatic about what Rand probably meant, the passage that I quoted still remains a little ambiguous and imprecise for me. Ambiguity and imprecision may have their place in certain types of writing; however, a book whose premise is to lay out the epistemological bedrock of a certain position would do better to not trade in such things as ambiguity and imprecision. Why do I say that it is ambiguous and imprecise? Let's refer back to what she says, imagining that we are reading her for the first time, while also including more context: I. First, two quotes that, more or less, immediately precede the main quote (found on pg. 11 of the ITOE 2nd Ed.): Rand says, “Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 10). Here, the only point that I would like to note is that she here seems to be marking words as different from concepts, in that I assume she here means that words are symbols that stand for concepts and are not actually the concepts themselves. Shortly thereafter, Rand says, “Words transform concepts into (mental) entities...” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 11). Again, the same sort of sentiment prevails, in that she again seems to be marking words as different from concepts. Repeating myself, I assume that she means that words are symbols that stand for concepts and are not actually concepts themselves. Furthermore, her use of the word, “transform,” indicates that concepts exist in some unspecified way as (bizarrely) non-mental entities until such a time that a word transforms that concept into a mental entity. Thus, there is the explicit intimation that concepts exist independently of whether or not they are denoted by a word. I am hoping that we are all in agreement. As far as I can tell, I don’t think that I am stretching or twisting her meaning in any way and certainly don’t mean to be if I am. Also, if you need more context, then please refer to the text yourself. II. Second, from the main quote (p. 11), she says, "Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically) — for instance, the concept 'length.'" This is the first sentence of that paragraph. As a reader, I would expect the first sentence of a paragraph to briefly identify what the content of the paragraph will be, as well as the possible direction of the ensuing content. It should foreshadow what is to come. Thus, I understand this to mean that she will discuss "The Process of Forming the Simplest Concept." The concept-formation-process that will be discussed is the process of forming the concept of a single attribute — "length." So far, so good. I hope. I don't think that I have read this in a bizarre way. I think that, so far, I have just repeated what she said and what she meant. III. Third, she says, “In order to form the concept ‘length,’ the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements” (p. 11). Within the context of the book, imagining that we are reading her for the first time, this sentence is somewhat problematic. Its facile brevity suggests that a concept is merely formed after “the child’s mind retains the attribute [common to multiple existents] and omits [the] particular measurements [of those multiple existents].” She has already suggested that words and concepts are different from each other without making it clear whether or not they are actually independent of each other. Here, she continues in that vein by suggesting that a concept can be formed without being denoted by a word. In other words, in the text thus far, she has yet to make it clear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. Thus, how are we to know, as first-time readers, that a concept’s existence is, in fact, dependent upon being connected with a word? The answer: We can know only retroactively. IV. Fourth, she says: "if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: ‘Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.’ ___The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept “length” by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street" (p. 11). At this point, she has described the child's process of forming a concept. She then refers to "the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly." What is "the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly." I take it to refer to the fact that the child does not think in words since he has “no knowledge of words.” In the last sentence, she then mentions, "the principle which his mind follows." What is this “principle” that she is referring to? I take it to also refer to the fact that the child does not think in words since he has “no knowledge of words.” Then later, in the last sentence, she says, “he uses it to identify the attribute.” What is this “it” that she is referring to? I take it to refer to the aforementioned, “mind.” Hopefully, we are all in agreement up to this point. Again, I don't think that I have read this in a bizarre way and I still think that I have just repeated what she said and what she meant; though certainly, there is room for interpretation. Now, another iteration of the problem: The problem for me is when she says, “when, having grasped the concept ‘length’ by observing the three objects...” For me, this phrase — situated in the context of this sentence, paragraph, and chapter, suggests several things: It suggests that grasping the concept “length” is done merely in dependence upon observing that those three objects share a common attribute — “length,” and not additionally in dependence upon and in conjunction with apprehending the word, “length” — the word that stands for that common attribute. This is thus an echo of the third (i.e. — III) quote that I mentioned. It is again, as of yet in the text, unclear whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. All that we may surmise thus far is that for the child 1) grasping the concept “length” occurs prior to his identifying the attribute of length in existents that are different from the original “three objects,” and 2) that his mind follows the principle of not thinking in words, since he has “no knowledge of words,” in order “to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street." Thus, we might reread/re-imagine the sentence as, “After having grasped the concept ‘length’ by observing the three objects, his mind — having no knowledge of words, follows the principle of not thinking in words in order “to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street." The quote from this last section (i.e. — Section IV), as well as its re-imagining, again, gives no indication whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being connected with a word. In fact, it suggests that a concept may be formed, then actually exist, and then be grasped by a child with no knowledge of words. For obvious reasons, this is quite problematic when compared to Rand's other perspectives on what constitutes a concept. V. Moving forward some, Rand later says: “The process of forming a concept is not complete until its constituent units have been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word” (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 19). This is the first mention in the ITOE that the process of forming a concept is not complete until it has been connected to a specific word. It is really worth noting that this sentiment is not expressed until several pages after the quotes from Sections I-IV and that this sentiment may or may not plant a seed in the minds of first time readers, thereby leaving the trace of a lingering confusion. It is only after reading this quote that the reader can go back and try to guess at her previous meaning. VI. Then, moving forward to "Ch. 5 — Definitions," she says several things that I would like to point out: "A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept" (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 40). "As an example, let us trace the development of the concept 'man.' ___On the pre-verbal level of awareness, when a child first learns to differentiate men from the rest of his perceptual field, he observes distinguishing characteristics which, if translated into words, would amount to a definition such as: 'A thing that moves and makes sounds.' Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition: man, in fact, does move and make sounds, and this distinguishes him from the inanimate objects around him..." (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 43). "...The specific steps given in this example are not necessarily the literal steps of the conceptual development of every man, there may be many more steps (or fewer), they may not be as clearly and consciously delimited — but this is the pattern of development which most concepts and definitions undergo in a man’s mind with the growth of his knowledge" (Rand. ITOE: Expanded Second Edition, p. 45). If needed, please refer to ITOE, p. 40 & 43-45, or ITOE, Ch. 5 — Definitions, for the full context. So, what is significant here? It is that here, we are talking about concept development in relation to a concept’s definition and not concept formation. In this case, concept development in relation to a concept’s definition entails the existence of the concept in question. Here, the concept exists. Generally speaking, she says that refinement of the defining characteristic(s) is, “the pattern of development which most concepts and definitions undergo in a man’s mind.” Curiously, Rand offers as an example of one such concept, that of the concept, “man,” wordlessly grasped by a child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness.” Can we be certain that a child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness” is actually, wordlessly grasping the concept, "man?" Yes, we can be certain because she says of this child with a “pre-verbal level of awareness” that, "Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition." Definitions entail the actual existence of concepts. Thus, we can formally, for the first time, conclude that concepts, in this case, can exist without being denoted by any word whatsoever. Thus, from a much more charitable perspective, we again have a case where Rand suggests that a concept can be formed and exist in a wordless mental space and without actually being denoted by a word. We are left once more with the impression that words and concepts are different from each other without clearly knowing whether or not a concept’s existence is dependent upon being denoted by a word, though it certainly feels like a concept exists independent of whether or not it is denoted by a word. VII. These are the most salient examples that I have found thus far that illustrate Rand’s vacillation about what the necessary constituents of a concept are. Her official position, especially when pressed for an explanation, being: Position #1: Concepts must consist of a word/be named by a word/be denoted by a word in order to be considered a concept that exists. Her unofficial/subconscious position being: Position #2: Concepts do NOT need to consist of a word/be named by a word/be denoted by a word in order to be considered a concept that exists (i.e. — concepts may be wordlessly grasped by a person with a pre-verbal level of awareness). At the very least, I am arguing that her writing about concepts lacks the precision that one would expect of an author laying out their "rationally-oriented" epistemological position. On the one hand, she suggests, implies, or actually indicates that Position #2 is really true. On the other hand, one could say that she regularly omits information about what the necessary constituents of a concept are at certain key junctures. Moreover, trying to be somewhat more charitable, she also seems to fluidly blend her perspectives on what constitutes a concept and what constitutes the pre-conceptual level of implicit concepts. She does this when such should not be the case as the two are actually mutually exclusive according to (at least some of) her own descriptions. She does this categorical blending so much that, at times, it is very far from obvious when she is talking about one and not the other. I am not saying that she unequivocally contradicts herself, though I tend to think that she actually does. Rather, I want to emphasize that her writing traffics in ambiguity and even, perhaps, a degree of subconscious vacillation about what actually constitutes a concept. These sorts of things have no place in a decidedly formal "philosophical" setting.

Rand says: "Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically)— for instance, the concept “length.” If a child considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept “length,” the child’s mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: “Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as ‘length’ that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity.” The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows, when, having grasped the concept “length” by observing the three objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street." Rand, Ayn (1990-04-26). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology: Expanded Second Edition (p. 11). How do we square this passage with my earlier quotes from her where she said that a concept must have a word to be considered a concept. She seems to have two positions: Concepts must consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see her previous quotes that I posted earlier) Concepts do NOT need to consist of a word/be named by a word in order to be considered a concept. (see the above quote)

I would argue that your inability to critically engage with the consequences of your own position, as well as your refusal to thoughtfully read through what I have actually said, is a better basis for you to not continue the debate.

Thanks Plasmatic. This is the section that I have been largely drawing from in my interpretation of the Objectivist "concept."

I mean to say that I am not arguing that words are completely identical to concepts.

1. "Your idea of something is not the thing itself." I assume that you mean that no mental existents are ever physical existents and that this is always true whether or not a particular mental existent denotes a particular physical existent. If this is true, I accept. 2.1 "A concept is not its definition." Superficially, I accept. Using your definition of concept, I never said that a concept is its definition. Instead, I said that whatever is a concept is necessarily a mental integration of existents and vice versa. For example, if the subject, [X], is a concept, then it follows that the subject, [X], is also a mental integration of existents. I never said the subject, [CONCEPT], is a mental integration of existents. 2.2 "So, just [because] concepts are mental integrations, does not mean that every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept." This just seems like an equivocation. I never said that "every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept." Instead, I again said that whatever is a mental integration of existents is necessarily a concept and vice versa. Also, if something [X] is a mental state that might be described as an integration actually is a mental integration of existents, then it is a concept. If it is not a mental integration of existents, then it is not a concept. 3. "A concept integrates things external to itself." This seems too vague for me and just seems to repeat your point #1. Integrates in what sense? Do you mean telekinesis? Does a concept integrate two physically existent rocks into one physically existent rock? Does this mean that your new definition of concept is [THE MENTAL INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL EXISTENTS] If so, then it follows that you can't have a concept about two or more concepts because a concept is a mental existent and not a physical existent. 4. "You appear to actually be arguing for words being completely identical to concepts. Is this correct? If so, this is a different metaphysical position as well as an epistemological one, because I see words as "out there" and concepts as 'in here.'" I am not arguing that words = concepts. I am merely trying to argue, successfully or not, from the perspective of what is entailed by Objectivist epistemology. Personally, I do not accept Objectivist epistemology. I am also arguing using logical consequences of your own position. In other words, I am trying to get you to see that what you say logically commits you to saying things that you don't want to say. It is a method of argumentation that gets you to contradict yourself, thus revealing error in reasoning. For example, if words are "out there" and concepts are "in here," then it follows that you cannot think of a word as that would mean that a word was "in here."

Also, if it is possible for you to mentally integrate the components of a pizza (crust, sauce, cheese), then it follows that pizza is a concept. This is according to your own definition of what a concept is. If a concept does not integrate its components, then what does it integrate exactly?

Also, what existents are there that are being integrated into the concept of the word [CUP], if not the mental existents — the letters [C], , & [P]? NOTE: I said concept of the word, not the word.